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Abstract 
This study examines labour relations in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1987, and 
finds that the government had a major impact on reforming labour relations. 
This interpretation differs from accounts presented in literature. Most writers 
assume employers are exploitative, and depict the government as acting on 
behalf of capital to control workers and ensure peaceful capitalist 
accumulation. It is argued that this view is one-sided, and a more balanced 
view of labour relations is provided by examining national labour policy and 
labour relations in three prominent organisations. This account suggests 
that government labour policy was to promote workers' interests while taking 
into consideration the need for national economic growth to enable 
employment and welfare services to be expanded. In an effort to balance 
workers' and national interests, the government pursued a corporatist 
strategy which involved the monopolisation of trade union representation, 
and control over unions to enforce government labour policy. A 
disaggregated view of "capital" is required which recognises that different 
management or organisational cultures exist. Thus, while some employers 
in Zimbabwe are exploitative and maintain racist management practices, 
others have gradually reformed their labour practices and have advanced 
black employees. In some cases this reform process has proceeded quite 
rapidly. The government's policies to protect and promote workers' interests 
provided the major stimulus for this reform of labour relations within 
enterprises. 
IV 
The time is past for guns and killings and massacres. We 
have to be cunning like the business people, there's more 
money in it and it's better for our children and our 
grandchildren. 
- Don Corleone 
Mario Puzo, The Godfather 969). 
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Names and Units 
In 1982 many places, towns and cities in Zimbabwe were renamed, for 
example: 
Pre-1982 Post-1982 
Fort Victoria Masvingo 
Gatooma Kadoma 
Gwelo Gweru 
Que Que Kwekwe 
Salisbury Harare 
Umtali Mutare 
Wankie Hwange 
The name in use at the time is used. 
In 1984 the Ministry of Labour and Social Services was expanded and 
renamed the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare. 
The Department of Industrial Relations within the Ministry of Labour, 
Manpower Planning and Social Welfare was renamed the Department of 
Labour Relations following the promulgation of the Labour Relations Act in 
1985. 
The Department of Industrial (or Labour) Relations was almost never 
referred to in common usage; instead "Ministry of Labour" was used, and 
this usage is adopted in this study. 
The exchange rates for the Zimbabwe dollar and US dollar were as follows: 
Year US $ 
1980 1.59 
1981 1.39 
1982 1.09 
1983 0.90 
1984 0.67 
1985 0.61 
Source: Ministry of Finance (1986: 187). 
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Introduction 
In March 1980 the Mugabe Government was elected to office in Zimbabwe 
amidst jubilation and optimism on the part of many black workers and 
peasants, and shock and loathing on the part of many employers and 
members of the white community. Prime Minister-elect Robert Gabriel 
Mugabe announced that the time for fighting was over, and his government 
would adopt a policy of reconciliation between blacks and whites. During 
the liberation war Mugabe's party, the Zimbabwe African National Union 
(Patriotic Front) {ZANU(PF)), had pledged to overthrow capitalism and 
pursue "revolutionary socialism". At independence the new government's 
policies toward private enterprise were unclear, but wholesale nationalisation 
of industry was ruled out by Mugabe. The government's stance in relation 
to capitalism has never been made clear, but it emerged that Zimbabwe 
would seek a middle way between capitalist expansion as in Singapore and 
South Korea, and socialist revolution, as in Angola and Mozambique. A 
gradual transition to socialism was envisaged. Within such a strategy, the 
Government argued, two main goals could be pursued simultaneously: rapid 
economic expansion and the social development of the disadvantaged black 
population. These two objectives were embodied in the government's first 
major economic policy statement after independence entitled Growth With 
Equity. 
Government labour relations policy in Zimbabwe since independence has 
been underpinned by the search for a balance between these goals of 
growth and equity. Workers' interests have been promoted in the context of 
achieving government's national development objectives. Government 
sought to benefit workers by ending discrimination, increasing low incomes 
and reducing the differential between low and high income-earners. 
However, the implementation of these policies was moderated in accordance 
with government's broader development goals of increasing economic growth 
in order to generate employment and expand health, education and welfare 
services for the overwhelmingly poor black population, in pursuing these 
policies government has had a major impact on the conduct of national 
labour relations, and analysis of the effect of government policy on national 
labour relations is the central concern in this study. Government labour 
policy has also influenced labour relations at organisation level, and this 
impact is also examined in detail. 
The Mugabe Government presented itself as the champion of workers' 
interests. In 1977, ZANU(PF) adopted the "Marxist-Leninist line" as its 
guiding ideology, and the party resolved to bring about "the victory of 
socialism over capitalism" {ZANU(PF) Election Manifesto 1985: 7). The 
liberation struggle was primarily peasant - not proletarian - based; 
nonetheless, there was a commitment to forging a worker and peasant 
alliance and improving the position of workers. Following independence the 
government pledged to benefit workers through policies which were intended 
to end discrimination in the workplace, raise workers' living standards, 
narrow the income gap between low and high income-earners, and generate 
employment growth (Republic of Zimbabwe, Growth With Equity, 1981). in 
order to implement these policies the Mugabe Government removed 
discriminatory legislation (e.g., via the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 
of 1981) and decreed that the promotion of blacks in the public service 
would be accelerated. In media reports government also stated that it 
expected private enterprise to end discrimination and promote blacks "to 
managerial levels" {l-lerald 13/9/80, reporting a speech by Prime Minister 
Robert Mugabe). Minimum wage legislation was introduced in order to 
increase workers' living standards, and government controlled income 
increases in an effort to reduce the income gap. 
The realisation of a need to weigh workers' interests against government's 
national goals became evident in the government's reaction to widespread 
strikes that occurred in 1980 and 1981. At first the government sympathised 
with black workers' demands and pent-up frustrations, but appealed to 
strikers to return to work so that goods and services could be provided to 
the country. When strikes continued, and national production was 
hampered, government reaction became stronger and strikers were ordered 
to desist. Eventually strikes were broken by police using force to arrest 
strikers. The government explained its opposition to the strikes in terms of 
the harm they caused to economic development. It further argued that 
chaos in the economy would retard national recovery after the civil war, and 
jeopardise the security of the majority rule government. If the majority rule 
government was rendered incapable of governing, then this would in turn 
jeopardise the attainment of goals for which the independence war had been 
fought, such as land reform, employment generation and an end to racial 
discrimination. Workers' claims had therefore to be considered in the light of 
these broader national interests. 
Balancing workers' interests and government's national development goals 
became a constant feature underlying state labour policy from independence 
until today. In this respect Zimbabwe is strikingly similar to countries such 
as Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana and, to a lesser extent, Kenya. Government 
labour policy in Zambia, for example, included a heavy emphasis on worker 
discipline to achieve rapid economic development, together with elements of 
"social justice" to end racial discrimination in relation to wage disparities, 
black advancement and the use of facilities (Bates 1971: 27ff; Gertzel 1975). 
This similarity is of some moment since Zimbabwe had a very different 
experience in obtaining independence. By comparison with the 
aforementioned countries Zimbabwe's independence was gained after a 
much more bitter and protracted violent conflict, and the nationalist 
movement became increasingly radical and revolutionary. At independence 
the government seriously considered radical change in many spheres of life, 
and one option was to nationalise substantial parts of the economy such as 
the mining industry (Herbst 1987: 38). In other cases where protracted 
violent struggles for independence were experienced, such as Angola and 
Mozambique, extensive nationalisation of industry was effected after 
independence. But the Mugabe Government adopted a gradual, transitional 
road to socialism, and this meant labour policy was formulated and 
implemented in tandem with managing a capitalist economy. Economic 
growth was needed to finance social development policies such as 
expanded education, health and welfare services, as well as employment 
growth. State sector employment and spending expanded rapidly after 
independence, but this did not bring about a major increase in overall 
employment and economic activity (Hawkins 1987). Indeed, after the mini-
boom of 1980-81, real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined 
by 2.3% in 1981-82, and averaged only 1.1% real growth in the period 
1981-84 (Ministry of Finance 1986: 14). In part this stagnation was the 
result of severe drought and international recession; however, the 
government's economic policies (e.g., large wage increases; restrictions on 
foreign investment) did not encourage investment (Hawkins 1987). 
Gradually, policies were adopted in an attempt to create a favourable 
investment climate so that the private sector would play a role in economic 
growth and employment creation. An economic climate to encourage 
investment entailed the containment of wage increases and limitation of 
strikes. 
The Mugabe government's attempt to balance workers' interests with its 
national development goals can be identified as a corporatist strategy of 
structuring (corporatising) interest representation into single, officially 
recognised bodies that play a role in enforcing public policy (Schmitter 1974; 
Crouch 1984, 1985; Cawson 1986). In Western democracies monopoly 
interest groups, such as a central trade union congress, play an important 
role in formulating, implementing and enforcing public policy. For example, 
the union congress might negotiate a tripartite national wage increase, assist 
in interpreting the agreement, and enforce the agreement by rejecting 
industrial action and pressuring their membership into complying with the 
agreement. Chapter 3 shows that the Mugabe government's first step to 
regulate labour relations was to curtail industrial action and insist that 
disputes be settled within an institutional framework. The government 
ordered that trade union and employer organisations be organised into 
monopoly representative bodies, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU) and the Employers' Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ). In the 
case of trade unions, the government and ZANU(PF) ensured that the ZCTU 
leadership was supportive of government policy. 
In this respect Zimbabwe differs from Western democracies in which 
"societal" corporatism is based on pre-existing strong union movements 
which enforce negotiated agreements (Schmitter 1974). Zimbabwe's trade 
unions were comparatively weak, and government played a more decisive 
role in formulating and enforcing public policy, for example, by virtually 
prohibiting strikes. The ZCTU played an auxiliary role by refraining from 
recommending strike action and by urging workers to support government 
labour policies. This auxiliary enforcement role was nonetheless important, 
for without ZCTU support for government policy the government would have 
had much greater difficulty in presenting itself as the champion of workers' 
interests. Characterising the Mugabe Government's labour strategy as 
corporatist does not imply a coherent and deliberate policy; in practice, 
labour policy was developed in an ad hoc manner as government reacted to 
the changing circumstances and endeavoured to find a balance between 
workers' interests and national development goals. 
To date, writing on labour relations in Zimbabwe has been patchwork and 
many contributions have been polemical criticisms of government policy. 
Government repression of the post-independence strikes has received some 
attention (Callinicos 1981; Astrow 1983; Sachikonye 1986; Mitchell 1987), 
and trade unions have been examined by Wood (1987, 1988). Aspects of 
government labour policy such as the role of the Ministry of Labour (Nangati 
1984a and 1984b; Mitchell 1987) have received brief critiques. Only one 
detailed case study of labour relations in an organisation has been published 
(Cheater 1986). Very little attention has been given to important features of 
labour relations such as the Labour Relations Act (Sachikonye 1986) and 
workers' committees (Nangati 1984a; Cheater 1986). Moreover, these 
disparate writings provide a one-sided view of labour relations since they are 
presented from a radical perspective in which capital is presented as 
monolithic in the sense that all employers, usually including the state as an 
employer, are exploitative of workers. Similarly, the state is portrayed as an 
instrument that serves the interests of capital to subjugate workers. Thus 
Astrow asserts that: 
The ZANU(PF) Government recognised that the African working 
class, during the so-called national democratic revolution, 
represented one of the biggest potential threats to capitalist stability. 
Mugabe soon indicated the role he intended this class to play: 
In the private sector there is little we can do for now. 
We don't want to disrupt the economy. But of course 
we are interested in the role of the worker, in his being 
organised so that he becomes more effective as a 
producer. 
The ZANU(PF) Government is interested in organising the working 
class only as a means of increasing efficiency of industry and the 
profitability of capitalism (1983: 175, quoting Mugabe in the Sunday 
Times 13/4/80). 
This caricatures rather than characterises government labour policy. 
A detailed study of the practice of labour relations at both national and 
organisational levels produces a very different view. Firstly, state labour 
policy is found to be formulated and implemented with the aim of balancing 
the interests of labour and the government's national development goals 
(Chapters 3 and 4). Secondly, a disaggregated view of employment 
practices finds substantial variation among organisations; while some 
companies have persisted with racist and authoritarian management 
practices, others have embarked upon reform programmes to advance black 
employees and create a more cooperative relationship with black workers 
(Chapters 5 to 7). 
Chapter 1 provides a discussion of approaches to the study of labour 
relations and labour in organisations at the general level, and in relation to 
developing countries, especially in Africa. In this chapter the conceptual 
framework employed in this study is identified. For analysis of national 
labour relations in Zimbabwe key features of corporatism are identified as 
the monopolisation of interest representation, and the fusion of interest 
representation and enforcement of public policy. As ideal-types corporatism 
and pluralism differ in that the latter involves a plurality, not a state-licensed 
monopoly, of representative bodies, and while pluralism involves inputs into 
policy formulation it does not involve the policing of public policy, as does 
corporatism (Crouch 1985; Cawson 1986). One valid criticism of Schmitter's 
(1983) attempt to operationalise corporatism is that he is preoccupied with 
institutional factors (e.g., the degree of unionisation), and neglects dynamic 
features (e.g., relations between unions and government) (Almond 1983). 
This problem is avoided here by focusing in detail on relations between 
trade unions and the state. 
Some commentators have suggested that corporatist analysis can be applied 
to African countries (Shaw 1982; Higgott 1985), but these contributions are 
at a very general level and little empirical evidence is provided to justify the 
designation of African countries as "corporatist". Some liberal analysts of 
labour relations in developing countries are aware of the attempt by 
governments to restructure and control the union movement so that unions 
play a "productionist" role to promote worker discipline and exercise wage 
restraint in order to further economic development (Bates 1971; Friedland 
1974). However, these analyses do not present empirical material so as to 
identify coherently the monopolisation and fusion features of a corporatist 
labour strategy. 
For analysis of labour relations in organisations a perspective is adopted 
which sees workers and management as having fundamental conflicts of 
interests. This conflict perspective is modified to take into account the 
effects of management culture, leaders' values and internal differentiation 
within the management of organisations. It is argued that management 
culture can have a powerful impact on the conduct of labour relations, but 
that fundamental conflicts remain between management and workers. 
Chapter 2 provides the backdrop to labour relations in Zimbabwe by briefly 
examining periods in labour history, and the situation with regard to trade 
unions, employers and government at independence. Government's 
corporatist strategy is shown in areas other than labour relations, such as 
the concentration of interest representation with respect to political parties, 
women and youth. Interpretations of labour relations in Zimbabwe that have 
appeared in the literature are then reviewed. 
The evolution of national labour relations is charted in Chapters 3 and 4. 
This begins with the 1980 to 1982 wildcat strikes and government's reaction 
to curtail industrial action. As in most other independent African states the 
Zimbabwe government and ruling party, ZANU(PF), brought the union 
movement under the control of government and party to a substantial extent. 
The government corporatised the divided union movement into a single 
congress (the ZCTU) and, together with party supporters in the union 
movement, neutralised non-ZANU(PF) union leaders by removing them or 
creating rival "splinter" unions. The result was a trade union leadership that 
was sycophantic, willingly playing the corporatist role of supporting and 
enforcing government policy. This union leadership was corrupt and became 
discredited. It was replaced in 1985 by a leadership that was more willing 
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to criticise government policy; however, strike action remained effectively 
prohibited, and government supervision of trade union affairs ensured that 
union criticisms did not develop into an organised campaign against 
government labour policy (Chapter 3). 
In Chapter 4 government attempts to benefit workers are examined in 
relation to increasing real incomes and narrowing the income gap, 
generating employment, establishing labour relations machinery to protect 
workers and prevent industrial action, and involving workers and their 
representatives in decision-making on labour issues. The government 
endeavoured to improve workers' wages and work conditions, but it did not 
achieve the goals it set for itself. With respect to wages, for instance, 
despite the introduction of statutory minima, real minimum wages generally 
were not appreciably higher in 1987 than in 1980. This was primarily due to 
government's need to balance workers' interests against policies to prevent 
retrenchments and stimulate investment for economic growth. Government 
labour policy was ostensibly to strengthen trade unions and to promote 
workers' interests. But by attempting to regulate wages and have Ministry of 
Labour officials protect workers from unfair labour practices, government 
policy had the effect of perpetuating the historical weakness of trade unions, 
since little role was left for trade unions. Continuing union weakness 
reinforced the government's position that it, and not the union movement, 
should play the leading role in protecting and enhancing workers' interests. 
So the corporatist strategy that involved the subordination of unions to 
government was reinforced as government assumed functions that trade 
unions commonly undertake on behalf of workers, such as wage 
negotiations and protecting workers with respect to unfair dismissal. 
The case studies show that management employment practices in Zimbabwe 
are characterised by considerable diversity rather than the uniformity 
assumed by Astrow (1983), Nangati (1984a, 1984b, 1987) and Sachikonye 
(1987). The three organisations analysed were specifically chosen to 
exemplify this diversity. Chapter 5 on General Industries (a pseudonym) 
shows that racist and authoritarian management practices persist in some 
large companies in Zimbabwe. In this company management opposed 
workers' demands for the advancement of black employees and the reform 
of personnel and labour relations procedures and practices (e.g., discipline, 
job evaluation, selection, promotion, training). Contrary to Marxist views 
which focus on structural factors (e.g., class formation, market competition) 
to explain labour relations (e.g., Burawoy 1974, 1985), it is argued that 
management obstinacy was in large part a result of the management culture 
at General Industries, which was characterised by white Rhodesian values of 
racial superiority. Anglo American Corporation (Chapter 6) is an example of 
companies that have gradually reformed personnel procedures and promoted 
black employees. Anglo companies sought to place relations with black 
workers on a negotiated rather than confrontational basis. In part this was 
due to the needs of complex organisations to secure the cooperation of 
employees and not to rely on coercion. However, management culture also 
played a role in terms of the values that were fostered in the corporation by 
its founder. Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, which included a commitment to equal 
opportunity. Yet there was a clash of cultures within Anglo management 
with many white managers holding racist attitudes. In a parastatal 
organisation, the Dairy Marketing Board (Chapter 7), black advancement and 
the reform of personnel practices proceeded more rapidly than at Anglo 
American, and by 1985 most managers with racist attitudes had left the 
enterprise. The organisation faced severe external constraints, such as a 
lack of funds and government controls over terms of employment, but within 
these constraints management generally endeavoured to build a cooperative 
relationship with black workers. 
Links between national and organisational labour relations remain 
undeveloped in the literature. Studies generally focus on either the 
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organisational or extra-organisational level. Empirically, however, 
organisations are influenced by external features such as labour laws, the 
institutional labour relations framework (e.g., collective bargaining and 
dispute settlement mechanisms), and government policy. Industry and 
national level arrangements might be influenced by common organisational 
forces (e.g., in response to employers retrenching workers, government 
introduced restrictions on termination of employment). While the links 
between levels are indicated in the empirical chapters, the literature consists 
of two virtually separate bodies. Reconciling these two bodies of literature 
would involve a substantial theoretical project (see Woodiwiss 1987a and 
1987b), which is beyond the scope of this study. 
White workers are not specifically dealt with in this study. By the mid-1980s 
most white unions had either dissolved or were being amalgamated into 
black unions. A few white union leaders were still active in union affairs, 
notably in the railways, air transport and engineering industries, but in 
general black workers and their unions occupied the centre of the labour 
relations stage. There were no white members of the workers' committees 
in the three organisations studied. In general white workers showed little 
interest in workers' committees, and perceived them with some disdain as 
bodies concerned with black workers only. 
A core period of full-time research was undertaken in Zimbabwe from August 
1984 until July 1985. Further part-time fieldwork was carried out in 
Zimbabwe in the period May 1986 to April 1988, while the writer served as 
lecturer in the Department of Business Studies, University of Zimbabwe. 
The research for Chapters 3 and 4 on national labour relations involved a 
survey of Herald newspaper reports from 1980 to 1987. Over 200 
interviews were conducted with government, employer and trade union 
representatives. Observation of meetings and proceedings included trade 
union meetings and congresses, employer and worker negotiating bodies 
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(employment boards and councils), tripartite meetings and conferences, and 
the hearing of cases by Ministry of Labour officials. Access was obtained to 
some records held by trade unions, employers' associations and the Ministry 
of Labour. For Chapters 5, 6 and 7 countless interviews were conducted 
with managers, workers and their representatives. Management and 
workers' meetings were attended, including disciplinary hearings and 
meetings of employment boards, works councils, workers' committees and 
managers' meetings. Company documents were examined including 
disciplinary and wage records. Throughout the core research period I spent 
many days and sometimes weeks in the three organisations with general 
freedom to interview organisational members, observe the work process, the 
operation of the personnel departments and meetings between management 
and workers. In general information sought was made available, although 
the Ministry of Labour refused to provide information relating to the number 
of cases handled by the Ministry, staffing levels of labour relations officers, 
and data on wage levels for employment boards and councils after 1985. 
The names of many informants in the empirical chapters are not provided in 
order to comply with the wishes of individuals to remain anonymous. The 
three enterprises requested that individuals not be identified. The past tense 
is used in the empirical chapters in recognition that labour relations are 
dynamic and that the situation may have changed. In many respects, 
however, the scene described remains much the same in 1989. 
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Chapter 1 Approaches to Labour Relations 
Introduction 
In this chapter I identify a general conceptual framework for the analysis of 
corporatist labour relations strategy. This framework has two key features 
which characterise corporatist arrangements, namely, concentration of 
interest representation, and fusion of representative bodies with state policy 
implementation and enforcement. Under pluralism specific interests can be 
represented by a multiplicity of bodies, while under corporatist arrangements 
representation is concentrated to give a single organisation monopoly 
representation of specific interests. Similarly, pluralism involves interest 
organisations providing inputs into public policy, while under corporatism 
interest organisations are fused with the state in the sense that they also 
implement and enforce compliance with public policy within their membership 
(Crouch 1984, 1985; Cawson 1986). After setting out these general features 
of corporatism, corporatist strategies in developing countries are examined. 
I argue that while formulations of corporatism in Africa to date have been 
weak, the approach I have adopted, following Crouch (1984, 1985) and 
Cawson (1986), shows greater promise. The discussion then turns to 
organisations, and a conflict and control perspective is used as a starting 
point. This perspective sees conflict between management and workers as 
endemic within organisations. However, relations between workers and 
management are also influenced by management style and culture, and the 
policies and procedures administered by the personnel department. The 
conflict perspective therefore requires supplementation by concepts from 
conventional approaches to the study of organisations, namely, organisation 
culture, leadership style and departmental differentiation. 1 then show that 
this modified conflict view has relevance in African countries, since studies 
which rely on structural factors (e.g., class conflict, market competition) to 
explain labour relations (e.g., Burawoy 1974, 1985), overlook the important 
influences of organisational culture and management style in labour 
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relations. The structural conditions of organisations need to be appreciated, 
but careful analysis also calls for culture and leadership to be recognised. 
1.1 Labour Relations at the National Level 
Labour relations at both the national and organisational levels are examined 
in this thesis. Most other studies focus primarily on only one level. My 
purpose in this section is to identify a general conceptual framework that is 
suitable for analysis of national labour relations in Zimbabwe. The 
framework adopted is derived from Schmitter, Cawson and Crouch who 
elucidate structures and processes they see as corporatist, such as the 
concentration of interest representation into state-sanctioned groups which 
participate in policy implementation and enforcement. I also aim to show 
that neither mainstream nor Marxist approaches are suitable alternatives for 
present purposes. 
Analysis of labour relations can be undertaken at various levels such as 
workplace, organisation, industry, national or international. For convenience 
these levels are frequently dichotomised as organisational and extra-
organisational levels. Some mainstream perspectives (e.g., Dunlop 1958; 
Margerison 1969; Kochan, McKersie and Cappelli 1984; Poole 1986) provide 
for analysis at various levels, and a central tenet of Marxist approaches is to 
see work relations within the broader context of the social relations of 
production and state intervention (Allen 1971; Hyman 1975). While some 
presentations examine structures and processes at differing levels (Clegg 
1970, 1979), the traditional approach (e.g., Flanders and Clegg eds 1954; 
Flanders 1965) is "heavily oriented towards" analysis of institutional 
arrangements either within industries or nationally (Margerison 1969: 275). 
Dunlop, for example, states that the systems approach can be applied to 
various levels (1958: 23). In practice, he is mostly concerned with industry 
and national levels, and where the organisational level is addressed, the 
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focus is on rules rather than processes (1958: 18-23, 129-97). Many others 
almost exclusively focus on either organisational (Walker and Guest 1952; 
Whyte 1961; Stogdill 1965; Nichols and Beynon 1977; Harris 1987) or extra-
organisational levels (Chamberlain 1951; Flanders and Clegg 1954; Weber 
1961; Flanders 1965,1968; Levinson 1966; Herman, Kuhn and Seeber 
1987), making only passing reference to other levels. An examination of 
articles in prominent journals such as the British Journal of Industriai 
Relations, Industrial Relations and Human Relations supports this argument. 
In the current study emphasis is given to both organisational and national 
level labour relations. Following the approach taken by Schmitter (1974) 
and Cawson (1986), who see corporatism as a system of interest 
representation, I argue that national labour relations in Zimbabwe are 
characterised by a corporatist strategy. Various formulations of corporatism 
have been proposed which, for instance, see corporatism as a mode of 
production (see Panitch 1980: 159) or, as Winkler has it, "an economic 
system of private ownership and state control" guided by the principles of 
"unity, order, nationalism and success" (1976: 109, 103). These conceptions 
have been cogently criticised for presenting as an economic system what 
are more properly seen as political forms of interest representation, depicting 
the state as detached from class and the economy, and failing to distinguish 
corporatism from capitalism (Westergaard 1977; Panitch 1977, 1980). 
Schmitter's celebrated definition of corporatism provides a useful starting 
point. 
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest intermediation in 
which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not 
created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational 
monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports (1977: 9). 
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Corporatism differs from pluralism in which interest associations operate as 
"an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchically 
ordered and self-determined ... categories" that are not controlled by the 
state (Schmitter 1974: 96). Schmitter distinguishes between "societal" and 
"state" corporatism which Lehmbruch (1977) refers to as "liberal" and 
"authoritarian" corporatism. As an ideal-type, liberal corporatism implies that 
groups show a "high degree of cooperation" and they strongly influence the 
state (Lehmbruch 1979: 54), while authoritarian corporatism implies the state 
is unfettered by such influences and imposes a semblance of unity. 
Schmitter has been criticised for failing adequately to distinguish between 
societal corporatism and pluralism (Nedelmann and Meier 1977; Almond 
1983; Martin 1983), for neglecting analysis of class and the state (Panitch 
1980, 1981), and for problems in operationalising variables (Almond 1983; 
McBride 1985). Crouch (1983) and Cawson (1986), following Schmitter, 
largely overcome the first of these criticisms. Crouch argues that the key 
distinguishing characteristic of corporatism is the "discipline and control" 
which interest groups impose on their membership in the implementation of 
agreements, a feature absent in pluralism (1983: 454). For Crouch 
discipline and representation vary inversely and this relation provides the 
independent variable for the continuum of ideal-types ranging from 
authoritarian corporatism (all discipline), liberal or bargained corporatism 
(discipline and representation), pluralism (representation with voluntary 
restraint), and contestation (representation without compromise) (1983: 457-
8). Martin is only partially correct in arguing that the elevation of the 
"policing" role (Crouch 1983: 458) to be the exclusive defining element is too 
"restrictive" (1983b: 462). While Crouch emphasises discipline he also 
includes the representational role, as seen in the above definitions. 
Moreover, Martin's own defining elements are by the same token too general 
(e.g., "inter-group cooperation" 1983a: 89), and it is preferable to employ 
Schmitter's and Cawson's explication. 
16 
Cawson identifies three features that distinguish corporatism from pluralism 
as ideal-types, namely, "(1) the extent of competition in the group process; 
(2) the nature of the groups; and (3) their relationship to public authorities" 
(1986: 27). As ideal-types pluralism involves "a large number" (p.28) of 
competing groups while corporatism entails the monopolisation of 
representation. Pluralist groups are "voluntary associations of individuals" 
(p.29) whereas corporatism involves interest representation through 
compulsory groups. These two elements follow Schmitter's approach; 
however, Cawson more clearly argues that pluralism assumes an 
independent state (p.28) and a separation between interest representation 
(civil society) and policy implementation (the state) (p.29). In contrast, 
corporatism entails a "fusion" (p.39) between interest representation and the 
implementation of policies, since groups take on the role of enforcing 
policies. Thus Cawson proposes the following definition: 
Corporatism is a specific socio-political process in which 
organisations representing monopolistic functional interests engage in 
political exchange with state agencies over public policy outputs 
which involves those organisations in a role which combines interest 
representation and policy implementation through delegated self-
enforcement (1986: 38). 
Cawson, unlike Crouch, retains and develops Schmitter's notion of the 
monopolisation of interest representation as a fundamental component of 
corporatism, and encapsulates this in his major independent variable - "the 
degree of concentration in the structure of interest groups" (1986: 32). Like 
Crouch, he helps to clarify the control function of interest groups. Thus 
there are two important features, concentration and enforcement. Cawson 
and Crouch also improve Schmitter's framework by seeing corporatism as a 
"process" (Cawson 1986: 38) or "strategy" (Crouch 1977: 33), rather than as 
a "system" (Schmitter 1974: 93). Their approach has the benefit of 
stressing the dynamic and relational features in corporatism. 
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Crouch presents corporatism as "a strategy of domination" (1977: 33) which 
is "pursued by capitalism when it cannot adequately subordinate labour by 
preventing its combination and allowing market processes to work" (1979: 
19). Class is clearly portrayed as a key feature since the strategy involves 
capital's attempt to subordinate labour. Crouch's view that this strategy is 
pursued "by capitalism", however, needs qualification. Crouch himself 
argues that labour can benefit from corporatist arrangements, and concludes 
that bargained corporatism offers the "most attractive opportunities" for 
labour in Britain (1982b: 221). The point can be better made that, 
depending on the strength of classes and the degree of state corporatism, 
the strategy might be pursued as much by the state, or by labour as by 
capital. Cawson, for whom "[cjorporate groups in production represent class 
interests" (1986: 37), adopts a similar view of classes and the state: 
By contrast [with pluralism] the stress within corporatist writing has 
been on the growing interpenetration of the public and the private 
spheres. The crucial concept is that of public policy as the outcome 
of a bargaining process between state agencies and those organised 
interests whose power in the political marketplace means that their 
cooperation is indispensable if agreed policies are to be 
implemented. The state is not sufficiently powerful for officials to 
dictate policies and impose them unilaterally, but at the same time it 
is sufficiently powerful to resist capture by those interests (Cawson 
1986: 35, cf. Cawson and Saunders 1983: 16). 
It needs to be remembered that this describes societal corporatism, and the 
state is more powerful in cases closer to state corporatism where the state 
can capture groups and dictate policy (as in Zimbabwe). In all cases there 
is a dialectical relationship between the state and civil society. The state 
attempts to control to a greater or lesser extent the activities and affairs of 
both capital and labour, through representational structures, and through 
incomes, monetary and fiscal policies. At the same time, the extent of these 
controls is limited by pressures from capital and labour, so that the efficacy 
of the representational structures might be questioned by constituents and 
controls mediated, though usually more strongly by capital than by labour. 
Furthermore, the state should be seen in disaggregated form so that internal 
divergences can be recognised, particularly along functional lines. A 
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relevant example is the potential for conflict between labour and social 
welfare agencies on the one hand, and finance ministries on the other. 
Almond correctly, though inelegantly, points out that "Schmitter has not really 
properly operationalised his ... variables" (1983: 259). Schmitter (1981) used 
the degree of unionisation and the centralisation and unity of the union 
movement as a measure of corporatism. That is, higher union density, 
centralisation and unity indicate a greater degree of corporatism. Almond 
notes that to be in keeping with Schmitter's own approach Schmitter should 
have endeavoured to indicate the "kind of relationship and bargaining 
process" between unions and other interest groups and the state (1983: 
260). In the present study an attempt is made to avoid this problem by 
paying close attention to these relations. In this respect, Crouch's view of 
corporatism as a strategy is helpful in highlighting the dynamic features of 
corporatist arrangements. 
Corporatist notions are directly relevant to labour relations; as Cawson 
explains "the theory of corporatism has developed around studies of 
economic-corporate groups" (1986: 32) since their interactions with the state 
are a major feature of the polity. Crouch and others (Streeck 1981, 1982) 
have specifically focused on corporatist labour relations in Western European 
countries. In focusing on British industrial relations Crouch develops the 
notion of "bargained corporatism", between the ideal-types of voluntarist 
(societal) and statist corporatism (1977: 262). He argues that while British 
unions resisted pressures toward incorporation, there were "signs" that they 
"took advantage of the openings afforded by corporatism" (1977: 262). For 
example, unions might have accepted increased "involvement" between 
workers and capital as evidenced in the shift by some unions to support 
workers' participation, but unions "have completely and successfully resisted 
attempts to make them creatures of the state" (1977: 262-3). 
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Some scholars argue that corporatist analysis does not provide a useful 
framework for analysing labour relations. Dabscheck (1983), for example, 
perceives a number of difficulties in Crouch's formulation of bargained 
corporatism. Crouch inadequately defines "bargained corporatism" since he 
omits the role of employers from his definition (Dabscheck 1983: 501 note 
56; Crouch 1977: 262-3, 1982b: 212-3). Moreover, in his early and major 
work on industrial relations Crouch (1977) broadly followed Winkler's 
approach which has been soundly criticised (Panitch 1980). Another 
problem with Crouch's analysis is his search for corporatism in Britain 
where, even before the Thatcher Government's reversal of 1970's trends, 
there was relatively little corporatism (Schmitter's "[c]ombined ranking" places 
Britain 14th out of 15 liberal democracies 1983: 294). After summarising the 
partial trends towards corporatism Crouch himself states "it would be highly 
misleading to describe these developments as the successful triumph of 
corporatism" (1977: 257). 
Nonetheless, there are grounds for examining corporatist labour relations in 
Western democracies, especially in, for example, Austria. The chambers of 
trade unions and employers in Austria "are entitled to give their opinion on 
all government bills before they are submitted to parliament" (Lehmbruch 
1979: 57). There were occasions when the chambers drafted bills which 
would then be legislated by Parliament. The cartels law, for example, was 
"ratified without any change by the government and parliament" (1979: 57, 
cf. 1977: 115-20). Given this extent of participation in policy formation, it is 
inconceivable that these state-sanctioned groups were not deeply involved in 
policy implementation and supervision. Furthermore, careful analyses have 
revealed that corporatist arrangements might be stronger in some countries 
than the ostensibly pluralist structures would suggest. Streeck (1981, 1982) 
provides evidence that works councils in West Germany, which are generally 
perceived to facilitate pluralism, have commonly operated in close 
conjunction with trade unions. (It will be seen that Zimbabwe's workers' 
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committees do little to provide a pluralist alternative to corporatist 
arrangements.) While corporatist strategies are weakly developed in some 
countries (e.g., the US, see Salisbury 1979), where such strategies are well 
developed corporatist analysis constitutes a productive research programme. 
Alternative frameworks from liberal and Marxist perspectives do not provide 
a satisfactory account of corporatist labour relations strategy. Substantial 
divergences exist within orthodox approaches, and Farnham and Pimlott 
(1979, 1986) clearly portray these in their typology of unitary, industrial 
conflict (i.e. pluralist), systems, and social action approaches (cf. Blain and 
Gennard 1970; Schienstock 1981; Dabscheck 1983; Thomason 1984; 
Bamber and Lansbury 1987). In a unitary perspective conflict between 
employers and workers is considered to be illegitimate, since both parties 
are viewed as having basically shared goals of organisational effectiveness 
for survival and reward for its members. Unions are to be avoided since, as 
Knox's (1955) crude systems model has it, they disrupt relations between 
workers and management. A unitary perspective is a common management 
"frame of reference" and usually takes the form of either an authoritarian or 
paternalistic approach (see Fox 1966, 1973; Purcell 1983; Keenoy 1985). 
This approach is frequently discredited by writers on labour relations; 
however, some analysts, notably those from the US, suggest that certain 
enterprises have surpassed paternalism and have established harmonious 
employee relations as a result of careful attention to employees' 
requirements, thus obviating the need for trade unions (Foulkes 1980, 1981; 
Levering, Moskowitz and Katz 1984). 
The unitary view is rejected by pluralists who argue that conflict in labour 
relations is normal, indeed healthy, allowing parties to pursue their distinct 
interests (Fox 1966; Flanders 1970; Flanders ed. 1969; Clegg 1975; Barbash 
1984). Trade unions are an integral part of work relations, and collective 
bargaining and other agreed-upon institutional arrangements for rule-setting 
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are advocated. Contrary to Marxists, theorists such as Dahrendorf (1959) 
hold that sufficient reforms have occurred within capitalism, such as 
increased social mobility and mechanisms for negotiation and reform, to 
negate the need for revolutionary change. Critics such as Fox (1973, 
1974a, 1974b), who recanted his earlier attachment to pluralism, and others 
(e.g., Goldthorpe 1974) argue that this view is based on mistaken 
assumptions that (notwithstanding Clegg's (1975) claim to the contrary) there 
is an approximate balance of power among the actors, and that conflicts are 
not so severe as to threaten system survival. Fox (1973) argues that capital 
has predominant power over labour and, since bargaining agreements can 
be seen by workers to have been reached "under duress" (p.221), it is to be 
expected that workers will reject the legitimacy of the labour relations 
system. 
Systems theory is similar to pluralism in abjuring both unitary and radical 
perspectives. Dunlop's (1958) model represents labour relations as 
essentially a system of rule-setting which is characterised by three actors, 
employers, employees and government; three contexts, technological 
conditions, budgetary constraints and power relations; and an ideology 
sufficiently shared to enable system cohesion. This model, and Flanders' 
(1965) similar conception, has been criticised for presenting a static view as 
a result of a preoccupation with structure, conflict resolution and formal 
relations, to the neglect of processes, conflict generation and informal 
relations (Margerison 1969; Hyman 1975). Bain and Clegg (1974) and other 
scholars (e.g., Blain and Gennard 1970) have proposed modifications to the 
basic model to take account of these criticisms, but "most industrial relations 
research" remains confined to the formal rule-setting model (Winchester 
1983: 101). 
Rather than focusing on structures, as in systems theory, social action 
theorists stress the behavioural characteristics in labour negotiations and 
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examine the potential for parties to achieve their objectives within the 
institutional framework (Schienstock 1981). This gives rise to a 
preoccupation with the conduct of actors in collective bargaining, as seen in 
the work of Walton and McKersie (1965), and the choices taken by actors 
with reference to the meanings they attach to phenomena (Silverman 1970). 
Hyman argues this neglects structural forces since the actors themselves 
might be unconscious of the influence of structures, meanings are to an 
extent "socially generated", and objective conditions might prevent the 
realisation of actors' goals (1979: 72). 
From a radical perspective all these formulations are preoccupied with 
explaining, and in large part defending, the status quo. Marxist analyses 
(Allen 1971, 1975; Hyman 1972, 1974, 1975, 1978, 1980) hold that these 
views neglect both the underlying conflict between labour and capital, which 
is characterised by unequal power relations, and the interventionist role of 
the state. Hyman argues that this broad traditional approach has three 
basic assumptions: (1) actors are multiplicities of individuals, (2) there is an 
"empiricist conception of power", and (3) there is a narrow view of workers' 
interests, usually confined to economistic collective bargaining. These 
assumptions lead to a conservative view that the proper function in industrial 
relations is to chaperone peaceful capitalist production (1980: 40). 
While a Marxist theory of industrial relations has not been clearly articulated, 
the problematic is based on the notion of contradictions between capital and 
labour and this class conflict "underlies everything that occurs in industrial 
relations" (Hyman 1975: 23). Hyman notes that there are two essential 
tenets. 
The first is that capitalist social relations of production reflect and 
reproduce a structured antagonism of interests between capital and 
labour. The second is that capitalism simultaneously organises 
workers collectively ... and hence generates the material basis for 
effective resistance to capital .... What is conventionally studied as 
industrial relations may thus be conceived as a fetishised 
presentation of the class struggle and the various forms in which it is 
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(at least temporarily) contained, fragmented and routinised (1980: 
42). 
A major omission liere is that the role of the state is not specified. 
Dabscheck states that unlike systems and pluralist approaches, Marxism 
"has a well developed stance with respect to the state" (1983: 498) and he 
presents this as being the "committee for managing the common affairs of 
the whole bourgeoisie" (Marx and Engels 1948: 43). Dabscheck cogently 
criticises this notion, suggesting that the state does provide "concessions" to 
labour which amount to gradual social change, and that "capital is not 
homogeneous" and that fractions of capital are in competition for the 
concessions from the state (1983: 499). Yet as Hyman points out "[t]he 
relationship between state power and capitalist production is one of the most 
contentious issues in contemporary Marxist controversy" (1980: 49), and 
many Marxist formulations other than the Communist Manifesto view have 
been developed (see e.g., Miliband 1969; Poulantzas 1973, 1975; Offe 1975; 
Jessop 1977, 1982; Block 1980; Therborn 1980). 
The difficulty in using a Marxist approach is not that the heterogeneity of 
capital is not taken into account, as Dabscheck states. The major problem 
is in the conception of the state. O'Connor (1973), for example, specifically 
differentiates developed capitalism into the capitalist state sector and 
monopoly sector where relatively high unionisation and wage levels prevail, 
and the competitive sector of usually smaller organisations where 
unionisation and wage levels are relatively low. The residual sector of 
migrant labour, welfare recipients, housewives and so on provides an 
unorganised secondary labour market (Edwards et al 1975; Gordon et al 
1982; see Clegg and Dunkerley 1980: 542-9). These approaches are 
directly related to developed capitalist countries, and they might not prove 
germane for analysis of Zimbabwe where the government came into power 
following a war of liberation and professes to be ushering in a transition to 
socialism. When a Marxist conception is used exclusively then the exercise 
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becomes one of arguments as to whether or not particular state 
interventions should be seen as pro-labour or serving the long-term interests 
of capital, then weighing the perceived pro-labour state interventions against 
the perceived pro-capitalist interventions to reach an overall assessment as 
to whether a capitalist or socialist path is being taken. Marxists could argue 
that this question is not answered at the level of outcomes, but rather from 
a class analysis of society and the state (Swainson 1980). Yet again this 
involves unproductive debate over inter alia the role of the middle-class in 
the class struggle (e.g., Mallet 1975; Poulantzas 1975, 1977; Abercrombie 
and Urry 1983; Wright 1984, 1985). Moreover, as Hyman (1980: 50, 59 
notes 59 and 60) acknowledges, the relationships among labour, capital and 
the state have not been satisfactorily conceptualised and "the detailed 
elucidation of the multi-faceted relationship between state and 'industrial 
relations', receive only the most limited guidance from a generalised 
commitment to Marxist theory" (1980: 50). The approach adopted here, as 
noted above, is to see the state as an interventionist force in the conflict 
between capital and labour, and not as a neutral arbiter, nor dogmatically as 
a class-aligned actor. 
Summary 
This study, unlike many others, provides an examination of labour relations 
at organisational and national levels. With respect to the national level, a 
perspective is adopted that identifies corporatist strategies involving the 
concentration of interest representation into state-sanctioned groups, which 
are expected to implement and enforce agreements through their 
membership. The state is neither a neutral arbiter nor merely a captive of 
class forces; instead, its interventions are influenced by both capital and 
labour, and by its own internal divergences. The critics correctly note that 
Schmitter's attempt to operationalise corporatism has not adequately 
portrayed relations among interest groups and the state; however, this 
problem can be overcome by paying closer attention to the dynamic features 
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of corporatist arrangements. Against the critics it is argued that corporatism 
can be distinguished from pluralism, and that class is not a neglected 
concept. Mainstream industrial relations perspectives are criticised for a 
weak conception of the state and for focusing on rules and conflict 
resolution to the neglect of underlying causes of conflict. While it is invalid 
to reject Marxist conceptions for postulating a homogeneous capital, despite 
neo-Marxist refinements, the role of the state remains highly problematic in 
Marxism with interminable and, for present purposes, fruitless debates over 
the class nature of the state. Attention now turns to discussions of labour 
relations within developing countries. 
1.2 Labour Relations in Developing Countries 
Considerable attention has been paid to corporatist strategies in Latin 
America, and analysis of corporatism has been carried out in other 
developing countries (e.g., Singapore). Some writers suggest that 
corporatist analysis can be applied to African countries (Shaw 1982; Higgott 
1985). These treatments have a weak conception of corporatism, and they 
do not elucidate the structures and processes involved in corporatist 
arrangements. These problems can be overcome by adopting a coherent 
conception of corporatism, following Crouch (1984) and Cawson (1986), and 
applying this to detailed empirical analysis, as I do in this study. 
Many scholars from both liberal and radical perspectives provide evidence of 
corporatist labour strategies in Africa, including the restructuring of union 
movements and the establishment of government control over unions. But 
these writers do not order their material into a framework which sees the 
monopolisation of representation and the fusion of interest representation 
with the enforcement of government policy as characteristic of corporatist 
strategy. In addition, many liberal approaches understate the repressive role 
of the state and capital in labour relations. Marxist formulations, on the 
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other hand, over-emphasise class forces, leaving little room for factors such 
as ethnicity, and unrealistically assess reform of labour relations in terms of 
socialist transformation. 
An extensive literature exists which examines corporatist strategies in Third 
World countries, particularly in Latin America (e.g., Malloy ed. 1977; Stepan 
ed. 1973; Stepan 1978; Epstein 1979; Purcell 1981; see Cawson and 
Ballard 1984). Malloy (1977: 4) follows Schmitter's (1974) definition of 
corporatism and characterises countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico 
and Peru as having had strong, relatively autonomous states which have 
attempted to restrict interest articulation to vertically organised groups 
recognised by the state. O'Donnell (1977) links corporatist political 
structures to the economy and argues that under import-substituting 
industrialisation, populism was a common strategy for mobilising sectors of 
civil society for accumulation; consequently there was partial inclusion of 
groups within state structures and provision of certain benefits such as 
employment security and, in principle, the right to strike. The state sought 
to activate groups politically in a controlled direction, and supervised the 
recognition of unions, their finances and the selection of leaders. As the 
import-substitution stage matured and the economy experienced stagnation, 
balance of payments and foreign debt problems, populism proved inadequate 
to cope with the intensity of exploitation needed to reorient industry for the 
competitive export market. This created pressures for bureaucratic-
authoritarian corporatism in which the state sought to ensure order for 
accumulation by excluding groups, atomising, depoliticising and even 
"destroying ... class organisations" through open repression (O'Donnell 1977: 
69; Stepan 1978: 73-81; Collier 1979: 23-30; but see also Hirschman 1979; 
Serra 1979). 
This approach has been applied to other developing countries. Deyo (1981), 
for instance, concludes that Singapore's drive to enter export markets 
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entailed a state corporatist strategy to control the labour movement. A 
single national union centre was "created" by the government (p.42), and 
government and unions maintained a "very close relationship" (p.21). in the 
early 1970s, for example, seven government members of parliament were 
central committee members of the congress (pp.42-4). Wages and industrial 
action were held down to encourage foreign investment and growth but, as 
economic prosperity increased, there were pressures for concessions to 
labour to provide a motivated rather than coerced workforce. Wage 
increases averaged 20 percent in 1979-80 (Schregle 1982: 35) and 
inclusionary strategies for greater welfare provisions and participation were 
pursued. Deyo describes this as a "paternalistic mode ... of authoritarian 
corporatism" since while there was attention to the welfare of labour, close 
supervision of unions was maintained to facilitate smooth capital 
accumulation (Deyo 1981: 95). 
Shaw (1982) argues that corporatism has been adopted by African countries 
which are in early or middle stages of import-substitution. Table 1.1 
presents Shaw's categorisation of corporatism in Africa. 
Table 1.1 Shaw's Correlates of Corporatism In Africa 
Political economy: State capitalist State socialist Socialist 
Variety of corporatism: 
Strategy: 
Social base: 
Cases: 
Bureaucratic-
authoritarian 
Capitalist 
National 
bourgeoisie 
Ivory Coast 
Kenya 
Nigeria 
Populist 
Non-capitalist 
Bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie 
Algeria 
Somalia 
Tanzania 
Collectivist 
Socialist 
Proletariat 
and peasantry 
Ethiopia 
Mozambique 
Source: Shaw (1982: 258 Table 1). 
Here Shaw, following Collier (1979: 396-7), correctly steps outside 
O'Donnell's and Stepan's treatments, since they base their analyses on the 
transition from import substitution to export oriented industrialisation, which is 
at present not applicable to many African countries (e.g., Mozambique, 
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Somalia and Tanzania). However, Shaw does not explain the reasons for 
categorising the countries he lists apart from outlining the major features of 
the subtypes developed by O'Donnell and others on Latin America. Nor 
does he provide a rationale for his distinction between socialist and state-
socialist political economies to enable an assessment of, for example, his 
classification of Tanzania as state-socialist and Mozambique as socialist. 
Similar problems of substantiation mar Higgott's (1985) approach. Higgott 
plausibly suggests that 
the emergence of the kinds of centralised control typical of [state?] 
'corporatism' are [sic] in many ways the logical outcome of the 
inability of post-independence governments to satisfy the demands 
and expectations generated by the rhetoric of the decolonisation 
process. The inherited post-colonial state, with its pluralist structures 
was essentially incapable of dealing with the competing tendencies 
of populist legitimation on the one hand and the necessity for 
production and growth on the other. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that the imperatives of order and regime maintenance triumphed 
over the demands of the 'revolution of rising expectations' (1985: 
28) . 
The problem is that the discussion remains at a very general level. The 
"centralised control" measures and "pluralist structures" are not specified, 
and there is a tendency to sweeping statements: 
It does not seem unreasonable on the basis of the evidence 
available to expect the growth of, or perhaps more appropriately, the 
continuance in growth of a form of state-corporatism in which there 
is a strong tendency to ovencontrol at the political level and 
underconirol (in a relative sense) at the economic level (Higgott 
1985: 26). 
These propositions may be correct, but Higgott provides little evidence in 
support. Similarly, he cautiously suggests that O'Donnell's formulation of 
corporatism could be applied to "the contemporary African situation" (p.29), 
but detailed evidence or argument to substantiate this view is not provided. 
Instead military governments are discussed as partial exceptions, with the 
implicit assumption that corporatism applies elsewhere. In part this problem 
arises from discussing Africa in general, but Higgott's basic conception of 
corporatism is also questionable. He notes that corporatism is a framework 
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for political analysis and then says "[c]orporatism is also essentially an 
economic system" (p.26). Panitch (1980) has cogently criticised Winkler's 
(1976) notion that corporatism is an economic system. 
What is needed, in order to go beyond the superficial level provided by 
Shaw and Higgott, is close analysis of the structures and processes of 
African countries to justify their designation as corporatist. This would 
indicate to which subtype the country approximates, and specify the control 
measures and structures that have been introduced. Such an examination 
is provided in this work with respect to labour relations in Zimbabwe. 
The discussion now turns to a consideration of alternative approaches to 
labour relations in developing countries and indicate why these are not 
adequate. 
Without explicitly using the term "corporatism" many analysts, both liberal 
and Marxist, provide evidence of the two defining characteristics of 
corporatism, namely, concentration of interest representation and the 
implementation and supervision of policy by the incorporated groups. In 
many developing countries the populism associated with independence and 
the "revolution of rising expectations" was shortlived, and governments took 
steps to control trade unions and other groups such as opposition parties 
capable of mobilising support for alternatives to government policies. 
Common measures were to confer monopoly representation on a single 
trade union congress, and attempt to incorporate this body to accept, 
implement and assist in enforcing government policy. In countries tending 
toward the state corporatist model, however, enforcement was engineered 
more by the state than by self-enforcement. It is important to examine the 
experiences in other African countries since Zimbabwe has followed a very 
similar path. 
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From a liberal viewpoint, Lofchie and Rosberg indicate three broad 
categories of state control over unions: "relative autonomy", where a 
considerable "associational freedom" exists (e.g., Nigeria, Sierra Leone); 
"semi-control", where the state intervenes in union affairs such as choice of 
leadership and international affiliation (e.g., Kenya, Ivory Coast, Zambia); 
and "control", where unions are integrated into party or state machinery 
(e.g., Ghana, Mali, Tanzania) (1968: 10-13). Friedland (1968: 21) discusses 
unions that have been "captured" by African governments, and Gertzel 
(1979) provides detailed analysis of attempts by the state in Zambia to 
incorporate trade unions. The government and party took steps to unify the 
union movement by coopting leaders into government (Gertzel 1979: 321, 
326). Militant unionists were detained (p.348), and labour laws consistently 
"increased governmental control of trade union activity" (p.321). Despite 
these measures, the union movement in Zambia has remained one of the 
most autonomous in Africa (Friedland 1974: 580; Gertzel 1979). 
Many liberal critiques place incorporation strategies in the context of the 
widespread discussion of the developmental versus representational role of 
Third World trade unions. Zack, for instance, notes that after independence 
nationalist political leaders expected unions to transcend "mere 
representation" of workers and play a role in "national development" policy 
formation and implementation (1968: 95-6). According to liberal views this 
call for increased commitment to production was a result of politicians' 
primary concern with improving economic development and political stability 
(Lofchie and Rosberg 1968; Friedland 1968; Davies 1966; Huntington 1968). 
National leaders expected labour to forego industrial disruption such as 
strikes and "accept some austerity and sacrifice ... [in] the broad public 
interest" (Lofchie and Rosberg 1968: 7). Political leaders demanded 
restraint from workers, pointing out that wage earners commonly comprise 
what amounts to a relatively privileged five to ten percent of the 
economically active population (Zack 1968; Bean 1985), and that 
31 
government has responsibilities to the community as a whole. 
Consequently, numerous independent governments adopted strong measures 
to control the union movements. In Ghana under Nkrumah (Lynd 1968; 
Damachi 1974; Kraus 1979) and in Tanzania (Friedland 1968; Mihyo 1979), 
despite some resistance, the union movements virtually became wings of the 
ruling parties, with only one central congress permitted, strikes practically 
prohibited, and close controls over union policy, finances, and appointment 
of personnel. At one stage the Tanzanian Minister of Labour, Michael 
Kamaliza, was simultaneously leader of the central union congress (Lynd 
1968), while in Ghana a key objective in the 1958 constitution of the central 
congress was "to uphold the aims and aspirations of the Convention 
People's Party" (quoted in Ananaba 1979: 10). 
Radical writers have recorded similar features. 
In the post-colonial era the state has increasingly intervened to 
regulate relations between capital and labour: to enforce compulsory 
arbitration, outlaw strikes, detain leaders, monitor union organisation, 
impose wage freezes (Burawoy 1982: 124). 
The case of Nigeria is instructive, since for some years following 
independence in 1960 corporatist strategies were not strongly pursued. 
Many African countries opted for centralised statutory wage regulation, but in 
federal Nigeria "voluntarist principles" of collective bargaining prevailed, and 
the unions were not incorporated into government (R. Cohen 1974: 180). 
Indeed, from the 1940s the labour movement "has nearly always been 
divided into mutually hostile groupings" (p.70) with very diverse attitudes to 
and relations with government (pp. 103, 151-8). More recently van Hear 
(1988) provides evidence of strong and partially successful state corporatist 
pressures, especially from military governments. In 1976 attempts by the 
four rival union federations to merge were "stifled by the military 
government" which then created a single congress, the Nigeria Labour 
Congress (NLC), in an effort to "tame" the labour movement (van Hear 
1988: 146). The government reduced the several hundred fragmented 
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unions and associations to forty-two industry unions, interfered in their 
elections, and banned all but two international labour bodies. Nonetheless, 
largely as a result of their history of independence, trade unions elected 
Alhaji Sunmonu, a "communist", as president of the NLC and continued to 
challenge government pressures toward compliance, for example, by staging 
a general strike in 1981 which achieved considerable wage rises (van Hear 
1988: 146-7). As the recession and falling oil revenues took effect in the 
1980s, and the union movement did not fulfil the role of controlling its 
members, the state used force to break strikes in an effort to obtain 
compliance. In an ironic episode, which lends support to Crouch's view that 
corporatist arrangements may benefit labour, the government tried to 
promote a more compliant union faction by attempting, unsuccessfully, to 
repeal the laws which gave the NLC monopoly status (van Hear 1988: 148). 
Alongside controls independent governments frequently granted certain 
benefits to unions such as the closed shop, compulsory check-off 
arrangements and the right to organise and bargain collectively (e.g., on 
Zambia see Gertzel 1979). In part these were "trade-offs" (Bean 1985: 221) 
in an attempt to gain the support of unions to fulfil the corporatist 
enforcement role. Partly also, as harbingers of independence the political 
leaders portrayed themselves as the true representatives of popular 
interests. The concentration of union representation was claimed to be in 
the interests of strengthening the labour movement, and the concessions 
provided evidence to support these claims. However, the closed shop and 
check-off system also provided greater potential for unions to perform the 
corporatist roles of implementation and enforcement of policy. 
While evidence of incorporation strategies can be gleaned from alternative 
perspectives, the latter are not embraced in this study. In order to explain 
why this is so it is helpful to examine the key underlying question or 
problem addressed by writers. For present purposes three alternative 
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approaches are identified, namely, orthodox, liberal and radical views. 
These can be depicted on a continuum from orthodoxy to liberal to radical. 
The corporatist approach adopted in this study lies between liberal and 
radical perspectives. As ideal-types the orthodox perspectives focus on 
order, and analyse phenomena in relation to system maintenance and stable 
capitalist accumulation. Liberals address the plurality of interests of actors 
and seek a path which combines growth and equity - desiderata that are 
frequently seen as being in mutual tension (e.g., Bienefeld 1975: 239). 
Thus Galenson, in recognition of this issue, writes "All of us who have 
worked on this book ... are convinced that independent trade unionism and 
satisfactory economic development are by no means antithetical" (1963: 10). 
Radical views, on the other hand, look to fundamental, if not revolutionary, 
social change to benefit workers and other exploited groups. 
The views underlying these perspectives can be seen in the treatment of 
worker protest. Conventional analyses by, for example, Kerr et al see 
protest as "a persistent problem" (1960: 208). Many early treatments 
included the word "problem" in the title - hence Tinley's (1942) The Native 
Labour Problem of South Africa. Initially the major problem was the supply 
of able and obedient labour (Orde Brown 1933). Now that proletarianisation 
processes have generally delivered sufficient supplies of unskilled labour 
(Arrighi 1970; Munslow and Finch eds 1984) strikes are treated as a key 
problem in the pursuit of stable capital accumulation. Thus Jackson, after 
charting the "disappearance of strikes" in independent Tanzania by 
government's "imposing obligations on organised labour" (e.g., restricting 
strikes and union organisation) and "creating new rights for workers" (e.g., 
minimum wages, industrial democracy) (1979: 250), reports: 
Naturally, these may have been accepted with various degrees of 
willingness, and there is bound always to be some grumbling about 
any such policy. But, overall, Tanzania appears remarkably free of 
the tension and conflict in industrial relations which beset so many 
other countries (1979: 251). 
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Liberal views are more inclined to see protest as an understandable though 
regrettable outcome of a plurality of interests. They do not celebrate strikes 
as a desirable challenge to capitalism; rather strikes are seen as a 
legitimate expression of workers' interests, and the ultimate weapon in 
collective bargaining. Consequently, much emphasis is placed on the 
independence of trade unions from government and party, so that workers' 
interests per se can be pursued. It is in this light that the immense 
literature on union relations with government should be viewed (Galenson 
ed. 1959, 1963; Davies 1966; Beling ed. 1968; Ananaba 1979; see Friedland 
1974). Hence Galenson, while close to orthodoxy in his anti-communist 
stance (1959: 13), puts more emphasis in his later volume (1963) on the 
need for independent unions with the right to strike: 
It is quite understandable for government leaders who are 
concentrating on the achievement of economic goals in the face of 
what must sometimes appear to be impossible odds to be impatient 
with intractable, "irresponsible" representatives of workers. There is 
an ever-present temptation to silence them and to substitute 
Daternalism for bargaining and conflict. But the price may be very 
ligh indeed: the loss to the nation of the creative energies of free 
men who feel themselves masters of their own fates rather than 
cogs in a vast, impersonal machine (1963: 10). 
Radical writers enthusiastically welcome strikes and protest under capitalism. 
Waterman espouses the need to see 
strikes as a creative act, as an assertion of the desires and interests 
of one section of the masses against the 'logic of industrialisation' 
and over the 'industrialising elites' (Kerr et al, 1973) who usually 
dominate and control them (1976: 337). 
Many writers look to worker protest as signs of and as spurs to the 
development of "working class consciousness" (Gutkind 1974: 28ff), and the 
"political potential" of workers (Gutkind 1975; Sandbrook 1977; Sandbrook 
and Cohen 1975a). Frequently radical writers argue that "development 
strategies relying on foreign private investment will at best produce 'growth 
without development'" (Bienefeld 1975: 239), and insist upon a "socialist 
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alternative" (p.240) for "the political and social liberation of the African 
working class" (Cohen, Copans and Gutkind 1978: 26). 
Each of these perspectives (orthodox, liberal and radical) is rejected in this 
study. Orthodox approaches understate the extent of coercion involved in 
labour relations, and present state action in basically neutral terms. Too 
often, however, conventional views have been dismissed without reasonable 
justification. In criticising the argument of Kerr et al (1960) that industrial 
conflict declines as institutionalisation proceeds, Hyman quotes from them at 
length but omits their argument that the "industrialising elite develops its 
strategies and means of controlling, limiting, or directing worker protest" 
(Kerr et al 1960: 209 cf. Hyman 1979: 325-6). Similarly, Freund (1984, 
1988) suggests that many studies of labour relations in Africa emanated 
from Cold War proselytisers. Freund cites many works from the 1960s and 
states "this literature took the continued institutionalisation of trade unions 
very much for granted and had a second, perhaps more significant, function: 
that of theorising and regulating the relationship of state to trade union in 
the new Africa" (1984: 7). While this has some credence (see Friedland 
1974: 578-81), what Freund does not say is that the contributors to one 
volume he cites (Beling ed. 1968, e.g., Friedland, Lofchie and Rosberg, 
Zack), and related works (e.g., Galenson 1959, 1963; Friedland 1974) were 
at pains to question the incorporation of trade unions into government and 
party structures. 
A protracted example of this form of critique is seen in Hess's (1986) work 
which is marred by overstatement and selective quotation. He alleges that 
for Kerr et al "development was an inevitable, 'invincible' and beneficial 
process, to which newly independent nations would enthusiastically submit 
under the guiding hand of an 'industrialising elite'" (Hess 1986: 228 citing 
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Kerr et al 1962: 2,18,300,38).' Further, orthodoxy "often neglects the 
manner in which these [industrial relations] systems actually operate" 
(p.225), and Hess adopts the concept of mode of production (see Foster-
Carter 1978) to show that features of traditional society are resilient and 
these are "a principal determinant of ... local workplace attitudes and 
behaviour" (1986: 233). 
Kerr and his colleagues (Dunlop et al 1975; Kerr 1983) have already revised 
their views on the rate and extent of change: 
We were] wrong in suggesting that the industrial mode of production 
would so quickly and so completely conquer the world and so 
overwhelmingly impose its own cultural patterns on preexisting 
cultures; industrialism does conquer and it does impose, but less 
rapidly and less totally than we implied (Kerr 1983: 27-28). 
In addition, Kerr et al were aware that industrialisation has not always been 
"enthusiastically" embraced by workers: 
Industrialisation has in several cases been less harsh than a century 
ago, but where it has been raw and cruel the instruments of control 
or even repression over the work force by management or 
government have been more efficient and have constrained most of 
the outward signs of protest. Industrialising elites and enterprise 
managers have more experience on which to rely and are more 
skilled in the control of protest (1960: 195). 
[T]he surface may be quiet by virtue of strong controls .... But 
beneath the exterior is always latent protest, seething and 
simmering, to erupt in violence or to overflow in indolence in times 
of crisis or tension (1960: 202). 
Hess (1986) correctly points out that industrialisation is characterised by a 
mixture of incorporation, control and repression, but he goes too far in 
suggesting that Kerr et al are unaware of these phenomena. It is more 
accurate to state that despite reference to control the overall position of Kerr 
et al is to see industrialisation as a neutral and beneficial process, and to 
'Hess' page references to the 1962 printing are inaccurate e.g., 
"industrialising elites" are mentioned on pp.11,12,15 and discussed at length 
in pp.47-76, but are not mentioned on p.38; "inevitability" is not mentioned 
on p.2; p.300 is part of a background appendix. The 1960 and 1962 
paginations are identical apart from the appendix. 
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argue that worker protest "tends to decline as workers become more 
accustomed to industrialisation" (p.30 emphasis added MAS). As Waterman 
(1976) and Hyman (1979) note, important strikes have continued to occur. 
Moreover, Kerr et al understate the importance of state coercion. They 
make only passing references to state control and ovenA/helmingly stress the 
seemingly neutral "logic of industrialisation", involving the web of rules and 
acceptance of modern values (1960: 33-46, 197-202, passim). 
Hess's treatment of Schregle (1982) is singularly cavalier. According to 
Hess, Schregle refers to "development ... [being] aimed at achieving the 
goals of the Asian people, at fulfilling their hopes and aspirations" (Hess 
1986: 227 quoting Schregle 1982: 2). For Hess, this is a "gross 
simplification" and "breathtaking assumption" (p.227), and he declares that 
"Schregle has so little interest in identifying sources of divergent attitudes 
that he even manages to overlook the most visible differences between 
various Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist communities of the region" (p.227). Yet 
Schregle is at pains to draw attention to such diversity: 
the resistance of the old Asian religions to Western-imported 
secularisation is strong and impressive. In a profound and richly 
documented comparative study of the religions of the world, Alfred 
Braunthal reaches the important conclusion that "in Islamic, Hinduist, 
and Buddhist societies the secularisation process appears to have 
strengthened rather than weakened the religious faiths" (1982: 59). 
There is ample evidence to show that writers such as Schregle adopt an 
uncritical view of state policy and the development of labour relations. In 
relation to Singapore early this century Schregle notes that individual 
employment contracts operated and, oblivious to the coercive nature of 
proletarianisation, he says "[i]n the circumstances no significant labour 
problems arose that would have led to major labour unrest" (1982: 33). He 
goes on to say that the government-aligned congress "obtained majority 
support" in 1964 (p.33). As Deyo makes clear this was virtually a 
government creation as the People's Action Party "set out to demobilise ... 
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leftist trade unions through political detention of leaders, union deregistration, 
and harassment" (1979: 37). Had Hess simply and persuasively developed 
this line of argument his critique would have been cogent. Instead his 
argument is weakened by his reliance on a caricature of mainstream works 
as being oblivious to, for example, ethnic divergences and the persistence of 
traditional social forms. 
A major failing with liberal analyses is that, although they frequently deal 
with countries which have corporatist strategies, they do not order their 
empirical material into a conceptual framework that clearly identifies these 
patterns. Instead their work requires, if not, as Friedland puts it in relation 
to semi-official works, "Aesopian skills" (1974: 578), then certainly careful 
sifting and organising. As was argued in the opening section, a corporatist 
framework has the advantage over a pluralist or liberal approach, since the 
former specifically recognises the monopolisation and policing role of interest 
groups and does not assume a plurality of interest representation. One 
further criticism is that liberal authors sometimes claim their ideological 
stance is attenuated by "our conscious effort to be impartial" (Damachi et al 
1979: 14). Presenting a balanced account which shows sensitivity to the 
arguments of various actors is a justifiable position, yet that need not impel 
authors to adopt a cloak of impartiality. Despite this veil ideological 
positions remain, necessitating a symptomatic reading if the stance is to be 
discerned. 
Marxist formulations tend to present overly mechanistic views of labour 
relations, in which other social features such as ethnicity are neglected and 
the state is seen as a class product. At the broad level recent contributions, 
following Poulantzas (1973, 1975) on the state's relative autonomy, seek to 
avoid presenting a position in which base determines superstructure, and the 
state is simply the instrument of the ruling class (Saul 1974, 1976; Davies et 
al 1976; von Freyhold 1977). It is debatable whether this endeavour has 
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been achieved as the insistence on the primacy of class over ethnic 
cleavages (Johnstone 1976) and the view of the state as fundamentally 
capitalist (Beckman 1980, 1981, 1982) often result in stultified analysis (cf. 
Young 1986; Bozzoli 1978; Innes and Plaut 1978). Marxists provide condign 
criticisms of colonial and liberal accounts which either seek to explain 
variations in labour strategies in Africa by reference to the culture of the 
colonial power (Damachi et al 1979: 4-6), or see exploitation solely in racial 
and not class terms (see Johnstone 1976: 204-5).^ In doing so, however, 
they in turn frequently understate the importance of ethnicity (both race and 
tribe). Thus for Cohen et al "the problem is not whether a working class 
exists, but its size; not its internal divisions (be they ethnic, linguistic, 
religious, or cultural), but its homogeneity when called upon to express itself" 
(1978: 16-7, see also p.9). Even with respect to South Africa ethnicity is 
relegated to very much a secondary and derivative role: 
This study proceeds in terms of an alternative approach, a Marxist 
structuralist approach, which sees and explains the system of racial 
domination as a product of the system of production of which it 
formed a part, and as determined in its specific forms, functions and 
nature by this system (Johnstone 1976: 2). 
My aim is not to advance debates in the immense literature on class and 
ethnicity in Africa (cf. Marenin 1976; Posel 1983; Young 1986); rather it is to 
note that the relationship is extremely complex and that neither ethnicity nor 
class "can be reduced, without banalisation, to a simple derivative of the 
other" (Young 1986: 470). 
Apthorpe correctly points out that to a considerable extent colonialism 
"administratively created tribes as we think of them today" (1968: 18). 
Whatever its origins, in the present predicament ethnicity is a significant 
feature of labour relations in some African countries (on Uganda see Scott 
^As Johnstone (p.204) notes, Hutt implausibly asserts: "The inescapable 
conclusion ... is that private enterprise in mining and industry (and the same 
is true even of ... farming ...) has tended to work wholly for the material 
advancement (and indirectly the social benefit) of the African people" (Hutt 
1964: 99). 
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1968), and this is certainly the case with regard to race in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. In his analytical discussion cited above Cohen calls for the 
primacy of class. It is noteworthy, though, that in his earlier empirical work 
on Nigerian labour he recognises the powerful influence of ethnic conflicts: 
"[t]he post-1966 history of Nigeria is essentially that of the inter-ethnic 
tensions in the political class" (1974: 33). In circumstances of high inter-
ethnic conflict class was manifested as a less potent force, so that Cohen 
can express the class role no more strongly than: "[t]hat a degree of 
working-class solidarity survived despite these pressures can be explained 
by reference to the structural position of workers" (1974: 34). This is not to 
suggest that ethnicity predominates over class. As Cohen remarks "class 
and ethnicity must be considered together, as a group of intersecting and 
interrelated matrices" (1974: 33). In doing so, however, Cohen breaks with 
the common Marxist call to see ethnicity as subordinate to class. 
Finally, Marxism sets unrealistic yardsticks with which to analyse labour 
relations. If workers, unions, parties and governments have not achieved 
that rarely defined "socialist" society, then the verdict is commonly either one 
of failure, or of living in hope that the revolution will someday prevail. 
Marxists and related critics themselves go to extraordinary lengths to 
document the overwhelming structural and political obstacles to socialist 
transformation, including the disunity and lack of consciousness among the 
nascent working class in Africa, the resistance of local and foreign capital, 
market forces and the capitalist labour process, state coercion and 
corruption, and the weakness of developing countries in the capitalist world 
economy (e.g., Bienefeld 1975, 1979; Bernstein ed. 1973; Bolton 1978, 
1985; Oxaal et al eds 1975; Sandbrook 1975). Yet they still expect radical 
social change to be achieved - and assess success or failure against this 
unrealistic measure. A common conclusion is to see in "glorious failures" 
and "occasional successes" inspiration for future struggles: "even the 
conservatively-led Kenya Federation of Labour gained some brief moments 
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of political glory" (Sandbrook and Cohen 1975b: 19). The work of Bienefeld 
is illustrative here. In 1975, after examining the quest for a "socialist 
alternative" (p.240) in Tanzania, Bienefeld concluded: 
The workers' struggle will be long and difficult, but in Tanzania they 
do have important allies in the government. Thus, after the spate of 
strikes that followed Mwongozo, causing much disquiet, the chairman 
of the Permanent Labour Tribunal announced that 'practically in all 
strikes investigated by us, most of the workers' grievances were 
found to be true'. Where else could one read that? (1975: 256). 
Four years later, after detailing the "failure" (p.592) of government, party, 
unions and workers committees to build a socialist alternative, Bienefeld 
reflected: 
At the present juncture, further advances along the path to socialism 
can only come from the workers themselves. They must find ways 
of exerting effective pressure on the Party, on NUTA, and on their 
employers (1979: 593). 
Workers could be forgiven for being bemused and wondering what else they 
can do after attempts to mobilise were circumscribed and strike action 
prevented by the sympathetic government - particularly when a prominent 
intellectual socialist can offer no advice. Similarly, workers cannot be 
expected to live on some brief moments of "political glory". Success for 
workers should not be measured in terms of the elusive political and social 
"liberation" of the working class, but in terms of the realisable gains that can 
be achieved. The question, in short, is not so much "What is to be done?"; 
it is "What can be done?" 
Summary 
There are suggestions that corporatist analyses be imported into Africa from 
Latin America. To date, however, these have been "airfreighted" and have 
barely touched ground in Africa. Detailed analysis is required of corporatist 
strategies in specific countries. Alternative treatments of labour relations in 
independent African countries are useful for providing empirical evidence of 
government attempts to control unions; however, there are problems with 
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these approaches. Orthodox views have been frequently caricatured though 
they can be criticised validly for understating the role of coercion in labour 
relations. Liberal approaches do not provide a framework for 
conceptualising corporatist strategies. Radical approaches tend to present 
state action and ethnic cleavages as derivative of class forces, and 
unrealistically measure social change in relation to socialist transformation. 
1.3 Labour Relations at the Organisation Level 
A critical organisation perspective is adopted here which views organisations 
as arenas of struggle, primarily between workers and management who 
have fundamentally opposed interests. Relations between workers and 
management in organisations, however, are also influenced by culture, 
leadership style and personnel policies and procedures. Consequently, 
critical organisation theory needs to be modified in order to take into account 
phenomena identified in orthodox organisation theory; namely, management 
culture, leadership, and differentiation within management. Some writers 
argue that concepts should not be borrowed from different perspectives, and 
others claim that radical organisation theory concepts can be subsumed 
within orthodox organisation theory. I differ with both these views, and 
argue that a conflict perspective can be modified by concepts from 
conventional organisation theory to improve analysis of labour relations in 
organisations. I reject superficial approaches which see organisations as 
having a unitary and malleable culture. My view is that management 
cultures are frequently rejected by workers, and that culture is extremely 
difficult to manipulate. While the literature refers to "organisational" or 
"corporate" culture, it is preferable to employ the term "management culture" 
in order to avoid the suggestion that the culture is shared by all 
organisational members. 
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1.3.1 Conflict and Control Approaches 
Critical organisation theorists conceive organisations as sites of conflict. 
Their view contrasts with that of orthodox organisation theory, which 
presents organisations in ostensibly value-neutral terms as coordinated goal-
directed activity commonly based upon cooperation (Barnard 1938; Selznick 
1948; Parsons 1956; see Dunkerley 1972). According to Burrell and 
Morgan, radical organisation theorists draw upon Marx and Weber and give 
primacy to four "core concepts": totality (organisations are inextricably 
embedded in broader social relations); structure (analysis of units larger than 
individuals); contradiction (structural conflict); and crisis (there are pressures 
for radical social change) (1979: 358-9, 365-92). In addition to these 
distinguishing concepts, notions of control and class warrant specific mention 
since these are integral to the problematic of most radical organisation 
theorists. Salaman, for example, develops the idea that "[o]rganisations are 
structures of control" (1981: 143ff). For Salaman (1981: 190-230) and 
Therborn (1980: 37-42) class plays a central role and control mechanisms 
are tools of management to be used against subordinates. 
Storey (1983, 1985) has identified management control as a central issue in 
recent organisation studies, after decades of neglect even by Marxists, who 
tended to be preoccupied with "more historically 'significant' questions 
relating to the wider fate of capitalism" (1985: 271). Braverman's (1974) 
work, and the debate that followed (e.g.. Coombs 1978; Littler 1982; Littler 
and Salaman 1984; Wood ed. 1982; Thompson 1983), investigated the 
deskilling of workers and the consequent enhancement of managerial control 
in the capitalist labour process, and stimulated a resurgence of interest in 
workplace control.^ In consequence, organisation theorists Clegg and 
Dunkerley posited "organisation as control of the labour process" (1980: 6). 
^Though as Wood (1982: 12-13) indicates continental writers also had been 
engaged in debates on skill, and Marglin's (1974) paper was presented in 
1971, see Kouzmin (1980: 152 note 3). 
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Salaman (1979: 215) and, more recently, Clegg have espoused a sociology 
of organisations premised on the view that: 
Organisations are ... arenas of struggle and coordination, resistance 
and control, dissonances and community, structure and agency 
(Clegg 1986: 34) 
Further: 
organisations are arenas of struggle and locii [sic] of calculation in 
which social relations of and in production are worked out with a 
degree of indeterminacy. Such work occurs in a space enscribed 
sic] by the triangulation between state, economy and civil society, 
constituting limits of citizenship, class and status as pressures on 
individual identities available for assemblage within organisational 
forms (Clegg 1988: 11). 
In these formulations the centrality of conflict and control is manifest, as is 
the link with broader societal forces of the state and the class structure. 
Organisations therefore are seen as being embedded in broader social 
relations (Burrell and Morgan's totality) and cannot be studied as if in 
isolation, as many orthodox theorists attempted to do (e.g., Barnard 1938; 
Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939; McGregor 1960). 
Other radical analysts have seen organisations in similar terms as sites of 
conflict and, not surprisingly given their Marxist antecedents, the fundamental 
conflict in capitalist organisations is identified as that between labour and 
capital (e.g., Allen 1975; Nichols and Beynon 1977; Burawoy 1979). Notions 
of class and control are applied in examinations of other types of 
organisation, including public enterprises (Carchedi 1977; Heydebrand 1977) 
and organisations in socialist states (Trotsky 1972; Burawoy 1985). In the 
main, even where non-capitalist organisations are examined, radical analysts 
conceive the fundamental conflict as being between two main classes or 
categories which approximate to labour and capital, often designated as a 
worker-management cleavage (Kouzmin 1980; Salaman 1981; Littler and 
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Salaman 1984)/ Other cleavages are recognised, such as gender (Wolpe 
1977; Hearn and Parkin 1983; Ferguson 1984) and ethnicity (Burawoy 1972, 
1974). Nevertheless, the overriding conflict is generally seen to emanate 
from the worker-management divide. While this cleavage is of greatest 
moment, I will argue that it requires modification for adequate organisational 
analysis. 
The worker-management conflict has deep-seated origins, wz (1) structurally 
based contradictory class interests (Burawoy 1985; Clegg and Dunkerley 
1980: 134; Allen 1975: 204); (2) the imposition of class-based power and 
rules to control workers (Clegg 1979; Boreham and Dow 1980; Kouzmin 
1980; Salaman 1981; Storey 1983, 1985); and (3) basic inequalities with 
regard to income, work conditions and content, and life chances (Littler and 
Salaman 1984: 14-28). Without a recognition of worker-management conflict 
as a starting point, analysis has too often been an exercise in glossing 
which misses imperative elements of organisations. 
Conventional organisation analyses from the Hawthorne Studies 
(Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939; Mayo 1946) on have glossed over 
conflict and mechanisms of control (Mouzelis 1975: 112-18; Salaman 1981: 
148-50).® Krupp has presented this case forcefully, arguing that the human 
relations movement and works of this genre (e.g., Maslow 1954; Argyris 
1957, 1964; McGregor 1960; Likert 1961, 1967; Blake and Mouton 1964) 
prescribe more subtle forms of control over workers than did scientific 
management: 
'Kouzmin (1980: 153 note 7), following Bendix (1956: xxi-xxii), treats 
entrepreneurs, managers and bureaucrats as one cleavage by virtue of their 
position in authority relations. 
^Taylor (1911) saw workers' resistance as invalid and his mental revolution 
called for worker-management cooperation, but unlike human relations 
writing, Taylor was much concerned with industrial conflict and control (see 
Braverman 1974; Merkle 1980). 
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The strategic feature of these traditions - Taylorism, human-relations-
in-industry, organisation theory - was the subordination of the work 
force to the needs and rules of the plant. Coordination of the 
worker and the machine in Taylor became for Mayo a subordination 
of the worker to the structure. The constraints of machine, structure, 
or organisation provided internal imperatives for the wage-seeking 
worker of Taylor, or the group-seeking worker of Mayo. Satisfaction 
and efficiency were joint products of the worker's adjustment (i-©- his 
acceptance of managerial authority) (Krupp 1961: 14). 
Management is entreated to consider informal organisation processes to see 
workers' perceptions of the situation, and consequently organisational 
problems are frequently diagnosed as "communication problems", the 
solutions to which are sought in techniques such as sensitivity training 
(Lakin 1972; Lieberman et al 1973). Clegg and Dunkerley correctly declare 
in response: 
It is from this requirement that the vast and oven^/helmingly 
ideological literature on leadership, supervisory style, group 
dynamics, planned change in organisations, communications 
problems, motivation and similar topics has emerged. Much of [this 
... is now regarded as ideological and unscientific .... 
[M]any problems of organisation are in fact only problems of and for 
management, and ... these problems cannot be spirited away 
through a change of supervisory style or the learning of social skills 
(1980: 133-4). 
This is so as a result of the structural contradictions between workers and 
management. In addition to this list of orthodox organisation techniques 
which radical analysts reject are job enrichment (Herzberg 1966; Paul and 
Robertson 1970; Timperley and Ondrack eds 1982), quality of working life 
programmes (Davis and Cherns eds 1975a and 1975b; O'Toole 1981; Stein 
and Kanter 1980), worker participation in decision making (Blumberg 1968; 
Horner 1974), and the advocacy of effective organisation cultures (e.g., 
Pascale and Athos 1981; Ouchi 1981). 
Radical scholars have rejected these proposals along the following lines. 
Job enrichment and other forms of work humanisation are rejected as they 
do not challenge existing work arrangements; they yield only piecemeal 
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changes to placate workers and provide a semblance of progressive 
management, which in reality is only a pretence at rectifying the negative 
effects of exploitative arrangements (Zimbalist 1975; Drago and McDonough 
1984; Clegg and Dunkerley 1980: 512-14). Industrial democracy schemes 
are discounted for similar reasons (Clarke 1977), and Ramsay (1977) 
contends that increased interest is given to participation when there are 
perceived threats to management authority; participation is thus simply seen 
as another process of control. For Mandel (1975) and others (Coates and 
Topham 1968; Clarke 1977; Panitch 1978) forms of participation are 
inadequate; only worker control is acceptable, and this can only be obtained 
with the extirpation of capitalist ownership and the market. As discussed 
below, organisation culture has received similar radical criticism. 
These criticisms have a certain validity since tinkering with surface-level 
phenomena will not eradicate underlying conflict (Nord 1974), and 
adjustments can therefore be seen as adaptive control measures. However, 
there are three problems with this approach. Firstly, despite protestations 
that workers do offer resistance (Beynon 1975; Brown 1977; Dubois 1979; 
Salaman 1979) the approach comes dangerously close to radical 
functionalism which sees everything as a control mechanism. Secondly, 
changes tend to be seen in zero-sum terms, yet it seems plausible to 
consider the possibility that workers might also gain from such adjustments. 
Thirdly, the conflict and control perspective, preoccupied with the worker-
management cleavage, tends to be a blunt instrument for analysing 
organisations. The conflict and control problematic requires supplementation 
with conventional notions of organisation culture, leadership and 
interdepartmental conflict. 
Such an approach needs to be justified since eclecticism is frequently 
criticised and Burrell and Morgan explicitly argue "for paradigmatic closure" 
(1979: 397-8). Donaldson characterises Burrell and Morgan's argument as 
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being that "no merging is possible" (1985: 37) between paradigms, and he 
warns against such "separate development" (p.46). Reed puts it more 
bluntly as "intellectual apartheid" (1988: 43). This is a misperception of 
Burrell and Morgan's argument since they note that "fusion and 
incorporation" (p.396) has taken place, and their primary point is that each 
perspective should be developed more fully, in keeping with its own 
philosophical traditions. Despite their argument benefits can be obtained 
from eclecticism. Donaldson (1985: 40-4) argues that structural-functionalism 
and radical structuralism are compatible by showing that Rex's (1961: 129-
30) summary statement of radical structuralism can be deduced from the 
archetypical view of functionalism from Radcliffe-Brown (1952: 180). The 
result is that, for Donaldson, Marxism should be subsumed within structural-
functionalism; however the major obstacle to "assimilation" (p.131) is the 
difference in levels of analysis. For Donaldson, Marxism is singularly a 
"societal and world-historical" approach (p.123) unsuited to organisational-
level studies (p.124), and Marxism's novel contributions to organisation 
theory are alleged to be "mainly semantic" (p.124). 
Donaldson's counter to the exaggerated divergences between Marxism and 
orthodoxy is partially constructive. It is correct to record that organisation 
theory can include analysis of conflict, control, power and political processes 
(e.g., Pondy 1967; Etzioni 1975; Pfeffer 1981; Pettigrew 1973). However, 
differences between Marxism and orthodox organisation theory are not 
merely semantic, as Donaldson alleges. Donaldson (pp.40-2), following 
Merton (1976), argues that radical concepts have analogues in orthodoxy, 
for instance, "contradictions" and '"dysfunctions". Donaldson also suggests 
that the radical usage of "control" is compatible with conventional 
formulations which recognise the need for "integration [and] pattern-
maintenance .... Thus the management attain control through ensuring 
adequate coordination" (p.131). Yet the radical notion of "control" is distinct 
from system needs of integration and pattern-maintenance for control 
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through coordination. Marxist use of the term "control" implies conflict and 
exploitation while the structural-functionalist notions connote equilibrium, even 
harmony. Furthermore, while power and control concepts are present in 
some conventional studies, such issues are neglected and at times entirely 
absent from much of this literature (see Burrell and Morgan 1979). For 
Marxists this could never occur. These concepts are invariably central in 
Marxist analyses since they are premised on the assumption that 
organisations are arenas of conflict. 
To reject Marxism as being unsuited to organisational analysis in the way 
that Donaldson does is mistaken. Clegg dismisses this by declaring that "[i]f 
one were almost wholly ignorant of Marx's analysis of the labour process 
and its subsequent development, then one might make such a statement" 
(1988: 10). Clegg's central point is understandable; authentically Marxist 
analysis can be applied at organisational level as seen in the work of Marx 
and his followers (e.g., Marx 1978; Braverman 1974; Burawoy 1979). Clegg 
correctly rejects the level of analysis argument as formulated by Donaldson 
(pp.123-34) in his chapter on Marxist theory but, taking Donaldson's 
argument as a whole, Clegg's dismissal is insufficient. While Marxism is 
ideally suited to highlighting conflict between workers and management, it 
has difficulties in explaining other organisational phenomena. For Donaldson 
this primarily relates to the design of organisational structures; in the current 
study, the problem areas are interdepartmental differentiation, leadership and 
culture. 
In summary, Donaldson goes too far in arguing that (1) Marxism can be 
subsumed within functionalism; (2) differences between the two approaches 
are mainly semantic; and (3) Marxism is unsuited to organisational analysis. 
However, he is correct to point out that Marxism misses important aspects 
of organisations and that an eclectic approach seems a "sensible" strategy 
(p.35). Donaldson himself does little to utilise different perspectives, and his 
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programme is largely restricted to contingency theory in organisation design. 
The present study utilises concepts from differing paradigms in order to 
cover weaknesses in each, but no attempt is made to synthesise these 
frameworks. This position is not adopted a priori, but derives from an initial 
attempt to view the organisations under study from a conflict perspective, 
and the discovery that this required modification to provide greater 
explanatory power. 
1.3.2 A Modified Conflict and Control Approach 
In explicating labour relations and organisational change in this study, certain 
concepts from conventional organisational theory are found useful as 
supplements to a conflict and control approach. These are the notions of 
culture, leadership and interdepartmental conflict. Organisational culture 
serves a control function but is not easily manipulated by management since 
it is a negotiated phenomenon. Leadership styles are important influences 
on cultural evolution. Distinguishing departmental roles, rather than seeing 
management as monolithic, allows the distinct position of personnel 
management to be appreciated. 
The early 1980s saw a spate of publications focusing on organisational 
culture, many of which were aimed more toward managers than academics 
{Business Weei< 1980; Peters 1980; Ouchi 1981; Pascale and Athos 1981; 
Peters and Waterman 1982; Uttal 1983; Peters and Austin 1985). For these 
writers corporate culture refers to the beliefs and values held in common by 
organisation members which are manifested in "artefacts", such as physical 
features, stories, rituals and myths (Pettigrew 1979; Martin et al 1983; Trice 
and Beyer 1984), and value statements of "the way we do things around 
here" (Deal and Kennedy 1982: 4). Peters and Waterman (1982) stress the 
core values of corporations, for example, customer service at IBM or product 
innovation at the 3M Company. 
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Many writers suggest that an organisation's culture can be changed or 
"managed" in order to produce a "strong" (Deal and Kennedy 1982) or 
"efficient" (Wilkins and Ouchi 1983) culture to improve organisational 
effectiveness (Kilmann et al eds 1985). Indeed much of this work (Ouchi 
and Price 1978; Vogel 1^79, 1982; Pascale and Athos 1981; Takeuchi 1981; 
Schonberger 1982; Wilkins and Ouchi 1983; Kanter 1985) emanated from 
the US and was concerned, as the subtitle to Ouchi's (1981) Theory Z puts 
it, to show How American Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge 
which many writers attributed in part to the success of Japanese 
management style (Drucker 1971, 1981; Pascale 1978; Tung 1984).® Some 
of these and related popular management books (Blanchard and Johnson 
1983; Naisbitt 1982) are best-sellers (Freeman 1985), but none more so 
than Peters and Waterman's (1982) In Search of Excellence selling over five 
million copies by 1985 (Peters and Austin 1985). 
These works, especially Peters and Waterman (1982), have been criticised 
from within management literature for empirical failings {Business Week 
1984) and their lack of academic rigour (Carroll 1983; Schein 1985), but 
have been defended for the appeal of their substantive content (Soeters 
1986; Hitt and Ireland 1987). Ray presents a more fundamental critique 
which argues that the manipulation of organisation culture is "possibly [the] 
most powerful form of control" (1986: 291). For Ray, "humanistic control" 
(e.g., quality of working life programmes) 
does not possess the capabilities to generate sentiment or emotion 
.... [Whereas the] latest strategy of control implies that the top 
management team aims to have individuals possess direct ties to 
the values and goals of the dominant elites in order to activate the 
emotion and sentiment which might lead to devotion, loyalty and 
commitment to the company (1986: 294). 
®For critical views on the perceived success of Japanese management style 
see, e.g.. Oh 1976; Shimada 1982; Odiorne 1984. 
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Ray suggests that managers assume the roie of "an evangelist, a shaman, a 
statesperson" (p.289), and that corporate culture might provide the force for 
social cohesion which Durkheim (1933) saw as lacking following the 
weakening of social bonds previously provided by church, community and 
family. Ray also posits the possibility that if workers embrace the corporate 
culture this would involve "a heightened sense of collectivity; it implies 
commitment to the firm" which might unite workers and lead to greater 
"activism" (p.295). 
Aside from the point that Ray wants to have it both ways - culture 
manipulation leads to either hegemonic control or increased activism - her 
approach entails difficulties. If organisational culture can be manipulated by 
management then this would be a potent control mechanism, and Ray's 
critique of popular works would be largely, although not totally, cogent. 
However, it is argued here that more rigorous treatments of culture partly 
avoid criticisms applicable to the popular works (propositions of a unitary 
and malleable culture) and, once again, radical organisation theorists 
mistakenly see phenomena in zero-sum terms. 
While popular management works reach a wide audience, organisation 
culture is not simply what is presented in these contributions. The concept 
has antecedents in the notions of "organisation spirit" (Drucker 1955) and 
"organisation climate" (Payne and Pugh 1976; Steele and Jenks 1977), and 
is a logical extension of the concern within the organisation development 
school to transform entire organisations (Beckhard 1969; Bennis 1969; 
French and Bell 1973; Beckhard and Harris 1977; Levy and Merry 1987; 
Burke 1987). Hofstede (1986: 253) briefly notes that the concern with 
culture marks a resurgence of interest in organisations as a whole shown 
earlier by Barnard (1938), Bakke (1950) and, notably, Jaques' The Changing 
Culture of a Factory (1951). Crozier's (1964) classic study is also deeply 
concerned with culture in the workplace. In more detail, Allaire and Firsirotu 
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(1984) and Smircich (1983) link the use of culture and related management 
concepts with more theoretically grounded uses in anthropology and social 
science. In contrast to simplistic formulations, Louis (1985) and van Maanen 
and Barley (1985) do not postulate a unitary organisational culture, as 
popular formulations suggest; instead they argue that subcultures exist and 
identify factors which promote their development, such as "the type of job or 
hierarchical level" (Louis 1985: 79), segmentation by function and ideological 
differentiation (van Maanen and Barley 1985: 38-47). Indeed, they conceive 
of countercultures which endorse "behaviour that is explicitly forbidden or 
viewed as improper" (van Maanen and Barley 1985: 45; cf. Salaman 1979: 
184). It would be more accurate to refer to management culture rather than 
organisational culture if this is a feature of management only, and not the 
general workforce (Louis 1985). This usage is adopted in this study. 
Schein (1981, 1983, 1985) presents similar views and has refined analysis 
of culture in organisations. He argues that reference to norms, dominant 
values and climate does not reach the essence of culture (1985: 6-7); for 
him this lies in deeper shared assumptions and he defines "culture" as 
a pattern of basic assumptions - invented, discovered, or developed 
by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration - that has worked well enough to 
be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as 
the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those 
problems (Schein 1985: 9). 
In addition, assumptions over time become taken for granted and culture 
formation is generally an unconscious process. Consequently Schein treats 
as problematic the notion that a culture can be manipulated by managers: 
If we take the concept of culture seriously, we may have to face the 
possibility that cultural assumptions are virtually impossible to 
change, or at least we should develop a dynamic theory of change 
that does justice to the tenacity often exhibited by such assumptions 
(Schein 1985: 45 see also 1981). 
He suggests that while it might be possible to change culture this is a 
complex and difficult process as the assumptions are deeply embedded 
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understandings and are not easily discerned, let alone manipulated. Schein 
concluded, after a three-year major change project for which he was a 
consultant, that "the cultural paradigm of the company has not essentially 
changed" (1985: 266); indeed, the organisational changes that did occur had 
to be based on extant assumptions for any chance of success. 
Ray acknowledges that "there is no persuasive evidence ... that the 
manipulation of U.S. corporations' cultures really functions as a form of 
control" (1986: 295). Indeed, it can be argued that attempts to manipulate 
are as likely as not to fail (van Maanen and Barley 1985: 48). Assuming 
that workers can be manipulated by an evangelising management is a 
dubious proposition. Suggesting that workers will simply imbibe what 
managers disseminate is questionable, as is seen in the lack of 
endorsement by workers of countless management proposals such as job 
enrichment (Nichols 1975; Nichols and Beynon 1977) and worker-directors 
(Brannen et al 1976). Cultures can be destroyed, though this is also a 
difficult process involving the purging of key bearers of the culture and 
revolutionary upheaval. Yet the management of culture calls for an 
immensely more sophisticated manipulation of culture, and it is debatable 
that the techniques currently exist for this to be carried out in a controlled 
manner in everyday organisations, as distinct from total institutions (Goffman 
1962). 
Some relatively careful analyses do present the possibility that cultures can 
be changed or managed (Cool and Lengnick-Hall 1985; Lundberg 1985; 
Nord 1985; Schein 1985; Siehl 1985). In the main, though, these change 
efforts are directed to senior employees (who might have more commitment 
to organisational goals). Yet even if it is assumed that cultural management 
can include lower-level employees, it could be argued that if workers can 
reject an attempt by management to change culture, equally they might 
decide to accept a cultural change effort. Indeed, in most cases it would 
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seem participants' active cooperation is required for change to have any 
hope of success (Schein 1985), and this point is also stressed by 
enthusiastic advocates of cultural management (e.g., Deal and Kennedy 
1982; Davis 1984). To refer to this as hegemonic control, then, is 
contentious. It is more appropriate to treat culture as a negotiated 
phenomenon. This does not require that an orthodox problematic based on 
concepts of order be adopted. A conflict and control framework can be 
supplemented by analysis of emergent, negotiated cultural phenomena. As 
such, the eradication of basic conflicts between workers and management by 
cultural manipulation is not presumed; rather the distinct nature of the 
conflict relations between workers and management can be assessed 
empirically. Management culture is thus viewed as having a control function 
(Salaman 1979: 183-97), but is not easily manipulated and is best seen as a 
negotiated phenomenon. 
The more rigorous formulations of culture in organisations (Schein 1985; van 
Maanen and Barley 1985) do not stand by themselves. These approaches 
view organisations as sites of order in which conflict occurs but is of 
secondary importance. 
Indeed, most organisational subcultures develop collective 
understandings that by and large accept the group's organisational 
position and do not conflict overtly with the organisation's presumed 
mission. While subcultures imply an internal political economy, 
subcultural disputes are usually played out over particular issues so 
that no single subculture is likely to be overwhelmingly at odds with 
the remainder of the organisation (van Maanen and Barley 1985: 
45). 
These writers do not identify the worker-management cleavage as the pre-
eminent source of conflict. Schein (1985: 7, 39), for instance, perceives the 
worker-management conflict on the same basis as conflicts based on 
geographic proximity or functional cleavages. Consequently, the approach 
taken by these writers is not accepted; rather insights from their formulations 
are used to supplement a conflict and control perspective. 
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In relation to leadership radical organisation theorists often suggest that the 
concept of leadership style is primarily one of obfuscation (Ciegg and 
Dunkerley 1980; Burawoy 1985). In making this argument radical theorists 
often go too far and allow virtually no space for the effects of leadership 
style on internal labour relations. My argument is that even if change in 
leadership style alone cannot eradicate conflict within organisations, it can 
have an impact upon important organisational phenomena such as culture 
and labour relations. 
A vast orthodox literature has been produced arguing that leadership has a 
major impact on organisations. Reviews of this literature are available 
elsewhere (Stogdill 1974; Vroom 1976; Bryman 1986). Here it is briefly 
indicated that leadership style can affect the conduct of labour relations (as 
shown in Chapter 5). This finds common expression in analyses involving 
two dimensions of leadership, broadly along the lines of concern for 
production and concern for relationships (Fiedler 1967; Likert 1961, 1967; 
Blake and Mouton 1964). Schein argues that "organisational" culture and 
leadership are inseparable phenomena (1985: 2, 4, 171), and he raises the 
possibility that "the only thing of real importance that leaders do is to create 
and manage culture" (p.2). This might be an exaggeration, since other 
important functions include the gathering and sharing of information 
(Mintzberg 1973, 1975). Nevertheless, leaders, especially organisation 
founders, do have a powerful effect on the formation of culture (Martin, 
Sitkin and Boehm 1985; Schein 1983). Schein provides a good example of 
this. In one company, individual creativity and responsibility were highly 
prized, and "a high level of interpersonal confrontation, argumentativeness, 
and conflict" was present (1985: 9). Yet simultaneously consensus in 
decision making was demanded. Schein points out that the founder 
"believed that good ideas could come from anyone, regardless of rank or 
background" (p.217), hence an emphasis on individuals. But he also held 
"that neither he nor any other individual was smart enough to determine 
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whether a given idea was correct", and so intense conflict at meetings was 
valued in order to reach decisions "tested in the intellectual marketplace" 
(p.217). 
While radical organisation theorists, and in particular those following Marx, 
tend to present management in monolithic terms, analysis benefits from 
using a disaggregated model to appreciate the distinct role of personnel 
management. Much of orthodox organisation theory assumes a 
disaggregated view and focuses on interdepartmental conflict (Dearborn and 
Simon 1958; March and Simon 1958; Dalton 1959; Button and Walton 1966; 
Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Walton and Dutton 1969; Pettigrew 1973). 
Numerous factors have been posited as antecedents to interdepartmental 
conflict, such as personal traits (Dalton 1950; March and Simon 1958), 
mutual task dependence and organisational differentiation (Walton and 
Dutton 1969). In a study of six plastics companies, Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967) found that greater emphasis was placed on social relations in the 
sales department, while task-orientation was stressed in research and 
production. Departmentalisation was also associated with differing goal 
orientations since, for example, production typically preferred stable 
standardised output, while sales valued specialised customer service. 
Similarly, personnel can be differentiated from other departments, especially 
those of line management (Myers and Turnbull 1956; Dalton 1959). Three 
major factors are identified here: ideology or personal characteristics, 
structure and environmental pressures. Firstly, the characteristics of 
personnel specialists frequently differ from those of line managers; for 
example, they might be more familiar with arguments for cooperative 
alternatives (human relations. Theory Y) to autocratic management. Purcell 
notes that in Britain "[mjany industrial relations specialists may be pluralist in 
their views, but the vast bulk of managers are more likely to incline to the 
unitary position" (1983: 11). Secondly, an important function of personnel is 
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to manage conflict between workers and management. At times this 
involves a balancing role (contra Pratt and Bennett 1985: 13) and generates 
structural tendencies for personnel specialists, more than line managers, to 
see disputes at least in part arising from management practices. Thirdly, 
personnel officers might be more familiar with environmental pressures such 
as those from government and trade unions, which seek to protect or 
enhance workers' interests (Miner and Miner 1985: 654). 
Personnel is a function of management and should not be seen as playing a 
neutral role. Further, the personnel function is justly criticised for a 
preoccupation with the minutia of techniques for greater efficiency, selection, 
appraisal, ergonomics, job evaluation (Tyson 1983: 148). Nonetheless, in 
some respects it occupies a contradictory position; beholden to and of 
management, yet tasked with the role of reconciling worker and 
management interests. For many radical writers this amounts to a more 
subtle form of control (Clegg and Dunkerley 1980). Yet in Nichols' (1969) 
survey of 65 managers and directors in the north of Britain, personnel 
specialists were far more likely than other non-line managers (sales, finance, 
technical) to provide answers which Nichols categorised as evincing 'social 
responsibility'. As will be seen, in Zimbabwe the personnel function at times 
appeared to benefit workers' interests; it is therefore necessary to see 
organisations as disaggregated, not monolithic. 
Summary 
A conflict approach is adopted based on a view of organisations as arenas 
of struggle, primarily between workers and management. This perspective is 
supplemented by concepts drawn from orthodox literature, those of 
management culture, leadership style and interdepartmental differentiation. 
While substantive differences between radical and orthodox approaches 
prevent synthesis, the divergences are less marked than is sometimes 
assumed, and the use of concepts from different perspectives is justified. 
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Simplistic formulations which see culture in organisations as unitary and 
open to manipulation are rejected in favour of a notion of culture as being 
negotiated by organisational leaders and members. Leadership style affects 
organisation behaviour, and it is possible that the personnel function 
manages labour relations in a manner more sympathetic to workers than 
does line management. These points are developed further in the case 
studies where the role of culture, leadership and personnel management are 
addressed. Having identified the general approach taken with respect to 
organisations the discussion now turns to organisations in Africa. 
1.4 Labour Relations at Organisation Level in Africa 
In this section it is shown that it is important to see organisations in their 
structural context, such as their position in the market, and also to take into 
account cultural phenomena at the national and organisational level. 
Kapferer (1972) studied a small (45 employees) Indian-owned clothing 
factory in Kabwe, Zambia in 1965-66, shortly after independence (in 1964). 
His study is grounded in urban anthropology examining social relations 
among black workers and their interface with management. Its main interest 
for present purposes is its analysis of industrial conflict. An abortive attempt 
to strike led to changes that caused further dissatisfaction, and Kapferer 
focuses on workers' attempts to obtain a more efficacious result by staging a 
further strike. Kapferer places these events within the context of 
independence which engendered "high expectations" (p.3) and perceptions of 
a strengthened position among black workers, and uncertainty within 
management as to the role of the nationalist government (pp.124-5). The 
attitudes of management, working conditions, pay system, and the role of 
the trade union, party and government are also discussed by Kapferer, but 
his interactionist approach leads to a major concern with the development of 
social relations and the struggle for leadership among the black workers. 
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According to Kapferer, the unskilled workers were generally "target" workers 
who were more inclined to move on from the firm than the skilled workers. 
Consequently the latter were more predisposed to seeking improved 
conditions. There was a contest for leadership among the skilled workers 
and one strategy was to attain status by obtaining work improvements. 
After the ineffectual first strike, some skilled workers cultivated the support of 
unskilled workers to stage a more successful strike in order to enhance their 
leadership status. 
Burawoy (1974) provides a sound critique of this analysis. For him, the key 
issues are derived from structural constraints imposed by capitalism. From 
evidence mentioned in passing by Kapferer, Burawoy argues that the advent 
of a direct competitor probably compelled the manager to increase the 
surplus extracted from the workers, and industrial action was the legitimate 
response from workers to resist this. Management action to increase 
surplus should not be ascribed to poor human relations or communications, 
according to Burawoy, and Kapferer is mistaken when he adopts 
the stereo-typical image of the Indian entrepreneur as a shrewd 
manipulator, 'maximising gains and minimising costs in the short run'. 
By focusing exclusively on Patel's [the manager] behaviour in the 
context of the factory social system, Kapferer implies that he 
'mismanages' the factory with the further implication that Patel has 
some significant choice in the way he regulates behaviour in the 
factory. External forces and constraints are not included (1974: 19-
20). 
While Burawoy's structuralist reinterpretation remedies Kapferer's 
interactionist view, he implies that management has no significant choice in 
labour strategy, and in this he takes an unjustified deterministic position. 
Burawoy's structuralist approach is set out in his analysis of Zambian 
Copperbelt miners based on research conducted during 1969-71 (1974, 
1982, 1985). He links production politics to state politics. The function of 
the colonial state was to entrench capitalism as the dominant mode of 
production, and the post-colonial state functions for "expanded rather than 
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primitive accumulation of capital" (1985: 214). Consequently, the post-
colonial state provides pressures for new forms of labour control which 
signify a transition from coerced labour to bureaucratic control. For Burawoy 
differing labour strategies have structural origins and he specifically rejects 
management style as an important factor in work relations. He lauds 
Perrings' (1979) study of mines in Northern Rhodesia and Katanga and 
comments: 
Perrings shows how geological constraints, the state of technology 
and the price of copper determined the range of production 
techniques open to any given mine. Thus, the labour strategies of 
the various mines were shaped primarily by the specific technical 
conditions of production, not by managerial style, nationality of 
directors or corporate policies, as had previously been argued (1985: 
220). 
Burawoy summarises Perrings argument to the effect that better work 
conditions in the Katanga opencast operations resulted in less labour 
turnover than in the Northern Rhodesian underground mines. Katanga 
companies therefore adopted better policies for the more stabilised miners 
and their families. Similarly, more training was provided to black employees 
at Katanga since expatriate labour was not as readily available, and fewer 
white workers at Katanga meant there was less opposition to black 
advancement than was the case on the Copperbelt. In short, it was the 
material conditions that determined labour strategy, and Burawoy specifies 
no role for management style. 
The transition from colonial to post-colonial relations in production involved 
the bureaucratisation of labour relations, and for Burawoy this process 
disadvantaged black workers (1985: 231-35). He found that changes in the 
operation of personnel functions of companies following independence were 
largely cosmetic or manipulative exercises, and that genuine black 
advancement was limited. For example, the personnel department was 
emasculated when blacks were appointed, initially by removing some of the 
powers and responsibilities attached to the positions, especially those 
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affecting expatriates. Black advancement took place without breaching "the 
colour bar principle that whites should not be subordinated to blacks", and 
new positions were often created for whites (1985: 233). 
Burawoy's approach has much to recommend it over narrower treatments, 
such as Kapferer's, which inadequately recognise production politics and 
processes involved in post-colonial capital accumulation. However, Burawoy 
over-emphasises structural determination and takes insufficient account of 
management choice. This inadequacy is clearly shown in his earlier work 
which presents the case of lashers in detail. 
Burawoy (1974) reports on two lashing gangs. One had younger, single 
workers who were more concerned with minimising their time at work in 
order to maximise their leisure time. They preferred not to share the burden 
of work nor to work overtime to finish the work task in order to obtain a 
bonus. This was especially so when the start of work was delayed while 
waiting for the section boss or "ganger" to carry out the mandatory safety 
precautions. Often this took two hours in an eight-hour shift. The older, 
married men in the other work group cooperated to optimise output so they 
could collect a bonus. Burawoy's explanation of this is couched in terms of 
work organisation, pay systems and the socio-economic interests of the 
workers - and all this is correct. Yet a crucial factor here, which Burawoy 
merely mentions in passing, is that the ganger of the older men bent the 
rules 
by encouraging certain members of his gang to prepare the ends 
[i.e. work area] themselves and he would then come and inspect. 
This gave Sinkala's gang more time in which to complete their ends 
before 2 a.m. and they would therefore be more likely to work as a 
team in order to finish early (1974: 33). 
In other words, supervisory style, a notion Burawoy is intent on dismissing, 
is an important part of his own presentation of work relations. Burawoy's 
analysis of post-colonial conflict arising from colonial relations of production 
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helps to explain relations at General Industries, examined in Chapter 5. 
However, to increase explanatory power, his approach is supplemented by 
consideration of management style and culture. 
Some writers have examined culture and organisations in Africa (see Blunt 
1983), but they have commonly produced very general, even superficial 
results. Poole (1986) takes up an approach which sees national culture 
influencing management style, and applies this to labour relations 
management. He illustrates this by briefly contrasting Japanese, US and 
Nigerian cultures. In Japan, Confucian values in part contributed to 
employers and managers seeking "to appear to be good moral citizens", and 
so "benevolent paternalism" (p.47) is a feature of Japanese industrial 
relations, at least in some prominent companies. In American culture, 
individualism has contributed to a management style which seeks a direct 
relationship with workers and excludes unions through a unitary approach 
involving close attention to screening, rewards, grievance handling and 
human relations training for supervisors. Nigeria's culture, for Poole, 
following Damachi (1978), results in "an authoritarian but people-centred 
African 'arbitrary paternalistic style' .... It also occasions a lack of proper 
institutionalised grievance channels and persistent 'high-handedness' in the 
treatment of the workforce" (Poole 1986: 50). Poole is wisely very tentative 
in his view of culture and emphasises the illustrative nature of this 
discussion; others, however, are less sensitive to limitations. 
An issue of International Studies in Management and Organisation focuses 
on Africa (in reality only Nigeria), and this is characterised by generalisation 
and a lack of substantiation. Nzelibe argues that Western and African 
management thought are not only different, they are 
in direct conflict. Whereas Western management thought advocates 
Eurocentricism, individualism, and modernity, African management 
thought emphasises ethnocentricism, traditionalism, communalism, 
and cooperative teamwork (1986: 10-11). 
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Such generalisations might be apposite but insufficient supporting evidence 
is provided; for example, it is not shown that teamwork is greater in Africa 
than in the West. Moreover, an exclusive focus on culture results in an 
exaggerated view of the importance of this concept. Nzelibe (1986), Abudu 
(1986) and Ahiauzu (1986) address the failure of African employees to adopt 
an "industrial culture" (Kerr et al 1960: 77-97) which implies a positive 
commitment to work. For Nzelibe the loss of traditional African management 
practices, traditionalism, communalism and teamwork and the associated 
importance of family, "has been responsible for managerial problems such 
as nepotism, bribery, corruption, and an acute lack of discipline in 
organisations, particularly in public servants" (p.15). Abudu presents a 
similar view and proposes their "cherished traditions of discipline, honesty, 
respect for constituted authority, and scorn for indolence have to be 
reinforced in families, schools, and churches" (1986: 33). These treatments 
neglect systemic politico-economic constraints that contribute to "the 
unsatisfactory attitudes toward work in Nigeria" (Abudu p.32). It is not 
simply that traditional cultures are not respected. Traditional structures of 
society have been partially eroded and destroyed, and the harsh conditions 
of developing capitalism militate against employees adopting a commitment 
to work. 
For Ahiauzu western management thought is not always applicable to Africa 
since "the African thought-system" (1986: 37) has an impact on behaviour in 
the workplace. While nepotism is (ostensibly) deplored in western society it 
might be seen as appropriate social behaviour in support of family or 
community ties in Africa (p.51). The influence of traditional religion and 
"mystical thinking" (p.54) is also strong; for example, on his first day in a 
factory a Nigerian worker described the machines as "'white man's magic'" 
(p.48), and traditional diviners are consulted by workers and businessmen to 
overcome work or business problems (p.53). This approach has the benefit 
of alerting attention to the limitations of applying western frames of reference 
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to organisations in Africa (p.55) but, by rennaining at the general level, it 
easily drifts into dubious areas such as discounting myths of African 
"laziness" by arguing instead that African "preference for slow, modulated 
action ... is probably, to a large extent, a reflection of the African thought-
system" (p.50). A preferable approach examines the effects of culture at 
this general level and also within particular organisations. This enables the 
broad picture to be seen, but militates against superficial generalisation by 
maintaining an appreciation of diversity among organisations. 
This is the approach taken by Hofstede (1985) who compares the value 
systems of 50 countries and 3 regions on four dimensions, namely, power 
distance (acceptance of unequal power), uncertainty avoidance 
("uncomfortable with ... ambiguity"), individualism ("preference for loosely knit 
social framework"), and masculinity ("preference for achievement, heroism, 
assertiveness, and material success") (1985: 347-8). Hofstede's research 
places "East" African (Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia) and West African (Nigeria, 
Ghana, Sierra Leone) countries in a relatively high position on acceptance of 
power distance, and moderately low on uncertainty avoidance (i.e. ambiguity 
is accepted). These regions are relatively collectivist, and feminine (i.e. 
emphasis is placed on "relationships, modesty, caring for the weak" p.348) 
(1985: 351, 354 Figures 1 and 2). Consequently, Hofstede would expect 
organisations in these countries to allow high personal authority for leaders 
and considerable ambiguity rather than strict adherence to bureaucratic 
procedure. Emphasis would be given to the group rather than individuals 
and modesty rather than assertiveness would be valued. Hofstede is aware, 
though, that specific organisations within these countries will have differing 
value systems as a result of, inter alia, industry type and size, and the 
values of the founder. A post office will be more bureaucratic than a small 
retail store (p.353), and the nationality of the founder is likely to affect the 
values in an organisation. 
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Hofstede provides a broad, international framework and he does not attempt 
to examine the culture of specific organisations in Africa. Indeed, there are 
very few discussions of this kind. One exception is Lessem (1987) who 
examines the culture of the Bank of Credit and Commerce which operates in 
Zimbabwe and other African countries. Lessem portrays this company as 
being guided by values such as integrity, humility and "interfusion" - a 
mixture of independence and interdependence creating "a merger of 
energies" (p.152). He claims that managers link material concerns with a 
"higher purpose" for "serving humanity", and he attempts to identify the 
"soul" of the company (pp.156-8). This is a weak treatment. Some of the 
most prominent flaws in Lessem's treatment can be briefly stated: shoddy 
empirical research which uncritically relies on pronouncements of top 
executives and policy statements; reification through attribution of "thought" 
and "feelings" to organisations (p.73); no conception of organisational 
conflict; failure to appreciate constraints of capital accumulation such as the 
systemic need to compete with rivals and extract surplus from employees. It 
is little wonder then, and not simply bad luck, that the company acclaimed 
by Lessem to be overflowing with munificence, was suspended from foreign 
exchange trading in Kenya over dubious transactions, and was indicted in a 
US court on charges relating to the "laundering" of US$32 million in 
proceeds from drug dealings {Canberra Times 13/10/88). In this study, I 
provide a more critical examination of the role of culture in Zimbabwean 
organisations, which takes cognisance of subcultures and not simply 
pronouncements from top management. 
Summary 
The need for structural analysis in organisation studies is shown in 
Burawoy's critique of Kapferer's interactionist study. Burawoy, however, 
incorrectly rejects the notion of managerial style, which is shown to be 
important even in his own work. It is preferable to take into account the 
effects of both national and management cultures on workplace behaviour. 
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Contributions such as Lessem's on culture in African organisations are weak. 
It is important to present a more refined view, as attempted in this study, 
which recognises structural constraints, such as the market, and subcultures 
and conflict within organisations. 
Chapter Summary 
In order to study labour relations strategy in Zimbabwe a framework is 
adopted which identifies processes involving the concentration of interest 
representation, and the fusion of representative bodies into state policy 
formulation and enforcement. In contrast to pluralist and Marxist 
perspectives, this approach sees the state not as a neutral arbiter nor 
merely as a class product but as interventionist, and influenced by both 
capital and labour. Schmitter has been validly criticised for failing to portray 
relations between interests groups and the state. In this thesis the dynamic 
character of corporatism is emphasised, and corporatism is seen as a 
strategy, not a system. Analyses of corporatism in Africa have remained at 
a superficial level, discussing the continent as a whole, and they reveal a 
poor conception of corporatism. This study presents a clear understanding 
of corporatism as a strategy of interest group concentration and fusion with 
state policy making and enforcement. This framework is applied to labour 
relations in Zimbabwe so that corporatist labour strategy can be seen in 
detail. 
At the organisational level the starting point is to see organisations as 
arenas of conflict primarily between management and workers. This 
perspective requires modification, however, to take into account culture, 
leadership style and departmental differentiation, since these features have 
an impact on the conduct of labour relations. It is necessary to place 
organisations in Africa in structural context; yet orthodox concepts such as 
culture and leadership style are also required for an adequate understanding 
of labour relations in organisations. 
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Chapter 2 Historical and Conceptual Approaches to Labour 
Relations in Zimbabwe 
Introduction 
in broad terms labour relations for black workers In Zimbabwe can be 
divided into three periods: colonial labour relations from 1890 to the 1950s, 
the institutionalisation of labour relations from the 1950s to 1980, and post-
independence corporatist labour relations. The first two periods are 
reviewed in this chapter. Under colonialism black workers were kept in a 
position of subservience to capital and the state; they were not permitted to 
form trade unions to bargain collectively with employers for improved wages 
and conditions of service. After the Second World War black workers' 
demands increased for the right to form trade unions, and eventually black 
unions were recognised and became a part of the institutional framework for 
regulating labour relations. However, the black union movement remained 
weak in terms of membership and bargaining power, and throughout these 
periods strikes were suppressed and trade unions were strictly controlled. 
At independence employers were relatively well organised, and the labour 
movement was weak and divided. The Mugabe Government pledged to 
counter the power of employers by protecting and enhancing workers' 
interests by, for example, improving workers' living standards and 
democratising the workplace. Following independence the government 
pursued a corporatist labour strategy (Chapters 3 and 4). Private enterprise 
was maintained, but government sought to impose controls over employers 
and trade unions. Corporatist policies were also pursued by government in 
areas other than labour relations; for example, the government attempted to 
monopolise interest representation in relation to political parties, women and 
youths. The monopoly representative bodies were expected to support and 
enforce government policy, and attempts were made to silence or 
incorporate sources of potential opposition within these groups. 
69 
Very different interpretations of pre-independence labour relations are 
provided in the literature. Liberal writers such as Ranger (1970) explain the 
weakness of the black labour movement by focusing on internal divisions, 
financial difficulties, ineffective leadership and the "unreadiness" of workers 
to mobilise a workers' movement. But radical authors such as van Onselen 
(1976) and Phimister (1988) show that black workers resisted capitalist 
exploitation through hidden forms of protest such as boycotting particularly 
callous employers. According to radical writers, labour movement weakness 
is better explained in terms of class action of capital and state to repress 
labour. In presenting their argument, however, radical writers overstate the 
role of class and understate the importance of ethnicity. In addition, radical 
writers such as Astrow (1983) condemn the trade union leadership for failing 
to develop a socialist revolution. Yet this view neglects the powerful 
constraints confronting unions including state repression, and financial and 
organisational weakness which are clearly described by Brand (1971, 1976). 
Most interpretations of post-independence national labour relations have 
been presented from a radical perspective (e.g., Callinicos 1981; Astrow 
1983; Mitchell 1987). Radical writers adopt the view that employers are 
exploitative, and they frequently suggest that the Mugabe Government 
assists in the exploitation of workers (e.g., Nangati 1984a and 1984b). Very 
few studies of labour relations have been carried out at enterprise level. 
Those that have been produced also see workers as being exploited by 
employers, and government is presented as either tacitly allowing or actively 
supporting this exploitation (e.g., Ladley and Lan 1985; Cheater 1986). 
These contributions do not reveal the complexity of labour relations in 
Zimbabwe. The government does not simply support employers; its 
corporatist strategy also involves benefits for workers. Similarly, 
management practices within organisations vary considerably, and there are 
pressures for colonial management culture to be reformed so that black 
workers' interests are taken into account. 
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2.1 Colonial Labour Relations 
During the colonial period the key legislative mechanism for regulating the 
employment of black workers was the Masters and Servants Act of 1901 
[Chapter 231 amended by 268\. Trade unions were not recognised under 
this Act; instead individual contracts "entered into voluntarily" {Chapter 231 
s.3(2)) operated between master and servant. Penal provisions were 
applicable to a servant during the contract for "misconduct" such as 
desertion, failure to obey a command, or being "abusive or insulting ... to his 
master or his master's wife or children" (s.47(1)h). Penalties for such crimes 
included a maximum fine of four pounds or one month's gaol; first offenders 
would have been happy to note that this might be without spare diet. 
Women were the subject of special provisions; for instance, a woman could 
be dismissed if she became unfit for work due to pregnancy, or if she 
worked or lived on the master's premises, and married or entered into "a 
state which in the Colony is reputed to be the married state" (s.46(1)). 
A number of scholars provide discussions of labour in the early colonial 
period, and these are reviewed by van Onselen (1975) and Phimister (1979). 
Most of these authors aim to dispel colonial myths, some of which seem 
self-contradictory, such as that black workers were indolent, fortunate to be 
employed, and content to perform menial, arduous labour for little reward 
under woeful conditions and white supervision (Harris 1974b; Ranger 1970).^ 
Ranger's (1970) classic study shows that blacks attempted to articulate their 
opposition to colonialism through organisations such as mutual aid societies, 
religious groups, and the forerunner to black trade unions, the Industrial and 
^A Nyasaland labour officer described Nyasaland workers in Southern 
Rhodesia: "Natives will often work contentedly for low wages with unvaried 
food and dilapidated quarters if the employer or shift boss is a man who 
does not harry them or lose his temper easily" (quoted in Gray 1960: 109-
10). 
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Commercial Workers Union (ICU). The ICU was modelled on its South 
African counterpart and operated from the late 1920s to the early 1930s 
when it declined. Ranger identifies four major weaknesses of this 
movement, namely, lack of finance, disunity in the South Africa ICU which 
led to problems of policy direction in the Rhodesian body, "the unreadiness 
for action" of black Rhodesian workers, and the leadership's failure to 
provide "an effective strategy of action" (1970: 163). Ranger's presentation 
is marred by his preoccupation with internal weaknesses and his tendency to 
assume rather than analyse capitalist and state repression. Nonetheless, 
Ranger provides rich evidence of repression which vitiates his argument 
concerning "unreadiness"; this included state intervention to ban and 
disperse meetings and arrest leaders, and the action of employers to refuse 
entry to officials and intimidate would-be members by, for example, 
spreading a rumour that members would be branded on the forehead. 
Other writers seek to provide critical alternatives to liberal analyses. Arrighi 
(1966, 1967) produced a Marxist analysis which interpreted Rhodesian 
political economy primarily in class, not racial, terms. Subsequently, he 
provided a critique of Barber's contention (1961; following Lewis 1954) that 
economic development occurred with "unlimited" supplies of labour (Arrighi 
1970b). Arrighi's account of the proletarianisation of the peasantry shows 
that there was a "shortage" (1970b: 200) of labour and blacks were coerced 
into the labour market (see also Malaba 1980). What Arrighi overlooks, 
however, is that primitive accumulation did not end around the 1920s, it is a 
continuing process (Clarke 1975). 
The primitive accumulation process is further explicated by van Onselen 
(1973, 1975, 1976) and Phimister (1971, 1978, 1988) who document the 
appalling working conditions black workers faced in the first half century of 
colonialism. They contest the earlier liberal analyses of Ranger and others 
(e.g., Gann 1965) which identify only overt industrial action and formal 
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organisations (e.g., the ICU) as nascent attempts by blacks to articulate their 
interests. For van Onselen (1973, 1976) and Phimister (1978) attempts to 
resist the accumulation process can be seen in black workers' "day-to-day 
responses to the work situation" (van Onselen 1973: 239) - what Cohen 
calls "hidden forms of consciousness" (R. Cohen 1980) - such as avoidance 
of and desertion from particularly bad employers. Similarly, superstition was 
sometimes said to be the cause of mass desertions in especially bad mines, 
and van Onselen refers to this as "boycott by bewitchment" (1973: 242). 
These authors also examine in detail strikes, at Wankie Colliery in 1912 and 
Shamva Mine in 1927, that had been largely overlooked, and they present 
class as the primary explanatory variable. They describe the poor working 
conditions under capitalism and argue that workers displayed a 
consciousness of being workers in conflict with employers (Phimister 1971; 
van Onselen 1974). 
The approach taken by these radical scholars raises the class-versus-
ethnicity debate, since they frequently seek to play down the importance of 
ethnicity. This is clearly evident in Phimister and van Onselen's analysis of 
clashes between Ndebele and Shona in 1929. They sought to 
refutje] any suggestion that 'faction fights' were and are the 
manifestations of mindless, irrational violence. Indeed, ... it becomes 
clear that the Bulawayo 'faction fight' of December 1929 was 
primarily a manifestation of intra-working class conflict. The fighting 
... was very largely an expression of competition within the working 
class about limited job opportunities (1979: 40-1). 
This approach provides a constructive counter to simplistic explanations in 
terms of tribal animosity, but in so doing the role of tribal consciousness is 
reduced to a mere epiphenomenon and culture is accorded little influence. 
Prins (1978) makes this point well in relation to van Onselen's interpretation 
of the Wankie Colliery strike of 1912. Prins argues that van Onselen's 
stress on the base over the superstructure results in an "economic 
determinist" position (1978: 119) that "precludes a sensitive analysis" 
(p.118). Van Onselen states that ethnicity, occupation and indebtedness 
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contributed to worker unity in the Wankie Colliery strike of 1912 (1974: 284, 
cf.1976: 221), but he goes on to lay greater stress on worker 
consciousness. For Prins tribe was "the key determinant" in the unity of 
workers (1978: 118). He attests that a minority tribal grouping under the 
Lozi accounted for 64 percent of the workers prosecuted (1978: 118), and 
not 45 percent as van Onselen stated (1974: 284). Rather than attempt to 
identify which was the key determinant, it is more appropriate to see both 
class and ethnic affiliation at work here. It is likely that the perception of 
exploitation (worker consciousness) led workers to unite "in the ethnic 
groupings most familiar to them" (Prins 1978: 118). In short, both radical 
and liberal scholars err in so far as they attempt to reduce ethnicity or class 
to the other. 
2.2 Institutionalising Labour Relations Before Independence 
The key law which regulated the institutionalisation of labour relations for 
black workers was the Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) of 1959. The earlier 
ICA of 1934 had recognised the right of white workers to form trade unions 
and bargain collectively, but "natives" were specifically excluded from the 
definition of "employee". The ICA of 1959 extended these rights to black 
workers, and allowed black workers equal representation to that of 
employers on industrial councils and industrial boards to negotiate legal 
agreements. Although this Act was in principle "non-racial", in practice it 
operated to control black trade unions. Representation by occupation 
encouraged fragmented craft unions with skilled white workers maintaining 
their own unions. The Act specifically permitted the formation of branches 
within unions on the basis of race (s.50(3)), and the weighting of votes 
according to skill meant substantial influence by whites in multi-racial unions, 
which dampened black workers' moves for major changes. Strikes were 
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limited to the point of being virtually illegal.^ Unions were prohibited from 
involvement in politics, and their internal affairs and international links were 
controlled (Brand 1971: 92-3, 1976: 59-62; Harris 1973, 1974a). 
The process of institutionalising labour relations for black workers began 
after World War II, when there was an increase in the tempo of overt worker 
organisation and industrial action (Pollack 1973). Associations were formed 
which sought improved wages and conditions, and the right to collective 
bargaining. A strike was organised by the Rhodesia Railways African 
Employees' Association (RRAEA) in 1945, and this spread along the line to 
Northern Rhodesia. A subsequent inquiry recommended major reforms for 
workers. This resulted in improved housing, and in the late 1940s the 
RRAEA was accorded limited recognition as a consultative body - not as a 
union with direct bargaining rights. Reforms were slow in coming (Phimister 
1988: 270) and it was only after much pressure from the RRAEA and the 
more militant Northern Rhodesian railways union, which had the support of 
the government there, that the RRAEA was eventually recognised in 
Southern Rhodesia in the early 1950s (Turner 1975). A Native Labour 
Board operated for all other industries except agriculture and domestic 
service, and this proved impracticable (Gray 1960: 327-8). A general strike 
was held in 1948, and the creation of labour boards for separate industries 
was sought by labour through continuing industrial action and trade union 
formation in the 1950s. Garfield Todd endeavoured to legalise black trade 
unions during his term as Prime Minister (1954-1958) (Harris 1974a: 66-7; 
Hancock 1984: 50-2), but he was unsuccessful and he was deposed 
primarily for his liberal leanings (Blake 1977: 313). Finally, as a result of 
persistent pressure, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959 came into effect 
^As Brand puts it, "There has not, to my knowledge, been a single 'legal' 
strike since the Act came into force" (1976: 61), and it "is only a slight 
exaggeration to state that it could only happen with the [approval of the 
Minister of Labour" (1976: 59). 
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on 1 January 1960, and permitted the recognition of black trade unions to 
allow them to bargain collectively. 
In 1962 only six black trade unions were officially registered, but this 
increased to twenty-six two years later, and by 1966 the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) recognised twenty-two black 
unions with a paid-up membership of 31,726 (Brand 1971: 101). The union 
movement, however, remained weak. Davies presents the situation in 1975 
as: 
Paid-up membership ... is ... approximately 50,000, out of a 
workforce of 900,000. Most of the gains in membership were made 
in the early 1960s; since then the rate of enrolment has been slow. 
There still exist a number of unions whose very existence depends 
upon a single leader. The number of powerful well-established 
unions can be counted on one hand (1975: 12). 
A further feature was the disunity among unions, with several federations 
perennially competing with each other. This general picture continued up to 
independence. 
Astrow (1983) suggests that the petit bourgeois trade union and nationalist 
leadership were as much to blame for the perseverance of colonialism and 
the exploitation of Zimbabwean workers, as was capital and state repression. 
The role of the trade union leadership combined with sustained 
repression by the settler regime helped to ensure that the struggle of 
the African working class was safely contained. As we shall see, 
the trade union bureaucrats worked actively to lead their members in 
a pro-capitalist direction and to limit the struggle of the rank and file 
to the narrow economics of wage arbitration. This proved decisive 
in dissipating the struggle of the working class (1983: 20). 
To support this argument Astrow cites examples of union leaders receiving 
funds and training from pro-capitalist sources (see also B. Cohen 1980), 
attempting to curtail strike activity and moderate wage demands, and 
advocating a restricted non-political role for unions. Here Astrow quotes 
from Tom Mswaka's 1963 presidential address to the Southern Rhodesia 
African Trade Union Congress: 
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It is high time all of us realised that we cannot use this organisation 
as a political platform for our political ends. I hate to have a political 
boss in the Trade Union Movement .... Politicians must stop 
interference into Trade Union affairs (1983: 22). 
It does not occur to Astrow to consider the historical context of this speech. 
It was given in late September 1963, just after the Zimbabwe African 
National Union (ZANU) split from the Zimbabwe African People's Union 
(ZAPU) on 8 August 1963. Seen in this light Mswaka's aim might have 
been to prevent the schism in the nationalist movement further dividing a 
disunited labour movement. More importantly, this point merely serves to 
highlight a fundamental problem with Astrow's shallow analysis. As Moore 
points out, while attributing to the petit bourgeoisie "the power to manipulate 
and betray whole revolutions" (Moore 1985: 111), Astrow does not tie this 
class to the material conditions that give rise to it. Consequently, Astrow 
neglects the historical circumstances in which the "petit bourgeois" 
leadership must operate, and makes an unrealistic assessment of the 
practical potential for unions to mobilise workers for a socialist 
transformation.^ 
Analysis of trade union formation from the end of World War II into the 
1970s by other writers (e.g.. Gray 1960; Pollack 1973; Harris 1974a; Davies 
1975; Hyslop 1986), provides a clearer understanding of trade union 
weakness than that presented by Astrow. Brand (1971, 1975, 1976) in 
particular focuses on the problems which have beset unions of black 
workers. While Brand records that some union leaders adopted a moderate, 
pro-capitalist approach, he also provides much other evidence that better 
explains the weakness of black trade unions than does Astrow's notion of 
leadership "betrayal" (1983: 21). Prominent features here include 
government strategy through the ICA of 1959 to control black trade unions. 
^Astrow, like many Marxists, does not specify what socialist transformation 
means;' however, this presumably involves workers and peasants seizing 
ownership and control of the state and the means of production. 
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as noted above. Other government action included the breaking of strikes, 
close police surveillance, harassment, and the arrest of leaders. According 
to the ICFTU eighty-eight unionists were detained or restricted in 1966 
(Brand 1976: 76). Employer hostility, especially from farmers and small 
employers, entailed the denial of entry to union officials and the dismissal of 
workers supportive of union activity. 
Wider socio-economic phenomena contributed to union weakness, and these 
have had an impact up until the present time. Union development was 
inhibited by regional and internal labour migration, which hampered the 
recruitment and maintenance of membership. High unemployment (Hawkins 
1972; Clarke 1977, 1978) decreased workers' propensity to strike, and this 
limited the bargaining position of unions. The low level of formal education 
and training of union leaders restricted their organisational and negotiating 
skills, and a related problem was that training programmes were preoccupied 
with mundane aspects, rather than strategies for mobilisation. Internal 
disunity in the black labour movement has been a major problem, and this 
has resulted from many complex factors, such as leadership disputes, 
differing alignments within the divided nationalist movement, affiliation with 
international labour bodies, and regional and ethnic cleavages, especially 
Harare versus Bulawayo, and Shona versus Ndebele (Brand 1971, Davies 
1975). Finally, financial weakness has been a major problem. Zimbabwe's 
peripheral position in the world economy has entailed low wage levels and, 
combined with the lack of the check-off system in which employers deduct 
union dues, this has meant meagre union resources. A further consequence 
of meagre union funds is the inability of many poorly-paid union officials to 
resist the twin temptations of corruption and reliance on foreign aid. This 
complex of factors is associated with the weak trade union movement, and 
the complicity of leaders is not as important as Astrow suggests. 
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Having noted these constraints it is also necessary to point out that the 
labour movement was not simply a compliant, non-political body. While 
moderate leaders did exist they were often attacked from within. The 
archetypical moderate, Reuben Jamela, was expelled from ZAPU and 
assaulted by "young militants" in 1962, and a rival union centre was formed 
against him before he was finally pressed into resignation in 1963 (Brand 
1971: 98-101). Moreover, there was considerable affinity between unions 
and the nationalist movement. According to Ignatius Chigwendere (n.d.), 
who was a prominent unionist and ZAND activist in the early 1960s, the 
unionists were generally younger and tended to be more militant than the 
political leaders. Chigwendere, however, provides insufficient evidence to 
support this view. There is some evidence in Zimbabwean labour history to 
support Berg and Butler's (1964: 340, 380) renowned thesis that trade 
unions in Africa played a limited direct role in achieving independence 
(Turner 1975: 74). For example, while political strikes did occur, such as 
those staged during the Pearce Commission visit in 1972 (Harris 1974a: 76), 
they were very much the exception. Brand captures the situation most 
accurately when he states that the labour movement certainly identified with 
"nationalist aspirations" (1971: 107). He quotes Phineas Sithole, Textile and 
Allied Workers' Union official, as saying that the vast majority of his textile 
union members were also members of the National Democratic Party 
(precursor to ZAPU), and then writes: 
Whereas the parties might at times have feared the unions as 
potential rivals or opposition, the unions' formal position vis-a-vis 
these parties was more a matter of strategy in terms of what they 
stood to lose by way of foreign support and relative immunity from 
government persecution. Their insistence on autonomy was 
probably founded on a desire to secure a degree of protection as 
much from direct government interference as from domination by 
nationalist politicians. A more neutral course simply meant a better 
chance for survival on [sic] the short term in difficult conditions 
(1971: 107). 
Given the experience of incorporation after independence in countries such 
as Ghana and Tanzania (Ananaba 1979), the union movement showed 
considerable insight in trying to maintain a supportive but separate role from 
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political parties. Brand quotes one of the more radical union leaders, Josiah 
Maluleke, on this point: 
We as a trade union are fully prepared to throw our weight behind 
the nationalist party's fight - after all, we all want to get rid of the 
present minority government, but we want to do so as workers, with 
our own organisation. For after independence the party will be the 
government and will be as much concerned as any government to 
increase production to develop the country. This may happen at the 
expense of the workers' wages and general standard of living. Then 
we want our own organisation to defend our position and our rights; 
if we, then are merely an arm of the party we as workers will be 
defenceless (1975: 32). 
As will be seen, several commentators on independent Zimbabwe have 
failed to grasp this point. The discussion now turns to the situation in 
relation capital, labour and government labour policy at independence. 
2.3 Capital, Labour and Government at Independence 
The broad picture of capital in Zimbabwe can be briefly indicated (cf. 
Stoneman and Cliffe 1989; Phimister 1988; Wield 1981; Stoneman 1981; 
Arrighi 1967). In the competitive sector of small and medium-sized 
enterprises there is extensive local white ownership, and Indian ownership is 
prominent in retail trade and clothing. There is an increasing number of 
black entrepreneurs in transport, repair services, retail trade and particularly 
in farming. Local white ownership is prevalent in commercial farming. 
There are some large non-agricultural corporations with high local ownership 
(e.g., TA Holdings, Mashonaland Holdings), but much of this sector is 
dominated by companies with high South African, British or American 
ownership (Clarke 1980). Stoneman estimates that in 1963 "about two-thirds 
of the productive investment in Rhodesia was foreign-controlled" (1978: 65), 
and the general pattern remained the same in the 1970s (1976: 44,54, 1978: 
68, 1980: 20). The economy was, and remains, substantially dependent on 
foreign-controlled monopoly and oligopolistic industries, as Stoneman puts it: 
the general picture of the Rhodesian economy in almost every sector 
is of one or two multinational firms operating in a monopoly [sic] 
80 
situation (this applies to some 65 percent of the 4,000 products 
^Association of Rhodesian Industries] register) with a 
I domestically-owned firms picking up what crumbs 
listed in the ... 
number of sma 
are to be had" (1978: 71). 
Thus private enterprise monopolies, whether foreign or domestically owned, 
were in key industries such as coal (Wankie Colliery), tyres (Dunlop), 
industrial and medical gases (Oxyco), glass manufacture (Zimbabwe Glass 
Industries), and urban bus services in the main centres (United Transport 
Group). Monopoly parastatals supplied, for example, electricity, oil supply, 
telecommunications, rail and air transport, and steel production. 
Compared to trade unions and black entrepreneurs, white employers have 
well established trade and employer associations in the broad sectors of 
agriculture (Commercial Farmers' Union, Agricultural Labour Bureau), 
industrials (Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries), mining (Chamber of 
Mines), commerce (Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce and National 
Commercial Employers' Association of Zimbabwe), and building (Construction 
Industry Federation of Zimbabwe). In addition, industry associations exist 
within these sectors (e.g.. Engineering Employers' Association of Zimbabwe). 
Before independence these bodies, especially the Commercial Farmers' 
Union and Chamber of Mines, generally had close relations with 
government. Consequently, the Confederation of Rhodesian Employers, 
which was formed in 1966 as the central body on labour issues, played a 
very minor role. After independence this body became the Employers' 
Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ) and its position was strengthened both 
in its representational role on labour matters, and organisationally with the 
appointment of a full-time secretariat in 1982. In the early years of 
independence a degree of suspicion, if not conflict, characterised relations 
between the major employer groups and the government. 
The formal sector employed slightly more than 1 million of the estimated 
total population of 7.4 million in 1980 (Central Statistical Office (CSO), 
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Quarterly Digest of Statistics, September 1985). In comparison with many 
other African countries Zimbabwe has a well-developed, and diversified 
industrial infrastructure. It is shown in Table 2.1 that in 1980 manufacturing 
constituted a higher percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
proportion of the workforce in Zimbabwe than in. for example, Zambia, 
Kenya and Nigeria (though in absolute terms Nigeria's manufacturing sector 
was much larger). 
Table 2.1 Size of Manufacturing Sector in Selected African 
Countries 1980 
% of GDP Number of Employees 
000s % of formal sector 
Zimbabwe 24.9 159.2 15 8 
Zambia 16.0 46.8 12.0 
Kenya 13.2 141.3 14.0 
Nigeria 5.5 1,343.0 4.8 
Sources: Calculated from CSO, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, September 1986 (for 
Zimbabwe); Africa Soutti of ttie Sahara, various editions. 
A sectoral breakdown of employment in Zimbabwe (Table 2.2) shows that 
many Zimbabwean workers were in agriculture (32.4%) and domestic service 
(10.7%) which involved low-paid and low-skilled work. The manufacturing 
sector workforce (15.8%) was quite high, and other major sectors for 
employment were the public service (7.0), distribution (7.0) and mining 
(6.6%). 
Table 2,2 Number of Employees by Industrial Sector 1980 
Employees (000s) % 
Agriculture 327.0 32.4 
Mining 66.2 6.6 
Manufacturing 159.2 15.8 
Electricity and water 6.7 0.7 
Construction 42.2 4.2 
Finance 12.5 1.2 
Distribution, restaurants and hotels 70.3 7.0 
Transport and communications 45.6 4.5 
Public administration 71.1 7.0 
Education 41.9 4.1 
Health 15.2 1.5 
Private domestic 108.0 10.7 
Other 43.8 4.3 
Total 1,009.9 100.0 
Source: Calculated from CSO, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, September 1986. 
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Many workers are employed in sizeable, "modern" organisations, and visitors 
unfamiliar with Zimbabwe are surprised by the size and diversity of industrial 
activity. Clarke lists over "1,000 'separate' sub-sectors" (1980: 209) in the 
economy, and in 1981 there were 181 mining or manufacturing 
establishments with over 500 employees, 84 of which had over 1,000 
workers (CSO, Census of Production 1981/82: 85). 
Unemployment has been a persistent major problem in Zimbabwe, at least 
since World War II (Clarke 1977, 1978). It is difficult to estimate 
unemployment in Zimbabwe since statistics for the informal and peasant 
sectors are very imprecise. For December 1979 the Riddell Commission 
proffers a "crude estimate" of 857,000 persons, or 34 percent of the total 
labour force, who could be considered job seekers (p.80). In the Annual 
Review of Manpower of 1983 the number of persons either unemployed or 
in informal activities is estimated to be 787,384 or 24 percent of the actual 
labour force (Department of Research and Planning 1983: 19). This figure 
excludes two people in each of the estimated 700,000 families in the 
peasant sector, yet it might be that many of these persons would be job 
seekers if employment were available. Accordingly, this report states that "a 
more realistic" estimate of unemployment, based on the exclusion of only 
one person in peasant sector families, is 1,487,384 persons, or 48 percent 
of the actual labour force (Department of Research and Planning 1983: 18-
19).^ ^ No matter which of these figures is accepted it is clear that at 
independence unemployment was high, and it has remained so until the 
present (Hawkins et a! 1988). Thus a large reservoir of labour is available 
and this has obvious consequences for labour relations such as pressure 
against industrial action and wage increases for low-skilled workers. It also 
''By using different methods of calculation, which are in part but not totally 
justifiable, the Annual Review of Manpower for 1984 produces a highly 
optimistic unemployment rate of 12.5% (Department of Research and 
Planning 1984: 16). 
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means government policies which might result in job losses, such as 
increasing statutory minimum wages, entail major difficulties. 
The majority of black workers in formal employment were in low-paying and 
low-skilled work. Of the 862,014 employees in the National Manpower 
Survey of 1981, 60% were unskilled and 20% were semi-skilled; the vast 
majority of workers in these two groups are black (e.g., 90% of semi-skilled 
workers were black. Ministry of Manpower Planning and Development 1981: 
73-74). Wages for black workers were far below those for whites. The 
Riddel! Commission provided much relevant data. For instance, the average 
earnings per quarter in March 1979 in manufacturing for non-blacks was 
$1,932 and for blacks $274, a ratio of 7:1; in mining the respective figures 
were $2,472 and $198, a ratio of over 12:1 (p.53). Black workers received 
low wages in absolute terms, over half (53%) the 820,000 workers in a 1977 
survey received less than $50 per month, and 28% were below $30 per 
month (p.55). Only 7.6% of workers in the 1977 survey (pp.54-5) received 
earnings above the September 1978 Poverty Datum Line for urban workers, 
$110 (p.96). In short, black workers were generally poor and wage 
increases were an overriding concern of workers at independence. 
Average annual earnings for all formal sector employees in 1980 were 
$1,863 (calculated from CSO, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, September 
1986: Table 6.1). There was substantial variation of minimum monthly 
wages among different industries; for example, in February 1980 tobacco 
grading was $22.66, building $55.25, sugar refining $76.70, and tyre 
manufacturing $99.88 (Riddell 1982: 6-7 Table 1). In September 1979 the 
mining industry minimum was $31.61 (Statutory Instrument 614 of 1979). 
Domestic service remained under the Masters and Servants Act until 1980 
(agricultural workers were also until just before independence) so individual 
contracts operated and wage rates were generally lower; for example, in 
1977 over 87 percent of domestic workers received below $30 (Riddell 
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Commission 1981: 316 Table E). Most other industries fell under the 
industrial Conciliation Act which allowed collective bargaining agreements on 
industrial councils (where there were registered trade unions) or industrial 
boards (where there was no registered union). In 1979 there were 21 
industrial councils and 66 industrial boards (Riddell Commission 1981: 257-9 
Tables 25 and 28). 
At independence, as has been noted, the union movement was 
characterised by weakness and disunity; a high number of unions existed 
which were generally small and divided. Figures for registered unions as of 
March 1980 are not available, but they would not be very different to figures 
as of 1 September 1980 which are provided in the Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into Incomes, Prices and Conditions of Service 
(Riddell Commission 1981). At that time there were 40 registered unions, 
representing 79,310 employees or roughly 8 percent of the one million 
employees in the formal sector. There were 10 separate municipal unions, 
and representation according to skill meant, for example, there were 4 
separate unions within the National Railways and 3 within Air Zimbabwe 
(Riddell Commission 1981: 256), and the close relationship between race 
and skill meant some of these unions were racially divided. According to 
the Riddell Commission "there were at least 71 known unregistered trade 
unions" in April 1980 (p.243). Many of these were small unions with little 
organisational infrastructure and some claimed membership of the same 
employees claimed by other unions. In consequence, the Riddell 
Commission estimated that "[i]t would be highly unlikely if the total 
membership of these unions was greater than 30,000 paid-up members" 
(p.260). This would mean that there was a maximum of 110,000 union 
members of the private sector workforce at independence. When public 
sector organisations were included, the Riddell Commission estimated "it is 
doubtful if the total number of organised employees would reach 200,000, 
which is only 20 percent of all formal sector employees" (p.260). 
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Focusing on the figure of 20 percent would tend to overstate the importance 
and level of organisation of Zimbabwe's trade union movement. The 
divisions on racial, regional, tribal and political cleavages reduced union 
strength. At independence there were six federations, and in addition there 
were moves to create the United Trade Unions of Zimbabwe (UTUZ) as the 
single national congress to supersede these six federations. Some very 
approximate data relating to the six federations are provided in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Selected Data Relating to Six Union Federations 
African Trades Union Congress 
Leader: Phineas Sithole 
Year formed: 1954 and reformed 1962 
Prominent unions: United Textiles Workers' Union, Motor Trade Workers' Union 
Political leaning: ZANU(Sithole)^ 
National African Trades Union Congress 
Leader: "J. J." Dube 
Prominent unions: Tailors & Garment Workers' Union, Clothing Industry Workers' Union, 
Railway Associated Workers' Union, United Food and Allied Workers' Union 
Year formed: initially 1974, dissolved, revived in late 1970s 
Political leaning: Reputedly ZAPU, but actually independent 
Trades Union Congress of Rhodesia (wtiite unions) 
Leaders: Howard Bloomfield, Brian Holleran 
Prominent unions: Associated Mine Workers' Union, National Union of Railwaymen 
Year formed: 1967 
Political leaning: Rhodesian Front 
Zimbabwe African Congress of Unions 
Leader: Aaron Ndhlovu 
Year formed: 1964 
Political leaning: ZAPU (ZAGU was in exile in Zambia before independence) 
Zimbabwe Federation of Labour 
Leaders: Abisha Kupfuma, Shangwa Chifamba 
Former leaders: Reuben Jamela, E. Tsvaringe 
Prominent unions: Commercial Workers' Union, Catering and Hotel Workers' Union 
Political leaning: United African National Council (led by Bishop Muzorewa) 
Zimbabwe Trades Union Congress 
Leaders: Alfred Makwarimba, Albert Mugabe 
Year formed: 1977 
Prominent unions: Air Transport Workers' Association, Commercial and Allied Workers' 
Union (Salisbury) 
Political leaning: openly ZANU(PF) 
^The parenthetical extension "Sithole", or "Mwenje", is often added to avoid 
confusion with ZANU(PF); however, the correct name is ZANU. "Mwenje" 
means walking stick, the symbol of ZANU. 
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Jouices: Brand 1971, 1976; Davies 1975; Coldrick and Jones 1979; Mitchell 1987; Wood 
'987; and interviews with numerous trade unionists 1984-85. 
Caution is needed in relation to the data in Figure 2.1. Alliances among 
unions changed continuously, and political allegiances were not always 
clearly stated. The data merely provide a general indication of the divisions 
within the union movement before independence. 
The labour policy of the Mugabe Government was placed in the context of 
its stated commitment to "establish progressively a society founded on 
socialist, democratic and egalitarian principles" (Government of Zimbabwe, 
Growth With Equity, 1981: 2). In the Growth With Equity policy statement of 
February 1981 there was an attempt to enunciate the policies and measures 
these elusive principles would involve. For labour relations government 
aimed (1) "to raise incomes and standards of living of all our people" (p.2) 
and reduce the income gap (p.10), (2) to end discrimination (p.10) and 
"redress the historical racial imbalance in skilled employment" (p.2), and (3) 
to "democratise the workplace ... by inter alia encouraging worker 
participation in decision making" (p.2), while (4) economic and employment 
growth was seen by government as being a concomitant goal (p.2).® 
In addition to these main objectives, the statement included a commitment to 
be guided by International Labour Organisation (ILO) policies and "the 
concept of 'tripartitism'", and indicated that attention would be given to 
dispute settlement machinery (p.10). Given the government's objectives to 
promote economic and employment growth, orderly industrial relations 
became a major issue in government policy, and from the outset government 
statements exhorted workers to work hard and unions to maintain "industrial 
peace" (Kumbirai Kangai, Minister of Labour, Address to National Trade 
Unions Seminar, 21 May 1980). In other statements much emphasis was 
®A related objective, which is outside the present focus on labour relations, 
was to strengthen human resource development, especially for blacks. 
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placed on government's resolve to develop a united labour movement, and 
the need for government to intervene on behalf of labour in order to 
counteract the historically greater power of employers (e.g., Robert Mugabe, 
Prime Minister, Address to the Inaugural Congress of the ZCTU, 1 March 
1981). These policies are examined in Chapters 3 and 4 where it is shown 
that, in order to pursue these policies, government adopted a corporatist 
labour strategy. This involved the curtailing of strikes in an effort to impose 
industrial peace so that economic growth could be pursued, and the 
incorporation of the trade union movement to support and enforce 
government labour policies (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4 it is shown that in 
pursuing its labour policies so as to increase lower incomes and reduce the 
income gap, to legislate for and administer labour relations machinery, and 
to promote workers participation, government assumed the roles that trade 
unions frequently play, and this assumption of union functions contributed to 
the weakness of the union movement. 
2.4 The Post-Independence Political Context 
It is argued in the following chapters that the Mugabe Government adopted 
a corporatist labour policy, and it is briefly indicated here that the 
government opted for corporatist political arrangements in areas other than 
labour relations. Private enterprise was retained with extensive government 
controls, and the government sought to monopolise interest representation in 
a variety areas (e.g., political parties, women, youth, agricultural producers). 
Government also expected the representative bodies to enforce government 
policy. Much emphasis was placed on curtailing opposition to the 
government, and uniting the country under the leadership of the ZANU(PF) 
Government. 
Private ownership of the means of production remains a major component of 
the Zimbabwean economy. In 1981 it was estimated that the state-owned 
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share of productive capital might have been "about a sixth" of the total 
(Stoneman and Davies 1981: 118). Significant state ownership was 
inherited from the colonial government in key sectors such as 
communications, rail and air transport, energy, and iron and steel (Stoneman 
and Davies 1981: 112-3). The Mugabe Government has increased state 
ownership in mining and manufacturing, and the public sector share of gross 
fixed capital formation increased from 41.9 percent in 1978, and 30.7 
percent in 1980, to 54.9 percent in 1983 (Ministry of Finance 1986: 30 Table 
3.9). Yet while ZANU(PF) declares its commitment to Marxist-Leninist 
socialism, for a number of reasons the Mugabe Government has not as yet 
embarked on a policy of large scale nationalisation. The Constitution of 
Zimbabwe negotiated at Lancaster House requires "adequate compensation" 
(s.16(1)c) for government acquisition of private property (see Ministry of 
Finance 1986: 8). More important, however, is the Government's policy of 
reconciliation with war-time opponents and, related to this, the perception 
that nationalisation elsewhere in Africa has raised many problems such as 
the exodus of skilled manpower (Smith and Simpson 1981: 166-9; Flower 
1987: 260). These considerations have impelled the Mugabe government to 
keep the private sector largely intact, at least for the present. 
Statements concerning the government's aims for a transition to socialism 
are usually accompanied by a recognition of the persistence of capitalism. 
This is seen in key government policy statements such as Growth With 
Equity (Government of Zimbabwe 1981: 1), and the First Five Year Nationai 
Development Plan (Government of Zimbabwe 1986: 2). There have been 
some government acquisitions, and the First Five Year National 
Development Plan presented in 1986 presages that Zimbabwean ownership, 
including state ownership, "should be increased progressively" (Government 
of Zimbabwe 1986: 2). The Chairman of the Industrial Development 
Corporation said that this policy had been misunderstood. "Far from 
nationalisation of the economy, the policy aims at increasing the degree of 
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local control within the economy, in close conjunction with local industrialists" 
{Herald 5/6/86). Nonetheless, the government has been a major actor in 
localisation, and state ownership is likely to continue to increase. A number 
of government corporations operate to promote development in particular 
industries such as mining, manufacturing and tourism, and heavy use is also 
made of state controls over capital. Measures which are aimed at regulating 
capital include the control of a wide range of producer and retail prices, and 
numerous purchasing and marketing boards control or supervise sales of, for 
example, minerals, grain, tobacco, beef, dairy products and cotton. Much of 
this complex of state ownership and control was inherited from the highly 
interventionist settler state. Independence has not marked a radical increase 
in the extent of state intervention; the major departure is that intervention is 
ostensibly in the interests of the nation as a whole and not only the minority 
white community. In the field of labour relations, as will be seen below, 
many controls are placed on employers concerning minimum wages, 
termination of employment and the selection of apprentices. This large 
degree of private ownership coupled with extensive controls is one 
characteristic of a corporatist polity; other common features are the 
monopolisation of interest representation and the enforcement of public 
policies by the monopoly bodies. 
The ZANU(PF) Government has to a considerable extent endeavoured to 
monopolise political representation, especially for blacks. As Shaw (1986) 
notes, there are strong moves within ZANU(PF) for the creation of a one 
party state. Shaw concentrates on the intellectual debates surrounding the 
issue and completely neglects the processes involved in attempting to 
achieve a one party state. Black opposition parties were effectively 
prevented from organising. Through co-optation and coercion their leaders 
were variously detained, charged with aiding dissidents, prevented from 
holding public rallies throughout the country, and enticed into joining 
ZANU(PF) (Nkomo 1984; Herald 6/8/85). Supporters of minority parties 
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were subjected to violence and intimidation by ZANU(PF) supporters, 
particularly the ZANU(PF) Youth League (Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights 1986). After losing in the 1980 elections Bishop Abel IVIuzorewa, 
leader of the United African National Council (UANC), and Reverend 
Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of ZANU(Sithole) were effectively forced out of 
politics, although one ZANU(Sithole) candidate was returned from the 
Chipinge area in the 1985 elections. In December 1987 a unity agreement 
was reached to incorporate ZAPU into ZANU(PF), and in January 1988 
Joshua Nkomo and other ZAPU parliamentarians were reintroduced into the 
ministry. There were, thus, few channels for organised political activity to 
take place outside ZANU(PF). Indeed, the party has endeavoured to 
establish hegemonic control over political representation, and ZANU(PF) 
youths frequently force attendance at party meetings and rallies by 
intimidating, beating and even whipping people {Herald 15/4/86, 21/7/86). 
Discontent in the political sphere eventually found expression through other 
channels, such as student demonstrations and the formation of a new 
political party, but during the period under study the government and party 
quite successfully pursued a strategy to curtail unauthorised political activity 
within the black community. The government has abolished the seats in 
Parliament reserved for whites under the Lancaster House Constitution, thus 
curtailing opposition from the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe, the 
successor to Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front. The government has attempted 
to gain the support of whites who are independent of the Conservative 
Alliance, and appointed to Parliament white business and community leaders 
such as Dawn Taunton, President of the Zimbabwe National Chamber of 
Commerce, and Tony Read, Director of the Confederation of Zimbabwe 
Industries. 
Within the government and ZANU(PF) members are expected to support and 
enforce official policy, and a number of government members have been 
disciplined for their outspokenness. Two prominent ZANU(PF) ministers. 
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Edgar Tekere and Herbert Ushewokunze, who are considered to be more 
militant than many other ZANU(PF) leaders (Libby 1984), were removed 
from many of their executive and party positions. Tekere, who was Minister 
of Manpower Planning and Development and Secretary-General of 
ZANU(PF), was involved in an attack on a farm shortly after independence 
which resulted in the killing of a white farmer. Tekere was an outspoken 
critic of ZANU(PF) leaders and policies, and called for an acceleration in the 
implementation of ZANU(PF)'s strategy for socialism. He was progressively 
removed from government and party positions, and was finally expelled from 
ZANU(PF) in October 1988 after criticising leadership corruption and the 
drive toward a one party state {Moto No.68/69: 15). In 1989 Tekere formed 
a new political party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement, in opposition to 
ZANU(PF) {Herald 1/5/89). 
Herbert Ushewokunze was removed from the Politburo of ZANU(PF) and 
shifted from several ministerial positions following his unorthodox approach 
in these posts. In 1981 he was removed from the health portfolio after 
encouraging a demonstration by nurses and criticising the Public Service 
Commission (which, significantly, was responsible to a minister in the Prime 
Minister's office) for not accepting his nominees for positions in his ministry, 
and for not reducing the wage gap between white and black nurses' quickly 
enough (Libby 1984: 150; Moto 4 & 18/7/81; Herald 14/10/81). After a short 
period as Minister of Home Affairs he was in turn removed from the 
transport portfolio after the Smith Commission of inquiry into parastatals 
reported numerous cases of mismanagement and irregularities, such as 
Ushewokunze's appointment of blacks with questionable qualifications and 
the removal of whites he considered to be racist (Smith Commission 1986a, 
1987). Ushewokunze defended his action on the grounds that he was 
carrying out ZANU(PF) policy for black advancement and socialism: "We 
seek to correct historical injustices, restructure and democratise parastatals 
so that they would become important vehicles in [the] transformation to 
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socialism" {Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 10 November 1987, 
col: 2186). Nonetheless, he was transferred to a ministerial position without 
portfolio. 
There were attempts through both the party and government to coordinate 
interest organisations and in many cases the formation of single bodies for 
interest representation was attempted. A Ministry of Community 
Development and Women's Affairs was formed to "mobilise, organise, 
coordinate and monitor public and private" women's interest groups (Ministry 
of Community Development and Women's Affairs 1985: 13 quoted in 
Kazembe 1986: 399), and a central role was given to the ZANU(PF) 
Women's League. Similarly, there were attempts to form bodies to 
coordinate youths. The Ministry of Youth, Sport and Culture created the 
Youth Brigade ostensibly to minimise problems of unemployment and 
delinquency, but the Youth Brigade and the youth wing of ZANU(PF) have 
acted as instruments of control by, for example, coercing people to attend 
ZANU(PF) rallies and meetings, and intimidating opposition supporters. 
Youth Brigade members shot to death five UANC members in Hwange 
during the 1985 election campaign (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
1986: 54-7, 113-34; Moto No.44 1986: 5-6).^ Emphasis was also placed 
upon corporatising interest representation for other groups such as farmers, 
non-governmental organisations. 
^Moto (No.71 1988: 4-5) reported that, after student demonstrations against 
corruption in government, 
The fear here is possible manipulation of the povo [peasants, 
workers, unemployed] by the leadership. The demonstration 
mounted by members of the Youth League against the anti-
corruption demonstrations smelt of this. "Youth League attacks anti-
corruptions demos" read a title in the Sunday Mail of November 23. 
The story quotes a statement signed by ZANU(PF)'s Secretary for 
Youth, Ernest Kadungure. The question and fear here is who is the 
Youth League? 
At this time 44 year-old Ernest Kadungure was a Minister of State (Political 
Affairs), and former Minister of Youth. 
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2.5 Interpretations of Labour Relations in Independent Zimbabwe 
2.5.1 National Labour Relations 
in this section the literature on labour in independent Zimbabwe is reviewed, 
beginning with discussions of national labour relations and followed by 
organisation level contributions. In comparison to the interest shown in 
current political and development issues (e.g., Stoneman ed. 1981; 
Schatzberg ed. 1984; Mandaza ed. 1986), and indeed earlier interest in 
labour, rather less work has been produced on labour in independent 
Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the material available is of varying quality and 
most contributions are from a radical perspective. Discussions at a national 
level have been provided by Callinicos (1981), Astrow (1983), Nangati 
(1984a and 1984b), Sachikonye (1986), Herbst (1987), Mitchell (1987) and 
Wood (1987), and studies at enterprise level include those by Cheater 
(1986), Ladley and Lan (1985), Maphosa (1985). 
Taking up Rosa Luxemburg's position, Callinicos (1981; Callinicos and 
Rogers 1980) argues that in adopting a reformist strategy the Mugabe 
government failed to pursue a socialist programme, and accommodation with 
capital entailed the suppression rather than the "development of a mass 
movement of workers and peasants" (1981: 66). As a result, the 
government crushed the widespread strike waves which followed 
independence. Similarly, Mitchell (1987) interprets the ending of the 1980-
82 strikes as part of the government's overall strategy to maintain a 
disciplined workforce and prevent the emergence of a strong independent 
trade union movement. He quotes one of the many exhortations by party 
and government leaders for workers to work hard and opines 
This is the thinking which lies at the heart of the state's industrial 
relations policies since Independence. Capitalist development, 
cooperation between workers and employers, requires a disciplined, 
peaceful workforce. It is not helped by strong independent unions. 
As the government has sought to maintain a favourable business 
climate and encourage foreign investment, it has waged a relentless 
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campaign against strikes and taken a range of measures intended to 
prevent the emergence of a truly independent union movement 
(Mitchell 1987: 105). 
These treatments are similar to the analysis adopted by Astrow (1983) and 
suffer from the same flaws. Despite repeated reference to capitalist and 
state repression the authors inadequately grasp the structural constraints 
confronting the Mugabe government and the difficulties that the labour 
movement has historically faced. The result is an unrealistic expectation of 
the possibilities for workers to build socialism. 
A number of writers on post-independence labour relations argue that strong 
government intervention to form a single trade union congress was an 
understandable and, by implication, an acceptable outcome to remove the 
influence of the formerly powerful white unions. Sachikonye (1986: 256-7) 
and Herbst (1987) portray the government as playing a positive role in the 
creation of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. For Herbst "[t]he 
ZCTU represents something of a worker success because it is a 
consolidation of the five national labour centres that were present at 
independence" (1987: 351). Wood notes that the non-ZANU(PF) unions 
which were "tainted" for supporting the Muzorewa internal settlement, "would 
be rejected by most of its more or less 'captured' black membership", and 
pro-ZANU(PF) unions attracted considerable support (1987: 65). Yet in 
order to achieve pre-eminence, these ZANU(PF)-aligned unions undermined 
the existing unions and the result was the creation of a sycophantic and 
corrupt ZCTU leadership. These writers are not critical of the Mugabe 
government for emasculating an already weak labour movement. While 
Wood offers a generally critical approach, he does not clearly indicate 
whether the Mugabe government should be considered progressive or 
capitalist, and Sachikonye reserves most criticisms for capital and not the 
state. 
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Nangati's critique differs from those of Sachikonye and Wood in that he 
specifically argues that it is "simplistic" to see the Mugabe government as 
"progressive" (1984a: 31). He adduces a critique of Zimbabwean political 
economy similar to that of Shivji (1976, 1983; see Leys 1976: 40) in relation 
to Tanzania, in which everything is seen as working against the interests of 
workers. By adopting a putative "gradualist road to socialism" (1984a: 34), 
accepting the existence of capitalism and the consequent need "to create 
and maintain a favourable investment climate" (Nangati 1984a: 30 quoting 
Government of Zimbabwe 1982b: 37), the government, Nangati argues, 
plays the specific role of the capitalist state. The trade union movement is 
thus subject to "severe control" while "control over employers is only a weak 
counter-weight" (1984a: 30). All seemingly progressive labour policies, such 
as restrictions on termination of employment, the use of labour officers to 
protect workers, and the introduction of workers' committees, are rejected as 
meaningless in practice and designed merely to obscure conflict. In the 
case of "participatory institutions", workers' committees and works councils, 
these are only consultative bodies which remain subservient to capital and 
are "simply a tool for manipulating workers" (1984a: 34). 
In contrast to these views, I argue that the "progressive" aspects of the 
Mugabe government's labour policy are not simply means for manipulating 
workers. Measures such as restricting termination of employment, imposing 
minimum wages, instituting workers' committees and unfair labour practices, 
in many cases do provide important gains for workers. They do not amount 
to a socialist challenge to capital precisely because they are not designed to 
achieve this. Secondly, the controls over employers are not as weak as 
Nangati suggests and, to some extent, the Zimbabwean state is not a 
typically weak state. There are extensive restrictions on capital, including 
stringent controls over many producer and retail prices, investment, export 
and domestic marketing (particularly of agricultural and mineral products), 
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and increases in managerial salaries. With regard to labour relations, there 
are regulations on dismissals, minimum wages and unfair labour practices. 
Given this context of state attempts to impose controls over both capital and 
labour, it is more productive to analyse Zimbabwean labour relations in 
terms of corporatism rather than to identify the state as capitalist and simply 
as a corollary dismiss the gains for labour and the controls over capital. 
There is considerable evidence of corporatism in Zimbabwe. To begin with, 
after independence the government forced the trade union movement to 
form a single national congress and to dissolve the five existing congresses. 
The numerous controls over unions inherited from colonialism were generally 
maintained and, in some cases, extended as is the case with respect to the 
prevention of strikes. Employers were also pressed to form a single national 
body for dealing with government on labour issues. There has been much 
emphasis on tripartite consultative bodies to make recommendations to 
government on, for instance, minimum wages and retrenchment. The 
government continually evokes "the national interest" in making decisions on 
labour issues, which usually please neither employers nor trade unions. 
This is not to say the state is neutral; nor is it passive. It has accumulated 
extensive legislative power and it plays a highly interventionist corporatist 
role. 
One writer on Zimbabwe has specifically rejected corporatist analysis (Herbst 
1987). In one of the few liberal discussions of labour in Zimbabwe, Herbst 
(1987) examines minimum wage setting as part of a study of policy 
formulation in Zimbabwe which focuses on a number of issue areas 
including land, agricultural pricing, foreign investment, minerals marketing, 
health services and minimum wages. Herbst spurns corporatist analysis 
since he holds that it does not fit with his desire to produce a theory of the 
state which takes into account "three vital issues" (p.10): "the patterns of 
state decision-making, the autonomy of the state, and the locus of decision-
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making in the state" (p.32). For Herbst "the corporatist model" has a 
number of drawbacks: it is only a "partial ... phenomenon in society" (p.30 
quoting Stepan 1978: 71) and therefore a comprehensive theory of the state 
cannot be developed from this, the level of analysis is "too general" (p.33), 
and it does not generate "persuasive propositions about state decision-
making" (p.29). Herbst's criticisms, however, are overstated. While he 
correctly argues that presentations from Shaw and Higgott are "too 
imprecise" (p.32), detailed empirical analysis of corporatist structures and 
processes is indeed possible, and is provided in this thesis. It is shown in 
later chapters that Herbst's analysis of the setting of minimum wages is 
weakened by failing to recognise the corporatist processes at work. This is 
ironic since he provides evidence of the aggregation of employers and 
labour representation into single officially-sanctioned bodies (pp.350-1). 
2.5.2 Labour Relations at Organisation Level 
Very few studies of labour have been carried out at the organisational level 
in Zimbabwe. Virtually all of these assume a radical perspective and 
generally argue or assume that capital is exploitative, government complicit 
and trade unions and workers' committees ineffective. Ladley and Lan 
(1985) provide an examination of a single dispute on a commercial farm in 
which the workers were disappointed and the farmer relieved at the outcome 
of the meeting with the labour relations officer. The suggestion is that the 
government supports capital over labour. In an unpublished dissertation 
Maphosa (1985) examines a mining company, a subsidiary of a multinational 
corporation, and finds that the company, with the assistance of the state, 
successfully resisted workers' demands for improved conditions and 
participation in decision-making in the immediate post-independence years. 
Nangati (1987), in his study of the private security industry, details the harsh 
working conditions and exploitation workers experienced for little return. He 
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reports no redeeming features associated with this work or in the conduct of 
employers. 
In a survey of 20 corporations in Zimbabwe, Nyoka (1987) found in that in 
12 of these the personnel manager had lower status than other managers, 
and did not perform conventional personnel functions such as administration 
of salaries of senior staff. In each of these cases the managing director 
was white and the personnel manager was black. Nyoka implies that the 
personnel function was not taken seriously, and that blacks were appointed 
as a public relations exercise. Raftopolous, Wittich and Ndlela similarly 
assert, without providing evidence, that "[mjany Blacks who have moved into 
the private sector moved into 'window dressing' positions such as industrial 
relations officers and personnel officers. The more substantive managerial 
positions have remained for the most part, a closed field for Blacks" (1987: 
34). Nyoka's conclusions need to be treated cautiously since the sample 
was not random, his measurement of status is open to discussion, and it is 
not clear that race is the determining factor in the low status of personnel. 
It could be, for example, that top management in these 12 companies 
assumes conventional responsibilities of other areas of management, and 
not just those of personnel. Personnel management has low status 
compared to the more established areas of management (e.g., production, 
accounting) for reasons other than race in many countries; for instance, in 
some US companies personnel functions for top management are handled 
not by the personnel manager but "by someone else attached to the chief 
executive's office" (Beach 1985: 594). Nonetheless, the case of General 
Industries is presented to exemplify companies which continue with window-
dressing and racial employment practices in independent Zimbabwe. 
In the most thorough analysis available to date, Cheater (1986) studies a 
textile factory of over five hundred employees in 1982-83. She examines 
the "triangular interface" of workers, management and government in the 
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context of "Zimbabwe's attempt to move from a colonial capitalism to a 
socialist economy" (p.xiii). She finds that management remained aloof and 
retained colonial management styles. Government professed to support 
workers and to an extent did so, initially rejecting the company's application 
to retrench. But when workers acquiesced to revised proposals, the 
government allowed the retrenchments to be effected. The trade union was 
rent by internal fighting and was ineffective, and the workers' committee is 
presented as being weak in the face of the more powerful employer and 
government. Cheater is pessimistic about the prospect of Zimbabwean 
workers' committees being transformed into revolutionary committees such 
as those in Turin discussed by Gramsci. Cheater's study is grounded in 
social anthropology and explicitly seeks to see industrial life "from the 
workers' perspective" (p.xix). While it might present a valid view from this 
perspective, it does not represent a broad view of labour relations in 
Zimbabwe. The aim in the present study is to provide a fuller understanding 
by taking into consideration the perspectives of capital and the state, and by 
examining three differing enterprises. 
I am unaware of any published discussions of management culture in 
independent Zimbabwe. Ethical issues among Zimbabwean managers have 
been considered (Gifford and McBurney 1988), and pre-independence 
management styles have been discussed (Mothobi and Cheater 1975; 
Cheater 1975). Baldly stated, white Rhodesian culture, with notions of racial 
superiority, a pioneering spirit and "rugged individualism", contributed to a 
labour relations management style that was at worst authoritarian and racist 
and at best authoritarian paternalistic (Mothobi 1975; Mothobi and Cheater 
1975; Cheater 1975). In general the pursuit of workers' collective interests 
was regarded as illegitimate; workers as individuals were expected to be 
happy with what they were given, since many whites considered workers to 
be better-off in employment than in villages (Clarke 1974). Thus during the 
war against the nationalists whites wore shirts emblazoned: "We Made 
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Rhodesia Great" - epitomising the view that whites built the country and 
blacks were inconsequential. Liberals were present in Rhodesian society 
(Hodder-Williams 1983) and many top managers rejected racist and 
authoritarian management ideologies (Hancock 1984: 88), but they were a 
minority and benevolent paternalism did not have much impact on 
Rhodesian racist labour relations management style. It is argued in this 
study that in independent Zimbabwe this colonial management style is being 
challenged by the government, party, workers and trade unions. 
Black managers in Zimbabwe are struggling to find their own management 
culture. It is a difficult task to find an amalgam or to chart a course 
between the cultural traditions of blacks and the structures and processes of 
western bureaucratic organisation. Mparutsa (1987) calls for organisations to 
be sensitive to Zimbabwean culture and, undoubtedly, there is a strong 
underlying desire to bring out Zimbabwean values. At the national 
convention of the Institute of Personnel Management of Zimbabwe, where 
two hundred personnel practitioners gathered in 1987, there was 
spontaneous acclaim for the following passage on "indigenous management": 
Organisations which ignore the culture and values of their employees 
treat them as 'non persons'. Under those circumstances, the 
employee could be excused if he views his work as totally 
unconnected to the rest of his life .... 
To illustrate my point, take for example an employee from Chiweshe 
holding a job in a factory in Harare. If during the month end he 
goes home to his village and discovers that a recently harvested 
crop is not secured and might be reached by livestock, he will 
demand the fullest explanation from those concerned. He might 
even decide to skip work on Monday to make sure that the crop is 
safe. Yet the same man will leave a water tap running in the 
factory because he was not responsible for turning it on. The same 
person might be the first to down tools on an important export order 
for which the deadline is imminent because it is time to go home 
and management have not suggested overtime (Mparutsa 1987: 4). 
This touched a definite impulse in the predominantly black audience; and yet 
the underlying issues are not necessarily particular to Zimbabwe or Africa. 
The worker can be likened to, for example, an Australian wage-earner who 
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at home works into the night, devotedly repairing his own or a friend's car, 
and at work behaves identically to his Zimbabwean counterpart. There are 
common strands of autonomy, ownership, challenge and self-satisfaction at 
home, and subordination to authority, lack of ownership, boredom and 
dissatisfaction at work. 
Mparutsa gives little indication as to how traditional Zimbabwe culture traits 
can be introduced into modern organisations, and what form such 
innovations should take. Most large organisations and European-run 
businesses deny entry to traditional mores (e.g., commitments to extended 
families) and endeavour to run the organisation according to western values. 
In part, this is by order of the whites who remain in senior positions though, 
more importantly in the long-run, industrialisation carries pressures for the 
adoption of rational bureaucratic processes. As Kerr et al (1960; Kerr 1983) 
point out, traditional skills and many social structures and practices (e.g., the 
extended family) tend to be eroded by the development of new skills, formal 
education, social and geographic mobility, highly differentiated occupations, 
and bureaucratic forms of organisation. 
There are a few cases in Zimbabwe in which conscious efforts have been 
made to interweave traditional cultural mores into large business 
organisations. At a tea estate in Honde Valley, Eastern Highlands Tea 
Estates, spirit mediums are consulted to improve production, and "production 
festivals" are held (Interview with Lovemore Mbigi, Personnel Manager, 
Eastern Highlands Tea Estates, May and November 1987). In a Bulawayo 
textile company. Cotton Printers, workers contribute to a fund and, in as in 
traditional society, collectively build houses for individual workers (Interview, 
David Chiweshe, Personnel Manager, Cotton Printers, September 1987; 
Moto No.44 1986: 3-4). These cases are very much the exception in 
Zimbabwean management to date. In many companies white management 
rejects traditional culture, and a colonial management culture prevails (e.g.. 
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General Industries see Chapter 5). The trend, however, is away from 
colonial management culture, and in many enterprises changes have 
occurred which mean that more empathy is shown toward black workers and 
their social needs such as responsibilities to extended families (e.g., Anglo 
American and Dairy Marketing Board, Chapters 6 and 7). 
Summary 
The historical development of labour relations in Zimbabwe has meant that 
the black labour movement was weak and disunited, while employers were 
more powerful and well organised. Liberal analyses attribute trade union 
weakness to factors such as internal divisions and workers' continuing 
attachment to the land which militated against the development of a working-
class consciousness. Radical scholars provide an important reinterpretation 
of labour history by arguing that workers showed signs of working-class 
consciousness in hidden forms of resistance (e.g., desertion). But radical 
writers emphasise class to the exclusion of other factors which influence 
labour relations (e.g., ethnicity). Another problem is that radical writers 
unrealistically assess workers' achievements in terms of socialist 
transformation (Astrow 1983), when state repression and other constraints 
provide major obstacles to such a transformation. 
The power imbalance between black labour and capital had major 
implications for labour relations after independence. In the context of weak 
trade unionism the ZANU(PF) Government adopted policies to counter 
employers' power and enhance workers' interests. Chapters 3 and 4 show 
that the government pursued a corporatist labour strategy to implement 
these policies. Corporatist arrangements were also established in areas 
other than labour relations (e.g., political representation), to concentrate 
interest representation and have the monopoly bodies support and enforce 
government policy. 
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Discussions of national labour relations since independence have been 
piecemeal. Many writers argue polemically that the Mugabe Government 
acted to benefit capital and not labour. Radical critics contend that the drive 
for socialism has been betrayed by the petit bourgeois leadership, but these 
writers do not take adequate account of historical and structural constraints, 
and incorrectly attribute enormous power to the petit bourgeoisie. From a 
different perspective, Herbst erroneously rejects corporatist analysis on the 
basis of simplistic treatments, and it is held here that more refined 
formulations provide greater understanding. Herbst in fact identifies aspects 
of corporatist strategy, but his liberal approach fails to recognise these as 
such. 
Few studies at organisational level have been produced, and again these 
are generally highly critical of employers and government's role in labour 
relations. Earlier work on management attitudes to black workers show that 
Rhodesian management style was characterised by racism and 
authoritarianism at worst, and paternalism at best. Colonial management 
styles are now being challenged. The following chapters show that the 
government and workers provide a major force for reform, and it has been 
argued here that industrialisation involves strong pressures for 
bureaucratisation. There are isolated cases in which features of traditional 
Zimbabwean culture have been adopted in large business organisations, but 
for the most part reforms have been more limited, taking into account the 
social needs of black workers in the context of Western-style organisational 
management. 
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Chapter 3 Curtailing Strikes and Corporatising Trade Unions 
I want to make it crystal clear that the ZCTU and all the trade unions affiliated to 
it will not condone thieving by our members. We want honest and disciplined 
workers whom we are proud to represent. We will not represent thieves and lazy 
people. 
Abisha Kupfuma, 
Acting Secretary-General, ZCTU, 
Herald 4 January 1983. 
We are all honourable men here .... 
- Don Corleone 
Puzo, The Godfather 969). 
Introduction 
A corporatist perspective provides the most useful conceptualisation of 
labour relations in independent Zimbabwe. Industrial action was sharply 
curtailed, the process of confining interest representation to single, officially 
sanctioned bodies was undertaken with considerable success, and heavy 
reliance was placed on the national interest to legitimate government action. 
One difference between the corporatist schema identified by Cawson and 
Crouch and labour strategy in Zimbabwe, however, is that the government 
took the major role in policing agreements, and unions played an auxiliary 
role. The first section of this chapter examines the curtailment of labour 
militancy, and following sections describe the partial incorporation of trade 
unions and limited attempts to coordinate employers' associations. 
3.1 Curtailing Industrial Action 
3.1.1 The 1980-82 Strikes 
Industrial action was curtailed following wildcat strikes at independence. The 
electoral victory of Robert Mugabe was announced on 4 March 1980, but 
before Zimbabwe's Independence Day, 18 April, strikes broke out in Harare. 
A wave of strikes quickly spread throughout the country, and Zimbabwe's 
first year of independence saw more strikes and production-days lost than 
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the country had experienced in any year since the general strike of 1948 
(Wood 1987: 67). Wood estimates that 153 strikes occurred, involving over 
300,000 lost production-days (1987: 67).' 
The unrest chiefly took place in large organisations involving hundreds, and 
in many cases thousands, of workers in private enterprise, parastatals and 
local authorities. Some of the immediate causes included demands for 
higher pay, improved working conditions, an end to racist management 
practices, the removal of racist managers, the reinstatement of dismissed 
workers, and the return of workers' pension contributions. Underlying these 
issues was what came to be known as the "crisis of expectations" in which 
workers sought immediate redress for the frustrations and unfulfilled 
demands they had accumulated under years of colonial rule {Herald 
March-November 1980; numerous interviews with trade unionists and strikers 
September 1984-June 1985 e.g., Shangwa Chifamba, Education Officer, 
ZCTU, October 1984; see also Sachikonye 1986: 252). This was the view 
expressed in semi-official Herald editorials (e.g., 23/3/80) and by government 
leaders. The government position also held that "misunderstandings" and 
"agitators" contributed to the disputes {Herald 22/3/80, 23/3/80; Sachikonye 
1986: 254). The then Minister of Labour and Social Services, Kumbirai 
Kangai, suggested that one cause was a "malicious rumour" that was 
generated by followers of opposing parties to the effect that the government 
would nationalise pension funds {Herald 19/3/80, 20/3/80, 22/3/80). This line 
of argument is hard to sustain for in the case of ZAPU, as Wood (1987: 67) 
points out, very few strikes took place in Bulawayo, the stronghold of ZAPU 
and its trade union ally, ZACU; and neither Wood nor I could find any 
evidence to support the agitator thesis in Matabeleland. The Chief Industrial 
Relations Officer, Ignatius Chigwendere, later said: "I have not seen a 
single instance of minority parties organising strikes. Under no 
'Sachikonye (1986: 268-72) lists fewer strikes, namely, 131 strikes in 1980, 
and a further 47 strikes to June 1981. 
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circumstances did I find ZAPU a hindrance to my operations" (Interview April 
1988). A minor exception might be found in the lowveld where, as will be 
seen in Chapter 6, there were some suggestions that supporters of 
ZANU(Sithole) did seek to provoke strikes to oppose the government. In 
general, however, it is more likely that the strikes were motivated by a 
genuine desire to improve wages and work conditions, and that the confused 
prevailing circumstances contributed to workers' willingness to strike. 
Workers perceived that fundamental change might be possible, and they 
endeavoured to have their genuine grievances resolved and their wages and 
conditions improved. Equally, it is probable that the agitator view presented 
by Kangai and others was primarily a stratagem to pressure strikers into 
returning to work, and to discredit overt industrial action. 
In an effort to quell the strikes, Kangai acknowledged that workers did have 
genuine grounds for dissatisfaction, but appealed for time so the government 
could formulate and implement new labour policies to benefit workers. In 
the meantime, disruption to industry would only serve to delay improvements 
and to hamper attempts to resettle thousands of people after the war 
{Herald 22/3/80). To deal with the immediate grievances, Kangai, his 
Deputy Minister, Robson Manyika, and the Chief Industrial Relations Officer, 
Ignatius Chigwendere (a former union official), visited strikers seeking to 
settle the disputes. Communication between management and black 
workers within companies was virtually non-existent or confined to liaison 
consultative committees to which workers' representatives were appointed by 
management. Kangai called for the establishment of workers' committees so 
that workers' representatives could meet with management, and the parties 
themselves could negotiate the issues. But Kangai's extemporaneous 
strategy had only limited success; strikes continued and there were 
occasions when strikes broke out again only hours after he left the site (e.g., 
Herald 26/3/80). 
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At this stage Mugabe made an address to the nation on radio and television 
which was a more persuasive exposition of the government's stance towards 
the strikes than Kangai had been able to present to strike meetings. 
Mugabe said that he sympathised with the aspirations of low-paid workers 
but argued that strike action was not the way to improve the situation; in 
fact, this would harm themselves and the community. The tenor of his 
address is projected in the following passage: 
The loss of production in many factories is to be deplored and when 
it comes to essential services, the resultant shortage of bread, and 
the spoiling of many thousands of dollars worth of dough, with so 
many hungry people in our land, is nothing short of criminal {Herald 
26/3/80). 
In an effort to show workers that their predicament had not been forgotten, 
Mugabe pledged that his government would give priority to an examination 
of the wage structure with the intention of increasing low incomes as soon 
as possible. Mugabe called upon the community to exercise "tolerance and 
patience" during the very delicate period of transition, and he volunteered 
the following opinion: "Let me be the first to say that no one is blameless, 
least of all elements within my own party, and I shall be personally seeing 
that the message is brought home in the strongest possible terms" {Herald 
26/3/80). 
In conjunction with this moderate approach, Mugabe also addressed the 
issue of law and order in peremptory tones. At the same time industrial 
unrest was occurring, there were outbreaks of violence and robbery. Not 
only had an elderly couple on a farm and a mining engineer been assaulted, 
but in a grenade attack three children had been killed. Mugabe stated that 
the "primary function" of his government was to maintain law and order and 
consequently he would give the police "whatever authority is necessary" to 
end the lawlessness {Herald 26/3/80). The warning of severity in relation to 
crime in the speech chastising strikers would have had an effect on those 
considering industrial action. Indeed, this spate of strikes ended quickly; 
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however, the issues involved were far from resolved and strikes broke out 
again only one month later. 
The second wave of industrial action spread throughout the country with 
serious strikes occurring in many companies such as Wankie Colliery, Swift 
Transport, and the Empress Nickel Mine where eight people were hurt in 
violence. On 28 May, in an effort to stem this new strike wave, the 
government brought fon^/ard an announcement of the introduction of 
minimum wage rates effective from 1 July 1980. Many workers, especially 
industrial and commercial workers, were already in receipt of wages above 
the stipulated minima, and some strikers had recently rejected offers above 
the awards {ARB-EFT 15 May - 14 June 1980: 5540). Kangai argued that 
the introduction of these minima was "only a stop-gap measure", since the 
government intended to appoint a commission to make a detailed 
examination of wages, prices and work conditions {Herald 29/5/80). To 
prevent price increases negating the wage increases, government imposed 
controls over prices of essential commodities, rent and public transport. 
Strikes continued on the day after the Minister's announcement, and the 
government's policy of tolerating strikes clearly changed. Kangai ordered 
strikers to return to work and stated that he and Labour Ministry officials 
would no longer deal with striking workers. The stricter policy was 
emphasised when about 1,000 strikers were dismissed at Swift Transport 
and police were used to disperse them. Police also used batons to break 
up a demonstration by women outside Parliament calling for the dismissal of 
Joshua Nkomo as Home Affairs Minister and the disbanding of the British 
South Africa Police {Herald 30/5/80). This hardened policy curtailed strikes 
until a third wave occurred in November 1980, especially at mines such as 
Trojan Nickel Mine, and again at Wankie Colliery. Once more the 
government ordered strikers to desist, and workers gradually complied. 
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The government adopted an increasingly impatient attitude to strike action 
and eventually took steps to stamp out strikes altogether. During 1981 
strike waves were reduced to occasional ripples. In late October teachers 
and nurses broke the calm by staging strikes and gathering outside 
government offices in Salisbury, demanding to see their respective ministers. 
The teachers called for pay increases, improved conditions and an end to 
racial discrimination, especially in pay rates. Nurses, too, put forward a host 
of demands {Herald 24/10/81). When the demonstrations continued for 
several days despite ministers' calls to resume work, the government sent in 
military medical staff to deal with patients in hospitals, and police to deal 
with the strikers. Almost one thousand nurses and teachers were arrested, 
loaded into trucks and taken to police stations where they were, reportedly, 
briefly detained {Herald 21/10/81). In the case of nurses, police struck 
people - including a Herald reporter - with batons. The Home Affairs 
Ministry stated that the demonstrations contravened emergency regulations 
that the Mugabe Government had recently gazetted, and also warned that 
future gatherings would be treated similarly. 
The strikers were told to proceed with their demands through the "proper 
channels", but the teachers replied that this had been tried for almost a year 
without success because the Zimbabwe Teachers' Association was 
subservient to the Minister, and the "proper channels" meant the pre-
independence procedures. The nurses made similar points. Government 
statements conceded that the teachers and nurses did have legitimate 
grievances but pointed out that their salaries, along with those for all public 
servants, were being reviewed in the light of the Report of the Commission 
of Inquiry into Incomes, Prices and Conditions of Service (Riddell 
Commission 1981) with a view to ending anomalies and increasing pay 
where possible. The government argued that it was justified in using harsh 
measures to end the strikes, and consequently issued ultimata to the nurses 
and teachers to return to work or be dismissed. 
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The terms of the ultimata were severe. Teachers would be dismissed if 
arrested for unlawful assembly or if they did not return to duty by 22 
October 1981. Dismissed teachers would have to re-apply for positions. 
Their previous service and benefits relating to it would not be recognised, 
and they might be posted to rural schools {Herald 22/10/81). Mugabe, a 
former teacher, was particularly severe in his criticisms of the nurses and 
teachers; they were, he said "people with unrevolutionary minds who never 
experienced the hardships of the struggle for liberation .... It is not difficult 
to arrest them and throw them into the bush for two or three months in 
order to make them feel such hardships" {Herald 22/10/81). He pointed out 
that the nurses and teachers did not strike under Smith despite calls to do 
so by the nationalists. He contrasted their strike with the patience of former 
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's 
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) fighters who waited in assembly camps for 
months without pay, and the endurance of peasants who were still waiting 
for land. The teachers and nurses returned to work in accordance with the 
government's ultimata. After examining the issues, the government 
announced a restructuring of teachers' pay scales in an effort to end racial 
differences in pay in late January 1982. This involved an increase of $3,000 
for some teachers to $6,000 per annum, the level previously restricted 
usually to whites {ARB-EFT 15 January - 14 February 1982: 6308). As 
noted above, one upshot of the nurses' strike was that Herbert 
Ushewokunze's support for them contributed to his removal as Minister of 
Health. 
Firemen in the state-owned National Railways also met with harsh treatment 
when they struck in January 1982. They called for a wage increase of 
almost 100 percent and argued that there had been too many delays in their 
case through the industrial conciliation machinery. Their strike lasted for six 
days and virtually halted Zimbabwe's national rail system, causing an 
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estimated loss of $1 million per day. When Kangai's order to return to work 
was ignored, the strikers were arrested. Thirty of them appeared in court for 
disrupting an essential service and were given six-month suspended gaol 
terms {ARB-EFT 15 December 1981 - 14 January 1982: 6275; African 
Business February 1982: 46). 
In March 1982 bus drivers and ticket checkers stopped work. This was the 
last major strike that Zimbabwe experienced until the agro-industry dispute 
over three years later. One of the major immediate reasons for this was 
that the strike was put down comprehensively and severely, and especially 
since this response followed the harsh government reaction to the nurses, 
teachers and railway firemen strikes. On the first day of the strike, 10 
March, 850 workers in Salisbury and 450 in Bulawayo were involved. On 
the following day when the strike continued and spread to other regional 
centres, United Omnibus Company strikers around the country were 
arrested: 424 in Salisbury, 315 in Bulawayo, 142 in Umtali and 101 in 
Gwelo {Herald 12/3/82). Police acted indiscriminately, using batons to load 
anyone wearing a company uniform into police vans. The leader of the 
Transport and General Workers' Union (Transport & GWU), Farai Makanda, 
was also arrested at the Ministry of Labour, even though he had been 
urging strikers to return to work and was trying to see the Minister of Labour 
to explain that the strikers were going back to work. The company was 
authorised to dismiss all strikers and could re-hire on a selective basis; 
those who had a "bad record" or were considered "troublemakers" were not 
re-engaged. Most of those arrested were given a $50 fine and a three 
months suspended gaol sentence (Interviews with General Manager, Harare 
United Omnibus Company and Secretary-General, Transport & GWU, 
October 1984). 
A major immediate cause of the dispute was confusion and disagreement 
over a pay increase. In October 1981 the Industrial Board for Transport 
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agreed to a 12.5 percent increase for drivers, and on 25 December 1981 
the statutory wage regulations allowed an increase for these drivers of up to 
16 percent. The drivers wanted to receive both increases, making a total of 
28.5 percent. The company refused on the grounds that the regulations 
accompanying the minimum wage increase had the effect of including 
industry agreements within the 16 percent statutory increase. Management 
therefore insisted that the drivers were legally entitled to only an additional 
3.5 percent above the negotiated 12.5 percent. So confusion over 
government wage regulations was central to this dispute. 
The influence of the party needs mention in relation to this dispute. At the 
Belvedere depot in Harare, the centre of the strike, ZANU(PF) meetings 
were held regularly. In 1984, they were held for 1/2-hour each Thursday 
morning, with the tacit acceptance of management. At Harare United it 
seems that party did have an impact on industrial relations; workers were 
highly politicised and they were apparently prepared to challenge 
management's policies and practices. They had many complaints 
concerning wages, work practices and disciplinary action, and they wanted 
the government to nationalise the company.^ A further complicating factor 
was that a brother of the Minister of Labour was the company's Personnel 
Officer. The workers became hostile to him and it was only after a long 
campaign and the replacement of the Minister that he was dismissed from 
the company in 1984. Party remained a factor in labour relations in this 
company, as a contest developed between the new Personnel Officer, a 
ZANU(PF) official, and the workers' committee chairman, also a ZANU(PF) 
official though junior to the Personnel Officer. Both tried to use their party 
^The company also invited the government to buy 49 percent of company 
shares. A senior manager interviewed explained that labour relations 
problems, price controls, and shortages of spare parts, foreign exchange and 
skilled labour made operations extremely difficult. In addition the company 
was criticised for failing to meet public expectations, and so United would 
welcome a convenient escape from this predicament, see also Herald 
26/3/88. 
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position to strengthen tineir standing in company labour matters (Personal 
communication Zivanayi Tamangani). The Personnel Officer was suspended 
and resigned in 1987 following allegations of nepotism in his appointments 
{Sunday Mail 25n 0/87). 
Party played a more prominent role at Harare United than in most other 
Zimbabwean companies. It was a rare occurrence for formal party meetings 
to be held at the workplace, and nationally many workers and managers, 
perhaps most, maintain that there should be a separation between work 
relations and party politics, especially while a multi-party system exists. The 
National Trade Unions Survey (NTUS) (Department of Research and 
Planning 1987: 60) arrived at similar findings with respect to trade unionists' 
views, and the Riddell Commission concluded: 
In talking to workers' committees, the Commission is convinced that 
the vast majority of workers do accept that political parties should 
have no direct influence on employee-employer relations and that 
sectional party politics should have no place on the shopfloor (1981: 
248). 
Probably most workers' representatives, outside Matabeleland at least, would 
claim they supported ZANU(PF), and this is to be expected given the social 
pressures not to be seen as being opposed to the ruling party.^ Party 
usually had an almost subliminal impact on shopfloor labour relations. As 
Cheater remarks for Zimtex workers: "Party seemed to be viewed as an 
optional extra channel of communication to the party bureaucracy in Harare" 
(1986: 128). Generally, workers' representatives would allude to party 
connections in order to strengthen their popularity or power among workers. 
Reference to party support or policies might also be made in their dealings 
with management. This generally had limited impact and government, 
especially through the Ministry of Labour (see Chapter 4), played a greater 
^In her textile company study Cheater states that "[pjresumably everyone in 
the village belonged, at least nominally, to the Party: we did not ask. Such 
an organisation implied a comprehensive coverage that was unlikely to be 
contradicted to a stranger" (1986: 128). 
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role than party in shopfloor relations with management. 
Government policy with respect to the 1980-82 industrial action warrants 
detailed discussion since the elimination of strikes has been a major feature 
of Zimbabwean labour relations, and state manacles on strikes has attracted 
more attention in the literature than most other issues. Commentators such 
as Callinicos (1981), Astrow (1983) and Mitchell (1987) condemn 
government action to stop strikes and suggest that this was the action of a 
petit bourgeois government to maintain capitalism and repress the drive for 
socialism which could be furthered by militant labour action. For Callinicos 
"ZANU(PF)'s response to the strikes was in line with Mugabe's overall 
strategy ... to accept, and modify gradually, the existing structures" (1981: 
60). These writers subscribe to Mitchell's view that "[t]he theory of a steady 
transition to socialism through capitalist growth together with an expanding 
state sector is a complete illusion" (1987: 121). 
Given their low income, the history of authoritarian management practices 
and their pent-up grievances, workers felt justified in striking. Equally, from 
the point of view of the government, there were sufficient grounds for ending 
strikes. Firstly, the government defended its position by arguing that it was 
endeavouring to achieve its populist objectives to ameliorate the poor 
economic and social conditions faced by the majority of the population. The 
government had strong policies to provide universal basic health services 
(Agere 1986: 363-9), universal primary education (Zvobgo 1986), and the 
development of black manpower (Murapa 1984; Raftopolous 1986; 
Presidential Speech, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 14 May 
1980 cols: 15-29). Minimum wages had been introduced and restrictions 
were placed on the dismissal of workers (see Chapter 4). The Riddell 
Commission had been established and its terms of reference acknowledged 
"the need for an equitable system of employment, conditions of service and 
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remuneration consistent with a free egalitarian society" (1981: 1). The 
government insisted that it needed time to implement its policies. 
Secondly, as has been seen with respect to other independent African 
countries, the government sought to justify the prohibition of strikes in terms 
of economic development. In Zimbabwe a further point was made that 
national recovery was necessary after a bitter civil war which cost over 
30,000 lives. Many more had been injured, leaving 10,000 blinded or 
maimed and 250,000 refugees outside the country (Cilliers 1985: 241). 
Strikes, the government argued, would retard national recovery. Gertzel 
points out that although the "subordination" of trade unions in Africa was 
rationalised by reference to "the imperatives of economic development ... the 
more fundamental issue ... is political" (1975: 290). Governments have been 
loth to tolerate any potential sources of opposition. In Zimbabwe, 
government presented the argument as follows. 
Zimbabwe's economy was and remains substantially dependent on monopoly 
and oligopolistic industries. Intentionally or not, strikes in these monopoly 
enterprises could cripple industry. The United Transport Group, for example, 
provides the basis of public transport to ferry employees to work in Harare, 
Bulawayo and other urban centres. Although transport is supplemented by 
private vehicles and Emergency Taxis (cars which carry multiple passengers 
on set routes), industry largely depends on United Transport buses for the 
transport of labour. In Harare alone at the time of the strike, the company 
carried between 300,000 and 345,000 passengers daily, half of Harare's 
275,000 employees in 1982 (Interview, General Manager, Harare United 
Omnibus Company, October 1984).^ 
"Figures calculated on approximately 140,000 employees each making two 
trips per day. 
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The importance of the post-independence strikes is played down by Wood 
(1987). He points out that while the 1980 strikes were high by Zimbabwean 
standards, and to some extent worried managers and investors, "the total 
loss of working days only amounted to about one third of that lost simply 
through one national public holiday" (1987: 67). Even indirect effects, he 
estimates, were unlikely to be "more than the equivalent of one national 
holiday" (p.67). But the government position was that this overlooks the 
major danger associated with the strikes: the possibility of national 
instability. If the strikes continued and escalated throughout the country 
then this could have had a disastrous impact on the economy, at the least 
hampering development and possibly destabilising the government. A state 
of chaos might have developed as a result of crippling strikes and 
opponents of the Mugabe Government (South Africa, some Zimbabwean 
whites and black opposition parties) would have welcomed the opportunity to 
take steps to undermine it (Interview with Dr Micah Tsomondo, formerly 
Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Labour and then Deputy Secretary, Ministry of 
Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs May 1985). Waterman, who 
welcomes strike action to stimulate worker consciousness, explains in 
relation to developing countries in general that: 
Since workers are frequently concentrated in the capital or in one or 
two major industries, and since they are often highly conscious of 
their potential, strikes by even small sectors have a social impact far 
greater than that of similar groups in industrialised countries during 
their period of early industrialisation, and can be in startling 
disproportion to their proportion within the particular country. 
Moreover, workers are inter-related with peasants and the urban 
poor .... Strike action by the relatively minute urban working class 
may be supported implicitly or explicitly by the rest of the poor 
(1975: 334-5). 
Zimbabwe's position was complicated by other factors. There was immense 
conflict seething in the country and the region. Many whites and supporters 
of opposition nationalist parties believed they were cheated in the elections 
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by ZANU(PF) intimidation (Nkomo 1984: 201-10).® From a staunch 
ZANU(PF) position Martin and Johnson (1986: 47-54) provide abundant 
evidence to show that national security was at risk from independence until 
at least 1982. For example, a bomb exploded on 18 December 1981 at 
ZANU(PF) headquarters where the Central Committee was to have met; and 
a quarter of Zimbabwe's air force aeroplanes were destroyed by sabotage 
on 25 July 1982. Conflicts among the nationalists included large-scale 
fighting between ZANLA and ZIPRA soldiers in Entumbane, in Bulawayo's 
western suburbs, in November 1980, and more serious clashes recurred in 
February 1981 resulting in a total of over 150 killed and hundreds wounded 
{Herald 12-18/11/80, 18/2/81). In early 1982 large arms caches were found 
on ZAPU properties, and after Entumbane, many ex-ZIPRA soldiers deserted 
the Zimbabwe National Army and dissident activity intensified. From March 
to August 1982, 66 people were killed in contacts with dissidents and in July 
1982, 6 tourists were kidnapped (Martin and Johnson 1986). 
Government action to crush the bus drivers' strike was efficacious in virtually 
ending strikes. Only occasional and, in comparison with 1980-81, minor 
strikes were experienced in Zimbabwe from March 1982 until at least 1987. 
Three strikes during this period are examined to illustrate the nature of 
industrial action and the conflicts underlying labour relations. These strikes 
occurred at Schweppes in 1982, in the agro-industry in 1985, and at 
Standard Chartered Bank in 1987. 
3.1.2 Limited industrial Action 1982-1987 
^Nkomo does not say he would have won the 1980 elections had there not 
been ZANU(PF) intimidation, but presumably he felt that "free and fair" 
elections would not have given a ZANU(PF) majority (1984: 207-8). This 
would have given minority parties a stronger bargaining position, or possibly 
allowed them to form a coalition government without ZANU(PF). 
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With only occasional strikes between 1982 and 1987, industrial action took 
other forms. This included frequent articulation of grievances by workers' 
comnnittees within organisations, unofficial go-slows, demonstrations outside 
working hours, and work-ins (where workers continued to work and refused 
to leave the company premises) in order to voice their grievances in an 
unreceptive climate. In some instances action took more militant forms. 
One of the most serious of these was the industrial action which took place 
at Schweppes in late 1982 {Herald 17/11/82). This dispute shows that while 
industrial action took place during 1982-85, such action was isolated and 
contained, and the most important immediate reason for this was 
government policy to forbid strikes. This case also raises questions about 
the involvement of the police in labour relations. 
Schweppes (Central Africa) Limited, supplier of Pepsi Cola, was very much 
a minor competitor to the only other sizeable company in the carbonated 
soft drink industry. United Bottlers, producers of Coca-Cola. In 1982, 
Schweppes had approximately half the number of employees (658) of its 
competitor (1,159) and about half the annual sales. Pre-tax profits for 
Schweppes had dropped from $503,001 in 1979 to $215,325 in 1981 and 
were to fall to $191,868 in 1982, the year of militant industrial action in the 
company (Annual Reports for selected years for Schweppes (Central Africa) 
Limited and for Delta Corporation, parent company of United Bottlers). 
Some employees saw this as a declining company whose days were 
numbered in Zimbabwe. A white senior manager was appointed who 
believed his expatriate predecessor took little disciplinary action and allowed 
workers to become unruly and dictate to white managers and intimidate 
black managers. He sought to impose "discipline" upon the workforce by 
various actions, including down-grading some positions. The workers 
opposed his attempts to introduce a new industrial relations regime, and in 
mid-October the workers assembled in the factory to hold a meeting 
concerning their grievances. The white manager went to address them and 
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conflict ensured in which the workers beat up the manager. Over 30 armed 
police came and arrested 89 workers. The workers showed remarkable 
solidarity since 85 pleaded guilty to assault (interviews with Schweppes' 
managers, January 1985). 
The role of the Ministry of Labour in this case was one of subduing the 
workforce. The ministry gave permission for the company to dismiss all 85 
workers, and disbanded the workers' committee for 12 months. This 
effectively ended any further militancy on the part of workers. The other 
notable aspect to this case was the role of the Central Intelligence 
Organisation (CIO) in the Prime Minister's Department. After the assault, 
members of the industrial wing of the CIO investigated Schweppes, and their 
investigations resumed in 1984, following allegations that retrenchments were 
being carried out on a tribal and party basis. Management rejected these 
allegations and made available documents to justify company action. The 
CIO accepted this evidence and did not prevent the retrenchments (Interview 
with Schweppes' manager, January 1985). 
The CIO operates widely in Zimbabwe and in general people are, for 
understandable reasons, very cautious in discussing this organisation. 
Nonetheless some clear examples of CIO involvement can be indicated. 
The colonial practice of police officers attending union meetings (Ranger 
1970: 153; Sithole 1977: 7) has continued. At the national congress of 
RAWU in December 1984, for example, two CIO officers attended to 
obsen/e proceedings, and the business of the meeting had to be hastily 
completed since these officers wished to leave by 5.00pm. (Observation 
December 1984). It is likely that CIO observation of union congresses was 
compulsory. Union officials at the RAWU congress considered it to be 
normal practice, and expressed satisfaction with this as their activities could 
then be seen to be "above board" (Interviews with Samson Moyo, President, 
and Anderson Mhungu, Secretary-General, December 1984). It would seem 
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that CIO surveillance of union activities is extensive, and one episode 
reveals that interference in trade unions results from this, in the form of 
detention of unionists. 
In March 1985 fourteen people involved in the Workers' Campaigr) for a 
Democratic GEMWU (General Engineering and Metal Workers' Union) were 
detained, as Emmerson Mnangagwa, Minister of State (Security), later 
described it, for "subversive" activities {Chronicle 16/4/86). Two expatriates 
among the detainees, Darcy du Toit and David Hemson, who were members 
of the Militant Tendency of the British Labour Party, were deported after six 
weeks' in detention, and there were claims that some of the black 
Zimbabwean detainees were tortured before being released (Reed 1985). 
These activists were opposed to the Secretary-General of GEMWU, David 
Chimusoro, who was aligned with Muzorewa's UANC, and alleged that he 
collaborated with employers and mismanaged union funds. In opposition to 
what they perceived to be bureaucratic unionism these activists endeavoured 
to develop a more militant grassroots organisation through study groups, and 
proposed more assertive demands such as a minimum wage of $150 per 
month (the industrial minimum at the time was $125), no redundancies and 
nationalisation of bankrupt companies {Inqaba ya Basebenzi Nos. 16/17 
1985). 
The implications for trade unions of state interference were that their 
activities were closely monitored, and they were prohibited from mobilising 
workers in a manner that the state defined as militant and therefore 
subversive. According to Mitchell this was the "clearest sign of the state's 
opposition to politically independent unions and to left wing political activity 
in general" (1987: 119). This assessment is only marginally inaccurate in 
that it suggests it was exclusively left wing political activity that was 
prohibited. In fact (see Chapter 2), the state opposed virtually all forms of 
political activity outside ZANU(PF) and government control. It is to be 
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expected, then, that union leaders were very cautious in their activities and 
they avoided confrontations with government. This made the task of leaders 
virtually impossible in trying to chart a course between government control 
on the one hand, and their need to represent and mobilise workers on the 
other. In these circumstances, there were pressures on workers to resort to 
wildcat strikes, and this occurred in 1985 in the agro-industry. 
Following the 1985 elections widespread and serious strikes took place in 
the agro-industry and a few other industries (Zimbabwe Correspondent 
1987a). The immediate cause of the agro-industry disputes was confusion 
and conflict associated with the statutory minimum wage adjustment 
promulgated on 28 June 1985. For the first time employees in 
"agro-industrial undertakings" (Statutory Instrument (S.I.) 186 of 1985) were 
awarded the same amount as industrial and commercial workers, namely, 
$143.75 per month. This was a 120 percent increase on the existing 
agricultural basic minimum wage of $65.00 for workers provided with certain 
benefits such as accommodation. 
There was confusion over the application of the term "agro-industrial 
undertaking". The regulations stipulated most agricultural industries involved 
in the "processing" of products, for example, fruit, meat, sugar, tea and 
coffee. These sectors included approximately 40,000 employees. The 
regulations created anomalies whereby field workers on neighbouring 
plantations performing identical work might be paid $143.75 on one site, 
while those on the other site received only $65.00 since no processing was 
undertaken. An amendment (S.I.219A of 1985) was promulgated on 16 
August 1985 which sought to clarify the terms of the earlier regulations, but 
this was only partially successful (Makings 1987: 191). Conflict arose when 
most "agro-industrial" enterprises refused to pay the $143.75 wage and 
sought exemptions. Exemptions had been available to a small minority of 
employers in the past who lacked the capacity to pay, but the majority of 
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agro-industry employers, 355 in number, applied for exemptions, including 
state-owned estates operated by the Agricultural Research and Development 
Authority. Bitter strikes broke out on many plantations and estates, and in 
some instances people were severely injured in violence that occurred (e.g., 
Hera/d 31/8/85, 5/10/85, 10/10/85, 5/11/85, 8/11/85). 
For Sachikonye the underlying cause of these strikes is to be found in 
capitalist exploitation (1986: 263-4). He suggests that the strikes occurred 
on estates that were in the forefront of industrial action in 1980-81, 
particularly those which were "characterised by ... transnational ownership 
and control (concentrated mainly in Anglo-American and Lonrho)" (p.263). 
This included, according to Sachikonye, sugar, fruit, coffee and tea 
plantations, but in reality the 1980-81 strikes did not occur on multinational-
owned estates in these industries except for those on Anglo-American-
controlled sugar estates. The Anglo-owned Mazowe Citrus Estate is not 
mentioned in his detailed list of strikes, and a maximum of only 6 tea or 
coffee plantations appear in his list of 178 strikes. None of these 6 
plantations was owned by Anglo or Lonrho. By comparison, he lists at least 
15 strikes in parastatals, 15 in municipal authorities, and 5 in other 
government establishments (1986: 268-72). So it is incorrect to suggest that 
labour conditions under multinational corporations were any more the cause 
of the strikes than were conditions elsewhere, including government 
enterprises. 
The agro-industry dispute provides a rare opportunity to examine clearly how 
senior government members stood in relation to a particular policy issue. 
Capital lobbied Cabinet members heavily to have the decision reversed 
{Financial Gazette 9/8/85) and confusion within government developed when 
the new Deputy Minister of Labour, Alexio Mudzingwa, was reported as 
saying that the $143.75 wage for agro-industrial workers had been 
suspended and the $75 wage would operate until an agreement had been 
123 
reached between the Agricultural Labour Bureau (the employers' 
representative body), the agricultural trade union, and the Ministry of Labour 
{Herald 30/8/85). But Frederick Shava, the Minister of Labour replacing 
Kangai in January 1984, maintained that all employees in agro-industries 
should be paid $143.75 {Herald 7/9/85). Herbert Ushewokunze, Minister of 
Transport, agreed with this {Herald 25/10/85), and the Prime Minister 
strongly supported Shava in the following terms: 
If anyone is foolish enough to take what a deputy minister says, 
which contradicts what the minister himself will have said, well they 
have only themselves to blame .... There is absolutely no reason for 
us to make a change in regard to agro-industry and plantations. But 
cases of hardship, as before, can be brought to the Minister of 
Labour and the Minister of Labour will look into them individually 
{Herald 9/9/85). 
It was clear that some senior ministers were opposed to the huge pay rise 
and this included the Ministers of Finance, Bernard Chidzero, Justice, 
Eddison Zvobgo, and Agriculture, Moven Mahachi. The Minister of Labour, 
Shava, apparently refused to alter his position in support of the increase, 
and it was only after about four months that a decision was announced in 
November to reduce the award. Agro-industrial workers' minimum was set 
according to a scale from $110 up to $143.75 per month, and for agricultural 
employees the scale was from $85 to $145 {Herald 27/11/85). This meant 
that most agricultural workers obtained an increase above the original $65 
per month, but this fell far short of $143.75. The power of capital 
predominated over labour in this dispute. Nonetheless, employers were 
unable completely to overturn the increase and labour obtained a 
compromise increase. This is a fair reflection of the power relations in 
Zimbabwean labour relations more generally. It was noteworthy that Zvobgo 
became Acting Minister of Labour and announced this Cabinet decision, for 
he is reputed to be more sympathetic to capital than those whom Libby 
(1984) refers to as "populists" (e.g., Tekere, Ushewokunze). Shava was "on 
leave" {Financial Gazette 22/11/85) in Britain where he addressed the 
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Britain-Zimbabwe Society {Sunday Mail 17/11/85). It seems likely that he 
had refused to alter his stance and left the country for convenience. 
The agro-industry strikes show that wildcat strikes were not efficacious in 
radically improving workers' wages and conditions. (This point can be made 
against Herbst's view, which is challenged in Chapter 4, that labour "was at 
its most powerful" (1987: 374) when it was engaged in strike action, 
particularly in 1980-81.) Conversely, these strikes indicate that employers 
have considerable, though far from total, influence over government wage 
policy. They also show that an important immediate cause was confusion 
over government labour policy and laws. Moreover, they reveal important 
divisions within government over wage policy, with some ministers favouring 
populist policies to improve workers' wages, while others, the more powerful 
in this case, insisted on more restrictive wage policies. 
One further strike that deserves consideration occurred at Standard 
Chartered Bank of Zimbabwe in 1987. The central issue in this dispute was 
the allegation of racism and lack of black advancement. After independence 
many blacks experienced rapid advancement into managerial, professional 
and skilled positions, especially in the public sen/ice, as whites left for 
private enterprise or emigrated and these positions became open to blacks. 
As time went on many cases of alleged racist management practices and 
lack of black advancement were reported in the media, and the issue 
appeared to be gaining in importance (e.g.. Herald 26/6/86, 10/7/86, 
15/9/87). Partly this was due to the ebbing of the white exodus and the 
slowing of rapid advancement, although this was also a product of frustration 
with racist practices which continued to entrench whites in senior positions. 
The Labour Relations Act of 1985 prohibited discrimination on a wide range 
of grounds including race, tribe, political opinion and sex, and the 
Presidential Directive of May 1980 ordered the accelerated the advancement 
125 
of Africans in the Public Service (Presidential Speech, Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Assembly, 14 May 1980 cols: 15-29). There was, 
however, no legislation for affirmative action in the private sector. Herbst 
states that it was tacit government policy to allow economically active whites 
to stay in Zimbabwe, continue in their vocation, and be replaced by blacks 
through natural attrition. "However, their children, with two exceptions 
[farming and wildlife-tourism], cannot stay" (1987: 383). This is only broadly 
correct. Career paths were not entirely ended for young whites, especially 
for children of business owners or those who embraced the spirit of 
independence, and the government did not passively await black 
advancement by natural attrition. Government policy strongly encouraged 
the promotion of blacks. This took a variety of forms ranging from general 
statements urging such promotions, to public exposure of companies alleged 
to have racist practices. There were also instances, such as that of 
Beverley Building Society and Legal and General Assurance, in which the 
Ministry of Labour ordered companies to "redress imbalances" caused by 
alleged racist practices {Sunday Mail 17/8/86; cf. 13/7/86, 26/7/87, 15/11/87, 
21/2/88). In the case of Legal and General, the white Assistant General 
Manager resigned after a meeting conducted by the Ministry of Labour 
"found [him] guilty of instituting racist policies" {Herald 17/5/86). 
At Standard Chartered Bank a wildcat strike of 1,000 workers was organised 
by the Harare workers' committee in September 1987 {Herald 12/9/87). 
Following this strike senior Ministry of Labour officials investigated the 
company and Minister Shava announced that "many of the employment 
practices ... tended to perpetuate past discrimination", and "a precedent 
setting settlement" had been reached between the Ministry of Labour and 
senior management of the bank to overcome the alleged discrimination 
(Ministerial Statement 5/11/87). The company, however, denied an 
agreement had been reached {Financial Gazette 6/11/87), and maintained 
that there were no racist personnel practices. Much training and significant 
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black advancement had taken place over a period of years, so that 26 of 
the 54 branch managers in November 1987 were black. Top management 
remained largely white, but the company pointed out that banking was 
characterised by slow advancement relative to some other industries, the 
length of service for many white managers was over 20 years, and 
promotions had slowed since the years following independence. In an effort 
to overcome the differences between workers and management, meetings 
were arranged so that workers' committee members could express their 
grievances to the Chief Executive. Practical steps taken included the 
introduction of a new job evaluation scheme, the spelling out of manpower 
plans to promote black personnel, the replacement of the white Senior 
Personnel Manager by a black personnel manager, and the commitment by 
the Chief Executive to cooperative negotiations to resolve workers' 
grievances (Observation and interviews with managers and workers, 
November 1987 to April 1988). 
There were thus three major stimuli for organisational change and black 
advancement: workers within the organisation, the Ministry of Labour, and 
the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive was receptive to changes in 
personnel procedures and practices in order to reduce the discontent among 
black employees and create a more cooperative industrial relations' climate. 
There were strong pressures for black advancement and many whites felt 
their future in the bank and the country was very bleak, as one old, long-
serving manager exclaimed: "They want us out. I just want you to know 
that. There is no future for us here. I'm getting out" (January 1988). So, 
contrary to Herbst's view, there was pressure on older whites to relinquish 
their senior positions to facilitate black advancement. At the same time, 
blacks in Zimbabwe were disenchanted with the pace of organisational 
change and demanded a more energetic role than had hitherto been played 
by the personnel function to establish or reform procedures, articulate 
policies and act upon grievances, for example, by setting out manpower 
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plans and career paths. Standard Chartered, like many companies, was 
faced with the quandary of either alienating white employees or failing to 
accommodate the increasingly impatient aspirations of blacks. The state, in 
this and other cases, did not legislate for affirmative action but engendered 
considerable public pressure for black advancement. 
Throughout this period, then, the government curtailed industrial action by 
prohibiting strikes, police sun/eillance of trade unions, and presenting itself 
as working in the interests of labour, particularly black workers. At the same 
time, the strategy was to incorporate the trade union movement under the 
direction of ZANU(PF) and the government, as is now seen. 
3.2 Partially Incorporating Trade Unions 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Soon after independence ZANU(PF) supporters endeavoured to capture 
control of the labour movement and incorporate trade unions under the 
direction of ZANU(PF) and the government. To a substantial extent they 
were successful due to a number of factors. The union movement was 
divided and disorganised, and furthermore ZANU(PF) considered the existing 
unions to be opposed to the party. To some extent this was correct; for 
example, Phineas Sithole, leader of the United Textile Workers' Union and 
the African Trades Union Congress, was a member of the national executive 
of ZANU(Sithole), one of the internal settlement nationalist parties. The 
involvement of opposition supporters within the union movement provided 
grounds for the government to intervene actively in order to change the 
situation. Change was effected by creating the Zimbabwe Congress of 
Trade Unions (ZCTU) as the single national federation, and forming 
pro-ZANU(PF) splinter unions, or trying to oust existing trade unionists 
opposed to ZANU(PF). ZANU(PF) was not a deus ex machina, planning 
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and implementing the incorporation of the union movement. Of significant 
importance were opportunists who had been associated with rival political 
parties, but who now sought to present themselves as being more faithful to 
ZANU(PF) than the founding members. In this respect the party played a 
major role as a control mechanism over trade unions, which Herbst 
overlooks when he remarks that ZANU(PF) "has become irrelevant in so 
many of Zimbabwe's decision-making processes" (1987: 431). 
From the point of view of ZANU(PF), many existing trade unions were 
controlled either by white Rhodesian Front supporters or by vatengesi 
(sellout) blacks, such as Phineas Sithole. ZANU(PF) supporters felt no 
compunction in emasculating the existing trade unions. Sachikonye, while 
acknowledging that many members of the first ZCTU leadership became 
"divisionists" and "others were centres [sic] of allegations of 
maladministration and corruption" (1986: 257), does little to question 
ZANU(PF)'s control strategy. For him the ZCTU was created to "fill the 
conspicuous vacuum in labour organisation" (p.256). He states that the 
United Trade Unions of Zimbabwe (UTUZ), a federation rivalling the ZCTU, 
was "ignored and allowed to dissolve" (p.256). As seen below, this is 
misleading since government recognised only the ZCTU, thus forcing the 
demise of the UTUZ. Wood is critical of the "tainted", "internal settlement" 
unions which gradually coalesced around the UTUZ (1987: 65), and sees it 
as natural that the discredited existing unions were supplanted by a central 
union body aligned to ZANU(PF). Yet this meant that long-established trade 
unions and leaders were weakened, if not removed, and supporting the 
ZTUC entailed supporting corrupt sycophants. Many of the ZTUC members 
did not have bona fide trade union credentials; for example, Webster 
Gwekwerere had recently returned from Britain and Albert Mugabe, although 
a unionist of long-standing, had recently been ousted from the Transport & 
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GWU leadership. Their "rallying cry was 'sign-up and support the new 
government because they will solve your problems'" (Wood 1987: 65). 
Consequently, there were no representatives of labour available to criticise 
effectively the Labour Relations Act promulgated in 1985, get trade unions 
registered and employment councils formed, increase union membership, 
pressure government into genuine tripartite consultation for wage fixation and 
labour market regulation, and contest government policy limiting collective 
bargaining. 
3.2.2 Creating a Weak National Congress 
In the years following independence the ZCTU became a very important 
organisation, despite its ineffectiveness in representing labour at the national 
level. The ZCTU was important because it was the body that the 
government, following its corporatist strategy, helped to form as the single, 
officially-recognised body to represent and control labour nationally. Control 
of the ZCTU leadership thus became a crucial issue for trade unions and 
the government. 
The Inaugural Congress of the ZCTU was held from 28 February to 1 March 
1981 with much fanfare and speeches from dignitaries including the Prime 
Minister. But the real formation of the ZCTU took place on 25 July of the 
previous year when Minister Kangai held a meeting with "prominent" trade 
unionists and established an Interim Committee to create a single national 
congress. This was quietly announced in an article in The Herald the 
following day. The formation of the ZCTU proceeded under the auspices of 
the Minister despite attempts by a number of the existing union groupings to 
head it off. 
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In 1978 there had been moves to create a unified congress (UTUZ Press 
Statement 23/11/80), and the formation of the United Trade Unions of 
Zimbabwe was reported in The Herald on 5 July 1979. This body was 
formed from ATUC, TUCR, and ZFL and claimed to represent 350,000 
workers. The actual paid-up membership could not have been even one-
third of this number, and Wood puts it as 50,000 (1987: 65). By late 1980, 
UTUZ also claimed the affiliation of two Bulawayo-based federations, the 
independent NATUC and the ZAPU-aligned ZACU which meant ail umbrella 
organisations except "one small centre", the ZTUC, which happened to have 
the support of Minister Kangai (UTUZ Press Statement 23/11/80). Wood 
says that NATUC "injudiciously" (1987: 72) attended a major UTUZ meeting 
in June 1980, but this move was in keeping with NATUC policy to develop a 
labour movement independent from political parties, in this case, ZANU(PF). 
As Wood points out, the perception that NATUC was ZAPU-aligned was 
exaggerated (1987: 66), and the deliberate policy of NATUC unions was to 
stay at arm's length from political parties. One NATUC leader, Ishmael 
Nedziwe, later explained it in these terms: 
When political parties were banned [under colonialism] the unions 
aligned with them went underground or into exile. From this we 
learnt the lesson not to be an arm of the political wing - [or 
government now. Government's can come and go, but workers 
need unions .... We are pleased when government supports 
workers, and work alongside government then. But we reserve the 
right to criticise when they are not acting for workers' interests 
(Interview September 1984). 
NATUC maintained this policy by finally embracing the UTUZ in June 1980, 
not with enthusiastic support for the organisers, but as the only possible 
means of developing a union movement outside ZANU(PF) hegemony 
(Interviews with several NATUC unionists, September-October 1984).® 
Kangai opposed the UTUZ for a number of reasons. White unionists were 
the initiators and were prominent in the leadership: Brian Holleran from the 
®These unionists preferred not to be named. 
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railways and Howard Bloomfield from the mineworkers union were Acting 
General Secretary and "Co-chairman", respectively. Also in the leadership 
were black unionists who were opposed to ZANU(PF) such as Phineas 
Sithole. The ideological direction of the UTUZ was also at odds with 
ZANU(PF), as Holleran was reported to have stated that the UTUZ was 
"totally opposed to marxism" and wanted to establish contact with the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the British 
Trade Union Congress {Herald 5/2/80). So Kangai did not recognise the 
UTUZ; instead, shortly after he formed the Interim Committee, Kangai said 
he would recognise no congress other than the ZCTU {Herald 4/8/80). 
When the UTUZ still endeavoured to operate outside the ZCTU Kangai 
declared: "Any trade unions who act against the government policy of 
having one national centre will be crushed" {Herald 9/12/80). 
There were strong allegations that the Interim Committee was a puppet of 
ZANU(PF). This assessment was basically accurate. It is true that 
members were drawn from different political affiliations, for example, Phineas 
Sithole (pro-ZANU(Sithole)) was Vice Chairman, Anderson Mhungu (not 
aligned) was Treasurer, and Brian Holleran (RF) and Aaron Ndhlovu (ZAPU) 
were committee members. But many of the executive members were 
ZANU(PF)-aligned; for example, the Chairman, Alfred Makwarimba, was from 
ZTUC, Albert Mugabe (Vice Secretary), Webster Gwekwerere (Organising 
Secretary), and Dickson Ndawana (Deputy Organising Secretary) were also 
from the pro-ZANU(PF) ZTUC. Michael Mawere (Financial Secretary) was 
known to be an organiser for ZANU(PF) and Elphegio Soko (Publicity 
Secretary) was a rival of Phineas Sithole and was later to become a 
member of the ruling clique of the ZCTU closely aligned with Kangai. 
The Interim Committee quickly became known simply as "the ZCTU" and 
reports soon appeared of unionists' opposition to this body. Philemon 
Lubengo, Deputy National President of the General Engineering and Metal 
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Workers Union suggested that the ZCTU leadership were "hand-picked 
individuals belonging to one political party" {Sunday Mail 10/8/80). Less 
than three months after Kangai formed the Interim Committee, the Vice-
President, Phineas Sithole, resigned saying thati 
the Government and the ZANU(PF) [are] trying to actively usurp the 
rights and role of established trade unions, [and] the ZCTU is 
ZANU-oriented and divisive (Hera/c/22/10/80). 
In December 1980 Aaron Ndhlovu (Secretary-General of ZACU) also 
resigned from the Interim Committee and was reported as saying 16 of the 
20 member Interim Committee were ZANU(PF) appointments {Herald 
31/12/80).^ When Sithole resigned, he claimed that the labour department of 
ZANU(PF) had created 30 unions in the last 7 months. 
In November 1980, even after Kangai's announcement that he would only 
recognise the ZCTU, the UTUZ still tried to organise outside the Minister's 
direction or control, and issued a press statement attacking the ZCTU and 
the Minister. This stated that Kangai "personally nominated" the individuals 
who attended the meeting to form the ZCTU Co-ordinating Committee and 
"seven of whom ... had no position in any trade union whatsoever!'. The 
UTUZ further claimed of the ZCTU that: it was run by a small group and 
there were many members who were not informed of meetings; financial 
records were not kept; it was creating unions in industries where existing 
unions operated well; and, alluding to the appointment of Soko and Mutemi 
despite Sithole's opposition, that the Chief Industrial Relations Officer on 
behalf of the Minister, refused some nominations to represent trade union 
organisations and appointed individuals whom the unions themselves 
opposed (UTUZ Press Statement 23/11/80). 
^ The original membership was 18. A Herald report of 23/10/80 indicated 
the membership was expanded to 25. 
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But the UTUZ did not get off the ground. Late in December 1980, Minister 
Kangai warned unionists that the government would intervene if no single 
central body was formed by February 1981 {Herald 29/12/80). The trade 
union movement duly complied and the Inaugural Congress of the ZCTU 
commenced on 28 February 1981. The government's position was that it 
was merely facilitating the labour movement to achieve unity and therefore 
greater strength, but the election results showed that Kangai sought to 
create a weak and sycophantic labour movement. 
As Table 3.1 indicates, the ZANU(PF)-aligned ZTUC contingent clearly 
gained the ascendancy in the elections winning 5 of the 8 executive 
positions (excluding the 2 Trustees). Albert Mugabe, the Prime Minister's 
younger step-brother, was elected Secretary-General, defeating veteran 
railways unionist Anderson Mhungu by only 5 votes, yet Mugabe, who had 
been President of the Transport & GWU, had just been expelled from his 
union (Interviews with numerous unionists e.g., Farai Makanda, Transport & 
GWU; Jeffrey Mutandare, AMWZ, September 1984). 
Table 3.1 Executive Elected at ZCTU Inaugural Congress 
ZCTU Position Name Union' 
Former ZTUC Members 
President Alfred Makwarimba CWU 
Secretary-General Albert Mugabe Transport & GWU(deposed) 
1 St Vice President Abisha kupfuma^ ZCHWU 
2nd Vice President Paul Mashavira ZCIWU 
Assistant Secretary-General Dickson Ndawana ZAPWU 
Other 
3rd Vice President MkhushI Khumalo NUCI 
Assistant Secretary-General Ishmael Nedziwe UFAWU 
Treasurer Anderson Mhungu RAWU 
Trustee Brian Holleran NUR 
Trustee R- Baleni ZEOV/U 
Source: Derived from ZCTU records. 
'See abbreviations for union name. 
^Recently switched to ZTUC from the Muzorewa-aligned ZFL. 
Wood notes that the credentials for entry to the Congress were "very 
relaxed" (1987: 73). Many unionists put the matter far more strongly than 
this, stating that the elections were "rigged" since Minister Kangai said this 
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should be an "all-comers' Congress" disregarding the results of the 
credentials committee. Unionists further claim that many ZANU(PF)-aligned 
unions were literally formed "at the door" of the Congress, and that only 32 
of the 52 unions voting at the Congress were authentic trade unions 
(Interviews with numerous trade unionists e.g., Jeffrey Mutandare, AMWZ; 
Emmanuel Tavagwisa, UFAWU; Michael Mawere, GAPWUZ, September-
November 1984; see also Department of Research and Planning 1987: 50-
1). Thus the pro-ZANU(PF) splinter unions played a major role in deciding 
the outlook of the ZCTU during the important formative years following 
independence. 
The five ZANU(PF)-aligned unionists elected to the ZCTU formed a ruling 
clique, and over time its membership changed. Albert Mugabe was found 
dead in his swimming pool in mysterious circumstances on 2 December 
1981, and Abisha Kupfuma became Acting Secretary-General. Ndawana 
was suspended from the ZCTU Executive by the Chief IRQ for financial 
malpractice, and Carlton Moyo came in as Publicity Secretary. In 1984 the 
leadership clique consisted of Makwarimba, Kupfuma, Moyo and Mashavira 
and they became known as the "Gang of Four". They operated with support 
of Elphegio Soko, Edward Njekesa and Dickson Ndwana and some other 
General Council members. Kangai in effect put these people into the 
leadership of the national trade union centre by allowing, indeed 
encouraging, bogus trade unions to participate in the ZCTU Congress. They 
remained beholden to him and he protected them, helping them to 
consolidate their hold over the ZCTU. The strategy of incorporating the 
trade union organisations was most successful during the period from 1981 
until January 1984, when Kangai was replaced as Minister of Labour by Dr 
Frederick Shava. 
The clique sought to entrench its power by weakening or even removing 
opponents. It continued to support splinter unions and threatened to expel 
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established unions in the clothing, food, and engineering industries {Herald 
27/9/83 and numerous interviews with trade unionists e.g., David Chimusoro, 
GEMWU; Paul Mashavira, ZCIWU, September 1984; Charles Pasipanodya, 
NUCI, December 1984). In relation to the clothing industry, for example, in 
early 1982 Soko announced that the ZANU(PF)-aligned splinter union, the 
ZCIWU, had merged with NUCI and the older leaders, Charles Pasipanodya 
(General Council member) and Mkhushi Khumalo (Vice President), were not 
re-elected so they could no longer serve on the ZCTU. NUCI denied there 
was any such merger and pointed out that the ZCIWU was five months in 
arrears in payments to the ZCTU while NUCI was fully paid up. Yet 
Makwarimba stated that the ZCTU would recognise the ZCIWU and not 
NUCI until the dispute was settled {Herald 1/2/82, 2/2/82, 17/2/82, 19/2/82). 
Kangai was supportive of these manoeuvrings, as shown in the removal of 
Ishmael Nedziwe, ZCTU Assistant General-Secretary. Kangai needed 
support from the trade unions for his new labour bill, which was to replace 
the Industrial Conciliation Act as the basic labour law in the country. 
Employers had criticised the bill and Kangai allegedly assured Cabinet that 
trade unions supported it. Soko dutifully obliged the Minister by announcing 
in April 1983 that the new labour bill was "the fairest ever" {Herald 6/4/83). 
But Nedziwe was secretary of a ZCTU committee to examine the bill and 
this committee had many points of contention including broad objections to 
restrictions on the right to strike, excessive ministerial powers, and 
provisions in conflict with one of the ILO's most important Conventions, 
No.87 relating to freedom of association (Interviews with Ishmael Nedziwe 
September 1984, and many other unionists e.g., Anderson Mhungu, RAWU, 
September 1984; Emmanuel Tavagwisa, UFAWU; Jeffrey Mutandare, AMWZ 
September; Herald 7/4/Q3). Indeed the ZCTU produced a "Policy Document" 
setting out these general criticisms and 38 specific objections, and calling for 
a tripartite committee to be established to redraft the bill (ZCTU Policy 
Document, March 1983). Nonetheless, Makwarimba and Kupfuma 
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suspended and later expelled Nedziwe from the ZCTU, again relying on the 
support of unions with dubious authenticity which had not been paying their 
affiliation fees to the ZCTU (Interviews with numerous trade unionists e.g., 
Emmanuel Tavagwisa, UFAWU; Bernard Murinda, NUCI, October 1984; 
Samson Moyo, RAWU, December 1984; Herald 14/4/83, 15/4/83, 20/7/83). 
The incorporation of the labour movement intensified from 1981 to 1984. 
The ZCTU leadership was sycophantic to the Minister and did not represent 
workers' interests effectively in relation to the drafting of the Labour 
Relations Act and, as will be seen below, pay-setting. This was also a 
static period in terms of increasing unionisation of the workforce, and 
establishing industrial councils for unions to bargain with employers. Figures 
on union membership are notoriously unreliable since unions tend to inflate 
their claims, but the broad picture was that overall union density remained 
about the same between 1980 and 1985. Unions affiliated to the ZCTU 
claimed a total membership of 161,884 in July 1985 (ZCTU Subscription 
Register 5 July 1985). In addition, the Zimbabwe Teachers' Association 
claimed 30,000 members, the Zimbabwe Nurses' Association 5,000 
members, and the Public Service Association 17,000 members (Interviews 
with association officers, July 1985). Total union membership in Zimbabwe 
in July 1985 was, therefore, no more than 213,884 or about 20 percent of 
the formal sector workforce. This was no higher than the estimate of union 
density in 1980 (20 percent) provided by the Riddell Commission (1981: 
260).® In the period 1980 to 1984, 8 unions were registered but no new 
employment councils were formed to allow unions to bargain collectively with 
employers (Interview, Oliver Takuba, Senior Industrial Relations Officer 
March 1985; Department of Research and Planning 1987: 81-2). Unions 
were also prevented from holding their annual or biennial congresses 
because the Minister allegedly instructed them to await the passage of the 
®Wood provides a sectoral breakdown of union membership (1988: 295-6). 
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Labour Relations Act (Interviews with many unionists 1984-85 e.g., Anderson 
Mhungu, RAWU, December 1984; Bernard Murinda, NUCI, January 1985). 
The ruling clique members and many of their supporters from the splinter 
unions were not willing to differ publicly from government policy. There were 
two factors at work here. On the one hand, some of them saw ZANU(PF) 
as playing the leading role as the representative of labour. The view was 
that the older unions were ineffective at best or sell-outs to imperialism at 
worst, and therefore opposed to the progressive policies of ZANU(PF). The 
splinter unions tended to use more socialist rhetoric than the established 
unions, but in many cases this was the adoption of a socialism of 
convenience. On the other hand, some clique adherents were quite simply 
opportunists who were sycophantic to the ruling party after independence. 
Kupfuma, for example, was a member of Muzorewa's UANC team at the 
Lancaster House talks, and both he and Soko had been associated with the 
UTUZ (Department of Research and Planning 1987: 23).® But they quickly 
changed their allegiance and completely refrained from any public criticism 
of the government. One reason for this timidity, no doubt, was that they 
recognised their lack of party credentials, and therefore felt obliged to be 
more ZANU(PF) than founding members. This deference to government's 
leading role was poignantly demonstrated at a trade union training course 
when the question was raised as to how minimum wages were set. One 
member stated that they were simply announced at a public rally by a 
government Minister, and the unionists present began to question why 
unions were not more involved than this. Abisha Kupfuma then interrupted 
and said: "This is a matter between the government, ruling party and the 
leadership of the ZCTU. This is not a matter for public discussion". This 
® Shangwa Chifamba, Education Officer for the ZCTU, was also in 
Muzorewa's team at Lancaster House, but he seemed to keep some 
distance between himself and the activities of the clique, and recently 
returned as Secretary-General of the Commercial Workers Union where he 
is apparently operating in a bona fide manner. 
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was a gathering of many top trade unionists in the country and Kupfuma 
told them that they had no right to question how minimum wages were set. 
Moreover, these top trade unionists acquiesced (Observation September 
1984). In other words, the ZCTU leadership was playing the corporatist role 
of enforcing government wage policy on its own senior membership. 
in short, while the ZCTU leadership enforced government policy upon its 
membership, in relation to government it was weak and unwilling to 
challenge government policy. Yet many other unionists were more prepared 
to criticise government and develop the role of trade unions in representing 
labour. In the following section it is shown how the leadership gained 
ascendancy by neutralising non-ZANU(PF) trade unionists. 
3.2.3 Neutralising non-ZANU(PF) Unions 
At around the time of independence, numerous so-called splinter trade 
unions were formed in competition to existing unions in particular industries. 
Splinter unions were formed in, for example, the clothing, engineering, food, 
mining, and motor industries. In the clothing industry, for instance, alongside 
the Bulawayo-based National Union of the Clothing Industry (formed by the 
amalgamation of the long-established Tailors and Garment Workers' Union 
and the Clothing Industry Workers' Union) was the formation of the 
Zimbabwe Clothing Industry Workers Union based in Harare and led by Paul 
Mashavira. In the mining industry, veteran unionist Howard Bloomfield and 
his white colleagues found themselves challenged by a splinter union under 
the leadership of Webster Gwekwerere, who had just returned from 14 years 
in Britain {Sunday Mail 23/11/80) where he had allegedly operated a 
discotheque (Interview with Jeffrey Mutandare, President AMWZ, September 
1984). Most of the splinter unions adopted a strongly pro-ZANU(PF) stance 
and were associated with the ZTUC though there were one or two 
exceptions. In agriculture Michael Mawere's GAPWUZ split from Dickson 
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Ndawana's Zimbabwe Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union, and 
although Mawere had been a ZANU(PF) organiser {Herald 2/5/80) he 
aligned hinnself with the non-ZANU(PF) unions. The Transport and General 
Workers' Union was formed in 1980, and Albert Mugabe was the Secretary-
General. But this union was not in opposition to any established union in 
the industry and Mugabe was voted out of office by the union membership. 
Moreover, this union was in the forefront of moves to overhaul the corrupt 
ZCTU. 
In some industries an attempt was made to take over existing unions. This 
happened in the textiles industry in which Phineas Sithole battled for months 
against Elphegio Soko and John Mutemi for the leadership of the United 
Textile Workers Union. Both sides claimed to have been elected to the 
leadership, and each asserted that the other's election was fraudulent. This 
was a bitter struggle and violence broke out between rival supporters in the 
Lonrho subsidiary, David Whitehead textile plant in March 1981 {Herald 18 & 
19/3/81). Despite Sithole's intention to mount a court challenge and his 
reported appeal to the Organisation of African Trade Unions Unity to stop 
government intervention in trade union affairs, Soko and Mutemi eventually 
ousted Sithole. The government clearly supported them since, despite 
Sithole's protests, the Chief IRQ, Ignatius Chigwendere, appointed Soko and 
Mutemi to represent Sithole's federation, ATUC, on the committee formed to 
establish the ZCTU {Herald 15/11/80). 
Soko became Publicity Secretary of the ZCTU at the Inaugural Congress 
and in June 1981 Sithole finally announced his resignation as Secretary-
General of UTWU and General Council member of the ZCTU {Sunday Mail 
7/6/81), after many years as one of his country's most prominent trade 
unionists. He was National Chairman of ZANU(Sithole) {Sunday Ma/V 4/1/81) 
so he was considered by ZANU(PF) to be a sell-out. The last time he was 
involved in public affairs appears to have been when he was arrested in 
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Masvingo following reported violence associated with a political rally he was 
organising for ZANU (Sithole), probably in 1983 (Interviews with two former 
industrial relations officers September 1984). 
While many of the splinter unions continued in opposition to established 
trade unions for several years, and some still exist, others were not so 
successful. The Associated Mine Workers' of Zimbabwe, for example, 
relatively quickly incorporated Gwekwerere by giving him the position of 
Deputy President {Herald 20/2/82). This concession was shortlived, though, 
for he shortly lost this position in elections. Bloomfield not only neutralised 
Gwekwerere's challenge, he also won an $8,000 defamation case against 
his rival who had alleged Bloomfield received $30,000 per annum {Herald 
25/6/81). 
3.3 Incorporation Retreats Slightly 
There were numerous allegations of corruption and mismanagement and 
possible theft of ZCTU funds, and as time went on it became clear that 
these allegations were justified. In July 1982 a report commissioned by 
Ignatius Chigwendere, the Chief IRO, revealed that thousands of dollars 
were unaccounted for and cheque stubs were left blank. The ZCTU was 
given a court order to vacate its office premises in Sinoia Street in April 
1982 because it had not paid the rent. In July 1984, the new Minister of 
Labour, Dr Frederick Shava, told Parliament that the ZCTU illegally sold a 
Peugeot 504 car and a number of bicycles which were donated by a French 
union organisation {Herald 20/7/84; Chronicle 27/7/84). Kupfuma denied that 
the car was sold and said Carlton Moyo sold 20 bicycles to pay for rent 
arrears and customs charges; 10 were shared among unions. Shava later 
agreed the car was not sold, but stated 24 bicycles were improperly sold, 
and added "the administrative machinery of the ZCTU was not working 
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properly" {Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 22 August 1984, col: 
1068). 
Overseas travel to attend trade union training courses was allegedly given to 
girl-friends of clique members. For example, a female police officer from 
Headlands, allegedly a girl-friend of Kupfuma, was sent to Bulgaria 
(Department of Research and Planning 1987: 53). Relatives of 
Makwarimba, Mashavira and Soko were allegedly sent to Moscow on trade 
union scholarships {Chronicle 12/10/84). Clique members were also of 
doubtful integrity as trade unionists. Makwarimba allegedly bought former 
Rhodesian Chief of Defence Staff General Walls' former house in Gunhill, an 
affluent Harare suburb, and was living above his means. The Headlands 
Hotel near Marondera is owned, according to Kupfuma, by his wife, and 
Kupfuma was Secretary-General of the Zimbabwe Catering and Hotel 
Workers' Union. Elphegio Soko was Secretary-General of the United Textile 
Workers' Union and simultaneously Personnel Manager for a textiles 
company, David Whitehead, a Lonrho subsidiary (Interviews with William 
Gillies, former Senior Industrial Relations Officer, July 1985; and numerous 
trade unionists e.g., Herbert Kupara, NUCI, October 1984; David Chimusoro, 
GEMWU, November 1984; Department of Research and Planning 1987: 56; 
Sachikonye 1986: 265). 
increasingly the ruling clique came into disrepute. Articles appeared in the 
media exposing these malpractices and the calls for reform of the ZCTU 
leadership were frequent. But this campaign began only after Minister 
Shava's criticisms of the ZCTU. The trade union movement in opposition to 
the clique had been largely incapacitated and they were extremely hesitant 
to do anything without the Minister's blessing. Their earlier experience with 
Kangai had demonstrated the necessity of ministerial support since, for 
example, they achieved nothing to reform the leadership after Chigwendere's 
inquiry reported gross mismanagement (Ndwana was reinstated by Kangai 
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after Chigwendere had suspended him), and Nedziwe was removed following 
his criticisms of the Labour Relations Bill. Even after Kangai's removal, 
unionists were hesitant to act without the Minister's approval. The hesitance 
seemed incongruent since Minister Shava was in the forefront of attacks on 
the ruling clique, as the bicycles incident indicates. 
Shortly after Shava's criticisms of the ZCTU, the Transport & GWU staged a 
demonstration, a rare event in Zimbabwe, calling for new ZCTU elections 
and these calls continued in the following months {Herald 1/8/84). In 
October, Shava seconded an official from the Ministry of Labour to 
administer the ZCTU. His role was not initially clear, though it later turned 
out that he oversaw the credentials committee for the Second ZCTU 
Congress. There were a number of meetings held by opposition unionists to 
engineer the demise of the clique, and the clique retaliated by writing a 
letter to the Prime Minister claiming that Shava was not genuinely 
ZANU(PF). According to many unionists, the Prime Minister was not 
pleased with the letter; it was addressed to him simply as "Comrade 
Minister", and he merely handed it to Shava to deal with. Shava then called 
a meeting of over 100 trade unionists, virtually the entire union leadership in 
the country, at Msasa near Harare on 2 December 1984. At this meeting 
Shava reiterated his criticisms of the ZCTU leadership. Some unionists 
stated that interim replacements should be elected at the meeting, but 
Shava argued that this could be seen as government interference. If unions 
wanted an interim committee then they should, in conjunction with the 
administrator, call their own meeting to do so (Interviews with several 
unionists e.g., Jeffrey Mutandare, AMWZ; Edward Njekesa, BWTU, Samson 
Moyo, RAWU, December 1984). 
It was not until March 1985 that an Interim Committee was formed, and the 
Second Congress was finally held on 27-28 July 1985. The results of the 
elections are shown in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 Executive Elected at ZCTU Second Congress 
2CTU Position 
President 
Secretary General 
1st Vice President 
2nd Vice President 
3rd Vice President 
1 st Deputy Secretary General 
2nd Deputy Secretary General 
Treasurer 
Trustee 
Trustee 
Name 
Jeffrey Mutandare 
Anselm Chitehwe 
Lovemore Matombo 
Jerry Jaricha 
Edward Njekesa 
Ishmael Nedziwe 
N. Mudzengerere 
Enock Gwayagwaya 
Brian Holleran 
C. Chiswa 
Union 
AMWZ 
ZSBO 
ZPTWU 
ZMIWU 
BWTU 
UFAWU 
ZCHWU 
ZCHWU 
NUR 
CWUZ 
Source: ZCTU records. 
The result of the Second Congress was the ousting of all the remaining 
clique members, although Njekesa was able to switch camps early enough 
to retain his position on the executive. Some of the prominent unionists 
who had opposed the clique were elected to the executive, for example, 
Jeffrey Mutandare, Ishmael Nedziwe, Jerry Jaricha. But there were others 
elected who did not have the clear support of opponents of the clique; for 
example, Anselm Chitehwe was elected Secretary General and he was the 
person who replaced Nedziwe when the clique ousted him from the 1984 
executive. Opponents of the clique unsuccessfully sought to have Anderson 
Mhungu elected to this post. A motion was accepted that the Secretary 
General give up his full-time membership of his own union, and it was 
known that Mhungu was unwilling to do this (Interviews with unionists e.g., 
Anselm Chitehwe, ZCTU; Jeffrey Mutandare, ZCTU; Shangwa Chifamba, 
ZCTU; Bernard Murinda, NUCI, November 1985). 
The new ZCTU leaders were more willing than their predecessors to speak 
out for trade union interests, but they were still circumscribed and 
circumspect in what they said and did; for example, they were unwilling to 
countenance strike action. When questioned on his union's policy on strikes 
one prominent union leader responded as follows: 
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Unionist: We are not interested to talk about that one. 
Interviewer: Wliat about work-ins? 
Unionist: Well you see [pause]. In actual fact I do not want to talk 
about that (Interview November 1985). 
As time went on, Mutandare began to speak out in the media in a manner 
different from that of his predecessors. This occurred at a time when, as 
Cheater (1988: 297) notes, there was increased criticism of government in 
the print media. However, the criticisms did not develop into a major 
offensive against the government; the media reported very few other 
unionists voicing objections to government policy. In an interview with the 
South African Labour Bulletin Mutandare continued his attack by arguing that 
the Labour Relations Act provisions were too restrictive in respect of 
regulating strikes and were too sweeping with respect to granting ministerial 
powers, especially to control trade union affairs, "all in all, the Minister has 
got very draconian powers, powers to throttle the unions if he so wishes" 
(Mutandare 1987: 65). Earlier Mutandare remonstrated against government 
wage policy stating that the ZCTU was not "party" to the 1986 minimum 
wage adjustment, as the Minister had claimed {Herald 30/6/86), and he 
further asserted that statutory wage increases had a retarding effect on 
collective bargaining {Moto No.47 1986: 3). When he returned from an ILO 
meeting in July he attacked the government as it "has not ratified a single 
ILO convention since independence" {Sunday /Wa/7 6/7/86). 
For these challenges to government policy he was in turn attacked by the 
government. Minister Shava hit back at Mutandare in the media by saying 
the ZCTU was involved in setting the minimum wages and further, that 
"some" ILO conventions had been ratified since independence {Herald 
1/7/86, 8/7/86, 25/7/86). After these exchanges an editorial in the 
semi-official Herald (9/7/86) entitled "ZCTU rambles", expostulated against 
the ZCTU and adjured it to work in unison with the government. At a later 
date, after the ZCTU called for representation in Parliament for labour 
representatives following the abolition of the white reserved seats {Herald 
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25/10/87), Mutandare was again attacked. This time he was censured by 
the Speaker of the House of Assembly and a Herald editorial which advised 
him to stop promoting sectionalism and spend his time on more constructive 
issues, such as building the labour college using the materials donated in 
1983 and which were still "rotting in the open in Chitungwisa" (26/10/87). 
There was another aspect to circumspection in Mutandare's criticisms. The 
ZANU(PF) Government was seen as the harbinger of independence and the 
champion of the povo, so Mutandare and other union leaders accepted that 
the ruling party played the leading role in setting economic and perhaps 
even labour policy. When Mutandare addressed a May Day rally, for 
example, he began by shouting "Viva ZANU" three or four times 
(Observation 1986, 1987). But that does not mean he and other labour 
leaders were completely dominated by the party or government. He 
performed a balancing act, knowing that he could not go too far in his 
criticisms of government, yet trying to represent labour and not be a simple 
"appendage of the government", as he put it (Mutandare 1987: 67). 
Mutandare ventured to criticise government policy in a careful manner, but 
he was aware that this should be balanced, as the following statement 
reveals. 
Here the government people talk about socialism. Of course, they 
talk about socialism in the day, and they're capitalists at night. But 
we know that there are real limitations on what we can achieve at 
this point in time. We believe in socialism, we think we should 
gravitate slowly towards socialism, not rapidly, otherwise we get a 
disaster like in Tanzania.... 
I don't want to be considered a reactionary. Let me say that I do 
believe in socialism, I think we have to start right away. But I don't 
think we can do it rapidly ... (Mutandare 1987: 68). 
Like many Zimbabweans, he was also hesitant to attack specific government 
members. When asked: "Have things improved with the new Labour 
Minister?" He replied: 
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You know, this is a very dangerous thing to say, I don't want to be 
seen to be crossing swords with the Minister, you know we have to 
get along, and I'd rather not comment on the various iVlinisters of 
Labour that we have had (i\/1utandare 1987: 69). 
Unions were prevented from adopting a position in political opposition to 
government, but there were signs that the union movement was becoming 
better organised under the second ZCTU leadership and the direction of 
Minister Shava. Union density remained static: in March 1988 unions 
affiliated to the ZCTU claimed a total membership of 162,835 (ZCTU 
document 10 March 1988), almost identical to the figure for July 1985 
(161,884). But from 1984 to 1987 the number of registered trade unions 
and employment councils increased markedly. From 1984 to July 1987, 11 
unions were registered (compared to 8 from 1980 to 1983), and between 
1985 and December 1987 4 new employment councils were formed to allow 
unions to negotiate industrial agreements with employers (no new councils 
were formed from 1980 to 1984) (Interview with Oliver Takuba, Senior 
Industrial Relations Officer, March 1985; Department of Research and 
Planning 1987: 81-2; Ministry of Labour records). 
3.4 Limited Incorporation of Employers' Organisations 
Government attempted to organise employers into a single officially 
recognised body to deal with labour matters. This reorganisation was much 
less thorough-going than for trade unions, and is only briefly examined here. 
The government insisted on dealing with only one employers' organisation, 
the Employers' Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ), for national labour 
relations issues such as minimum wage negotiations, ILO matters and the 
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drafting of labour relations regulations. However, the incorporation of 
employers' groups was far less successful than was the case for trade 
unions. Sectoral employer bodies occasionally continued to make direct 
representations to the Ministry of Labour on issues particular to their 
industry. Unlike black trade unions the sectoral employer bodies (e.g., 
Confederation of Zimbabwe Industry (CZl), Commercial Farmers' Union, 
Chamber of Mines) were strong organisationally and financially, and they 
had considerable political clout both before and after independence (Murray 
1970; Stoneman and Cliffe 1989: 108-10). The main employers' groups 
were dominated by whites and they viewed ZANU(PF) with suspicion if not 
hostility, thus the ruling party was unable to attract support among 
employers as it did in the labour movement. Still, employers generally did 
not wish to be seen to be totally opposed to the government, and, 
admittedly with reluctance, agreed to compromise with government labour 
policy on many issues such as minimum wages and termination of 
employment restrictions. 
While government did not control the election of the EMCOZ executive, this 
organisation appointed personnel who could develop a cooperative 
relationship with government. EMCOZ appointed David Chanaiwa as 
Executive Director, and Dawn Hove as an organising officer, both of whom 
were black former Ministry of Labour officials. Chanaiwa had held a very 
senior position as Director of Employment and Hove was a Senior Labour 
Relations Officer responsible for the administration of employment boards. 
Employers' associations have not been controlled to the extent that trade 
unions have; nonetheless, the government does influence some of their 
affairs. Employers are expected to eschew open opposition to government 
policy. One example of government influence occurred after the President 
of CZl, John Mkushi, stated in a television interview that Zimbabwe's 
economy would collapse if it imposed economic sanctions on South Africa. 
The government and reports in the semi-official newspapers strongly 
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criticised Mkushi, and four black CZI members resigned in protest. CZI was 
attacked for having predominantly white membership drawn from 
multinational corporations and the private sector generally and under-
representing parastatals {Sunday Mail 22712/85, 5/1/86). Later CZI 
moderated its policy on sanctions in order to improve relations with 
government. 
Herbst characterises EMCOZ as follows: 
EMCOZ was created recently (1986 was the first year it was 
completely involved in wage bargaining) because the government 
wanted to negotiate with only one group of employers during the 
wage-setting process. EMCOZ is well-organised, adequately funded, 
and quite sophisticated in its lobbying techniques. The director ..., 
Dr David Chanaiwa, is a former Ministry of Labour official who was 
intimately involved in writing much of the current labour legislation 
(1987: 350). 
This view is broadly correct although EMCOZ's predecessor was created in 
1966, and Herbst misses the corporatist significance of the government's 
insistence that EMCOZ be the monopoly representative body for employers 
on national labour matters. Employers valued EMCOZ for providing sen/ices 
such as advice on and interpretation of labour law and practice, and getting 
the voice of employers heard on wages and labour law especially during the 
chaotic years following independence. Nonetheless, employers preferred to 
negotiate wages on a sectoral basis, and would have continued doing so if it 
were not for government insistence on centralised wage-setting (Interviews 
with George Makings, EMCOZ, April and December 1985; Doug Verden, 
Chamber of Mines, October 1984 and April 1988; Lovemore Marere, CZI, 
September 1984). 
Conclusion 
A primary objective in state labour policy following independence was to end 
industrial action. This was attempted by exhorting workers to support 
government and party policies to benefit workers and aid national recovery. 
When this was not entirely successful strikes were repressed and police 
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monitoring of labour activities intensified. This virtually ended strikes 
although wildcat industrial action occasionally broke out. Often the 
immediate cause of these strikes was confusion over government wage 
policy. A corporatist labour strategy was pursued in which trade unions, and 
to a lesser extent employers, were organised into a single, officially 
recognised body. ZANU(PF)-aligned unionists gained control of the union 
movement. This was justified on the grounds that ZANU(PF) provided the 
leading role in promoting workers' interests; however, the result was a weak 
union congress that was sycophantic to the government, and played a role 
in enforcing compliance with government labour policies such as support for 
the new labour relations bill, minimum wage policy and the no strike policy. 
Given the political tension in Zimbabwe and the region, government mounted 
a strong argument that strikes could jeopardise political stability, but as the 
ZANU(PF) government consolidated its position this argument lost force. 
From 1987 discontent in the community was expressed by disillusioned 
ZANU(PF) leaders (e.g., Edgar Tekere, Byron Hove), and student 
demonstrations against corruption in government, but controls over the 
labour movement prevented strikes by workers at least until 1988. 
Nonetheless, dissatisfaction with the sycophantic ZCTU leadership was 
sufficient to engender their removal, and the new leadership was more 
prepared to criticise government labour policy. 
Gertzel points out in relation to African governments generally, that controls 
over trade unions were rationalised in terms of economic imperatives, yet 
the key issue was political control, since any potential opposition to 
government and party was not tolerated (1975: 290). Zimbabwean trade 
unions were subordinated to government and party to a much greater 
degree than was the case in Zambia. In both countries the union movement 
did not formally become a wing of the party, as was practically the case in 
Ghana and Tanzania (Ananaba 1979). In Zambia, the Mineworkers' Union, 
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the most powerful union, "resisted steadily anything that smacked of party 
political interference" (Gertzel 1975: 293; cf. Gertzel 1979; Bates 1971: 146-
65). Gertzel notes that the Zambian government has taken many steps to 
control unions, for example by appointing "strong" leaders to government 
positions (1975: 295), and there are elaborate laws to prohibit strikes in 
essential services, but despite this the government has refrained from 
prosecuting strikers: "Thus, although in 1970 there were nineteen stoppages 
... In] essential services ..., no prosecutions were made" (Gertzel 1979: 338-
9). As Gertzel explains: 
The length of Zambia's miners' industrial experience, the strength of 
the union as an institution, the miners' strategic position in industry, 
have all helped the union to maintain some degree of independent 
action in relation to collective bargaining (1975: 295). 
In Zimbabwe this did not obtain. Due to the history of state repression, 
internal disunity, organisational and financial weakness, and the leading role 
of ZANU(PF) in the liberation struggle, Zimbabwean trade unions were 
unable to resist moves to subordinate them to the government and party. 
Similarly, the government did not hesitate in prosecuting strikers, and strikes 
were virtually stamped out. Curtailing industrial action and controlling trade 
unions were the first steps in incorporating labour. The following chapter 
examines the assumption by government of trade union functions, such as 
wage-setting and job protection. 
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Chapter 4 Government Assumption of Trade Union Functions 
No longer are the strictures of past legislation and the employment of draconian 
laws to thwart the development of a labour movement a necessary resort. 
Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, 
Inaugural Congress of the 2CTU, 1 March 1981. 
Our role as mediator for the workers has been hijacked by government. 
Decisions are being made for us, yet government should only come in on 
invitation, and as long as the government continues to interfere with the union, it 
will be difficult for the union to represent the workers effectively. 
Jeffrey Mutandare, President ZCTU, 
{Moto No.47 1986: 3). 
At least if we control it we can cover it better, organise it better, make sure it 
causes less trouble. Being in it is not so bad, there has to be control, there has 
to be protection, there has to be organisation, we can't have everybody running 
around doing just what they please like a bunch of anarchists. 
Don Falcone 
Puzo, The Godfather {1969). 
Introduction 
In attempting to implement its labour policies government assumed many 
basic trade union roles, and this contributed to the incorporation of the 
labour movement. This process is analysed in this chapter by examining 
four major government labour policies: (1) increasing lower-level incomes 
and reducing the income gap, (2) establishing and administering labour 
relations machinery to protect workers and ensure industrial peace, (3) 
promoting democracy in the work place, and (4) establishing tripartite 
institutions.^ 
There has been some discussion of government labour policies in the 
literature. It has been noted that statutory wage increases have not kept 
pace with inflation (Herbst 1987; Zimbabwe Correspondent 1987b). Some 
writers suggest that the government has not administered labour laws to the 
benefit of workers. Ladley and Lan (1985) and Cheater (1986), for example. 
^Two other major government labour objectives were to end discrimination 
and generate employment growth. Employment growth is considered in the 
context of wage policy in this chapter. Anti-discrimination laws are also 
discussed in this chapter, and government policy on discrimination was 
discussed in the previous chapter. The case studies also discuss this issue. 
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suggest that government labour relations officers better serve the interests of 
employers than those of workers, and Nangati (1984b) argues that the 
tripartite committee to decide employer applications for retrenchment does 
not protect workers. There is also reference to the possibility that workers' 
committees were created by government to rival the existing unions (Cheater 
1988: 296). These conclusions are assessed after an analysis of the 
manner in which government labour policies had the effect of assuming 
trade union functions. 
4.1 Wage Policy and Employment 
4.1.1 Wage Regulation 
From independence government policy was to improve workers' wages but 
there was no coherent incomes policy to achieve this. There was an 
attempt to increase statutory minimum wages annually, but in the face of 
difficult economic conditions and employer resistance these were imposed in 
an irregular manner. Government intervention to control wages superseded 
collective bargaining, and this meant that government assumed one of the 
major functions that trade unions frequently perform. 
Government intervention in setting minimum wages has had a major impact 
on wages since independence. Much pressure came from striking workers 
in 1980 and in an attempt to head off the strikes, and in keeping with its 
policy of improving pay for workers, the government announced a statutory 
minimum wage for workers in certain industries effective from 1 July 1980. 
The increases were awarded under the Minimum Wage Act, No.4 of 1980, 
one of the first Acts of the new government. 
Trade unionists such as Phineas Sithole {Herald 30/5/80) pointed out that 
the $70 for industrial and commercial workers was well below the Poverty 
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Datum Line level (the minimum amount necessary to sustain an urban family 
of six, Riddel! and Harris 1975), which was $120 in 1980. While workers 
argued that the increase was insufficient, many employers were opposed to 
minimum wage awards altogether and sought to lay off workers. White 
Members of Parliament speaking on their behalf claimed that employers, 
especially farmers, lacked the capacity to pay the minima. Workers would 
have to be sacked or businesses would fold {Herald 22/5/80). 
In the following years, the government continued to walk a tight-rope 
between those pushing for wage increases and those resisting them (see 
Table 4.1). In favour of increases were workers and their sympathisers 
including elements within ZANU(PF), and the Commission of Inquiry into 
Incomes Prices and Conditions of Service, chaired by Roger Riddell, who 
supported increased incomes for blacks. In general, those opposed to 
minimum wages were employers, some white Members of Parliament, the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and some University of 
Zimbabwe academics (Muir et al 1982; World Bank 1985 and 1987). 
Table 4.1 Statutory Minimum Monthly Wages 1980-1988 
Industry 
Domestic' Agriculture^ Mining^ industry & 
Grade 1 Grade 3 Commerce 
1/7/80 30 30 43 (70) 70 
1/1/81 30 30 58 (85) 85 
1/1/82 50-62 54-66 50-60 105 105 
1/9/83 55-67 59-71 55-65 110 115 
1/7/84 65-77 69-81 65-75 120 125 
1/7/85 75-93 79-97 75-90 143.75 143.75 
1/7/86 85-103 89-107 85-100 158.13 158.13 
1/3/88 100-118.50 104-122.50 100-115.50 181.85 181.85 
Sources: Minimum Wages (Specification of Minimum Wages) Notices: S.1.367 of 1980; 
925B of 1981; 455A of 1983; 238B of 1984; 186 of 1985; Labour Relations (Specification of 
Minimum Wages) Notices: 195 of 1986 and 26B of 1988. 
T r o m 1 January 1982 there were 3 grades of domestic workers. Grade 1 = gardener; 
Grade 2 = cook/housekeeper; Grade 3 = child-minder. 
^From 1 January 1982 domestic and agricultural employees were to be paid allowances if 
the following benefits were not provided by the employer: accommodation, transportation, 
light and fuel. 
^Amount in parentheses paid if aforementioned benefits not provided. 
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Between July 1980 and January 1982 substantial statutory wage increases 
were introduced, the industrial minimum rose $35 or 50 percent. The 
economy was buoyant as trade sanctions were lifted and a bumper harvest 
was recorded, and real Gross Domestic Product increased by 23 percent in 
1980 and 1981 (Hawkins 1987: 186). This mini-boom was short-lived and a 
lack of investment, the world recession and drought took effect and the 
economy declined. Growth in GDP averaged less than 1 percent per annum 
during 1982 to 1987 (Hawkins 1987: 186), and actually declined in 1983 
(CSO, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, December 1987: 10). In an effort to 
cope with this slump there were no statutory wage increases after January 
1982 until September 1983 when a small increase was awarded. In 1985 
slightly higher increases were granted, but a wage freeze was reimposed 
during 1987. 
A striking feature of wage regulation in Zimbabwe is that statutory minimum 
wage increases were usually accompanied by regulations made under the 
Emergency Powers Act which set the maximum rate of pay increases that 
could be negotiated or awarded to employees. Table 4.2 shows these 
income controls for 1981 to 1987. 
Table 4.2 Control of Income Increases 1981-1987 
S.I.925A of 1981 S.1.185 of 1985 S.I.196 of 1986 
Income 
p.a. up to $ 
1,200 
2,200 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
6,000 
7,000 
8,000 
9,000 
10,000 
12,500 
15,000 
18,000 
20,000 
Maximum Income Maximum Income Maximum 
increase p.a. increase p.a. increase 
% $ % $ % 
23.5 Up to 3,600 15.0 Up to 6,000 10.0 
20.0 3,600-7,200 14.0 6,000-12,000 9.0 
17.5 7,200-10,800 12.5 12,000-18,000 7.5 
16.0 10,800-14,400 11.0 18,000-24,000 6.0 
15.0 14,400-18,000 9.5 24,000-30,000 4.5 
14.5 18,000-21,600 8.0 30,000-36,000 3.0 
14.0 21,600-25,200 6.5 Over 36,000 0 
13.5 25,200-28,800 5.0 
13.0 28,800-32,400 3.5 
12.5 32,400-36,000 2.0 
9.0 Over 36,000 0 
5.0 
2.0 
1.0 
Sources: As shown in this Table. 
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In addition to the schedule shown in Table 4.2, the 1981 regulations 
prohibited increases in directors' fees (s.4) and salaries and allowances paid 
to managerial employees (s.7). For 1988 the maximum increase permitted 
was 15 percent up to $3,600 p.a. tapering down to no permissable increase 
over $45,000 p.a. (S.I.26A of 1988). 
There are three major points to be made in relation to the minimum wage 
and control of income regulations: (1) the regulations were characterised by 
confusion and led to a number of industrial disputes and strikes; (2) the role 
of trade unions was to a considerable extent usurped by the government; 
and (3) the government aim to reduce the income gap and improve the real 
incomes of workers was not successful, especially for industrial and 
commercial workers. 
In each year that statutory minimum wage regulations were promulgated 
they were characterised by confusion with respect to their interpretation and 
application. This confusion has been a major factor in some of the disputes 
and strikes that have occurred; the bus drivers' and agro-industrial strikes 
described earlier are cases in point. Furthermore, in the past most 
prominent companies, especially multinational corporations, had an 
established system of annual increases based on, for example, length of 
service or performance. Virtually the entire workforce usually received some 
increase even if performance was the criterion. During 1981 many 
employers negotiated with their employees a company-based or industry-
level increase. On 25 December 1981 minimum wage and control of 
income regulations were promulgated which did not recognise normal annual 
increases, and employers were then required to pay a statutory wage 
increase (S.I.925A of 1981 s.6(1)a) on top of the negotiated increase. 
Under these circumstances, many employers simply stopped negotiating 
company-based increments. The government then found it necessary to 
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amend the regulations, and this was done with respect to the control of 
income regulations in November 1982 to allow "normal annual increments" to 
be awarded (S.I.714A of 1982). 
The general perception remained, however, that collective bargaining had 
been superseded by government wage regulation. The industrial boards and 
industrial councils through which collective bargaining was supposed to take 
place still operated but in many instances the results of their negotiations 
were overtaken by minimum wage adjustments. Some industries did not 
negotiate an increase for a number of years.^ It was therefore not surprising 
that an attempt by government in 1985 to allow greater autonomy for 
collective bargaining was largely unsuccessful. The 1985 regulations 
awarded a scale of increases beginning at 15 percent for those earning up 
to $300 per month and permitted other employees to bargain with employers 
for increases, within the control of income scale ranging from 15 percent for 
lowest-paid workers down to zero for those above $36,000 per annum 
(S.I.185 and 186 of 1986). While many of the large organisations, such as 
multinationals and parastatals which presented themselves as responsible 
employers, did negotiate increases, many other employers either refused or 
delayed. Consequently, in August 1985 the government issued regulations 
to compel employers to bargain in good faith, or the Minister would 
determine an increase (S.I.219B of 1985). 
Advocates of minimum wage regulation could cite this failure of collective 
bargaining to justify the policy, but it can also be seen as a consequence of 
both employer opposition to government wage policy and the confusion 
associated with its implementation. Employers took the view that another 
statutory increase would be likely at some time without regard to their 
^For example, the printing, packaging and publishing industry, did not 
negotiate an increase between January 1982 and April 1984 (Interviews with 
members and secretary of NIC for this industry May 1985). 
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capacity to pay, so they were prudent to avoid an increase, especially in 
depressed economic conditions. 
The minimum wage and control of income regulations also usurped perhaps 
the major function of trade unions, namely, negotiating pay levels. The 
government not only set minimum wages, it also set the limit to which trade 
unions could extract increases from employers. This moved ZCTU President 
Mutandare to declare, "Infact [sic] the minimum wage has become the 
maximum wage" {Moto No.47 1986: 3). This criticism is broadly accurate, 
but there is still confusion over this point. The control of income regulations 
allow "normal annual increases up to the appropriate maximum rates" set 
out in the schedule (S.I.185 of 1985 s.4(4)f). Many observers, including 
employers and trade unionists, have operated as though the regulations 
prevent all increases above the prescribed statutory increase. There is 
considerable difference of opinion on this matter, but in the view of perhaps 
the most experienced labour lawyer for employers, George Makings, this 
clause allows negotiated increases equal to the appropriate rates in the 
schedule, to be made over and above the statutory increase (Interview May 
1987; see also Makings 1987). Pay increases based on a system of 
promotion, merit or seniority can be a "normal" policy or custom in the 
organisation or industry, according to Makings. Nonetheless, labour 
representatives have difficulties in convincing employers to accept such 
increases. So the role of trade unions has been considerably undermined 
by government wage policy. 
In the early years of independence government justified the control of 
income increases in terms of reducing the income gap between high and 
low income-earners. The Zimbabwe economy declined in 1982, with real 
GDP per capita declining by 2.3% (Ministry of Finance 1986: 14), and 
inflation increased sharply, by over 20% per annum in 1983 and 1984 for 
low income-earners (Ministry of Finance 1986: 79). Formal sector 
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employment declined in 1983 by over 12,000 (CSO, Quarterly Digest of 
Statistics, September 1986: 6). The government then justified the income 
controls as mechanisms to contain inflation and assist employers' capacity to 
pay (World Bank 1987: 50). With respect to controlling inflation, in late 1982 
the government agreed to an IMF package which, despite government 
denials {ARB-EFT 15 November - 14 December 1982: 6654), included 
constraints on economic policy (Hawkins 1987: 187), and provided pressure 
for wage controls. The IMF agreement collapsed in early 1984 though in an 
effort to cope with the weak economy (Hawkins 1987), the government 
continued a policy involving elements of wage restraint in the following 
years. 
Narrowing the income gap has proved to be a difficult matter.^ To begin 
with, the policy was stalled by the two wage freezes. After the 1 January 
1982 increase there was no statutory increment until 1 September 1983, and 
a similar freeze operated in the period 1 July 1986 to 1 March 1988. It 
might also be that controls on increases were more effective at the lower 
income scale. Figures provided in the Castellion Salary Survey of 1985 
indicate that salaries for top and senior managers (grades 1 to 4) on 
average increased by 52 percent between 1981 and 1985, and for unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers (grades 13-16) the increase was 90 percent 
(Castellion Salary Survey 1985: xvi-xx, my calculations MAS). The increase 
for managers was below the inflation rate of 70 percent for high income-
earners (for workers it was 78 percent) during this period. This increase 
was, however, well above the maximum increase allowable under the control 
of income regulations, which was commonly only a few percent per annum 
or zero for higher paid employees, and much higher percentages for low-
paid workers (Table 4.2). One factor here was that the regulations permitted 
increases, for example, for promotions and schemes of advancement. 
^Using the 1986 income control scale, it would take $6,000 per annum 
workers 30 years to reach $36,000 per annum. 
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Although, in order to cope with skills shortages and high labour turnover, 
there was great pressure to circumvent the controls over managerial and 
professional salaries. This was effected through a variety of methods 
prohibited by the regulations such as discreetly increasing allowances (e.g., 
entertainment, payment of school fees of employees' children), "promoting" 
personnel, or just raising the salary without making this publicly known 
(Interviews with numerous personnel managers, 1984-1987). 
While low incomes might have been increasing faster than high incomes, 
wages nonetheless remained depressed. The Riddell Commission estimated 
that the Poverty Datum Line to be $128 in December 1980 (1981: 96). In 
similar fashion to commissions appointed in other newly independent African 
countries (e.g., the 1962 Chetsworth Commission in Tanganyika, Scott 1967: 
147), the Riddell Commission recommended that "target minimum income 
levels" be set so as gradually to reach 90 percent of the Poverty Datum 
Line in July 1984 viz, "$115 per month, at 1980 prices" (1981: 97). This 
was certainly not obtained. As Table 4.3 shows, real wage increases were 
affected for mining and industry and commerce up to 1982, but have since 
fallen to below the 1980 level (using the mining base figure of $70). Except 
for 1981, agricultural and domestic wages remained well above the 1980 
rates, but have not increased to a level near the Poverty Datum Line. The 
decline in industrial, commercial and mining real wages from 1982 resulted 
from government policy to control inflation, unemployment and the budget 
deficit (Hawkins 1987). This included the wage freezes in 1982-83 and 
1987, and the increases from 1983 to 1986, which averaged 11.25% per 
annum, were insufficient to keep up with inflation, which averaged 18.9% per 
annum for lower income earners in these four years (calculated from CSO, 
Quarterly Digest of Statistics, December 1987). 
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Table 4.3 Real Minimum Wages at 1 July 1980-1987 (in 1980 Prices) 
Effective 
Date 
Domestic^ 
Grade 1 Grade 3 
Agriculture^ Mining^ Industry & 
Commerce 
1980 30.00 30.00 43.00 70.00 70.00 
1981 26.53 26.53 51.29 75.15 75.15 
1982 49.52 52.72 47.92 83.87 83.87 
1983 40.23 42.83 38.94 68.14 68.14 
1984 41.58 43.74 40.50 64.79 67.49 
1985 46.29 48.28 44.80 71.55 71.55 
1986 44.84 46.58 43.53 68.85 68.85 
1987 39.88 41.42 38.72 61.22 61.22 
Sources: Calculated from various Statutory Instruments (see Table 4.1) and 
CSO, Monthly Digest of Statistics various issues average annual Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) for lower income urban families. 
Vrom 1982 there were 3 grades of domestic workers; wage for those 
without benefits provided is shown. 
^Wage for those without benefits provided is shown. 
^In 1980 and 1981 mining wages were discounted for benefits provided; both 
wage levels shown. 
So the statutory minimum wage adjustments did not achieve their intended 
purposes of increasing real wages of all low income-workers, and narrowing 
the income gap. Furthermore, as the World Bank points out, there may 
have been negative consequences including: (1) decreased employment 
demand; (2) potential drift from labour-intensive to capital-intensive 
production and from price-elastic products to less elastic sectors, possibly 
dampening employment creating expansion; and (3) a greater decline in 
youth employment due to higher training costs which cannot be 
compensated by lower wages (World Bank 1987: 50). 
Muir et al (1982) support the view that minimum wage laws contribute to a 
lack of employment growth. In an examination of the tobacco and maize 
industries in the early 1980s, they found farmers were likely to shift from 
labour-intensive tobacco production to the less labour-intensive maize crop 
(1982: 77; Muir 1984). More recent evidence is found in a national survey 
on employment prospects, the Employment Demand Conditions Survey 
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carried out in 1986 (Hawkins et al 1988). Employers were asked to rank 
the factors preventing them from hiring additional staff. Table 4.4 has the 
results for non-agricultural and agricultural employers showing the 
percentage of respondents who included the listed factor among their three 
most important factors. 
Table 4.4 Factors Deterring Increased Employment 
(% of employees including the factor among their top 
three factors in order of importance) 
Non-Agricultural Agricultural 
insufficient demand for product/output 58.3 22.6 
inability to dismiss (dismissal regulations) 41.8 80.6 
Wage and salary costs 38.5 77.4 
Foreign exchange availability 30.8 12.9 
Excess capacity 30.8 12.9 
Skilled labour availability 12.1 6.5 
Level of capital investment 13.2 25.8 
All other factors 7.7 6.5 
Source: Hawkins et al 1988: 36, Table 3.17 
For non-agricultural employers, wage and salary costs were the third most 
important factor deterring further employment, which was higher than the 
unavailability of foreign exchange that is commonly considered a major 
constraint in Zimbabwe. For agricultural employers, wage and salary costs 
were the second most important factor exceeded only by the dismissal 
regulations discussed below. Hawkins et al also pointed out that increases 
in average real wages appear to be associated with decreased employment 
when examined by industry, as seen in Table 4.5. This is particularly so in 
the competitive export-oriented agriculture and mining sectors, though in 
manufacturing and distribution, sectors somewhat cushioned from 
international competition, the result has been a stagnation or decline in 
productivity, rather than a fall in employment. 
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Table 4.5 Real Wages and Employment 1979-1984 
Sector Change in Average Change in 
Real Wage % Employment % 
Agriculture +47 -19.1 
Mining +28 - 8.5 
Manufacturing +11 +15.0 
Distribution + 1 +18.6 
Zimbabwe Economy +13 +5 .1 
Source: Hawkins et al 1988: 13, Table 1.10 
Job losses did take place following the introduction of minimum wages, and 
the government's response was to place restrictions on the termination of 
employment. 
4.1.2 Termination of Employment Regulations 
Restrictions on termination of employment were imposed in the Minimum 
Wage Act of 1980 to stop employers dismissing workers solely on the 
ground of unwillingness to pay the minimum wage. As discussed later in 
this chapter, a tripartite committee was also established to consider 
employer applications for retrenchment. Later regulations further restricted 
employers' power to dismiss employees to protect workers from unfair 
dismissals. This was an important curative after arbitrary and discriminatory 
dismissals which could and did take place under colonialism. But these 
laws were characterised by uncertainty and confusion. There were also 
negative results in terms of deterring employment growth and usurping the 
role of trade unions. 
In early July 1980, Labour Minister Kangai stated that 1,030 workers had 
been dismissed in anticipation of the minimum wage rates which were to 
take effect from 1 July. This was illegal under the Minimum Wage Act, 
except in special circumstances which received ministerial approval. The 
offence carried a fine of $1,000 or three months' imprisonment or both, and 
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Kangai warned employers: "We shall insist that the first few culprits must 
get the maximum penalty" {ARB-EFT 15 June - 14 July 1980: 5573); 
however, only one employer was reported to have been prosecuted for 
breaching the Act {African Business February 1982: 45-6). 
Despite the restrictions on dismissal many jobs were lost, especially in 
agriculture and domestic service, in the early 1980s. In the non-drought 
year 1980-81, employment declined in agriculture by 32,700 and domestic 
service by 3,400. There was a secular decline in employment in these two 
industries dating back to at least 1975. A number of factors were involved 
in this decline including the emigration of white employers and economic 
stagnation, but the minimum wage requirements also played a major part. 
Employment growth was recorded in the manufacturing and distribution 
sectors despite the minimum wage provisions, and with public sector 
expansion total employment rose from 1.010 million in 1980 to 1.033 million 
in 1983. However, as Hawkins et a! argue, employment growth has been 
insufficient to keep up with growth in the population and the number of 
school-leavers, and unemployment is projected to remain high (24 percent in 
1990) (1988: 1-7). 
Table 4.6 Number of Employees (000s) In Selected Industries 1975-1983 
Public' Total' 
Service 
98.4 1,050.2 
104.2 1,033.4 
111.2 1,012.2 
117.9 986.2 
122.3 984.7 
+23.9 -65.5 
Year Agriculture Domestic Mining Manufacturing Distribut 
1975 363.8 124.1 62.6 156.0 77.3 
1976 356.1 122.8 63.8 153.6 74.7 
1977 348.2 120.0 61.6 145.1 72.5 
1978 341.4 115.9 58.1 139.3 69.1 
1979 335.2 110.4 59.5 144.7 67.6 
Change -28.6 -13.7 -3.1 -11.3 -9.7 
1979 335.2 110.4 59.5 144.7 67.6 
1980 327.0 108.0 66.2 159.4 70.3 
1981 294.3 104.6 68.2 173.2 75.0 
1982 274.3 101.4 63.7 180.5 79.8 
1983 263.5 99.8 60.3 173.4 80.6 
Change -71.7 -10.6 +0.8 +28.7 +13.0 
122.3 984.7 
128.2 1,009.9 
158.6 1,037.7 
172.0 1,045.9 
179.7 1,033.4 
+57.4 +48.7 
Source: CSO, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, September 1985. 
'Includes public administration, education and health. 
'Includes all formal sector industries. 
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In an effort to stem the flow of dismissals and retrenchments, the 
government, on 11 December 1981, gazetted S.1.894 of 1981, the 
Employment (Conditions of Service) Regulations. Like the minimum wage 
and control of income regulations, these laws were from the beginning 
accompanied by controversy and confusion. These regulations were wide-
ranging in their effect, stating that: 
No employer shail-
(a) retrench or lay-off any employee from employment without the 
prior written approval of the Minister ...; 
(b) dismiss any employee from employment without the prior written 
approval of the Minister (s.4(1)). 
This was a major curtailment of the classical employers' prerogative to 
dismiss, yet the Employment Act of 1980 (s.8(1)), the enabling Act for these 
regulations, allowed for summary dismissal on a wide range of grounds 
modified from the Masters and Servants Act of 1901 [Chapter 268\ (cf. s.30 
(1) b,d,f,h). These grounds were: 
(a) where an employee is guilty of misconduct, whether in the 
course of his duties or not ...; 
(b) for wilful disobedience to a lawful order given by his employer; 
(c) for lack of skill which the employee ... holds himself out to 
possess; 
(d) for habitual or substantial neglect of duties; 
(e) for absence from work without the permission of the employer or 
without reasonable excuse (Employment Act of 1980 s.8(1)). 
The regulations were arguably ultra vires the enabling Act, and this was in 
fact advanced in the Elizabeth Jovner i/. the State case of 1982 {Reportable 
(79) Judgement No. S.C. 164/82). It is often suggested that this Supreme 
Court case found the regulations ultra vires, but this is not strictly correct. 
The case was decided in favour of the employer Mrs Jovner who allegedly 
wrongly dismissed an employee, Mr Marimira; but the grounds for this 
decision were that the Industrial Agreement for the commercial industry 
covering Jovner's undertaking allowed summary dismissal and this 
agreement took precedence over the dismissal regulations, in accordance 
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with the Employment Act (s.5(2)a). It was therefore unnecessary for the 
ultra vires argument to be considered, but the Chief Justice, John Fieldsend, 
did cast doubt on the validity of the regulations, describing the proposal as 
an "interesting argument" and remarking that it would be "far safer" to 
regulate unemployment through an Act of Parliament {Reportable (79) S.C. 
164/82: 10-11). 
This judgement was handed down on Thursday 18 November 1982 and on 
Monday 22 November 1982 Emergency Powers (Termination of 
Employment) Regulations, S.I.714B of 1982 were gazetted. These 
regulations were made under the Emergency Powers Act [Chapter 83] and 
replaced S.1.894 of 1981. The 1982 regulations stipulated that ministerial 
approval was needed for involuntary termination of employment "by notice", 
and summary dismissal was not mentioned. Summary dismissal was 
therefore permitted without ministerial approval and this was upheld in a 
1984 High Court judgement {Christopher Taderera Tavengwa v. Marine 
Centre (Pvt) Ltd Reportable (ZLR Only) 38, HC-H 461/84). Many 
responsible employers such as parastatals, multinational corporations and 
prominent local companies, were aware of the moderated requirements, but 
sought ministerial approval for all terminations of employment, summary or 
otherwise (Interviews with numerous Industrial Relations Officers, company 
officials, workers' committee members and trade unionists 1984-1985). 
Under the Labour Relations Act No.16 of 1985, regulations 
were made reverting to the 1981 requirements of ministerial approval for 
virtually all types ("summarily or otherwise") of termination of employment 
(S.I.371 of 1985).^ The procedure is that an employer can "summarily 
suspend" an employee with or without pay where there is "good cause to 
"Exceptions to this arise if the employee and employer mutually agree in 
writing to end the contract, or if the contract was for a fixed duration or 
performance of a task. 
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believe" the employee is guilty of misconduct as defined in the regulations. 
The grounds are similar to those in the Employment Act. 
There were a number of problems in implementing the various dismissal 
regulations. With the early regulations there were often long delays in 
obtaining a decision from the Ministry of Labour, some cases were still 
pending after two years, and usually the minimum time between suspension 
and the ministry decision was two months. Meanwhile neither the employer 
nor the employee knew if the suspended workers would be reinstated. The 
laws were changed frequently and so were the industrial relations officers 
(iROs) administering the laws. There was no coherent body of case law to 
guide judgements and employers' assessments of the likely ruling, and often 
employers found ministry decisions inconsistent. There were other problems 
in terms of alleged bias and corruption on the part of IROs which are 
examined later in this chapter. 
The dismissal regulations had the effect of government assuming one of the 
roles that unions play in many countries, namely, endeavouring to protect 
workers from unfair dismissal. If workers felt they had been unfairly 
dismissed they could approach the Ministry of Labour. In many instances 
the assistance of trade unions was sought by workers, but this need not 
have occurred. Workers could do without union help. Secondly, a major 
role for some trade unions in industrialised countries, and some developing 
countries such as India and Sudan, has been to negotiate substantial pay 
agreements for retrenchments or plant closures. But in Zimbabwe such 
payments are rare and comparatively small (World Bank 1987: 54). 
A further criticism is that the dismissal regulations have helped to create 
what they were intended to prevent, viz, increased unemployment. Put 
simply, employers were reluctant to risk taking on additional labour since 
they might be unable to shed labour if this became necessary. As shown in 
167 
Table 4.4 above, the Employment Demand Conditions Survey found that the 
dismissal regulations were a major factor deterring employers from hiring 
more labour (Hawkins et al 1988). In late 1987, the Chief Justice of 
Zimbabwe, Justice Enoch Dumbutshena, took the unusual step of severely 
criticising legislation: 
The [Labour Relations] Act forces employers to keep unproductive 
workers and to shut their doors to would-be future [sic] employees who 
may prove to be better workers. There must be competition on the 
labour market. The general impression is that the Labour Relations Act 
says: Thou shalt not dismiss a lazy worker. If you do, the heavy 
hammer of the Ministry of Labour will descend on your skull' (Financial 
Gazette 6/11/87). 
The dismissal regulations have had some benefits in terms of social equity. 
The procedures are also becoming institutionalised and therefore better 
understood, reducing confusion and delays. One further benefit from these 
regulations is that they have indirectly compelled employers to adopt 
improved personnel policies and practices. Before independence staff 
record-keeping was of very poor standard. Now for a case to be accepted 
by the Ministry of Labour, records have to be kept of employees' work 
history with a company, especially their disciplinary records, so there is a felt 
need to improve records and address personnel and industrial relations 
issues more seriously.® As the case study chapters show, this has had an 
impact on the adoption of disciplinary codes to move away from previous 
haphazard and arbitrary disciplinary practices. Similarly, formal job 
evaluation schemes have been and continue to be implemented in many 
organisations to replace previous ad hoc grading and remuneration practices. 
Overall, though, government wage and employment objectives have not 
been met. Workers' living standards have not increased substantially and 
the income gap has not been greatly reduced. In addition, formal 
®The 1987 draft amendments to the LRA propose that records relating to 
wages must be kept by employers. 
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employment growth has been insufficient to absorb labour supply so 
unemployment has remained high. Employment generation and wage 
growth have been restricted by Zimbabwe's poor economic performance, and 
government explanations hold that this is the result of international recession 
and drought (Government of Zimbabwe 1986: 1). But, as Hawkins argues, 
the government's own policies have augmented the economic difficulties 
(e.g., government borrowing contributed to the trebling of foreign debt during 
1980-83, 1987: 187), and wage policies and the dismissal regulations have 
discouraged employment growth. The discussion now turns to an 
examination of government policy with respect to labour relations legislation 
and administration. 
4.2 Labour Relations Legislation and Administration 
Government's policy was that its labour relations machinery and 
administration would operate to benefit workers and strengthen them in their 
relations with employers (see Chapter 2). The performance of government 
in meeting this objective is assessed in this section. The discussion on 
labour law is largely confined to the Labour Relations Act since this brought 
together various legislative initiatives since independence. 
4.2.1 Labour Relations Act 
Little attention has been paid to the Labour Relations Act in the literature.® 
Herbst (1987) does not discuss it, and after briefly describing the Act 
Mitchell concludes 
it is clear that the central objectives [sic] of the Act is to prevent 
strong independent unions from ever emerging. While the law does 
seek to defend workers from the excesses of management, it also 
^Makings (1986) provides an unpublished but reliable guide to the Act, see 
also Government of Zimbabwe (c.1986). 
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seeks to defend capital from the possibility of a serious challenge 
from the working class (1987: 121). 
Mitchell does not explain how the Act prevents the growth of strong unions, 
nor does he show it defends employers from "serious challenge". 
Sachikonye provides greater detail (1986: 259-63), and he states that the 
Act "represented a major advance for the working class to the degree that 
its fundamental rights have been ... guaranteed; and to the extent that its 
previous gains accumulated since independence were consolidated" (1986: 
263). His final assessment, however, is that the involvement of the drafters 
of the Act in "interminable meetings with employers' organisations" 
reflects the social reality that in contemporary Zimbabwe the balance 
of class power is still heavily weighted in favour of the bourgeoisie 
(1986 :263) . 
Sachikonye's approach is to assess the Act in class terms and since it has 
not brought about the demise of capital, like Mitchell he concludes that it 
favours the bourgeoisie. In Moto magazine the Act, then in draft form, was 
descr ibed as a "monster" which "serves the interests not of workers, but of 
employers", since it would not strengthen unions; indeed the "bill makes it 
practically impossible for workers to organise their own trade union" (No. 19 
1983: 19). Wood briefly discusses the LRA noting that "it inherits a great 
deal of the corporate control measures from the old ICA", but he states that 
it is not yet possible to detail the working of the Act (1988: 302). Further, 
he is confused about the role of hearing officers (1988: 303). This section 
examines the Labour Relations Act in detail. The discussion begins with the 
background to the Act, and a description of the collective bargaining 
procedures and dispute settlement mechanisms follows. After this a 
balanced assessment of the Act is made in terms of the benefits afforded to 
labour and the provisions for corporatist control. 
From independence until the Labour Relations Act took effect in 1985 the 
labour relations framework was provided by the Industrial Conciliation Act 
Chapter 267\ (ICA) and the Employment Act of 1980 which repealed certain 
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discriminatory laws, such as the Masters and Servants Act [Chapter 268 
which still regulated domestic workers (see Chapter 2). The ICA was 
amended in 1981 to disallow discrimination and provide minimum conditions 
of employment (e.g., paid vacation leave, IC Amendment Act No.23 of 
1981). On 15 December 1985 the Labour Relations Act No.16 of 1985 was 
promulgated to replace previous legislation and provide the key labour 
relations law in Zimbabwe. It covers all employers and employees except 
for those whose conditions of employment are provided for under the 
Constitution. Therefore, the defence forces, police and public service are 
excluded, but parastatals are included. According to some informants, the 
first draft of the bill was largely the work of Professor Robert Seidman, an 
American lawyer then working in Zimbabwe. This was rejected and a third 
draft was produced principally by Dr Micah Tsomondo, then a Deputy 
Secretary in the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. This became a 
public document and a seminar was held at the University of Zimbabwe to 
debate the proposed bill in 1983. The draft was subsequently amended 
many times within the Ministries of Labour and Justice, Legal and 
Parliamentary Affairs (there may have been eleven drafts, interview Senior 
Labour Relations Officer September 1986), before it was finally presented to 
Parliament, where it was amended slightly - an unusual event in Zimbabwe^ 
(Interviews with Dr Micah Tsomondo May 1985 and Dr David Chanaiwa, 
Director of Employment, September 1984, February 1985). 
The Act eventually adopted is, despite claims to uniqueness by its architects 
(Interview Dr Micah Tsomondo, May 1985), modelled on various other laws 
and practices: primarily the Industrial Conciliation Act [Chapter 267\ as 
amended and aspects of the US National Labour Relations Act (Wagner Act) 
^s.5(6) of the bill allowed discrimination if the "act or omission was justifiable 
and othenA/ise not prohibited as to the requirements of the occupations 
concerned, and was not attributable wholly or mainly to the race, tribe, place 
of origin, political opinion, colour, creed or sex of the persons concerned" 
(emphasis added MAS). The emphasised words were omitted from the Act, 
as they were discriminatory and thereby unconstitutional. 
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of 1935. It also codified workers' committees which had operated de facto 
since independence. Some parts were new to post-independent 
Zimbabwean labour relations, such as the provisions for paid maternity leave 
and the legally backed collection of union dues by employers, although the 
latter was a common feature in independent African countries such as 
Zambia, Tanzania and Ghana (e.g., Gertzel 1979). 
The Act was in certain respects a significant departure from the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. Nonetheless, the differences between the ICA and the LRA 
have been exaggerated by government. In introducing the LRA in 
Parliament, Minister Shava described it as "both an instrument and weapon 
for advancing and protecting the interests of the workers as we lay the firm 
foundation for the establishment of socialism". The ICA, by contrast, was 
"an oppressive piece of legislation designed primarily for the enslavement of 
our workers" {Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 22 January 1985: 
cols: 1314 and 1318). However, many important features of the LRA are 
modelled on the ICA, including collective bargaining procedures, the 
restrictions on collective job action and to some extent the dispute 
settlement mechanisms. 
Under the LRA there are two types of bodies which can negotiate collective 
bargaining agreements for an industry or undertaking, viz, Employment 
Boards and Employment Councils. These are virtually identical to Industrial 
Boards and Industrial Councils under the ICA.® In general, employment 
boards are formed where no registered and certified trade union and 
employer organisation exists. Members are appointed by the Minister of 
Labour, taking into account the interests of employers and employees, and 
they can be removed by him. Membership includes a chairman, employer 
and employee representatives, and other persons to assist the board. In 
®For convenience I will sometimes refer to industrial boards and councils as 
employment boards and councils. 
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practice, a chairman and one independent member are commonly appointed 
plus six representatives of both employers and employees, who are usually 
managers and workers' committee members nominated by those they 
represent. This is relatively simple in many industries which have a small 
number of establishments (e.g., one in tyre manufacturing; two in ferro-
alloys), but there are difficulties in industries with numerous establishments. 
The Ministry of Labour performs the major secretariat functions (but cf. 
S.1.368 of 1985 s.10(1)). Employment board decisions are recommendations 
to the Minister and he can direct that the deliberations of a board be 
transferred to another employment board if he considers this in the interests 
of the parties involved (s.78). The boards' recommendations cover 
conditions of service including pay, grading, hours of work, sickness benefits, 
vacation entitlements, protective clothing and disciplinary codes. These are 
gazetted as "employment regulations". In December 1984 there were 64 
employment boards (Ministry of Labour records) a slight decline from 66 in 
1979 (Riddell Commission 1981: 259). 
Employment councils are in principle different from employment boards. 
They are comprised of certified trade unions and employer organisations 
which elect their own representatives. The council can elect a chairman 
from within or appoint a "neutral" chairman (e.g., university professor, retired 
town councillor). If the chairman elected is a trade union member of the 
council, then the vice-chairman must be an employer representative and vice 
versa (s.64(c)). The certification process is carried out by the Registrar in 
the Ministry of Labour, who also must approve the constitution for the 
formation of an employment council. Employment councils conduct their 
own secretariat function by collecting fees from member employers and 
unions to provide a full-time secretary, support staff and designated agents 
to enforce the agreements. Council funds can be used for purposes such 
as training employees, though in practice this rarely occurs on any 
substantial scale except in the catering and hotel industry. In May 1985 
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there were 16 employment councils (Interview, Oliver Takuba, Senior IRO, 
May 1985). 
The agreements of the councils are published as "industrial agreements" and 
have the force of law; they must, however, first be approved by the 
Registrar. The Minister may direct the Registrar not to approve the 
agreement if the provisions in his opinion are inconsistent with existing laws, 
inequitable to consumers or the public, or unfair to the agreement parties. 
So while there is a qualitative difference between the autonomy of 
employment councils and employment boards, the councils may still be 
circumscribed by the Minister. Once again there is ample potential for state 
corporatist control of labour agreements. To date, the Minister has not 
abused these powers; agreements are usually accepted in their original 
form, but according to some participants this is partly a result of the 
councils' adjusting agreements in the light of government policy (Interviews 
with four employment council secretaries and chairmen May-June 1985). 
In general it seems that trade unions on employment councils have not been 
substantially more effective in achieving pay increases than have workers' 
committee representatives on employment boards. There is as much 
variation among industries covered by councils and boards as there is 
between industries covered by the two different bargaining bodies. For 
example, in 1984 minimum monthly wages in industries covered by 
employment boards ranged from $65 in agriculture to $205.79 in the tyre 
industry. At this time the range in employment councils was from $120 in 
mining to $176 in banking. In 1984 the average minimum wage for all 64 
employment boards was $137.12, while the average for 10 of the 16 
employment councils® was $137.93 (calculated from Ministry of Labour 
records and various statutory instruments). This reflects the impact of 
^Figures for four municipal councils, the railways and phosphate industries 
were unavailable. 
174 
government on minimum wages, which was more important than the 
bargaining position of trade unions. Councils, however, have provided 
benefits to workers that employment boards have not, including the 
enforcement of agreements by designated agents as well as pensions and 
medical aid funds. Moreover, the councils provide a training ground for 
unionists to gain experience in labour negotiations and administration. 
On the face of it, the formal dispute settlement stages under the Labour 
Relations Act are similar to those under the ICA (see Figure 4.1); however, 
there are major differences in the operation of these procedures. A dispute 
or an unfair labour practice can be referred to a labour relations officer 
(LRO) in the Ministry by an employee or employer. If the LRO is unable to 
settle the dispute it can be referred or appeal can be made to a higher 
"determining authority", a hearing officer or regional hearing officer, who 
have similar powers to LROs, although they are more senior. These are all 
Ministry of Labour positions similar to those of IROs, senior IROs and chief 
regional IROs under the ICA. In both cases the Chief LRO (or Chief IRO) 
was senior to these officers, and ex officio the Registrar. An important 
difference, however, is that under the Labour Relations Act (and the 
accompanying regulations S.1.368 and 371 of 1985) LROs have wide powers 
including authority to order an employee to be promoted or reinstated with 
back pay up to two years, and order the payment of monies owing, 
compensation or legal fees relating to an unfair labour practice (LRA s.111). 
Under the ICA, IROs were not given specific powers to order promotion, 
reinstatement or back pay (ICA s.134); back pay could be ordered only by 
the law courts (ICA s.129-131). 
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Figure 4.1 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms under the Labour 
Relations Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act 
Labour Relations Act Industrial Conciliation Act 
Supreme Court Appellate Division 
(Supreme Court) 
Labour Relations Tribunal 
Administrative Court Industrial Tribunal 
Labour Relations Board (e.g., registration) (e.g., disputes) 
Regional Hearing Officer Chief Regional IRO 
Hearing Officer Senior IRO 
Labour Relations Officer Industrial Relations Officer 
Sources: Labour Relations Act and Industrial Conciliation Act. 
Under the 1985 Act disputes may be referred by a determining authority or 
on appeal pass to the Labour Relations Board, and from there appeals are 
to the Labour Relations Tribunal, and finally to the Supreme Court. The 
Labour Relations Board is appointed by the Minister and its five to seven 
members must have "wide experience in labour relations" (s.88(2)). The 
Labour Relations Tribunal is composed of a chairman and deputy chairman, 
who are qualified to be High Court judges, and two to four members 
experienced in labour relations matters. In practice there has been parity 
representation of employers and labour among the ordinary members of the 
Board and Tribunal. 
These bodies have counterparts under the ICA but they operate differently in 
some respects. While a single dispute can proceed through each level from 
LRO to Supreme Court under the 1985 Act, under the ICA the 
Administrative Court and Industrial Tribunal dealt with different matters. The 
Administrative Court (formerly Industrial Court) heard appeals from the 
Registrar's decisions relating to the operation of the Act, such as the 
registration of trade unions, employer organisations or industrial councils. 
Appeals were only on matters of law to the Appellate Division (Supreme 
Court). The Industrial Tribunal determined disputes from industrial councils. 
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conciliation boards and those referred to it by the Minister. There was no 
appeal from the Tribunal (s.110). 
The two Acts are similar with respect to provisions for settling disputes 
through voluntary or compulsory arbitration, and the approach to collective 
job action under the two Acts is comparable - the emphasis was on 
prohibition. Both Acts prohibit strikes and lock-outs in essential services, 
and lengthy and convoluted procedures (see below), including the 
appointment of conciliation and arbitration bodies, were established to 
minimise such action. 
So there is a great deal of overlap and continuity between the two Acts, 
though the Labour Relations Act introduced provisions which benefit workers, 
and government's position is that the Act is administered in a manner that 
assists workers to counteract employers' greater power. The discussion now 
provides an assessment of this legislation beginning with the provisions 
which benefit labour and then reviewing the corporatist components. 
The Labour Relations Act was the first law to specify "fundamental rights" of 
employees to form and operate workers' committees and trade unions, and 
prohibit a range of unfair labour practices such as "to fail to negotiate in 
absolute good faith" (s.80(2)). These provisions are akin to those in the US 
Wagner Act of 1935 which aided union development during the depression 
years and employer resistance to unionisation (Cohen 1960: 476-82). The 
Wagner Act was not the only factor assisting union growth but during its 
operation, 1935 to 1945, it contributed to the increase in union membership 
from 3.9 million to 15 million in this period (Cohen 1960; Beach 1985: 413). 
In principle these provisions could provide a spur to union development in 
Zimbabwe, especially since the Act also obliged employers to collect union 
dues for a registered or certified trade union (s.60). This was advantageous 
to labour because it has been extremely difficult for black trade unions to 
177 
organise without the "check-off system". Numerous problems were 
encountered by unions trying to organise workers by physically collecting 
union dues at the factory gate. This includes the difficulties involved in 
organisers travelling the country attempting to collect the dues, and the 
temptation for poorly paid organisers to misuse the funds. 
Other provisions throughout the Act identify unfair labour practices that 
benefit employees, for instance, the protection of "fair labour standards" such 
as minimum wages and work conditions (s.6); and preventing employers 
from hindering workers' committees from airing grievances or negotiating for 
employees. The Act gives very wide opportunity for employees to seek 
redress for their grievances by contacting a LRO: "Any employee or 
employer who is involved in a dispute or is aggrieved by an unfair labour 
practice may refer the matter to a labour relations officer" (s.109). This 
codified a broader role played by the Ministry of Labour after independence. 
Earlier the Ministry of Labour dealt with alleged breaches of agreements 
such as under-payment of wages. After independence IROs dealt with 
virtually any labour grievance brought to them by workers including unfair 
dismissal, discrimination, housing, disciplinary action. 
Discrimination on the grounds of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, 
colour, creed or sex is prohibited under the Labour Relations Act (s.5), and 
this is reminiscent of Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act of 1963. 
Discrimination on these grounds is illegal on a wide range of employment 
matters such as advertising, recruitment, grading, wages, leave, promotion, 
training, transfer, retrenchment and the provision of facilities (s.5). Despite 
employer opposition, paid maternity leave at the rate of at least 60 percent 
of a woman's normal wages for 45 days before and 45 days after child-birth, 
and daily time off work for breast-feeding mothers was established (s.18). 
The Act further provides for a minimum of 22 days paid sick leave for full-
time employees {s.14). Finally, the penalty for committing an unfair labour 
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practice or for contravening the Act was considerably strengthened in 
comparison to the ICA, providing for a maximum fine of $2,000 (increased 
from $200) or one year's imprisonment or both the fine and imprisonment. 
Despite these benefits, the Labour Relations Act is replete with provisions 
establishing ministerial power to control labour relations in Zimbabwe. Trade 
unions and employers organisations are regulated by government. They are 
not permitted to levy dues unless they are registered by the Registrar, and 
they cannot form an employment council without certification by the 
Registrar. The Registrar, subject to appeal to the Tribunal, has authority to 
"vary, suspend or rescind the registration or certification of a trade union or 
employers organisation" (s.40(1)). The Minister's powers to regulate trade 
union and employer association funds, however, carry no appeal 
mechanisms, and provide abundant opportunity for state corporatist control. 
Section 61 of the Act applies mutatis mutandis to employer association 
funds and it is reproduced in extenso to indicate the extent of these powers: 
(1) The Minister may make regulations providing for the proper and 
systematic collection, management, application and disbursement of 
union dues by trade unions. 
(2) Regulations made in terms of subsection (1) may provide for-
(a) the maximum amount, and method of assessment, of union 
dues; 
(b) the accounting procedures that shall be followed ...; 
(c) the appointment of auditors and the keeping of books of 
accounts; 
(d) the payment by trade unions of a percentage of union dues to 
any association or congress of trade unions recognized by the 
Minister as being representative of all or most certified trade unions 
in Zimbabwe; 
(e) limitations on the salaries and allowances that may be paid to 
employees of trade unions; 
(f) limitations on the staff that may be employed, and the equipment 
and property that may be purchased, by trade unions; 
(g) limitations on the matters on which and the extent to which union 
dues may be expended (s.61). 
In introducing the bill in Parliament Minister Shava said: 
It has been commented upon by the International Labour 
Organisation at the 4th draft stage and when enacted, it will enable 
Zimbabwe to adopt, ratify and implement all the major ILO 
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conventions and recommendations on Labour matters without in any 
way jeopardising our national interests {Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Assembly, 22 January 1985, col: 1313, emphasis added 
MAS). 
Yet these provisions in all likelihood are inconsistent with the fundamental 
1948 ILO Convention No.87 concerning the "Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise": 
Article 2 
Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have 
the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the 
organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing 
without previous authorisation. 
Article 3 
1. Workers' and employers' organisations shall have the right to draw 
up their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full 
freedom, to organise their administration and activities and to 
formulate their programmes. 
2. The public authorities shall refrain from any interference which 
would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof. 
Article 4 
Workers' and employers' organisations shall not be liable to be 
dissolved or suspended by administrative authority. 
Article 5 
Workers' and employers' organisations shall have the right to 
establish and join federations and confederations and any such 
organisation, federation or confederation shall have the right to 
affiliate with international organisations of workers and employers 
(ILO 1982: 4-5). 
So Section 61 of the Labour Relations Act appears to conflict with Articles 3 
and 5 of ILO Convention No.87, and the Act's provisions relating to 
registration of unions and employers' organisations may be in conflict with 
Articles 2 and 4 of this convention. It is not surprising then that the 
Zimbabwe government, as Mutandare noted, has not ratified this and other 
major ILO conventions {Sunday Mail 6/7/86). As noted above (Chapter 3), 
Minister Shava reacted sharply to Mutandare's claims, but their exchange in 
the media did not address the possibility of the Labour Relations Act being 
in conflict with ILO conventions. Government spokesmen point out that the 
ILO takes into account the laws and practices of member countries, and that 
the potential to control unions is necessary given the corruption and 
maladministration in Zimbabwe's unions (Interview David Chaniawa, Director 
of Employment, June 1986). This has some persuasiveness, but an 
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alternative policy might be to create an independent body to monitor unions 
and employers' associations, and introduce a right of appeal. 
The Minister of Labour is given enormous power under Section 17 of the 
Act to make regulations on virtually all employment issues in Zimbabwe. 
Subsection (1) reads: 
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Minister may make 
regulations providing for the development, improvement, protection, 
regulation and control of employment and conditions of employment. 
Subsection (3) states: "Without prejudice to the generality" of the Minister's 
powers, regulations can be made on a list of twenty-one provisions. These 
include broad categories such as: 
(a) the rights of employees, including minimum wages, benefits, 
social security, retirement and superannuation benefits, and other 
conditions of employment; ... 
(u) any other matter relating to or connected with employment which 
it may be necessary to regulate. 
The possibilities for state corporatist use of these laws are self-evident. In 
defence, government spokespeople argue that these provisions are 
necessary in order to combat the ovenwhelming power held by capital both 
before and after independence. But as noted above, the government has 
arguably played a restraining role in terms of limiting trade unions in their 
negotiations with employers. 
The "right to resort to collective job action" is guaranteed to all employees, 
trade unions and workers' committees, subject to the provisions of the Act 
(3.120). Following the practice in the Industrial Conciliation Act, the Labour 
Relations Act prohibits collective job action (e.g., strikes, lock-outs, boycotts 
and sit-ins) in essential services and includes convoluted procedures before 
legal collective job action can be undertaken. "Essential services" include 
any service or any service relating to: electricity supply; fire brigade; 
sewerage, rubbish or sanitation; health; "the production, supply, delivery or 
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distribution of food or fuel"; water; mining; communications; transport and 
services relating to the repair, driving or loading of transport sen/ices; and 
road, railway and other transport facilities. Further essential sen/ices can be 
introduced in terms of the Act (s.118). 
in practice legal collective job action is virtually prevented even in non-
essential industries by the nature of the dispute settlement procedures. A 
necessary condition for a legal strike is that the dispute pass through the 
dispute settlement procedures under Part XIII of the Act. This means it is 
highly unlikely that a strike will be sanctioned, since at some stage during 
the process a binding determination will probably be given (s.115-117). 
There are in reality only two instances when legal collective job action is 
likely to take place, namely, where there is an immediate threat to the health 
and safety of persons, or to the existence of a workers' committee or trade 
union (s.120). 
One example that indicates that to date legal strikes are not permitted in 
Zimbabwe is the housing dispute in the mining industry. This issue has 
been a source of conflict since Rhodesia was founded. More recently, 
Mutandare's Associated Mine Workers' of Zimbabwe in 1983 formally sought 
to declare this as a dispute to move towards a legal strike. Since the 
mining industry is deemed an essential service strikes are forbidden, but the 
government's response to this dispute is indicative of its approach to avoid 
strikes. The dispute was referred to conciliation a number of times, and the 
issue was recently postponed again (Interviews, Doug Verden, Chamber of 
Mines, October 1984, April 1988; Jeffrey Mutandare, AMWZ, October 1984, 
June 1985). 
As discussed in Chapter 3 the government defends its position on strikes on 
the grounds that they are harmful to development, and also may jeopardise 
national security. The argument relating to national security is less 
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persuasive in 1988 than it was in the early 1980s, since the internal security 
position is far more stable. Dissidence in Matabeleland has been sharply 
curtailed, and the three pre-independence armies have been integrated. 
ZANU(PF) has firmly consolidated its position as the ruling party, and has 
achieved an almost hegemonic position in most of the country; ZAPU and 
ZANU(PF) have signed a unity accord, and have agreed to create a one-
party state. In general the country has had eight years in which to stabilise, 
and it is now better able to absorb a certain level of strike action without 
jeopardising national security. The explanation for government legislating 
against strikes is more likely to be found in its strategy to control labour to 
further its developmental goals and to prevent the manifestation of 
opposition to government policies. 
In sum, it is argued that the Labour Relations Act provides meaningful 
benefits for labour, notably with respect to rights to form labour 
organisations, ensuring bargaining in good faith, and prohibiting 
discrimination and other unfair labour practices. However, the preponderant 
effect of the Act is to bestow upon the government enormous powers over 
labour relations actors and the conduct of labour relations through controls 
over organisations, bargaining bodies and agreements, and collective job 
action. 
4.2.2 Administering the Labour Relations Act 
It is argued in this section that the general approach or ideology of the 
Ministry of Labour changed markedly following independence. Whereas 
before 1980 the role of the ministry was basically to ensure a compliant 
workforce, after independence its role was still to inhibit industrial unrest but 
far greater sympathy for workers was exhibited. 
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Labour relations officers^" have a potentially very powerful position, 
especially with respect to cases of dismissal. High unemployment and 
minimal social welfare provisions mean that the consequences of losing a 
job can be disastrous. For management the process of dismissal is 
arduous, and many responsible employers only seek dismissal when they 
perceive very strong grounds. Losing an application for dismissal means 
retaining an "undisciplined" worker and this can impair general employee 
discipline. Thus the stakes are quite high on both sides of the dismissal 
issue. It is inevitable then that labour relations officers draw criticism for 
supporting one or the other party. 
There is a general consensus among employers that Ministry of Labour 
officials and the laws they administer favour workers too greatly. Labour 
officials as well claim that the ministry is guided by the government's 
"socialism" to protect workers from employer abuse (Numerous interviews 
1984-1988, e.g., Doug Verden, Chamber of Mines, October 1984)," and this 
is symbolically reiterated in the term of address "comrade" and posters of 
Marx, Lenin and Mugabe on office walls. Employers maintain that LROs are 
lenient towards workers. There are many cases in which a litany of 
offences had to be accumulated before a worker's dismissal was approved 
by LROs (see Chapter 7). The popular reference to workers in Zimbabwe 
as being "fire-proof" attests to the general view that LROs protect workers 
from dismissal, in countless interviews employers, managers and personnel 
specialists maintained that the Ministry of Labour favoured workers. One 
manager at Standard Chartered Bank in Bulawayo became distraught when 
she declared, "You can't even speak to them about their work [performance] 
^°Labour Relations Act 1985 changed the name from "industrial" to "labour" 
relations officer; the new title is used in this section. 
"As Minister Shava told an IRO seminar: "The Government expects you to 
be ideologically and politically disposed to uphold the interests of the 
workers, promote industrial harmony and advance the cause of socialism" 
(Hera/cf 5/11/84). 
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any more. They go off to the Ministry, and start making a crime out of 
nothing. I just don't know how to talk to them any more. It's impossible" 
(January 1988). 
By the same token, labour relations officers have been attacked for 
favouring employers (Nangati 1984b). In a case study of a Kadoma textile 
company in 1983, Cheater found that a LRO sided on a class basis with 
management, resulting in "bureaucrats" and managers against workers 
(1986: 130-1). The one meeting reported which involved a LRO was 
described as follows: 
the workers received a stern lecture about the necessity of signing 
all letters to the department, so as not to waste bureaucrats' 
valuable time and the country's scarce petrol on journeys of 
investigation that proved unnecessary. In management's absence, 
the workers were talked down to. When management was recalled 
into the meeting, the workers received acknowledgement of their 
presence from occasional words tossed over the Industrial Relations 
Officer's right shoulder. The two wage-workers present visibly 
shrank into the wall in an attempt to remove their irrelevant and 
possibly offensive presence, though the salaried supervisor refused 
to be cowed by such class behaviour. Meanwhile bureaucrat and 
managers conversed knowledgeably and at length in fluent English 
on technical matters such as foreign currency allocations, 
maintenance schedules and so forth. Whereas the management 
representatives had been uneasy, if not actually quaking, before this 
meeting, it was the workers' committee members who emerged from 
it with feelings of insecurity and their self-confidence undermined 
(Cheater 1986: 131). 
Cheater maintains that this interaction "is certainly representative and not 
merely an isolated case" (p.131), and Ladley and Lan (1985) report a case 
study of a farm with almost identical interactions and results. 
There have also been numerous reports of corrupt LROs accepting bribes 
from management. Labour Minister Shava was reported as saying that the 
Harare regional labour office building, BB House, had become known as 
"Big Bribe House", and he gave two examples of corruption. In one case, a 
trap was set and a LRO was caught receiving a cheque from an informant 
employer. In another case, LROs in Bindura had received land, equipment 
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and seeds from farmers {Herald 22/6/86). Other such cases have been 
reported in the media (e.g., Herald 10/12/85; Sunday Mail 1/11/87) and the 
National Trade Union Survey reported many other cases cited by trade 
unionists (Department of Research and Planning 1987: 65). The NTUS also 
found that while 8 unions had a "good" relationship with LROs and 21 did 
not express an opinion, 22 of the responding unions were dissatisfied with 
their relations (it should be noted, though, that 15 of these 22 unions were 
unregistered and one of the complaints against LROs related to their 
handling of unregistered unions p.64). The common drift of LROs into 
private enterprise (especially multinational corporations) as personnel officers 
is also seen as evidence of their corruption and pro-employer ideological 
stance. Minister Shava referred to this and noted that between July 1982 
and September 1984, 42 LROs, four Chief LROs, one deputy chief LRO, 
and two senior LROs had moved to the private sector {Herald 5/11/84; cf. 
Department of Research and Planning 1987: 66; Cheater 1986: 131). 
Probably, an accurate view of LROs lies somewhere between the polar 
criticisms. The current research found evidence of favouritism towards both 
employers and workers, but the balance was weighted in favour of workers 
(e.g., Chapter 7). Many LROs went beyond their duties and authority to 
assist workers. As mentioned above, even after the 1981 dismissal 
regulations were attenuated in 1982, LROs still demanded that summary 
dismissals be subject to their approval. Some employers sought to resist 
this and maintained they were summarily dismissing an employee under 
Section 8 of the Employment Act 1980, and therefore would not seek 
ministerial approval. If the LRO wanted to pursue the matter, this would 
mean mounting a court challenge. The employer was often legally entitled 
to this approach, but many LROs considered this to be "unscrupulous", and 
one boasted of how he once overcame this problem: 
LRO] 1 hit him. When Mr [a European owner of a 
sizeable, local company] said: "I'm dismissing him [the worker 
under section 8 of the Employment Act". I hit him. Right in the 
face. His nose started bleeding, and he cried "Help! Help!" I told 
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him if he didn't want any political trouble, he had better just shut up, 
or he would be in more problems. [Laughter] 
[Interviewer] You're joking. 
[LRO] [Laughter] I hit Mr . Go ask him. When I went back 
there again, he put up his hand [to cover his injured nose] and said 
"No! No! Everything is all right [the employee was retained]. I don't 
want^to see you again". [More laughter] (Interview LRO August 
The assault was an unusual and extreme incident, but LROs commonly 
alluded to the possibility of "political pressure" through ZANU(PF) being 
applied. Another example of LROs exceeding their formal powers in order 
to further their case against employers is that they often demanded that 
employers yield relevant documents although the Labour Relations Act did 
not allow for this.^^ 
It is not surprising that many LROs moved to private enterprise. Their 
offices were noisy, chaotic, ill-equipped and dirty, and many LROs 
complained of this (Interviews with numerous LROs and former LROs 1984-
1987). Moreover, pay and promotion prospects were far behind those 
offered in private enterprise. In 1984, a LRO with a university degree 
received $650 per month with slim hope for advancement. Many left to join 
multinational and local large companies as personnel officers, starting at 
$900 minimum, and usually with clear opportunities for promotion. For 
example, one such former LRO became personnel manager of a large 
company and in 1987 was earning $3,400 per month with a modern 
company car and other benefits. Those who remained with the Ministry as 
LROs received $750 at this time. 
^^wo other LROs present supported the story. 
^^The ICA did give IROs power to seize documents and the proposed LRA 
amendment bill seeks to reintroduce these powers. 
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There are grounds for doubting the view in the literature that LROs 
administer labour laws in favour of employers. There is probably an 
approximate balance in decisions favouring employers or employees, and 
there is evidence that workers have at times benefited from strong 
intervention by LROs. Many employers perceive that the Ministry of Labour 
acts in the interests of workers and this has caused them to improve their 
approach to industrial relations. Moreover, unlike the situation before 
independence, workers now have recourse to the Ministry of Labour when 
faced with racism and unfair labour practices by employers. There is a view 
among many employers and workers that workers now have rights to fair 
treatment, whereas before independence they were virtually subject to 
employers' dictate. The case study chapters consider the variable extent to 
which this is put into practice. 
4.3 Democratising tine Workplace'^ 
Government labour policy pronounces in favour of democratising the 
workplace (see Chapter 2), and several observers have looked at workers' 
committees to assess the achievement of this policy. Two broad criticisms 
are made of workers' committees: that they are inadequate vehicles for 
participation, and that they usurp trade union functions. Nangati (1984a) 
follows general radical critiques of industrial democracy schemes such as 
those by Clarke (1977) and Clegg and Dunkeriey (1980) (see Chapter 1). 
Nangati's argument is that government policy to create a "favourable 
investment climate" (1984a: 30 quoting Republic of Zimbabwe, Transitional 
National Development Plan, 1982b: 37), entails the maintenance of 
"'industrial peace' which means control of the workers in their struggles 
against capital" (1984a: 30). Consequently, workers' committees cannot 
challenge existing relations of production and this means that "the new 
'^^ Parts of this section appear in Shadur (1987a). 
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participatory institutions serve as instruments for the exploitation of the 
worker" (1984a: v). Cheater contrasts workers' committees at Zimtex with 
the workers' councils described by Gramsci, which posed a challenge to 
capitalist relations of production, and she concludes that the "concern of the 
workers' representatives at Zimtex ... remained the very localised realities of 
workers' lives in individual enterprises in post-independence Zimbabwe, not 
the 'transition to socialism' to which government claims to be committed" 
(1986: 133). In addition the Zimtex workers' committee was becoming 
"discredited by its structural association with management", and by its 
conflicts with the union and party (1986: 132). In similar vein to criticisms of 
workers' committees in Tanzania (e.g., Shivji 1976: 129-33; Fashoyin 1986: 
64), writers on Zimbabwe argue that these bodies usurp the role of trade 
unions. According to Nangati "workers committees in plants which are not 
yet organised tend to weaken the influence of [the] trade union" (1984a: 42). 
Cheater notes that "the rift between trades unions and workers' committees 
continued to fragment the interests of workers" (1988: 296). In 1980, textile 
union leader Phineas Sithole denounced "the use of the workers' committees 
by the government to divide and control trade unions for political ends of the 
governing party" (Press statement 22/12/80). 
These commentators share the view that workers' committees have achieved 
little in terms of democratising the workplace, and they suggest that these 
bodies have undermined trade unions. The view presented here is that 
workers' committees have achieved little in terms of worker participation in 
management decision-making precisely because they were not designed or 
intended to achieve this. They are primarily industrial relations bodies. 
Workers' committees were formed at the request of Labour Minister Kangai 
during the 1980 strikes since the union shop-steward system was not well 
developed, and in many companies unions had negligible contact with the 
workforce. As the Ministry of Labour Workers' Committee Guide Lines 
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published in February 1981 state, the broad role of workers' committees was 
to provide a "means of communication" between management and workers 
(Ministry of Labour 1981: 1). They were not given legal backing until the 
Labour Relations Act of 1985, and their precise role was not made clear. 
Nonetheless, they were established in virtually all sizeable parastatals and 
private companies (as with many industrial relations practices, small 
enterprises frequently ignore workers' committees), and a general modus 
operandi evolved. It is common for one committee member to be elected 
for each department or identifiable work group in an organisation. Workers' 
committees are made up of workers only, and each committee elects 
representatives to meet with management on the works council. There is 
often parity representation between management and workers on works 
councils. The committees and councils can discuss general conditions of 
employment (e.g., rosters, canteen, safety, disciplinary codes, grading); 
however, the emphasis is on communication to maintain industrial peace and 
increase productivity. The outcomes of discussions are recommendations to 
management, and their decisions are subordinate to those of employment 
councils and boards (Ministry of Labour 1981: 6-10). Works councils clearly 
have a more important role than workers' committees, but in popular 
parlance workers' committees are often referred to in a way that includes the 
works council. Workers' committees have assumed some trade union roles 
in in-plant industrial relations negotiations; however, they have also played 
an important role in supplementing weak trade unions, as is shown in the 
case study chapters. Their primary role is as industrial relations bodies, it is 
therefore inappropriate to assess them as institutions for worker participation 
in management decision-making. 
Management committees have been discussed by government as a means 
of bringing about participation in decision-making. Labour Minister Shava 
and Prime Minister Mugabe have spoken in favour of management 
committees (e.g., Herald 24/5/85, 19/6/85, 19/8/86, 2/5/87). The most 
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detailed statement to date is a conference paper presented by the Ministry 
of Labour in mid-1986: 
It is Government's desire tinat workers, togetlier with management, 
be involved in decision-making so as to influence enterprise policy at 
micro-level and overall economic policy at macro-level. Although the 
form and nature of worker participation in management committees 
will be open to discussion between Government, workers and 
employers. Government would, however, want to see workers 
effectively participating with management in making decisions 
involving production targets, production levels, investment policies, 
disbursement of profit and marketing policies and the overall 
utilisation of manpower and other resources used in the production 
process (Ministry of Labour 1986). 
This proposal is far-reaching. It would involve workers in decision-making 
that has hitherto been considered the prerogative of management. The idea 
that workers should set production levels and decide in which areas to 
invest and the amount of such investment would be anathema to many 
employers in Zimbabwe. But, despite Minister Shava's announcement that 
legislation would be passed in 1985 to implement management committees 
{Herald 24/5/85), to date there have been no concrete developments 
concerning their introduction. Consequently, there has been no serious 
attempt to implement government policy to democratise the workplace. 
Partly, no doubt, this is because employers would oppose such moves; 
partly also there is a perception within government that workers are ill-
prepared for participation in management. On this last point it is noteworthy 
that government has not taken steps to prepare workers through training 
courses (Cheater 1988: 296). It is likely then that participation is not 
strongly supported within government. One reason for this might be that it 
is seen as being detrimental to economic growth, and in this regard it is also 
pertinent to note that workers' committees were not formed in central 
government departments. 
4.4 Tripartitism 
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The final component of government labour policy to be examined in this 
chapter is tripartitism. In accordance with its commitment to ILO support for 
tripartitism (set out in the 1981 Growth With Equity policy statement), 
government created a number of institutions to deal with employment 
matters; these included the Wage and Salaries Advisory Board, the 
Retrenchment Committee and the Tripartite Consultative Sub-committee on 
ILO Matters. Commentators to date have argued that these institutional 
arrangements have worked against the interests of workers and have 
benefited capital. Herbst (1987) puts this view with respect to wage setting, 
and Nangati (1984b) argues this in the case of the retrenchment committee. 
These views are questioned here. 
The initial statutory minimum wage rates were simply announced by 
government without consultation with employers or unions. In 1985 the 
government called for position papers from employer and trade union 
organisations (EMCOZ, ZCTU) and then made the decision. In 1986, under 
pressure from employers, unions and the ILO, tripartite consultations were 
extended so that EMCOZ, the ZCTU and government representatives met to 
discuss the position papers on the Wage and Salaries Advisory Board. The 
recommendations then passed to a Working Party of permanent secretaries, 
then to the Ministerial Economic Coordinating Committee and finally to the 
full Cabinet. The ministries represented in these bodies included Finance, 
Trade and Commerce, Industry and Technology, Agriculture, Mines and 
Labour (Interview, Lazarus Dhlakama, Chief LRO, February 1988; S.I. 368 of 
1985). 
Herbst shows that in the 1986 negotiations the ZCTU displayed "poor ... 
bargaining tactics" by basing its case on the poverty datum line which 
resulted in extravagant demands for wage increases (e.g., 174 percent 
increase for industrial workers, 1987: 369-70). EMCOZ was more adept by 
focusing on the effects of wage rises on employment and inflation. Herbst 
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is aware that economic recession played a role in depressing wage 
increases; however, he places more emphasis on the bargaining skills of the 
actors. He argues that the institutionalisation of wage setting "led to the 
direct loss of labour power because the formal structure of wage 
negotiations rewards the attributes labour is most lacking in: analytic skills, 
coordinated bargaining approaches, organisational cohesion" (1987: 375). 
Thus Herbst holds that labour was in a stronger position when wages were 
earlier set by "purely political decisions" rather than the "more technocratic 
basis" (pp.365-6): "Labour was at its most powerful in 1980-1981 when 
spontaneous strikes forced government into early establishment of minimum 
wages at levels that gave workers real increases in income" (p.374). 
Undoubtedly the bargaining skills of the ZCTU were inferior to those of 
EMCOZ. Nonetheless, Herbst's analysis is flawed. To begin with, it was 
not simply the case that the strikes forced the wage increases of 1980-81; 
government's own labour policy was to raise low incomes after years of 
colonialism. Moreover, labour was not stronger when wages were set by 
political decisions. Even before the institutionalisation of wage setting in 
1986, a wage freeze was imposed by government in 1982-1983, and real 
minimum wages declined from 1982 until 1985. As has been argued above, 
the economic decline was the key factor leading to depressed wages. In 
the buoyant years 1980-81, government was able to increase real wages, 
but when the economy sharply declined it imposed a wage freeze. It is not 
entirely accurate to see the 1980-81 strikes as signs of labour's strength. 
Most strike action called upon the government to play the leading role to 
pursue workers' interests. More importantly, wildcat strikes proved to be a 
fragile means for labour to exert influence, since government decisively 
moved to curtail such action, and it is almost certain that government would 
again stop strikes were they to recur. A potentially more fruitful approach 
would be for labour to develop a stronger position within the institutional 
framework, and pressure government into restoring unions' bargaining role. 
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In order to achieve this the unions would have to analyse the basis of 
government incorporation of the labour movement, which has been examined 
in detail in this thesis, and is a process that Herbst entirely neglects/® 
Nangati has criticised the operation of the tripartite Retrenchment 
Committee, by stating that workers' who face retrenchment must rely on 
labour relations officers to put their case, and that this is unsatisfactory since 
LROs appear to favour employers (1984b: 19). To support his view Nangati 
cites one case, which he considers "illustrative" {p.19), in which approval 
was given to retrench 230 workers in a transport company in October 1984 
{Herald 6/10/84). This case, however, was more probably an exception 
since the ZCTU, then under the incompetent leadership of the first 
executive, failed to send a delegation. Other than this case, Nangati 
provides no evidence to support his claim that "workers have lost most 
cases of retrenchments" (1984b: 19). In other meetings many employers' 
applications have not been approved, or alternatives have been ordered 
such as a reduction in working time, rotation of the standing down of 
workers, or retrenchment of fewer workers than the employer requested. 
The committee heard reports from workers' committees in the affected 
company, and where insufficient evidence was available the committee often 
deferred consideration, and on occasion decided to visit the company 
concerned (Observation of two Retrenchment Committee meetings October 
1984; interviews with employer and union members). Figures for 1987 show 
that the Ministry of Labour approved the retrenchment of 999 (38 percent) of 
the 2,600 workers whom 96 employers applied to retrench. Employers 
applied for 1,388 workers to be placed on rotation, short working hours or 
unpaid leave, and approval was given for 457 (33 percent) of these. In 
^^Herbst does not mention the incorporation of unions by party and 
government and, as noted in Chapter 2, he sees the "consolidation" of the 
five union centres into the ZCTU as "something of a worker success" (1987: 
351). 
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1988, approval was granted for 744 (39 percent) of the 1,915 workers 
employers sought to retrench {Financial Gazette 4/3/88, 14/4/89). 
Summary 
The haphazard development of government labour policy with respect to 
wages, restricting termination of employment and labour relations machinery 
has been charted in this chapter. Government attempts to increase 
significantly workers' real incomes have not been efficacious, and the 
minimum wage policy and restricting dismissals probably contributed to the 
lack of employment growth. Moreover, unions' potential to develop was 
undermined and state corporatist control was reinforced by the government 
which assumed traditional trade union roles in wage setting and employment 
protection. Labour relations machinery established through the Labour 
Relations Act provided some benefits to workers such as prohibiting 
discrimination and unfair labour practices. In addition, and contrary to the 
general thrust of critical views, in many instances labour relations officers 
have administered the Act so as to support workers, on occasion exceeding 
their formal powers. However, the overwhelming effect of the Act is to arm 
the state with extensive controls over trade unions and the conduct of labour 
relations. Strikes are virtually illegal, collective bargaining agreements are 
open to government control and sweeping regulatory powers enable the 
minister to govern almost the entire realm of labour relations, including the 
internal affairs of trade unions. 
Government policy to democratise the workplace has been all but dormant. 
A number of writers have assessed the operation of workers committees and 
works councils in terms of their contribution to workplace democracy and 
have concluded that they are very limited institutions. However, these 
institutions were created as labour relations bodies, and not as vehicles for 
worker participation in management decision-making. It is argued here that 
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when workers' committees are evaluated as labour relations bodies to 
supplement weak shopfloor trade unionism, then they can be seen as 
playing an important role. The committees have assumed some functions 
that are commonly performed by trade unions in other countries, yet 
workers' committees have provided needed representation for workers in 
many organisations which have had a negligible union presence. To date 
there has been only rhetorical reference to, and no practical steps toward, 
the introduction of management committees which would involve participation 
in management. 
Critics claim that workers have not benefited from the participation of labour 
in tripartite institutional arrangements in relation to wage setting (Herbst 
1987) and retrenchment (Nangati 1984b). However, these views do not 
provide a balanced account. Workers in fact did not gain higher wages as a 
result of wages being set outside the tripartite wages body, and the tripartite 
committee protected many employees from retrenchment. 
The government's corporatist labour strategy places strict controls over trade 
unions by enabling government to regulate their internal affairs and 
restricting them from engaging in strike action. Government labour policy 
has militated against the growth in union strength; nonetheless, the 
government pursues policies to further workers' interests. Labour policy 
seeks to provide growth with equity (i.e. expansion of employment and 
wealth together with protection and enhancement of workers' interests), and 
this is similar to the twin objectives that Bates identified the Zambian 
government as following (1971). 
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Chapter 5 General Industries Limited 
There are no industrial relations in this company. Relations in this company are 
in a shambles. The reason for this lies with the workers' representatives. In 
past years we have had good workers' committees but the current members have 
undergone [pause] indoctrination .... They do not give a true reflection of how 
ordinary shopfloor workers feel. Many of their grievances are personal issues 
that involve the members themselves, in relation to promotion, etc., that should 
have gone through Personnel. 
General Manager 
General Industries, April 1985. 
The Negroes were considered of absolutely no account, of no force whatsoever. 
Puzo, The Godfather {^969). 
Introduction 
The case of General industries exemplifies the persistence of racist and 
authoritarian management practices in independent Zimbabwe. i\/1anagement 
sought to continue colonial relations of production (Burawoy 1985) in the 
post-colonial setting, and when workers resisted colonial practices conflict 
permeated labour relations. This case shows that, contrary to Marxist views, 
management style and culture have important influences on the conduct of 
labour relations. The influences of Rhodesian culture and the chief 
executive, who was a member of the founding family, are prominent in this 
case. 
A precondition for permission to study General Industries Limited was that 
the correct name of the company would not be used, a major reason for this 
being that the company was experiencing pronounced labour relations 
problems. Details of the company have been altered to protect anonymity, 
though not in a manner that would substantially affect conclusions drawn. 
5.1 Background to Labour Relations at General Industries 
The company was a long-standing local business that had grown into a 
prominent manufacturing enterprise. Annual turnover was in the $100 
millions, and profits amounted to millions of dollars per annum. Growth had 
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led to changes in ownership and by 1984-85 the company was mostly 
foreign owned but - and this was a decisive factor - management remained 
in the hands of local whites; indeed the chief executive officer was a 
member of the company's founding family. 
At the time of research, late 1984 and 1985, the company had 
approximately 4,000 employees nationally and about half this number were 
in the Harare area. The research focused on the plants in Harare, although 
Bulawayo operations and regional sites were visited for short periods. The 
production process included quite sophisticated technology and also 
conventional production-line operations and distribution systems. The 
majority of General Industries' employees were unskilled or semi-skilled, 
performing handling or machine operator tasks. Virtually all these workers 
were male with little formal education, and the majority earned below $300 
per month. The work was strenuous for many workers, some tasks 
involving lifting heavy loads. 
The main form of labour representation was the workers' committee. An 
unregistered trade union existed and, according to a union representative, 
had approximately 800 members within the company, less than 20 percent 
of the total workforce. Management considered the union unrepresentative 
and primarily dealt with the workers' committee. This was basically in line 
with government policy since unregistered unions were not members of 
industrial boards. There were several plants in Harare located a few 
kilometres from each other and each plant had a workers' committee, which 
in turn elected a central workers' committee of 12 members, each of whom 
had a deputy. The deputies attended workers' committee meetings, but did 
not attend Works Council meetings where discussions with management 
representatives were undertaken. Usually only three management 
representatives attended these meetings; the General Manager, the 
Personnel Manager and the Industrial Relations Officer. A national works 
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council was convened on an ad hoc basis and was chaired by the Chief 
Executive. It dealt with company-wide issues such as wage negotiations 
but, due to conflicts between workers and management, this body did not 
convene regularly. 
Contrary to the view that workers' committees supplanted trade unions in 
Zimbabwe (Nangati 1984a; see also Cheater 1988) the General Industries' 
workers' committee supported the development of unionism in the company. 
Indeed, this support led to a conflict between the workers' committee and 
management when the workers "smuggled" a trade union official into a 
meeting with management without informing the meeting (Minutes of October 
1984 Works Council Meeting). 
5.2 Labour Relations at General Industries Limited 
Relations between management and workers were very poor, even hostile. 
Human resource management was not taken seriously by management; 
instead, personnel policies and procedures (e.g., the job evaluation scheme, 
grievance procedure, safety policy) were established to pacify and control 
workers rather than to manage labour policies in good faith. On the surface, 
post-colonial labour relations practices at General Industries were becoming 
institutionalised: a formal job grading system was implemented, an industrial 
relations officer was responsible for dealing with disciplinary cases involving 
dismissal, and a workers' committee structure existed for discussions 
between workers and management. In reality these were a thin veneer over 
a mixture of discriminatory, arbitrary and paternalist practices. 
As in many large organisations, disciplinary hearings were held to determine 
cases potentially involving dismissal. These were conducted by the 
company industrial relations officer, with the head of department, the 
accused and a workers' committee representative participating. Typically, 
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management retained determining authority. But General Industries differed 
from many other companies in that the company often attempted to mete 
out discipline in a severe and discriminatory manner. 
In one case, a 55-year-old unskilled worker had been caught stealing 
material valued at 52 cents. This worker pleaded in the hearing for 
forgiveness, saying that this was his first offence in his 19 years of service, 
and begged for leniency since he would find it extremely difficult to obtain 
alternative employment to support his five children. The Security Manager 
rejected these appeals, arguing that theft was rampant, so firm action was 
essential. The management representatives were aware that the Ministry of 
Labour would probably not approve an application for dismissal in this case, 
so the white Security Manager attempted to intimidate the accused into 
resigning. Among other stratagems, the accused was given a choice 
between resignation and public disgrace by being arrested and brought to 
trial. The Security Manager demanded, "How would your children think of 
you then, with their father being a criminal?" The black Industrial Relations 
Officer played a non-committal role in the hearing, and the workers' 
committee representative accepted the argument that the disciplinary code 
entailed dismissal for theft (Observation February 1985). This contrasted 
markedly with workers' representatives strong defence of a worker in a 
similar case at Dairy Marketing Board (Chapter 7), and one factor here 
might be the authoritarian approach taken by the Security Manager and 
management generally at General Industries. The decision was made to 
pursue the case. However when the case came to the attention of the 
General Manager he ordered that the employee be reinstated with a 
warning. 
Workers' committee members alleged that discipline was enforced in a 
discriminatory manner. They cited a number of cases in which senior 
employees, usually whites, were given lenient treatment after committing 
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offences. When a white maintenance supervisor became intoxicated at a 
social function at work and fought with a black worker, he then allegedly 
attempted to run down the worker with a motor vehicle. Workers claim that 
instead of being dismissed the offender was transferred to another region. 
Management claimed that discipline was enforced fairly and cited dismissals 
of senior whites and blacks for serious offences. But workers' committee 
members insisted that such dismissals occurred primarily as a result of their 
pressure on management. 
The company experienced difficulties in having many of its dismissal 
applications approved by the Ministry of Labour. There were many disputed 
applications, and numerous cases were pending for months, even years. In 
many cases General Industries was obliged to conform to Ministry of Labour 
rulings and influence. One such case involved a driver who was found over 
100 kilometres off route, with a strong suspicion that he was attempting to 
sell company property. Labour officials were briefed on the case and they 
intimated that dismissal would not be approved, so the company opted 
instead to issue a final warning. 
Many basic personnel and labour relations systems were either not in 
existence or were inadequate. Top management gave little support to 
safety. Protective clothing was provided for many jobs, though this was 
often a result of workers' demands. The following response to workers' 
request for protective footwear typifies management's attitude: 
The Chairman advised that when workers felt such a need they 
should research the matter obtaining costs, advantages of such 
equipment, this should be discussed between departments so they 
can work together. This must then be put on the agenda (Minutes 
of Works Council meeting May 1984, chaired by the white Group 
Personnel Manager). 
Aside from apprenticeships and training for a particular technical position, no 
formal training of employees was undertaken by the company during the 
research period. This meant for the Mashonaland region, only 22 members 
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of the approximately 2,000 strong workforce were undergoing training. 
Matabeleland region provided a little more training than did Mashonaland. A 
previous Personnel Manager had provided workers' committee members with 
labour relations negotiations training which participants lauded (Interviews, 
1985) but these lasted only a few days and were not repeated after he 
departed in 1984. No formal performance appraisal method was in use and, 
as indicated below, in many cases discriminatory practices affected 
promotions and merit pay decisions. Despite ample personnel and accounts 
departments, even record-keeping for employees, especially low level 
workers, was 
very incomplete and unreliable .... A great deal of embarrassment 
was caused at last year's long service awards when people who had 
left the company, or who had died, had been incorrectly included in 
the awards list (Minutes of Works Council Meeting June 1985). 
Job evaluation and remuneration were sources of serious worker 
dissatisfaction. The Paterson Method of Job Evaluation (discussed in 
Chapter 6) was implemented in 1982, and there were constant calls for 
regrading. The position of Personnel Manager for Mashonaland was 
characterised by crisis management, in that incumbents were continually 
engaged in resolving immediate disputes rather than planning longer-term 
improvements in labour relations. This preoccupation with "fire-fighting" and 
rapid turnover in the position led to a large back-log of claims with little 
effective action to re-establish a grading committee to review jobs. The 
Personnel Manager at the time of the research commenced the training of a 
grading committee, but resigned before the exercise was completed. 
The high turnover in the positions of Mashonaland Regional Personnel 
Manager and Group Personnel Manager was indicative of the malaise in 
labour relations at General Industries. From independence to 1985 there 
had been at least three group personnel managers and nine incumbents in 
the regional position (two of them in an acting capacity). Many of these 
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occupants became exasperated and resigned; top management pursued a 
policy to frustrate some of them in order to engineer their resignation when 
it was considered they were not controlling labour relations as management 
required. The stint at General Industries embittered and demoralised some 
of these people, as one out-going regional manager put it with considerable 
emotion "The last three months have been the most unhappy in my life [long 
pause] and that is because of work and how things are run". He had held 
the position for one year, and prophesied that his replacement would suffer 
the same fate, "[he] thinks he will be able to cope with them [top 
management], but they will undermine him .... He's a nice guy, but they'll 
ruin things for him" (Interview). The in-coming manager did indeed become 
disenchanted at General Industries and resigned after about 18 months, 
turning down financial and promotional inducements to remain. Both these 
men, like most incumbents, were white. 
Wage rates at General Industries were consistently higher than the statutory 
minimum wage for industrial workers. As shown in Table 5.1, in nominal 
terms the company's wages stayed in line with statutory increases. 
However, in real terms basic wages at General Industries declined from 
$108.25 in 1980 to $91.99 in 1985, while the real industrial minimum rose 
slightly. 
Table 5.1 Nominal and Real Minimum Wages {in $) for General 
Industries and Industrial Workers July 1980-1985' 
Year General Industries Industrial Minimum 
Nominal Real Nominal Real 
1980 108.25 108.25 70.00 70.00 
1981 121.90 107.78 85.00 75.15 
1982 134.09 107.10 105.00 83.87 
1983' 144.09 93.50 115.00 74.63 
1984 160.00 86.39 125.00 67.49 
1985 184.80 91.99 143.75 71.55 
Sources: Calculated from company records and various statutory instruments, see Chapter 
4 Table 4.1. 
' Calculated in 1980 prices. 
^ For September. 
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Put another way, real wages for General Industries' workers were higher 
before the introduction of statutory minima. As noted in Chapter 4 many 
employers opposed these minima, and at General Industries opposition to 
wage increases intensified when relations between management and workers 
deteriorated. While paternalism reigned, higher wages were proffered to 
beguile workers, but when the government began acting on workers' behalf 
and workers began asserting themselves, management withdrew the 
inducements for passivity and resisted wage increments. 
There was a convoluted saga of wage negotiations at General Industries. In 
1983 labour relations were amicable enough for management to arrange 
meetings of worker and management representatives, both for General 
Industries nationally and in the other major companies in the industry, before 
the Industrial Board meeting. General Industries' management stated that 
the reason for this was that in the previous industrial board meeting conflict 
occurred and the Chief Executive wished to avoid this. From management's 
viewpoint, the 1983 industrial board meeting was conducted without rancour 
and a wage increase of 12 percent was agreed. But in 1984 a number of 
conflicts escalated and management was no longer disposed to facilitate 
friendly negotiations. Without informing management, the workers' 
committee had invited Ministry of Labour officials and had smuggled a trade 
union official into an internal management-worker meeting. These actions 
led management to end its guise of cooperation and move to a more openly 
confrontational approach, as the minutes of an ensuing meeting recorded. 
An Industrial Board meeting to negotiate wages was again pending 
and ... [the Chief Executive] stated that he had wished, as in the 
previous year, to complete internal negotiations with the National 
Works Council in advance. However, ... the elected Chairman of 
the Harare workers, had shown that he had no respect for 
management and had now involved third parties. Advance 
negotiation was therefore no longer possible and ... [the Chief 
Executive] regretted that, as a result, he would have to attend the 
Industrial Board meeting to fight the case of management only 
(Minutes of a special Harare management-worker meeting, 4 
October 1984). 
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Underlying the ostensible issues was a fundamental schism. Both parties 
were responding to the incompatibility between the continuing paternalist 
colonial relations of production, and the demand for post-colonial relations. 
In subsequent discussions on wages, management continued to dismantle 
the facade of paternalism and maintained an inflexible policy on wage 
negotiations, while increasingly shifting blame onto the government. In the 
National Works Council meeting of November 1985 the Chief Executive 
adopted the following posture on wages: 
Looking at the Agenda it seemed to the Chairman that it appeared 
workers were under the impression that they are still free to 
negotiate over and above the relevant Government Regulations -
but this was not the case. 
The Chairman then quoted section 9 of the Emergency Powers 
(Control of Income Increases) Regulations, 1985 .... It followed, 
therefore, that if the Company agreed to pay more by way of 
increased wages, bonuses or service awards, it would be guilty of 
an offence (Minutes of a National Works Council Meeting, 
November 1985). 
As was seen in Chapter 4, this is an understandable misinterpretation of the 
laws on control of income. These regulations were confusing, though it 
would seem that they did not prevent negotiated increases being paid over 
and above the statutory increase. In 1984 this would have allowed a 10% 
statutory increase and an additional 10% negotiated increase for low income 
earners. The government therefore created a convenient shelter behind 
which companies like General Industries could insulate themselves from 
wage demands. 
Another major feature of remuneration at General Industries was the 
prevalence of wide pay disparities. Many employees, especially skilled and 
senior staff, on the same Paterson grade received very divergent salaries. 
There were a number of factors involved here, including the principle of pay 
according to merit, seniority, favouritism, and racial discrimination. 
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Racial discrimination was a focal issue at General Industries, and negligible 
black advancement had taken place in senior positions. There was only one 
black director of the main Board and he was appointed by one of the 
multinational corporate shareholders as a non-executive member. Of the 10 
directors of the operating company, one was black; however, he departed 
from the company during the research period, leaving no blacks on the 
Board. Management was similarly dominated by whites. Of 43 managers 
and senior staff in Mashonaland, there were 6 blacks and 1 Asian. Most of 
the 6 blacks occupied junior management or technical positions. 
Racism was also evident in senior promotions and appointments, so white 
predominance was not attenuated. To begin with, the private employment 
agencies used by the company knew from past dealings that strong 
preference was given to whites and, in any case, it appeared that some 
employment agencies themselves favoured whites (Nangati 1984b: 28). 
Thus most candidates for senior jobs were white. In one case no suitable 
white applicant could be found and the Personnel Manager recommended 
the appointment of a coloured (mixed race) person as Wages and Salaries 
Clerk. The General Manager rejected this proposal on the grounds that 
non-whites should not hold a sensitive position with access to the salary 
profile of management. The Personnel Manager in turn refused to accept 
this response, and stated he was not prepared to go through another round 
of interviews for the position. To resolve the issue the General Manager 
consulted the Chief Executive who agreed to the appointment (Interviews 
with Personnel Manager). 
When blacks did reach senior positions, as Nyoka (1987) and Burawoy 
(1985) found elsewhere, some of the responsibilities were pruned from the 
jobs. In the case of the most senior black, the Plant Manager, several 
major responsibilities were transferred when he was appointed, including the 
warehouse, workshops and purchasing. The colour bar principle, under 
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which blacks did not supervise whites, did not, however, operate strictly at 
General Industnes. The Plant Manager, for example, was in charge of 
some white employees. But this had been transformed into a largely 
technical position, and in the case of the former black director who occupied 
a more genera! position, there were no senior staff reporting to him. Indeed, 
many blacks considered the black director a "window-dressing" appointee, 
for the unit had very few staff and its role was primarily to liaise with 
government and the public. 
Blacks were treated by some white staff as though "they were still living in 
Rhodesia" (a common expression used to refer to a racist). Black workers 
were spoken to in a rough manner, and racist jokes were frequently 
exchanged by white employees; at times these were made in the presence 
of blacks. This was flagrant practice on the shopfloor, but even the less 
racist white staff adopted the curious Rhodesian quirk of raising their voices 
to an unnecessarily loud, even supercilious, tone when addressing blacks. 
Another source of workers' vexation was the conduct of the company 
Industrial Relations Officer (IRO). This officer's functions involved handling 
disciplinary cases and grievances, appointing low-skilled workers, and 
deciding on requests for advances on pay. The workers' committee 
repeatedly alleged that the IRO indulged in favouritism, intimidation and 
chimbadzo (usury) in his dealings with workers. Allegedly, he would charge 
exorbitant interest for personal gain instead of granting no-interest advances 
on workers' pay. The IRO was an unqualified person appointed by the 
Chief Executive and for years management defended him, maintaining that 
the workers objected to him since they wanted a sycophant. He was 
retained to the chagrin of workers' committee members. 
As relations between management and workers deteriorated, workers 
became unreasonable and frequently put forward issues that were not 
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adequately supported by argument or evidence. This appeared to be the 
case with their demand for the dismissal of the company IRO, and in some 
of their allegations relating to discriminatory disciplinary action. Many claims 
for job re-grading were merely stratagems to obtain pay rises. During 
depressed market conditions, rather than attempting to lay off workers, the 
company arranged with workers for rotation to different jobs. The workers' 
committee then demanded "acting allowances" for workers performing 
different duties. At times workers' committee members acted deliberately to 
provoke management, as in the smuggling of the unionist into a meeting, 
and in the Chairman's hanging a poster of Lenin on the factory gate. For a 
management like that of General Industries, this was tantamount to a casus 
belli. 
All these issues coalesced to create a climate of hostility within General 
Industries. For years workers had sought action on their grievances through 
the workers' committee structures, the Ministry of Labour, and the Industrial 
Board. Some issues were addressed, but on many others management 
either demurred or rejected them altogether. Consequently, there was a 
perpetual list of demands from Harare workers. To convey their frustration 
they began a boycott of the monthly Works Council meetings in November 
1984. By March 1985 this had had no effect, so the Harare workers' 
committee wrote to the Minister of Labour setting out their grievances and 
requesting permission to stage a strike. In response to these letters, 
management representatives were summoned to attend a meeting with the 
Deputy Minister of Labour, and this created an imbroglio within General 
Industries. The state thus became directly involved in labour relations at 
General Industries. 
Before the meeting with the Deputy Minister, General Industries' workers had 
had experience of contact with the Ministry of Labour. This arose through 
the disputed dismissal cases and on occasion they urged the labour officers 
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to assist them in having management heed their claims, in these respects 
workers had mixed success. In numerous cases the Ministry IROs rejected 
applications for dismissal. In relation to their disputes with management, 
however, the state had been less helpful to workers. During one dispute 
both the workers' committee and the Personnel Manager made repeated 
requests for the IRO to visit the company to assist in settling the conflict, yet 
the IRO refused. The IRO stated that transport was not available, and when 
the Personnel Manager offered to drive him, he replied that he was too busy 
(Observation and interview with Personnel Manager, February 1985). 
Ministry officials did attend works council meetings occasionally at the 
request of workers, but with little result. General Industries' management 
constituted a very artful opponent and was often able to provide a 
semblance of cooperation and propriety so that no particular action could be 
identified as warranting intervention from the Ministry. The example of the 
workers' committee request for labour officials to attend Works Council 
meetings is indicative here, as shown in the Minutes of the National Works 
Council meeting held in November 1985: 
The Chairman [CEO] asked which of the Representatives present at 
the meeting feared victimisation and it became clear that the fear 
was not of victimisation by management but by the workers when 
the Workers' Representatives reported back. 
The Chairman indicated that he had no objection to the presence of 
such observers and it was agreed that the Secretary would issue 
an invitation to appropriate senior officials of the Ministry for future 
meetings. 
Workers also had dealings with the state when they staged a work-in in 
1982. With strikes prohibited by the state, Harare workers endeavoured to 
demonstrate their dissatisfaction on a range of issues by continuing to work 
overnight and into the following day, a Saturday. The Chief IRO attended 
the site and persuaded the workers to end their action and promised to 
have their grievances examined. But little came of this apart from a promise 
of a wage rise which awarded at a much later date. So poor relations 
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continued. 
In March 1985 Harare workers' committee members again sought state 
assistance and gained an audience with the Deputy Minister of Labour, 
Robson Manyika, who summoned management to discuss the contents of 
their letters of complaint. Their criticisms related to wages, job evaluation, 
unfair disciplinary practices, the conduct of the company IRO, poor 
communications and low morale. At the meeting both parties presented 
their views. The Deputy Minister ruled out strike action and requested that 
the parties put their cases in writing, after which a meeting would be held 
with national worker and management representatives (Interviews with 
participants and company records). 
At the subsequent meeting worker representatives did not acquit themselves 
well. Management delegates provided detailed responses, even if they were 
at times perfunctory, while workers made a number of factual errors and 
were unable to provide sufficiently detailed evidence to support their 
allegations. Nonetheless, the Deputy Minister advised that an Industrial 
Board meeting be convened to review wage and job evaluation issues. 
There was also a suggestion that General Industries' salary structure be 
investigated. Priority was to be given to the Harare regrading exercise and 
the disciplinary code review. The Deputy Minister also urged that 
communication and cooperation be improved, and that the role of the 
company IRO be examined. 
The implementation of these recommendations was largely perfunctory. 
Management did change their stance on the company IRO and called for 
evidence against him, but the workers' committee merely reiterated 
unsupported allegations, in the end, to reduce conflict, the white Personnel 
Manager persuaded the IRO to resign by offering a financial inducement. 
Thus one change was effected, though even here workers' committee 
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weakness was apparent. The industrial board meeting was held after the 
main research period ended, and the results of this are not available. Job 
evaluation was a matter for examination within the company. The review of 
grading and the disciplinary code ambled along, hampered by the departure 
of the Harare Personnel Manager and poor worker-management relations. 
Uneasy relations prevailed and frustrated workers periodically boycotted 
discussions with management. The review of the company salary structure 
apparently did not eventuate. 
In writing to the Minister of Labour workers looked to the ZANU(PF) 
government almost as a father figure to protect them from their perceived 
oppressor. Their hopes for a favourable outcome were not characterised by 
the earlier naivety since they had experienced previous disappointments in 
their dealings with the Ministry of Labour. They appealed to the Minister 
only after exhausting all other channels rather than being driven by a sense 
of optimism (Interviews with workers' committee members). 
While the government's role would be interpreted by writers such as Astrow 
(1983) as selling out the workers, this would be an exaggeration. Partly the 
problem was the weakness of the workers' committee; secondly, the Deputy 
Minister, Robson Manyika, died a few months after the meetings, thus 
vitiating continuity and follow-up action. Equally important was 
management's obduracy. As is shown in later case studies, government 
influence did have an impact on labour relations in companies genuinely 
wishing to project a responsible image to the community. Management at 
General Industries was less inclined to this approach. Its strategy was to 
obscure shortcomings by arguing that there was no problem, as in the 
meeting with the Deputy Minister, and by feigning propriety through various 
public relations exercises such as the Workers' Trust scheme. 
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Under this scheme the company donated a percentage of annual profits 
(initially $1.6 million and subsequently 10% of annual dividends) into a trust 
holding equity in the company up to 10 percent of issued shares. The 
income earned from dividends on these shares was to be used for the 
benefit of workers and their families, such as loans for housing and 
education. This was heralded as a "Workers' Participation Scheme" in line 
with government policy but, as many analyses of such schemes have 
shown, this was a very limited form of participation (e.g., Drago and 
McDonough 1984; cf. Chapter 1). In some ways the company benefited 
from the scheme, since worker requests for housing loans or for guarantor 
facilities, a common practice in Zimbabwe, could be channelled to the trust 
which had finite reserves available. Salaried employees could seek such 
assistance from the company rather than from the trust. The company used 
the scheme to great advantage, and mentioned it at every opportunity, such 
as in the meeting with Minister Manyika, to portray the company as a 
beneficent employer, attuned to the new Zimbabwe. In reality, the company 
was strongly opposed to worker participation in decision-making. When 
questioned on the company's stance toward mooted management 
committees, a senior manager argued that workers did not possess the level 
of training necessary for management decision making, and that if workers 
showed management ability they would be promoted to higher positions 
(Interview July 1985). 
It is probable that management also used the workers' trust and various 
other strategies in coping with the prospect of nationalisation. A minister, 
Kumbirai Kangai, announced that the government was seriously considering 
nationalising the industry and summoned managers to his office to demand 
full financial details of the company (Interviews with company managers). 
Management raised many objections and points of detail which clouded the 
issue until support could be mustered elsewhere in government to reverse 
the proposal. This indeed was the outcome, for a Cabinet committee was 
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established to examine the matter, and this was reputedly comprised of 
Kangai and ministers usually considered to be sympathetic to capital, 
namely, Bernard Chidzero, Eddison Zvobgo, Richard Hove, and Denis 
Norman (Confidential newsletter)/ It was generally assumed that the 
Cabinet committee would allow the issue to die quietly, and by early 1988 
there had been no action. 
There was speculation within the company as to whether the poor labour 
relations scene influenced the proposal for nationalisation. Compared with 
expectations of the Mugabe government before it came to office, few 
companies had been nationalised. The government purchased substantial or 
controlling interests in a few companies, though none of these acquisitions 
appeared to be forced on the seller. A key factor was the companies' 
strategic importance in the country (e.g., media, coal) or, as in the case of 
Astra Corporation, because the company was seeking a local buyer to meet 
government restrictions on investments. It could be said therefore that 
nationalisation was not directly used by the Mugabe Government as a 
mechanism for regulating the conduct of labour relations. Without such a 
threat management at General Industries paid little heed to workers' 
demands, and conflict continued. 
5.3 Management Culture: Colonialism Continued 
A company history written in 1977 stressed the pioneering spirit of the 
founding family, and proudly proclaimed, "the sons and grandsons of the 
founder immigrants are Rhodesian, if not always by birth or education, then 
by upbringing and outlook" (Company document). This was a very apt 
description even after independence, for to a considerable extent the 
I^n order to prevent identification of General Industries this source is not 
cited. 
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company leadership maintained colonial management practices and racial 
discrimination. 
The Chief Executive was a member of the founding family and ran the 
company as a family company - indeed, as his personal fiefdom. At best 
this involved paternalism, such as giving jobs to favourites. In one case his 
cook was dismissed with the approval of the Ministry of Labour, but later, 
after the cook personally appealed to the Chief Executive, the cook was 
rehired. At times management style was authoritarian and petulant. In one 
instance a black worker was ordered to repair the Chief Executive's car 
urgently and, when the task was not completed promptly enough, the Chief 
Executive grasped the worker by the legs, dragged him from under the car, 
and drove off. This type of treatment was not confined to black workers; 
senior white employees including managers were periodically the target of 
verbal abuse. These outbursts of rage had implications for labour relations. 
A classic case was that of the sale of goods to employees at wholesale 
price. Warnings had been issued against workers placing orders during 
working hours. The Chief Executive became incensed when he 
subsequently saw workers attempting to make purchases during normal 
working hours. He shouted at the workers to return to work, and issued an 
order to cease staff sales for all of Mashonaland region. This involved even 
smaller depots where the practice had been carried out smoothly with local 
management support. 
Despite its size and the dilution of ownership the management of the 
organisation had not made the transition from a family company to a 
bureaucratic organisation. There was no organisational chart for the 
company, and this was deliberate, for the Chief Executive insisted that this 
was not required in a family company. Even job descriptions for middle and 
senior managers were spurned. When the Harare Regional Personnel 
Manager was requested to construct an organisational chart for the Harare 
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region to aid the current research project the reply was: "it's impossible. 
I've been thinking about this and I really don't know where people go. 
[Pause] And there are lots of them," The previous incumbent had given an 
almost identical reply. Many senior personnel reported to a number of 
superiors on various issues, and this had nothing to do with "matrix 
organisation" (Davis and Lawrence 1977). There were several instances in 
which managers skipped a management layer to report to a superior of their 
preference purely for personal, not ethnic, reasons. 
During an attempted drafting of a chart it emerged that at least 18 managers 
formally reported directly to the General Manager. However, it was made 
very clear that while managers formally reported to the General Manager, 
they were also answerable on a day-to-day basis to the Chief Executive. 
One key manager stated that it was only after a year in the position that he 
realised he formally reported to the General Manager and not to the Chief 
Executive. The latter would regularly summon managers to his office to 
discuss minutiae and intervene directly in their affairs. Many managers did 
not feel at liberty to make non-routine decisions; one regional personnel 
manager, for instance, was ordered by the Chief Executive to redraft a letter 
to the Ministry of Labour four times. In the end the personnel manager 
refused to sign the letter, and this was one factor in his departure. In short, 
the Chief Executive was a domineering manager who would not accept any 
challenge to his authority, either from workers or his subordinate managers, 
whatever their colour. 
When workers sought to challenge management authority, their demands 
were not recognised as legitimate grievances. Many of the conflicts at 
General Industries were defined by both management and workers as 
"communications problems". This implied that the conflict could be resolved 
simply by presenting the issue clearly to the other party. But 
"communications" was a protean explanation at General Industries and. 
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indeed, in many organisations (Clegg and Dunkerley 1980). More 
fundamental than communications was the hostile approach to labour 
relations taken by management. Management adopted a unitary perspective 
of labour relations (see Chapter 1), seeing the workers' committee and other 
labour bodies as third parties intervening to vitiate othenA/ise harmonious 
relations between themselves and the workers. The excerpt from an 
interview with the General Manager at the beginning of this chapter depicts 
this clearly, and the Chief Executive adopted a similar position, as revealed 
in a letter dated September 1985 replying to a workers' committee letter of 
complaint. 
There has been numerous correspondence which has been initiated 
by you either to myself or the Personnel Department and I am 
becoming very weary with your attitude. I have also instructed my 
Personnel Manager to arrange a meeting for Friday 27 September 
1985 at 1100 hours of which [sic] I have now been informed that 
you are refusing to see me. If this is how you intend to represent 
my wage earners then I view your approach as uncooperative, 
destructive and definately [sic] not in the interests of your fellow 
workers. As your decision has been made not to have dialogue 
with me ... then may I inform you that there is no further need for 
you to address letters directly to me. I would like to know whether 
your decision in not having further dialogue with me is the feeling of 
all the workers at ... [General Industries]. 
For management, a "good" workers' committee meant a compliant one, and 
they were nostalgic for a subdued workforce of the colonial days. 
Grievances presented by the workers' committee were not considered to be 
genuine demands; rather they were artefacts conjured up by agitators. 
These views permeated the behaviour of management vis-a-vis workers. 
Under such circumstances, it would be plainly wrong to dismiss the role of 
management style in labour relations. 
Contrary to most Marxist interpretations, management style patently did have 
a major impact on labour relations at General Industries. Countless writers 
on management point out that the chief executive can have a major impact 
on employee relations and organisational culture (e.g., Schein 1985; Bryman 
1986; Lansberg 1983). This is particularly so with respect to founders of 
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organisations (Schein 1985), and consequently companies commonly 
experience marked difficulties in undergoing the transition from a family 
company to a more bureaucratic organisation (Beckhard and Dyer 1983). 
These processes are readily apparent at General Industries as seen 
throughout this case study. 
The point can be emphasised by examining one of the company's main 
competitors and internal differences within General Industries. The 
competing company had a workforce approximately half the size of General 
Industries, and sales were considerably lower. Despite differences in size, 
there were many similarities between the two companies, for products, 
production techniques, location of plants, and rates of profitability were 
comparable. Nonetheless, substantially greater black advancement had 
taken place in management positions in the other company. By 1985 most 
senior appointments were of black personnel while General Industries 
continued to select whites for senior positions. Whereas General Industries 
provided very little formal training apart from apprenticeships, its competitor 
provided extensive training, including "6M courses" and workers' committee 
training for low level workers, supervisory and line management courses in 
labour relations, technical and management training for junior and middle 
managers. 
It did not appear that this company was more compelled by structural factors 
to train and promote blacks than was General Industries. There was little 
drift of employees from one company to the other, and turnover among 
senior staff was higher at General Industries than in the other company 
(Communication with former General Industries' Personnel Manager). 
Moreover, training staff and promoting blacks was simply corporate policy. 
All companies within the group were obliged by Head Office to carry out 
such policies. The competing company was part of a corporation that had 
progressed beyond a family company approach to management, while the 
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management style of the General Industries Chief Executive prevented this 
transition. 
Similarly, compared to Harare, the Matabeleland operations of General 
Industries experienced far less turmoil. There were problems in the region 
but not on the scale of Mashonaland. Partly this was the result of distance 
from the Chief Executive, who intervened less directly and could more easily 
be ignored when he did intervene. The General Manager of Matabeleland 
operations was less authoritarian than the Chief Executive and this assisted 
in creating less hostile relations between workers and management at 
Bulawayo. Another major factor was that the white Personnel Manager had 
been in the position for 17 years providing continuity which Harare lacked. 
Consequently there was less crisis management in Bulawayo, allowing 
personnel issues to be processed more gradually. With respect to job 
evaluation, for example, reviews were carried out periodically whenever 
about five cases had accumulated. The seasoned Personnel Manager 
needed no time to familiarise himself and train a grading committee as was 
necessitated in Harare; instead he promptly orchestrated the exercise. This 
was typical of his approach, and he used his years of experience to great 
advantage in talking down workers' complaints. The approach was not so 
much to tyrannise workers as to appear more knowledgeable about the 
issue in question, so that workers' viewpoints could be presented as being 
mistaken. (This style of "baffling workers with science" was a well-
developed strategy among white personnel managers in Zimbabwe who 
considered themselves to be "non-racialist but firm".) So in Bulawayo the 
management style of the Chief Executive had less impact and the 
management style of the regional General Manager and Personnel Manager 
was of greater importance than in Harare. 
Some time after the main research period the company announced that the 
Chief Executive requested to be relieved of his position so that he could 
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concentrate more on his own affairs; however he remained non-executive 
Chairman of the Board, retaining considerable power over broad policy. He 
was replaced as Chief Executive by the General Manager of the Bulawayo 
operations. Underlying the tensions between workers and management at 
General Industries throughout the research period was the maintenance of 
outmoded relations of production in post-colonial Zimbabwe. The Chief 
Executive played a major role in maintaining colonial relations, and it is likely 
that his persistence with colonial relations in the post-colonial setting was a 
key factor in his departure (Communication with former Personnel Manager 
1989). 
Conclusion 
The case of General Industries exemplifies racist and authoritarian labour 
relations practices which persist in some companies in Zimbabwe. 
Throughout this chapter it has been argued that there was a fundamental 
incompatibility between management's wish to continue colonial management 
practices and workers' demands for reform. The worker-management divide 
is seen here as the pre-eminent cause of conflict, as radical organisation 
theorists argue (e.g., Clegg and Dunkerley 1980; Salaman 1981). However, 
it has been shown that management culture is also a major factor in the 
conduct of labour relations, so radical perspectives need to be supplemented 
by conventional concepts (management style and culture) in order to take 
this into account. It is clearly seen in this case study that the notion of a 
unitary organisational culture does not apply, and that it is preferable to refer 
to a management culture as do writers such as Louis (1985). 
Critical commentators point out that racist and authoritarian management 
practices continue in Zimbabwe. The case of General Industries provides 
detailed evidence of this, and the situation at General Industries was by no 
means an isolated case. This is particularly so for smaller enterprises in 
industry, commerce and mining, and much of the agricultural industry. 
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However, as the following chapters attest, it cannot be concluded that this is 
the only approach to labour relations in Zimbabwean organisations. 
There are two underlying issues in this case study: alternative explanations 
of conflict arising from Marxist and conventional management literature, and 
the question of structure versus agency. Parallels can be identified in 
respect of how radical and conventional approaches could analyse 
organisations such as General Industries. Marxists such as Burawoy (1985) 
refer to the clash between colonial production relations and the demands of 
workers for post-colonial relations. Conventional concepts refer to notions of 
organisational life cycle and the incompatibility between authoritarian 
paternalistic practices in a family company being unsuited to a company 
which has grown beyond being a family business (Beckhard and Dyer 1983; 
Kimberly and Miles eds 1980). Both radical and conventional perspectives 
can be used to explain the conflict that has been recorded at General 
Industries, but a preferable approach is to use aspects of both 
simultaneously. That is, radical approaches provide the starting point for 
analysis by identifying the fundamental conflict between workers and 
management, which conventional approaches tend to play down or overlook. 
However, conventional concepts such as management style and culture, and 
organisational life cycle can be fruitfully added to provide finer explanatory 
power. 
The General Industries case also raises the question as to what extent 
labour relations were influenced by an individual, the Chief Executive, or by 
structural forces. My view is that the Chief Executive did have a powerful 
influence on the conduct of labour relations, but that this is largely explicable 
in structural terms. His authoritarian approach was fundamentally a product 
of his Rhodesian culture and his status as a member of the founding family. 
However, many other managers at General Industries, from supervisors to 
top managers, were imbued with Rhodesian management culture. The Chief 
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Executive's authoritarianism was simply intensified by his founding family 
status. So his removal would not be sufficient to overcome labour relations 
problems. A reformist replacement would probably improve the situation, but 
many of the white managers and supervisors would oppose major changes 
and would maintain authoritarian practices and racist attitudes. A major 
change would probably require a crisis from an external source, such as a 
direct government threat to nationalise the company unless labour relations 
were improved. 
Government policy has been to use public censure rather than 
nationalisation to improve labour relations in companies, so at present there 
appears to be insufficient pressure to change recalcitrant employers such as 
General Industries. As time passes, however, it is likely that increasing 
pressure will be mounted against racist practices both by workers within 
these companies, and by government in response to their demands. If 
media attention were given to workers' claims about discrimination, then 
considerable weight would be placed upon companies such as General 
Industries to adopt reforms. This applies with respect to issues of race but 
it is unlikely government would seriously address the issue of uncooperative 
management practices (e.g., intimidating workers, continuing to treat workers 
as inferior, ignoring their requests). This would require a strong workers 
movement within companies and strong backing by the government. Both 
these conditions are unlikely to arise. The union movement has remained 
weak in Zimbabwe due in part to its incorporation by government, as has 
been discussed (Chapters 3 and 4), and given government policy to 
encourage private sector growth a major challenge to current labour relations 
practices in which management predominates is improbable. 
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Chapter 6 Anglo American Corporation 
All these developments made it increasingly difficult for Ernest [Oppenheimer] to 
keep watch on the whole organisation. But at least he could be friendly towards 
all his staff, greeting them in the lift, smiling as he saw them and shaking hands 
to wish them the compliments of the season at Christmas. For that they loved 
him. They could hardly believe how 'ordinary' and accessible he was. 
Hocking, Oppenheimer and Son (1973). 
Anglo will show you the beautiful side - they will not tell you the real story of 
what workers put up with. 
Jeffrey Mutandare, President, Associated Mine Workers' of Zimbabwe, 
October, 1984. 
Don Corleone received everyone - rich and poor, powerful and humble - with an 
equal show of love. He slighted no one. That was his character. 
Brasi's reputation for violence was awesome and his devotion to Don Corleone 
legendary. He was, in himself, one of the great blocks that supported the Don's 
power structure. His kind was a rarity. 
Puzo, The Godfather (1969). 
introduction 
The case of Anglo American Corporation exemplifies the transition from 
colonial to post-colonial relations of production that is taking place in many 
organisations in Zimbabwe. Anglo bureaucratised its personnel and labour 
relations systems and practices in order to move beyond arbitrary and racist 
practices. These systems and practices are analysed in detail in this 
chapter to document the gradual transition of labour relations in Zimbabwe. 
Multinational corporations such as Anglo American have often been depicted 
as exploitative of Third World economies, and their bureaucratisation of 
labour relations is seen as merely a more subtle form of exploitation of 
labour than colonial relations (Burawoy 1985). These critiques present 
management as monolithic and overlook internal differentiation and 
management culture. Close examination of Anglo American shows that 
management culture influences the conduct of labour relations, and that the 
distinct role of the personnel department needs to be understood for 
adequate analysis of labour relations. 
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6.1 Background to Labour Relations at Anglo American Corporation 
The Anglo American Corporation (AAC) of South Africa together with its 
associated companies (e.g., De Beers) was the largest corporation in 
Southern Africa. The Anglo American Corporation was also one of the 
largest corporations in Zimbabwe. Arrighi's description of Anglo as an 
"economic empire" (1966: 50) is apt; in 1985 it had over 50 group 
companies in Zimbabwe and substantial interests in numerous other 
companies. Drawing on 1976 data, Clarke lists 82 companies in which 
Anglo had one or more directorships (1980: 68-70). Group companies were 
those which came under the management control of the Zimbabwe Head 
Office, Anglo American Corporation Sen/ices Limited, a subsidiary of AAC of 
South Africa, and this could include daily interaction or direction, in 1985 
the group companies employed over 23,000 people and had millions of 
dollars of assets. 
Four of the major group companies are examined in this study: Bindura 
Nickel Corporation, Hippo Valley Estates, Wankie Colliery Company and 
Zimbabwe Alloys Limited. All four were quoted on the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange. Bindura Nickel Corporation (BNC) was comprised of the Trojan 
Nickel Mine, the Bindura Smelter and Refinery (Trojan/BSR) and three other 
mines. Trojan/BSR was located in Bindura about 90 kilometres from Harare. 
The size in terms of turnover, fixed assets and number of employees of 
BNC and the other three Anglo group companies in this study is indicated in 
Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 Size of Four Anglo Group Companies 1984-1985 
Company Turnover ($m) Fixed Assets ($m) Employees 
Bindura Nickel 76.9 116.9 4,432 
Hippo Valley 73.0 114.5 6,785 
Wankie Col iery 74.4 145.3 5,009 
Zimbabwe Alloys 8 M 6 ^ 2.182 
Total 307.3 442.3 18,408 
Sources: Various Annual Reports. 
BNC was Zimbabwe's only nickel producer, and it was heavily dependent on 
exports. The world price for nickel fluctuated wildly in the 1980s and BNC's 
financial results also fluctuated markedly. As shown in Table 6.2, heavy 
losses were sustained in 1982 and 1983 and again in 1986 and 1987. In 
1987 BNC was in serious financial difficulties and despite assistance from 
Anglo American and government there was a real possibility that operations 
would cease. Stringent cost saving measures and retrenchments were 
effected, and these had deleterious effects on labour relations. Then, 
fortuitously, the international nickel price rose dramatically from US$1.60 per 
lb to US$4.60 per lb during 1987. This rejuvenated the ailing company, but 
high price volatility and low grade ores entail an uncertain future for BNC 
{Annual Report 1987). 
Table 6.2 After Tax Proflt/(Loss) {$m) of Four Anglo Companies 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
9.0 3.5 (6.4) (9.6) 5.3 12.8 (16.9) (4.4) 
2.7 22.4 8.0 (0.04) 5.1 6.6 9.2 11.8 
n.a 0.9 n.a 2.0 3.8 4.5 n.a n.a 
5.9 3.6 (1.0) (9.4) (0.2) 10.8 n.a n.a 
Bindura Nickel 
Hippo Valley 
Wankie Col iery 
Zimbabwe Alloys 
Sources: Various Annual Reports. 
Trojan was a hardrock underground mine beneath a mountain, about eight 
kilometres from Bindura town centre. The smelter and refinery were 
positioned adjacent to Trojan Mine in a green, picturesque area. Some 
workers' houses were located beside the smelter and the housing complex 
stretched around a hill behind the smelter. The production process in the 
smelter and refinery was capital intensive, using quite modern production 
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techniques. Trojan was a large mine with a clean, wide walkway under the 
hill to cages which conveyed miners to different levels. Drilling, blasting and 
lashing (loading) took place in arteries of the catacomb in the mine. Drilling 
and lashing is hard work, and the surroundings, with the light beams from 
miners' hats flashing here and there and the screeching drills, provided an 
almost surreal setting. The occasional rumble of a blast elsewhere in the 
mine was a reminder that a mountain was sitting on top of the work area. 
The 4,000 strong workforce comprised mostly unskilled (48%) and semi-
skilled (42%) workers. 
Zimbabwe Alloys' had several chrome mines which supplied ores to the 
refinery located in Gweru (270 kilometres from Harare on the Bulawayo 
road). This company also faced financial problems, recording after tax 
losses in 1982 ($1.0m), 1983 ($9.4m) and 1984 ($0.2m) before recovering in 
1985 ($10.8m profit), and the total workforce declined from a high of 4,400 
in 1982 to 2,182 in 1985 {Annual Report 1985). The mining operations were 
similar to those of BNC; though the refinery used different production 
methods involving huge furnaces so many jobs involved very hot work 
conditions. Union Carbide's Zimbabwe Mining and Smelting Company 
(ZIMASCO) was the only other chrome producer in Zimbabwe. 
Wankie Colliery Company was Zimbabwe's sole coal producer. Hwange 
was a company town (the town was renamed after independence, but the 
company was not), located 100 kilometres from Victoria Falls in the far north 
west of Zimbabwe. The population of Hwange was about 40,000. Mining 
began in 1899 and Anglo took over the colliery in 1953. After independence 
the government purchased a 40 percent holding in Wankie Colliery, though 
AAC retained the management contract. Two mines were in operation, the 
underground No.3 Colliery and the opencast project. Underground mining 
was reduced following an explosion in No.2 Colliery which killed 427 men in 
June 1972 (Qu6net Commission 1973). Opencast mining produced 80 
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percent of output in the 1980s, and was highly capital intensive, employing 
270 low-skilled workers compared to 1,300 in No.3 Colliery. A huge dragline 
weighing 3,500 tonnes scooped out 120 tonnes of material in a single swoop 
to expose the coal seam for extraction again using huge machinery. In 
1984 low skilled workers comprised 88 percent of the total workforce (5,000 
employees). The company yielded profits in each year from 1981 to 1985. 
The workforce was reduced in 1985 as 330 employees accepted the 
company's inducement package to resign. 
Hippo Valley Estates was formed in 1956 and became the largest sugar 
producer in Zimbabwe. It was located in Chiredzi in the Lowveld about 500 
kilometres south of Harare. Situated virtually next door to Hippo Valley was 
the other main sugar producer. Triangle Sugar Estate, and AAC of South 
Africa had a major interest in this company. Hippo and Triangle remained 
separate companies, however, and Triangle was not a group company of 
AAC in Zimbabwe. They worked closely together; for example, in a joint 
venture they owned and operated the third main sugar producer, Mkwasine 
Estate. Labour relations were managed separately though the personnel 
departments conferred at monthly liaison meetings. Hippo Valley's financial 
results were mixed, with high profits in 1981, a small loss in 1983 and 
gradually increasing profits thereafter. 
The production process involved the planting, tending and harvesting of cane 
on a vast area of land, about 10,700 hectares in 1984-85. The plantation 
was divided into 24 sections, on each cane was burned and cut throughout 
the harvesting period from April to November. From December to March the 
fields were planted and maintained. This allowed permanent rather than 
seasonal work. The cane was harvested by hand slashers and the work 
was onerous. Almost 5,000 workers, mostly unskilled cane-workers, were 
employed in the fields in 1985. An additional 1,900 employees were 
attached to the mill which processed the cane using fairly modern 
226 
techniques and equipment. Of tlie total workforce of 6,785 in 1985, 5,267 
(78%) were unskilled and 1,295 (19%) were semi-skilled workers. 
At independence virtually all managerial employees in the four companies 
were white, and only a few blacks were in senior positions. Wages were 
typically low, ranging from $20.80 per month at Hippo Valley to $81 for the 
lowest paid industrial workers at Zimbabwe Alloys (though many workers 
were paid above these minima). Strikes and labour unrest occurred at all 
four companies over a number of issues including pay, discrimination, 
working and housing conditions and pension funds. Wankie Colliery was the 
scene of two major strikes in 1980, one in May lasting for 12 days. 
Workers demanded an increase from about $2.00 per day to $2.00 per hour, 
or $16 per day. During this dispute the Rhodesian African Rifles were sent 
to "maintain essential sen/ices at the coke plant" {ARB-EFT 15 April - 14 
May 1980: 5502). The British South Africa Police patrolled the villages and 
used megaphones to urge an end to the strike. At one stage the message 
from the back of a Hippo (i.e., armoured personnel carrier) was "[rjeturn to 
work or your houses will [be] taken away", and heavy police surveillance 
was maintained throughout the strike with Hippos and other security force 
vehicles patrolling the villages (Company Report on the May 1980 Strike). 
The General Manager met with assembled workers, but they demanded to 
see the Minister of Labour, hoping that he would grant far more than 
management was prepared to offer. A delegation of workers was 
transported some kilometres from the colliery to meet the Minister on 13 
May and the following day the workers' representatives recommended a 
return to work. There was no pay increase granted but the following points 
were agreed: 
1) workers should return to work in the national interest; 
2) minimum wages were being reviewed by government; 
3) the "master and servant" attitude must end; 
4) the workers' "MIPF" pension contributions would be refunded and the 
scheme cancelled; 5) an ex gratia payment of $5 to all employees for hardship allowance was 
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to be paid (Company Report on the May 1980 Strike). 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, there was a suggestion by the Minister of 
Labour that the 1980 strikes were instigated by supporters of opposition 
parties. Wankie is located in Matabeleiand North Province which elected 
only ZAPU candidates in the 1980 elections, and is an area populated 
predominantly by Ndebele-speaking and other minority tribes (e.g., Nambian, 
Tonga). Strike leaders later maintained that political opposition was not the 
cause, and given the grounds for grievances this is reasonable to believe. 
They said the strike was a reaction to other strikes taking place around the 
country, and majority rule had just been attained so workers took the 
previously denied opportunity to strike for improved wages and work 
conditions. One of the key leaders further explained: 
We were striking out of ignorance. We saw in the newspapers the 
company making millions [of dollars profit]. To us, we didn't know 
anything about investments and those things (Interview May 1985). 
Workers felt that companies could afford massive wage increases and that 
independence would enable them to extract such increases from 
management. 
With respect to the November strike over pension funds, again the evidence 
suggests it was not primarily opposition parties who were responsible; if 
anything, the government was as much the cause as any other factor. 
Workers called for the return of their pension contributions and demanded 
that the company should pay for their contributions for them. Minister 
Kangai at first supported the return of their contributions. Workers voted on 
this issue and virtually all voted for their return. But later Kangai changed 
his view. Refunding would have required a change in the law and refunding 
would have been detrimental to workers' interests since they would not 
receive employer contribution benefits. In the end Kangai ordered the 
strikers back to work despite his earlier statements (Interviews with strike 
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leaders and managers May 1985; Herald 19-25/11/80). 
Some interviewees stated that opposition parties instigated strikes at Hippo 
Valley by declaring that ZANU(PF) had done little to improve the situation 
for workers since wages were merely increased from $20 to $30 per month. 
The major opposition party was ZANU(Sithole) which had a strong following 
among the HIengwe and Shangaan-speaking people who lived around 
Chipinge, 150 kilometres from Chiredzi.' But opinions differ on this issue 
and many argue that a major cause was the pay disparity between field 
workers ($30 per month) and mill workers ($70 per month). A further view 
was that the strikers were mobilised by ZANU(PF) rallies addressed by 
government ministers. Strike leaders later stated that in the tumultuous 
times following independence "we thought we could take over the company". 
It does seem that ZANU(PF) mobilisation efforts contributed to the strikes, 
and this is supported by the fact that the strikers refused to return to work 
until they were persuaded to do so by Minister Kangai and ZANU(PF) liaison 
officers who toured the plantation addressing workers (Interviews with strike 
leaders and managers May 1985, and former Ministry of Labour official 
January 1988). 
This was a volatile period in all four group companies. Meetings between 
managers and workers were often permeated with hostility and heated 
exchanges on racial issues took place. Labour unrest other than strikes 
also took place. One example of this occurred at Zimbabwe Alloys in July 
1982. Workers in the briquette plant used to stop work 15 minutes before 
closing time to clean-up. This had tacitly grown to 30 minutes, and the 
white Furnace Manager endeavoured to return to 15 minutes. The workers 
rejected this and held a meeting after working hours, and the following 
^A company personnel officer estimated that around 65% of the workforce 
were Shona (Karanga or Sezuru), about 25% were Shangaan or HIengwe 
and less than 10% were Ndau. 
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morning the entire workers' committee and sub-committee for the 
department, about 20 workers, assembled at the Furnace Manager's office. 
They were in a hostile mood, and when the manager left his office the 
workers' committee members followed and accused him of being racist, 
commenting that he should "go to South Africa", "the workers' committee 
was firing him", and he should "be chopped into 1,000 pieces". In the 
Personnel Manager's office a heated exchange occurred between the 
manager and six workers' committee members. A workers' committee 
member grasped the manager's arm in order to remove him from the 
company premises. He was a small but volatile man and he hit out, 
whereupon at least 3 workers' committee members attacked him. The Anglo 
Group Industrial Relations Advisor in Harare was contacted and he obtained 
permission from Minister Kangai to suspend the entire workers' committee 
and the white manager. The Chief Industrial Relations Officer came and 
addressed workers, but they disputed many of his points and at times jeered 
at him. The white manager was asked to leave Zimbabwe Alloys, though 
the workers believed he was transferred to another Anglo company. One of 
the workers' committee members was dismissed and the others were 
reinstated (Company records and interviews with the Personnel Manager, the 
Personnel Officer and workers' committee members, who were involved in 
the incident, December 1984). 
Over time tensions eased in the four group companies and most white 
managers and black workers displayed less animosity toward each other. 
Conflict, however, did not entirely cease. Labour relations became less 
conflictual in the Anglo companies than at General Industries; for two main 
reasons. Labour relations systems were developed which were designed to 
attenuate racist and authoritarian management practices, and blacks were 
appointed to personnel positions which assisted in improving negotiations 
between workers and management. 
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6.2 Personnel and Labour Relations at Anglo American 
There were variations in the structure of workers' committees in the four 
Anglo companies, but the general pattern was for departments to elect a 
workers' committee which would elect representatives to a central workers' 
committee. Members of the central committee met management at the 
works council. At Hippo Valley, because of the size of the workforce, there 
was a three-tiered structure with workers' committees at the section, field 
and company levels. 
Relations between workers' committees and trade unions varied. The 
Associated Mine Workers' of Zimbabwe (AMWZ) was well organised in terms 
of union structures and membership at Bindura (55% of the workforce) and 
Wankie (48% of the workforce) in 1984. The committee and the union at 
BNC established a division of functions with the union focusing on, for 
example, wages and housing, and the committee attending to job evaluation 
and village facilities. There was overlap but relations were generally 
cooperative; indeed, in 1985 the union branch chairman previously had been 
workers' committee chairman, and he worked closely with the incumbent 
workers' committee. Later differences emerged between the two bodies with 
the union taking a more aggressive stand than the committee on issues 
such as racial discrimination and housing. A BNC manager stated that the 
unionists had "more clout" with management, and "they would really do their 
homework and push management" (Interview April 1987). In part this 
resulted from a higher proportion of skilled workers among the unionists than 
among the committee members, and also the unionists could pursue 
outstanding issues through the mining union structure and the industrial 
council. 
At Hippo Valley and Zimbabwe Alloys the situation was quite different. The 
Chiredzi workers strongly resisted joining either of the two agricultural unions 
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because this would bring them under the low agriculture award. They 
wanted to be under the higher industrial award and so formed the Zimbabwe 
Sugar Industry Trade Union. This proved fruitless since the Ministry of 
Labour denied it registration on the grounds that this would breach 
government policy of one union in each industry; in this case government 
policy, which was ostensibly to strengthen the union movement, in fact 
retarded unionisation. At Zimbabwe Alloys' there was no union for black 
workers.^ The workers' committee executive together with ZIMASCO 
workers strongly supported the creation of a union for the ferrochrome 
industry. In 1982 a person claiming to form a union collected $500 from 
Zimbabwe Alloys' workers and $400 from those at ZIMASCO. That was the 
last they saw of the unionist and their money; police investigations were 
unsuccessful. The workers' committee sent a delegation to the ZCTU in 
Harare in June 1984, and they were promised books and assistance to 
launch a union, but neither were forthcoming by mid-1985. 
Zimbabwe Alloys and Hippo Valley workers were represented by workers' 
committee members at industrial board meetings since no trade union was 
registered in their industry. It is seen below that, as with the mining union, 
workers' committees had very limited direct influence over wages and 
government played a more important role. Zimbabwe Alloys' representatives 
who attended the ferrochrome industrial board meeting in 1984 were not 
effective bargainers. They did not caucus with ZIMASCO workers (65 
kilometres from Gweru) before the meeting and they were unfamiliar with 
how boards functioned: "We tried to do our best, but we were not fully 
aware what was happening" (Interview Chairman Workers' Committee April 
1985). The agreed increase was surpassed by the statutory increase 
awarded later. 
^White workers had a union before independence but it became defunct. 
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Common issues dealt with by workers' committees and works councils were 
job evaluation, discipline, company housing, managers' attitudes to workers, 
staffing levels, village facilities, loans and work arrangements. They were 
primarily labour relations bodies, and not arenas for workers' participation in 
decision-making as they have been assessed by some observers (Nangati 
1984a; Maphosa 1985; Cheater 1986). Workers' committees were not 
powerful labour relations bodies, but they did serve an important 
representative role where no union was present. A frequent management 
response to demands from workers' committees that involved money was 
that the company lacked the capacity to pay or that it was a Head Office 
decision. As company-based bodies they were unable to pursue issues 
beyond the company works council, and government prohibition of strikes 
weakened their bargaining power. Within these constraints workers' 
committees played an important role in putting forward workers' day-to-day 
industrial demands. Over time they improved working conditions, and they 
gained acceptance from management that workers had legitimate demands. 
At Hippo Valley, for example, the workers' committee successfully pushed 
for the removal of a white chairman of the works council whom they 
considered to be racist, a review of the grading for all jobs, and a change in 
the timing of pay day. Meetings between management and workers became 
far more cordial in Anglo companies than at General Industries, and there 
was much greater commitment from management to work in cooperation 
with workers. At Bindura Nickel this was symbolically reinforced by the 
white mine and smelter managers who referred to workers on the works 
council as "comrade" - usually an unthinkable practice for whites in 
Zimbabwe. 
One of the most important developments in personnel management in 
Zimbabwe has been the introduction of formal job evaluation methods to 
avoid ad hoc or paternalist job and pay structures. The single most 
commonly used scheme was the Paterson Method of Job Evaluation which 
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was introduced into Zimbabwe by Anglo American after its adoption by 
Anglo in South Africa. All Anglo group companies and many other private 
companies and parastatals use this method,^ and most of these 
organisations implemented it in the early 1980s. Paterson bases his method 
on predominantly one factor - decision-making - in order to avoid a wage 
structure based on allowances for labour scarcity, work conditions and so on 
which lead to a "chaotic compilation of bonuses and allowances long after 
the circumstances for these allowances have gone" (Paterson 1974: 1). The 
Anglo manual on job evaluation states that four other factors (stress, 
tolerance, sequence, variety) can be taken into account for the third and 
final stage of job sub-grading, but in the first two stages (banding and 
grading) decision-making is the only factor (AAC Services Limited 1984). 
This causes problems since decision-making and the additional four factors 
do not differentiate well among the low-skilled jobs which are prevalent in 
Zimbabwean industry. Other factors such as work conditions, hazards, 
physical effort and consequence of error do differentiate low-skilled jobs but 
they are not included in the Anglo manual. Anglo companies thus "add on" 
to the Paterson Method the bonuses and allowances Paterson sought to 
avoid. Allowances are paid, for example, for working underground and 
exposure to intense heat, and there was a long-running dispute over the 
drag-line drivers' grade since there was no factor for consequence of error. 
Another problem is that, despite Paterson's claim that the method is simple 
to understand and implement (1974: xi), in practice "decision-making" is 
difficult to operationalise and many workers' representatives do not easily 
grasp the concepts. Many managers and personnel specialists also have 
similar difficulties (Observation and numerous interviews 1985-1988 e.g., 
Nigel Turner, Personnel Consultant, November 1987), and in 1981 Anglo 
brought Paterson himself from Britain to Zimbabwe to overcome their 
^his method also forms the basis of the Zimbabwe public service grading 
scheme. 
234 
problems with grading si<illed workers. The Anglo manual states that the 
method "is internationally accepted and applied, and its acceptability to 
workers has been demonstrated around the world" (AAC Services Limited 
1984: 8). Yet this system has not gained widespread international 
acceptance. According to a major ILO study on job evaluation this method 
is comparatively little used. One of the reasons for this may be 
because workers do not readily accept the idea that factors such as 
skills, experience, etc., should not be taken into consideration. 
Moreover, there may be doubts whether in practice the evaluators 
would be able properly to identify the scope of decision-making (ILO 
1986; 63). 
Similarly, Bottomley contends: 
Since the method is geared to managerial discretion, the trade 
unions find it unpopular. Measuring the level of decision-making is 
often contentious and requires continued review and endless 
monitoring (1987: 85). 
There are grounds for concluding that the Paterson Method has been 
adopted on a major scale in Zimbabwe as a result of the weak labour 
movement which has not had the expertise and strength to resist this 
method. The black trade unions had no professional advisors to analyse 
and compare the Paterson Method with other schemes. Indeed this point 
applies to companies and managers as well. When managers in companies 
other than Anglo were asked why the Paterson Method was selected a 
frequent response was, as one personnel manager put it, "Well, what else 
was there?" (Interview, Personnel Manager, Blue Ribbon Foods, June 1985). 
There were a few alternative schemes in use in Zimbabwe, but none was 
generally considered to be preferable. Of the commonly used methods, 
several had consequence of error as a factor, only one had physical effort 
and none included work conditions and hazards. 
While there were genuine criticisms to be made of the Paterson Method, 
some criticisms were misplaced. Some workers' representatives in 
Zimbabwe considered the Paterson Method to be racist and "anti-worker". 
They claimed that white managers were given top grades while workers 
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were consigned to lower grades. In reality, the fact that whites occupied 
managerial positions in greater proportion to blacks had nothing to do with 
the Paterson system, and it is therefore incorrect to describe the method as 
"racist". Workers also complained against being graded lower than 
managers yet this is true of presumably virtually all job evaluation schemes 
throughout the world. Job evaluation schemes in themselves do not 
challenge hierarchy; they are designed to reflect hierarchy in accordance 
with the prevailing societal notions of distributive justice (Cowan 1985), and 
in Zimbabwe hierarchy in the private and public sectors was very much the 
order of the day. 
Workers in Anglo companies found it difficult to criticise the Paterson 
scheme in principle, since they lacked detailed expertise and knowledge of 
other methods. There was an underlying suspicion of the method, but their 
objections were predominantly over technicalities in the implementation and 
review of the method. Workers frequently demanded that jobs be regraded, 
and at times they called for a review of all jobs in the company. In part 
these demands resulted from genuine problems of grading which required 
review; however, another factor was that government controls on wages led 
workers to seek pay increases through the upgrading of jobs. In general, 
the four Anglo companies were more willing to revise job grading than was 
General Industries; jobs were regraded periodically and a review of ail jobs 
was occasionally agreed. Anglo's use of the Paterson Method can be 
criticised for neglecting important work factors and the difficulty in 
operationalising decision-making. Nonetheless, the scheme was useful to 
replace ad hoc or racial grading and pay practices with bureaucratic 
procedures. 
Formal disciplinary and grievance procedures were laid down in writing by 
Anglo's Zimbabwe Head Office (AAC Services Limited n.d.). The disciplinary 
code set out in detail a schedule of offences and sanctions, and procedures 
236 
for hearing disciplinary cases, pursuing grievances and appeals. Line 
managers have authority over discipline and the personnel department can 
advise and assist in the conduct of disciplinary cases. Offenders have a 
right to be represented (e.g., by a trade union or workers' committee 
member) in disciplinary cases and hearings. Common offences were 
absenteeism, poor time-keeping and disobedience. Penalties depended on 
the nature of the offence; serious offences (e.g., theft, assault) could incur 
suspension pending dismissal, and lesser offences could result in two 
recorded warnings and a final warning. Generally, workers' committee 
members in the four companies reported that discipline was carried out 
fairly. There were instances in which workers objected to disciplinary 
practices, but by the same token there were occasions when the disciplinary 
code was side-stepped and "extended final warnings" were given instead of 
dismissal. Applications were made to the Ministry of Labour for dismissals 
even during the period when summary dismissal without ministerial approval 
was legal (1982-1985). There was an attempt by the personnel departments 
to create a cooperative labour relations climate by discouraging harsh 
disciplinary practices. 
Extensive training was carried out at all four group companies. Each 
company had its own training centre and training officer, and Head Office 
provided additional training. Courses were provided to employees at all 
levels including "6M" and workers' committee training for shopfloor workers, 
and supervisory and management courses for more senior employees. The 
"6M" course was designed to provide shopfloor workers with a basic 
knowledge of the functioning of a business enterprise (e.g., men, money, 
machines). The graduate learner programme, which developed employees 
for senior positions, was probably the most extensive in Zimbabwe. Indeed, 
the Group Training Advisor maintained that "we have the best training 
structure in the country". The combined figures for all Anglo group 
companies in 1984 indicated 55,000 man-days of training, involving 11,500 
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people and a budget of $4 million (Interview, Group Training Advisor July 
1985). 
In conjunction with this staff development Anglo established policies to 
advance black employees. Manpower plans were developed and, as Table 
6.3 shows, considerable black advancement had taken place by 1985. For 
the four group companies, blacks held 28% of management positions (Bands 
D and E) in 1985, up from 3% in 1980, and the increasing proportion of 
blacks in management continued into 1987 (36%). The proportion of blacks 
in skilled positions increased dramatically from 29% in 1980 to 70% in 1985 
and slowed to 72% in 1987. Manpower plans envisaged that these trends 
would continue. Black advancement was most rapid at BNC, which 
experienced extremely high turnover (38%) among senior staff in 1987 when 
there were fears the company would close {Annual Report 1987: 2). Black 
advancement was slowest at Hippo Valley. This was due to the low 
turnover among senior staff, which was 4.9% in 1984, well below the 
average of 9.8% for companies in the Castellion Salary Survey. 
Table 6.3 Number and Percentage of Black Employees In Four Anglo Companies 
Company Bands D and E Band C^  
1980 1985 1987 1980 1985 1987 
# % # % # % # % # % # % 
Bindura Nickel 1 2 14 29 19 45 106 48 313 82 285 87 
Hippo Valley 2 6 9 21 9 21 33 22 95 60 111 61 
Wankie Colliery 1 3 11 22 n.a n.a 121 33 397 76 n.a n.a 
Zimbabwe Allovs 0 0 7 41 8 42 14 12 95 60 107 67 
Mean % 3 28 36 29 70 72 
Source: Company records. 
'Paterson Band E = top management; Band D = junior management; Band C = skilled 
employees. 
Considerably more black advancement occurred within personnel 
departments than in line management; for example, at Hippo Valley in 1985, 
3 of the 4 personnel managers were black. As has been noted (Chapter 2), 
this is frequently seen as evidence of "window-dressing". In many cases 
this may be an accurate assessment, but this is not the case for the Anglo 
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companies studied here. In part these appointments are in recognition of 
the need to have personnel officers sensitive to the needs and culture of 
workers. At the most basic level this includes understanding workers who 
do not speak English well, and refraining from calling older workers by their 
first name. Black personnel officers better appreciate the importance of the 
extended family in African culture, such as the need to spend perhaps days 
at the funeral of a mainini (small-mother, aunt) or babamunini (small-brother, 
cousin). Rather than treating workers with disdain, as many white managers 
did, black personnel staff evinced greater respect for workers and treated 
their requests seriously. This improved the tone and atmosphere in 
meetings, and contributed much to the decline in confrontation and the 
development of negotiated labour relations. Workers at Wankie Colliery 
appreciated the contribution of the Personnel Department since they 
requested that this department have the right of veto over line managers' 
decision to dismiss workers.'' 
Racist attitudes persisted among whites and racial labour relations practices 
were not removed overnight. Hippo Valley workers stated that racial 
tensions continued and no whites were under the supervision of blacks in 
the fields. Not until 1985 was the personnel department restructured to 
abolish separate sections for salaried and non-salaried staff. Whites did not 
mix well with blacks, and at the May Day ceremony in 1985 the General 
Manager was the only white manager present. At Wankie Colliery in 1985 
workers strongly objected to a white expatriate manager who assaulted two 
workers. This manager was suspended and his contract was not renewed. 
Zimbabwe Alloys' workers similarly complained about the white Chief 
Engineer who assaulted a worker in a minor way. Workers did not demand 
his dismissal, taking cognisance of the level of offence and the difficulty in 
replacing him, but they were angered that management treated this case 
''This request was denied since the policy was, as is commonly the case, for 
the personnel department to have advisory authority on discipline. 
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more leniently than cases involving shopfloor workers. Whereas workers 
faced formal disciplinary hearings, the manager was apparently rebuked in a 
closed meeting with the General Manager. So despite company policy, 
strains persisted in race relations though in muted form compared to the 
early 1980s. 
Job evaluation, discipline and black advancement were thus prominent 
issues in Anglo's labour relations. In addition wages and housing were 
major concerns of workers. Wages were undoubtedly the most pressing 
issue for workers yet, due to their weak representation, government controls 
and problems of profitability in the companies, workers had very marginal 
direct influence over wages. Workers at Wankie Colliery and Bindura Nickel 
were represented by the Associated Mine Workers' of Zimbabwe at the 
Industrial Council for the Mining Industry. However, the minimum wage for 
the lowest-paid workers at Wankie and Bindura was equal to the statutory 
minimum wage from 1980 until at least 1985 (see Chapter 4 Table 4.1). 
The minimum for Zimbabwe Alloys' refinery workers ($100) was higher than 
the industrial minimum ($70) in July 1980, but by 1984 this margin had 
narrowed ($141 and $125 respectively). In other words, the national miners' 
union was no more effective than the workers' committee at Zimbabwe 
Alloys in obtaining wage increases. 
At Hippo Valley wages were a special problem. Cane workers received 
$20.80 per month before the agricultural minimum was set at $30 by the 
Mugabe government in 1980. In 1981 Hippo Valley wages were raised to 
$50, well above the $30 minimum for agriculture, and wage rates remained 
above the statutory minimum at least until 1985. Workers, however, were 
extremely dissatisfied with the wage awards. According to a Personnel 
Officer, before independence the minimum wage was the same for mill and 
field workers (Interview May 1985). The introduction by government of 
different awards for agriculture and industry led to striking anomalies at 
240 
Hippo Valley in which mill workers received $70 monthly, while cane workers 
received $30 monthly in 1980. In January 1982 Labour Minister Kangai 
declared that all sugar workers' wages should be raised to the industrial 
minimum of $105. This represented a 210% increase over the $50 
minimum for cane workers, and Anglo made strong representations to 
government to change this decision (based on low local and world sugar 
prices; indeed the company recorded a loss in the year to 31 March 1983). 
The decision was altered and wages were set at $60 per month, but this 
angered workers and the divided pay structure was a major source of 
dissatisfaction that persisted until 1985. The agro-industry dispute brought 
the issue to a head in 1985, and this resulted in a minimum wage of 
$143.75 for all Hippo Valley workers (Hippo Valley Estates, Annual Report 
1987). 
The experience in the Anglo companies was that government had greatest 
impact on wage rates, and to the extent that workers influenced wages this 
was by lobbying government rather than the company directly. In the three 
mining companies wages remained in line with statutory increases, and real 
wages were therefore generally static in the period 1980 to 1986 (see 
Chapter 4 Table 4.3). Government policy had a pronounced impact on real 
minimum wages for Hippo Valley field workers which increased from $20.80 
at independence to $71.55 in 1985. However, in the process of establishing 
this increase, government wage policy led to anomalies and protracted 
disagreement between workers and the company. 
Housing was a major cause of workers' dissatisfaction. After independence 
accommodation was allocated according to skill rather than race. 
Nonetheless, for low-skilled workers housing was generally in a pitiable state 
and consisted of one- to three-roomed brick semi-detached dwellings. Some 
houses did not have electricity, and bathing and toilet facilities were 
communal. At Hwange and Bindura these facilities were overloaded and. 
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despite the companies' efforts to maintain them, the ablution blocks had an 
unpleasant odour and appearance. Unattached houses were provided for 
skilled workers and their families, and these were comfortable houses on at 
least one-third of an acre at Hwange. Managers had larger and more 
comfortable houses and gardens. 
At the national level, the mining union, AMWZ, declared a dispute with the 
Chamber of Mines over what the union considered to be "'unacceptable' 
housing rentals where some workers were charged up to $54 a month for 
poor accommodation" {Herald 28/12/84). The AMWZ suggested that many 
mine workers lived in squalid conditions, paying excessive rents, and media 
reports lent support to this view: "Most of the 68,000 workers in the 
[mining] industry were living in a variety of structures, some of which could 
not be fairly classified as housing because they were in a bad state" {Herald 
28/12/84). The Chamber of Mines sought to rebut the allegations {Herald 
3/1/85), but follow-up reports showed pictures of ramshackle, pole-and-dagga 
"shacks" for miners' housing at one or possibly two mines near Harare 
{Sunday Mail and Herald 22/1/85). In one report the earlier 
qualifying word "some" was substituted in the following manner: "Most of 
the 68,000 workers in this industry live in structures that hardly deserve 
classification as housing" {Sunday Mail 13/1/85). Wankie Colliery was 
specifically mentioned: 
The AMWZ had learnt with dismay that Hwange Collieries [sic] had 
recently negotiated with the Government to allow them to levy a 
charge for the maintenance of the "hovels" the miners lived in. This 
accommodation was built before 1963 and was supposed to be rent-
free (Hera/d 28/12/84).' 
Low-skilled workers' housing at Wankie and other mines was in a regrettable 
state; however, the worst housing was found on the smaller mines. The 
'These charges were introduced to partially recover up-keep costs after the 
government removed the discount for housing and other benefits in the 
mining award. 
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larger multinational-owned mines were often more profitable and housing 
was not as unpleasant. As Derek Bain, the chief executive of the Chamber 
of Mines, stated, 
the traditional pole-and-dagga dwellings were fast becoming a relic 
of the past for the big mining companies - although the smaller 
operations might be lagging behind because they lacked money {Herald 3/1/85). 
The standard of housing for low-skilled workers on the multinational-owned 
mines was poor and higher-level employees enjoyed much better conditions; 
however, this is also true throughout Zimbabwe in both the private and 
public sectors. Many senior public servants live in opulent houses in the 
low-density, former white suburbs, while their office cleaners and their 
families might share a dilapidated, small house with two other families with 
one toilet-cum-shower in the high-density suburbs such as Highfield in 
Harare. As pointed out by the Chamber of Mines, under the formula they 
proposed, rent paid to the company at Golden Kopje Mine near Chinhoyi, 
would be $27 per month, yet the Municipality was charging $53 for 
"identical" housing (Verden 1987: 4). The government prevented the union 
from organising a strike over this dispute and conflict between the union and 
the Chamber of Mines continued. In 1987 the Labour Relations Tribunal 
determined the dispute in favour of the formula proposed by the Chamber. 
Conflict between workers and managers in Anglo companies declined in the 
1980s since commitment was given to the implementation of labour relations 
systems for, for example, grading, discipline and promotion to rationalise 
labour relations. In addition, appointments of blacks to personnel 
department positions helped to place labour relations on a negotiated rather 
than a confrontational basis. This was a gradual and difficult process, not 
without its problems and setbacks. By 1987 it was still a process rather 
than an accomplishment, and conflicts over issues such as wages and 
housing persisted. Nonetheless, the post-independence labour relations 
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climate in Anglo companies improved dramatically over the earlier situation 
in which racial antagonisms dominated work relations. 
6.3 Management Culture: Bureaucratic Enlightened Self-Interest 
versus Colonialism 
A common feature of the four group companies was the interplay between 
rugged individualism, or pioneering spirit, that characterised white managers 
in mining and farming operations, and the imposition of bureaucratic systems 
of management. In Zimbabwe ruggedness and pioneering spirit have racial 
overtones as a legacy from Cecil Rhodes' Pioneer Column and white settlers 
who colonised Zimbabwe by overwhelming black resistance. Most overt 
racism has now been removed from the group companies and the 
"ruggedness" of authoritarian whites was being attenuated by the 
bureaucratic systems and company and government policy which prohibited 
racism. There was more emphasis on the company as a whole community 
and its contribution to Zimbabwe; not just to the Rhodesian white 
community. Racist attitudes remained among some whites, but the 
prevailing social climate was that these must be suppressed and not 
permitted to govern whites' actions and their treatment of blacks, as was the 
case before independence. Many whites were socially distant from blacks 
and the interaction that took place was on whites' terms such as banter at 
work or in the clubs for senior employees, much the same as before 
independence (Brand 1981: 51). Whites almost never visited the homes of 
blacks and rarely attended activities such as political rallies and Worker of 
the Year Awards, as Cheater (1986) found at Zimtex. This was partly an 
ideological divide and not just a racial one, since many whites probably 
rejected these affairs as "socialist clap-trap", as one white manager at Hippo 
Valley put it (Interview May 1985). 
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At Hippo Valley the General Manager challenged racist behaviour and 
endeavoured to breakdown racial barriers. He developed his own policy of 
"management by wandering around" (Peters and Waterman 1982), by 
touring villages on weekends while other white managers were, for example, 
at their popular polo matches. In the villages he would ask people their 
problems; then on Monday mornings he would seek out the responsible 
manager and demand an explanation and remedial action. Workers' 
committee members and other black personnel described the General 
Manager as "firm but fair". He was a tough-minded manager who did not 
let racial considerations intervene in the operations of the company. In 
1978, at the height of the civil war, as Mill Manager he sacked seven whites 
whom he deemed to be inefficient and too authoritarian, and, according to a 
Hippo manager, declared "I am not employing soldiers". In the early 1980s 
when he believed some white managers put forward unwarranted dismissal 
cases, he insisted that all dismissal cases be presented to him, and he at 
times ordered the managers to take back a suspended employee when they 
urged that the worker be transferred to another section. The General 
Manager was quite open about his views on race at the workplace, and in 
meetings repeatedly declared "Between blackies and whities, I will favour the 
blackie" (Interview, Personnel Manager, Hippo Valley). At Zimbabwe Alloys 
the General Manager played a strong role in support of black advancement, 
and the black personnel manager there stated that without this support white 
line managers would have substantially limited black advancement. General 
management, in short, played a major role in setting the tone for work 
relations, and this was often a positive contribution (Interviews with 
managers and workers May 1985 and 1987). 
Another characteristic of Hippo Valley's culture was that the distance from 
Head Office allowed the company a certain degree of autonomy that some 
other Anglo companies did not experience. Several Anglo managers stated 
of Hippo Valley that, as one put it, "it is a law unto itself" (Interview 
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December 1985). This autonomy allowed Hippo Valley to develop relations 
with government officials independent of Head Office, notwithstanding 
corporate policy to the contrary, and enabled the personnel department to be 
restructured outside corporate practice. Another instance of latitude was that 
a white employee was being trained to be Chief Engineer in two years 
according to the General Manager; while at some other Anglo companies 
this was considered to take seven to fifteen years. Similarly, at Wankie 
Colliery a number of managers considered distance from Head Office a 
blessing rather than a tyranny, and in conjunction with workers they modified 
Anglo's labour relations systems by, for example, developing a distinct 
disciplinary code and including additional categories for unskilled workers in 
the Paterson job evaluation scheme. The proximity of Bindura Nickel to 
Head Office, on the other hand, contributed to managers there believing that 
they were more closely controlled than elsewhere. It is likely though that 
BNC's lack of profitability was a major factor in this tighter control. 
At the corporate level, the physical features of Head Office epitomised some 
aspects of Anglo's culture. It was situated on the corner of a major 
intersection in Harare and had a solid-looking red-brick structure. The 
building was named "Charter House", derived from the "Chartered 
Company", the British South Africa Company which founded the settler 
colony in Rhodesia® and was later taken over by Anglo American. The 
entrance had prominent pillars and the foyer had a high ceiling. A brass 
portrait of Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, the founder of Anglo American 
Corporation, adorned the wood-panelled foyer, and dignified black 
commissionaires took details of all visitors. The closed offices branched off 
the curved corridors and there was a formal, hushed atmosphere about the 
building. The directors' offices on the third floor had sedate furnishings. 
The physical features, in short, project a solid, establishment appearance in 
®The original Charter House owned by the British South Africa Company was 
on a different site (Jackson 1986: 70). 
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keeping with the character of the organisation as the founding company of 
the country. 
Relationships among the staff at Charter House were quite formal. One 
manager described the relations as "[c]old, serious, status-orientated. 
Everyone wants to make sure you know your place and you stay in it" 
(Interview December 1985). Dress was also formal; grey or blue suits were 
de rigueur. Many of the Head Office managers were accountants or 
engineers. Their emphasis on financial and technical matters contributed to 
a bureaucratic approach to managing the organisation. 
At Anglo American systems and bureaucratic procedures were very highly 
valued. This was clearly evident with respect to personnel and labour 
relations systems such as job evaluation, discipline and promotion. Virtually 
all labour policies were in writing and these were sometimes lengthy 
documents: the job evaluation manual had 94 pages; the Disciplinary Code 
and Grievance Procedure had 22 pages. The general business approach 
was bureaucratic compared to many other companies. An Anglo manager 
was of the view that new business proposals were not greatly encouraged 
(Interview 1987). One very differing corporation was Lonrho which had a far 
greater entrepreneurial, free-wheeling business approach partly as a result of 
the personality of Tiny Rowland, the Chief Executive. Rowland, "the tireless 
jet-borne tycoon", travelled around Africa meeting numerous leaders, and 
arranging various deals (Cronj6, Ling and Cronj6 1976: 11). Lonrho 
negotiated a multi-million dollar agreement with Mozambique involving 
investment in agriculture, mining and tourism, despite the economic malaise, 
guerrilla war and Marxist ideology of the ruling party in that country 
{Financial Gazette M/5/85). In Zimbabwe Lonrho entered a joint venture 
with ZANU(PF) to establish a company. Anglo American would not 
contemplate such ventures, preferring to keep some distance from overtly 
political activities of black parties. The Government purchase of interests in 
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Wankie Colliery was a very different case from the Lonrho venture. Lonrho 
was dealing with a political party, while AAC was dealing with the 
Government, and the Government was buying out some of Anglo's interests, 
whereas Lonrho commenced a new venture jointly. 
To understand Anglo's management culture it is helpful to note the 
company's experience in other countries, particularly Zambia. In 1970 the 
Zambian government nationalised 51 percent of the copper industry which 
included substantial investments by Anglo American (Sklar 1975). The 
company retained the management contract, but Anglo managers considered 
the transaction to be a setback in terms of a decline in their control over 
their specific investments, and they were opposed to an overall extension of 
state ownership of industry. A number of Anglo managers in Zimbabwe had 
worked in Zambia and they endeavoured to prevent a similar takeover in 
Zimbabwe after independence. To achieve this Anglo was presented as "a 
good corporate citizen", earning valuable foreign currency, making capital 
investments, and employing and training many workers. Similarly, the 
company was presented as a "responsible employer" which eschewed racist 
or authoritarian management practices. Hence strong commitment was 
given to bureaucratic systems as a means to avoid these practices, and as 
a defence against allegations of discrimination and unfairness. Following 
Schein (1985), it can be seen that bureaucracy was highly valued at Anglo 
as a strategy for coping with the problem of possible nationalisation. 
Bureaucratic procedures have now become a part of the fabric of Anglo 
American. 
The values of the founder of AAC of South Africa, Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, 
and his successors (e.g., his son, Harry, and Gavin Relly) have also 
contributed to Anglo's bureaucratic culture. Ernest prided himself in carrying 
on Cecil Rhodes' philosophy of "equal rights for all civilised men" (Hocking 
1973). Both Ernest and Harry were members of the South African 
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parliament who were opposed to apartheid, and successive chief executives 
of Anglo and De Beers continue to speak against apartheid and racism 
(Relly 1983, 1985; Ogiivie Thompson 1985). They espoused equal 
opportunity and this provides support for non-discriminatory bureaucratic 
procedures. Relly points out that Harry Oppenheimer was "[n]o wide-eyed 
liberal idealist"; he was not in favour of a "one-man one-vote system in a 
unitary form of government" (1983: 47-8). Anglo leaders campaigned for 
gradual change and group companies donated funds to, for instance, 
housing and education projects for blacks, and endowed a university Chair 
in Human Rights (Ogiivie Thompson 1988). The guiding principle among 
Anglo leaders was, as Ernest Oppenheimer stated, "enlightened self-interest" 
(Hocking 1973: 327). 
In South Africa Anglo's corporate industrial relations personnel argued that 
Afrikaner mining houses saw Anglo as too "liberal" and too willing to 
concede pay increases and improvements in conditions of service 
(Interviews January 1985). Anglo has a reputation for being a more 
enlightened employer than the Afrikaner mining houses (Innes 1984: 15), 
and yet there is much evidence which contradicts this liberal image. Critical 
reports state that, as with other mining companies, Anglo relies on migrant 
labour, job reservation and the compound control system: "mine security 
operate like private armies, armed with dogs, hippo armoured cars, rubber 
bullets, tear gas and shot-guns" (von Holdt 1989: 83). Anglo dismissed at 
least 27.000 workers in an effort to break the 1987 miners' strike {Herald 
29/8/87; Markham and Mothibeli 1987). 
One explanation for this contradiction within Anglo is that the "liberal" 
policies are merely a public relations exercise to delude workers and the 
public, and that fundamentally Anglo depends upon the exploitation of 
workers (von Holdt 1989; Johnstone 1976). Public relations is a factor in 
Anglo policies and the company is driven by imperatives of production; yet 
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two points need to be made. Workers derive benefits from employee and 
community projects no matter what the motivations are, and, more 
significantly, this contradiction is explained equally well in terms of internal 
differentiation within Anglo American. Personnel departments and general or 
corporate management by the nature of their roles are more likely to be 
concerned with the community image of the corporation than is the case for 
line management which is more preoccupied with production. Members of 
Anglo's corporate Industrial Relations Department indicated that they 
endeavoured to accommodate workers' demands wherever possible, and this 
meant that they were more sympathetic to workers than were line 
management and government apartheid policy (Interviews January 1985). 
This chapter on Anglo in Zimbabwe provides evidence to support a similar 
view. Personnel staff were generally more concerned than line managers to 
create a cooperative relationship with workers and their representatives, and 
some staff of general management adopted a similar approach. Company 
labour policies can therefore be seen as involving debate among 
departments, and critics who present corporations as monolithic neglect 
these important internal differences. 
Conclusion 
Multinational corporations have frequently been criticised at the economic 
and political levels for exploiting Third World countries in general (e.g., 
Barnett and MUller 1975) and Southern African countries and Zimbabwe in 
particular (Chimombe 1986; Ndlela et al 1986; Samoff 1978; Seidman 1977). 
This exploitation is perceived to include extracting resources and surplus 
value without developing industry, transfer pricing and undercutting state 
autonomy (Seidman and Seidman 1986; Stoneman 1988, 1986). 
Multinational corporations have also been criticised in relation to their labour 
practices (Seidman Makgetia 1980), and the Anglo American Corporation 
has been the object of specific criticisms including the "undermining" of the 
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mineworkers' union and repression of workers' protests and strikes in South 
Africa (von Holdt 1989: 85). Anglo is also specifically referred to in 
criticisms of "capitalist stratagems" in agriculture in Zimbabwe for the 
"circumvention by capital of post-1980 legislation to protect workers" 
(Sachikonye 1987: 81). These criticisms provide only part of the picture. It 
has been shown this chapter that Anglo was actively seeking to reform 
labour relations and, compared to companies such as General Industries, 
Anglo American had more progressive personnel and labour relations 
policies and procedures. 
Labour relations in Anglo American companies in Zimbabwe were gradually 
placed on a relatively cooperative basis. Conflicts between workers and 
management persisted but these were far less bitter than was the situation 
in Anglo companies at independence, and the continuing hostility at General 
Industries. The implementation of bureaucratic labour relations systems, and 
the commitment of personnel and general management helped to curb the 
authoritarian and racist practices of white employees. These systems were 
not totally beneficial for workers - for example the job evaluation method 
was a cause of dissatisfaction - but overall workers benefited from the 
attenuation of authoritarian management practices. The promotion of blacks 
to personnel management positions meant that workers were seen as having 
legitimate grievances and they were treated with greater respect. Thus this 
was not simply window-dressing, as some commentators allege (Raftopolous 
et al 1987). Personnel and general management frequently played a 
positive role in promoting more cooperative work relations, and their distinct 
role therefore needs to be appreciated. 
In the group companies Anglo's culture was characterised by two conflicting 
features: the abrasiveness of Rhodesian whites, especially toward black 
workers, and company policies to curb this management approach by 
implementing bureaucratic personnel systems. At the corporate level 
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bureaucratic procedures were highly valued as measures that assist the 
company to overcome problems relating to a negative public image and 
possible nationalisation. The "enlightened" values of the founder and 
successive leaders of Anglo American also contribute to the corporation's 
commitment to curb racial management practices. 
Compared to General Industries, Anglo was more responsive to pressures 
from workers and government to reform their labour relations practices. A 
major difference between General Industries and the four Anglo companies 
is that General Industries produced mainly for the domestic market which 
was fairly stable and oligopolistically controlled, whereas the Anglo 
companies were far more reliant on exports to a competitive and at times 
erratic international market. This, however, could work both ways: it could 
provide impetus for harmonious labour relations for efficient production, or 
alternatively it could create pressures for more intense labour utilisation and 
a harsh labour relations regime. 
Factors other than market competition might contribute to a better 
understanding of the variation in management practices between General 
Industries and Anglo American. Unlike General Industries, Anglo American 
had transformed from a family company to a more bureaucratic organisation. 
The size and diversity of Anglo companies meant that operations could not 
be overseen by one person, as the Chief Executive of General Industries 
attempted to do. Bureaucratic rules and procedures were established at 
Anglo in order to manage an organisation of such size and diversity. In 
addition, Anglo's management culture was conducive to adopting 
bureaucratic procedures to attenuate the racist attitudes of some managers, 
and protect the corporation from government intervention and public 
disgrace. Thus Anglo's programme to reform labour relations was in part 
the result of the management culture to present the corporation as an 
enlightened employer. 
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Chapter 7 Dairy Marketing Board 
We welcome you to carry out this study. We might benefit from it, and we have 
nothing to hide. 
Kumbirai Katsande, General Manager, Dairy Marketing Board, September 1984. 
Everywhere in the city, honest men begged for honest work in vain .... But the 
men of Don Corleone walked the streets with their heads held high .... With no 
fear of losing their jobs. And even Don Corleone, that most modest of men, 
could not he p feeling a sense of pride. He was taking care of his world, his 
people. 
Puzo, The Godfather {1969). 
Introduction 
The case of the Dairy Marketing Board exemplifies that the advent of 
independence and the Mugabe Government's labour policies had a major 
impact on labour relations in some enterprises in Zimbabwe. Before 
independence management practices and attitudes were typical of colonial 
enterprises; white managers ruled black workers with a mixture of racism 
and paternalism. Managers did not feel compelled or obliged to react to 
workers' grievances. After independence there was hostility between 
workers and management as workers sought to have their pent up 
grievances met. Over time cooperative relations were established between 
workers and management. Workers' demands were recognised as being 
legitimate, and management genuinely took workers' views into account. 
Structures were established to enable workers' representatives to negotiate 
labour relations policies from the shopfloor workers' committees through to 
the employment board for the dairy industry. Many whites refused to 
conform to the post-independent labour relations regime and left the Dairy 
Marketing Board, and this gave rise to rapid black advancement which 
facilitated the shift from racist management practices. In this chapter it is 
also seen that, contrary to views that workers' committees undermined trade 
unions (e.g., Nangati 1984a), at DMB workers' committees relentlessly 
endeavoured to strengthen union organisation. 
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7.1 Background to Labour Relations at Dairy Marketing Board 
The Dairy Marketing Board (DMB or Dairibord) was a statutory authority 
established in 1952. It was virtually the monopoly purchaser of milk from 
dairy farmers and it was also the monopoly processor and supplier of most 
dairy products sold in Zimbabwe including fresh milk, longlife milk, butter, 
cheese, Lacto (a cultured milk product), cream, yoghurt and flavoured milk. 
It also produced and sold ice-cream and powdered milk, and sold fruit 
juices. Domestic market competition occurred with respect to these last 
mentioned products and butter (with margarine); although DMB was the sole 
supplier to private companies of the basic ingredients for ice-cream and milk 
powder. Over 95 percent of the dairy products sold in Zimbabwe were 
provided by DMB. Sales were overwhelmingly to the domestic market with 
limited exports (e.g., butter) to Southern African countries. In 1984 sales 
realised $71.5 million. The national workforce numbered approximately 
3,800 people in six dairies and 48 depots located throughout the country. 
Thus the organisation was quite large and played an important role in 
Zimbabwe's economy. 
As shown in Table 7.1, DMB operated at a deficit funded by government. 
The annual trading account deficit increased dramatically after independence, 
rising from 7% of sales in the year to June 1980 to over 50% of sales in 
each year from 1983. DMB managers stated that the Board did not 
operated at a loss; the deficit was the inevitable result of government pricing 
policy, and in particular its subsidy to consumers. Government set the price 
paid to producers and the price of products sold by the Board. A major 
factor in the deficit, then, was that the average prices paid to producers by 
DMB for milk increased from June 1980 to 1985 by 126%, while the price to 
consumers remained static from 1 July 1979 until a 50% increase in 
September 1983, and a 20% increase in November 1984. After 
independence the government decided gradually to remove the subsidies to 
parastatals and began raising consumer prices, though economic difficulties 
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interrupted this policy and deficits continued (Hawkins 1987). In addition, 
the Board was required to accept all milk and butterfat from registered 
producers, regardless of the demand for dairy products. In the mid-1980s 
there was a substantial surplus of milk and this contributed to the deficit. 
The consequence for labour relations was that funds were not available to 
meet workers' demands involving money. This situation was largely beyond 
management's control. 
Table 7.1 DMB Trading Deficit to Sales for Year to 30 June 1980 to 1985 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Sales ($m) 36.1 40.4 46.6 55.6 71.5 82.1 
Deficit ($m) 2.5 7.8 18.3 35.7 38.7 46.3 
Deficit/Sales % 7 19 39 64 54 56 
Source: DMB Annual Reports. 
There were many decision-making tiers above the six dairies (see Figure 
7.1). Each of the six regional managers of the dairies reported to the 
General Manager and other top managers at Head Office in Harare. They 
in turn reported to the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA), primarily 
through the Dairy Committee of the AMA. 
Figure 7.1 Authority Structure at DMB 
Cabinet Committee on Parastatals 
Minister of Agriculture 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Agricultural Marketing Authority 
AMA Dairy Committee 
General Manager DMB 
Regional Managers 
Harare Bulawayo Gweru Kadoma Mutare Chipinge 
Source: DMB records. 
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The AMA was established under the Ministry of Agriculture to coordinate 
supervision of DMB and three other agricultural marketing boards. An 
additional level of authority (not shown in Figure 7.1) was later introduced to 
oversee the functioning of all parastatals following a government inquiry into 
corruption and maladministration in parastatals (Smith Commission 1986a, 
1986b, 1987). 
All six dairies produce milk, and other products are also manufactured at 
various dairies. The milk delivered from farms was pasteurised, packaged 
and delivered, sales were made to retail outlets and through home 
deliveries. The manufacturing process was capital intensive; in January 
1985 at Harare Dairy 251 employees were in production while the majority 
were in sales and distribution (1,056), and in ancillary services (369). The 
main low-skill tasks in the factory involved, for example, can-tipping, loading 
and operating machines; in sales and distribution the main jobs were those 
of delivery, street sales (milk and ice-cream) and merchandising (e.g., 
visiting shops to ensure shelves are stocked). The plant and machinery at 
the dairies, except for Chipinge and the bulk milk collection facilities, were 
generally aged and frequently needed repair. In many cases machinery did 
not satisfactorily keep up with demand. 
At independence, virtually all managers and senior employees were white. 
There were two conditions of service: those for "established staff" which 
roughly meant skilled and senior employees, most of whom were white, and 
"non-established staff" who were invariably black. There was no industrial 
relations officer within the enterprise, nor was there any trade union of any 
significance, although some black Bulawayo workers joined a union 
federated to the United Food and Allied Workers' Union. There was no 
formal disciplinary code or grievance procedure, and record-keeping for black 
workers was sketchy at best. Workers' representatives did exist before 
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independence, but they were nominated by the personnel officer, a 
nnanagement representative, and employees' grievances were not adequately 
answered, and very few concessions were granted by management 
(Interview with former workers' committee chairman, October 1984). 
Industrial relations between black workers and white managers were 
probably no worse than in other companies; managers ruled with a mixture 
of paternalism and authoritarianism. Members of the workers' committee 
fondly recalled one white manager who disciplined workers l ike a father 
does"; for example, he might have given a first offender the choice between 
dismissal and a "clap" (i.e. a blow). 
In the absence of an effective voice for workers through trade unions, and in 
line with government policy, workers' committees were formed in 1980. In 
the early 1980s a volatile atmosphere characterised industrial relations at 
DMB and workers' committees were in the forefront of the confrontations. A 
strike took place at Harare Dairy in April 1980. The immediate issue was 
that workers were not to be paid overtime for working on May Day, though 
underlying this was discontent with pay, white managers' attitudes and 
general work conditions. Many white managers left DMB, but wages and 
basic conditions of employment did not improve as quickly as workers 
hoped. The two different conditions of service remained intact, although 
senior blacks now enjoyed the superior benefits in terms of pension, health 
and leave entitlements. Tensions built up as workers' calls for increased 
wages, improved conditions and an end to authoritarian management were 
not met. Workers were frustrated and a black manager was beaten up by 
workers at the Msasa Depot near Harare in August 1982. This involved the 
police and a court case ensued against the workers, including workers' 
committee representatives. The manager was transferred. The labour 
relations climate was fractious, and the workers' committee agitated strongly 
for demands to be met. They could not be accused of being vatengesi 
(sell-outs). 
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Harare Dairy managers state that workers remained "heated up" and 
"Bolshie" until the Salisbury United Omnibus Company strike in early 1982. 
The Belvedere Depot, which was the centre of the strike described in 
Chapter 3, was situated immediately across the road from Harare Dairy. 
DMB workers witnessed police using batons to load about 500 workers into 
police vans. This signal that the Government would no longer tolerate 
strikes had a powerful impact in dampening DMB workers' demands. It was 
clear that militant action would not be tolerated by the government, to whom 
workers had felt they could turn to support them against management. The 
prosecution of workers following the Msasa assault confirmed this and 
workers' claims became less sweeping, and instead focused on more 
immediate issues, those thought to be more achievable. With moderated 
demands, tension was reduced between management and workers and 
relations slowly became more amicable. Militancy declined though workers' 
committees still pushed for reforms, and labour relations procedures were 
gradually placed on an institutionalised basis. 
7.2 Personnel and Labour Relations at Dairy Marketing Board 
There were numerous aspects related to personnel and industrial relations 
procedures that were affected by the process of institutionalisation. These 
included worker representative bodies, disciplinary and grievance procedures, 
job grading and remuneration, training and promotion. Prior to 
independence the procedures and practices relating to these features were 
haphazard at best and non-existent or racially biased at worst. Over time 
personnel systems were developed and implemented to replace ad hoc or 
discriminatory practices. This was a process similar to that which took place 
at Anglo American companies, but at DMB the systems were less 
formalised. For example, unlike Anglo, no formal performance appraisal 
258 
system was adopted at DMB at least until 1985, and personnel record-
keeping was less comprehensive than at Anglo. 
As at Anglo, the Paterson Method of Job Evaluation was used. This was 
implemented in 1982 after a government decision that all agricultural 
parastatals use this method. There were constant appeals from workers for 
jobs to be regraded. Many workers and their representatives were 
perplexed by the Paterson Method and, as at Anglo, without specialised 
advice they were unable to formulate persuasive objections to the scheme 
as a whole. However, unlike at General Industries, DMB management 
agreed to regrading exercises and generally these were carried out mutual 
agreement. 
The disciplinary procedures at DMB were similar to those at Anglo though 
cases were handled more amicably at DMB. There was a strong emphasis 
on reaching consensus, and generally DMB administered discipline quite 
leniently. In many disciplinary hearings the head of department was 
extremely loathe to dismiss even where clear grounds existed under the 
code of conduct (Observation). This was in keeping with management's 
policy to act as an enlightened employer. Another factor was that the 
Ministry of Labour had a marked influence on the outcome of disciplinary 
cases. As noted in Chapter 2, writers such as Cheater (1986), Ladley and 
Lan (1985) and Nangati (1984b) describe Ministry of Labour officials as 
favouring employers. At DMB there was a wealth of evidence to the 
contrary. Many applications for dismissal were rejected by the Ministry and, 
as a result of these precedents, hearing committees frequently decided not 
to dismiss on the basis that the Ministry of Labour would probably reject the 
application. In the Msasa assault case mentioned earlier the Ministry of 
Labour ordered the reinstatement of the workers' committee chairman even 
after the General Manager had argued strongly for his dismissal and had 
sought support for the dismissal from the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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One case indicates the extent to which leniency was granted to workers. A 
boiler attendant had an appalling record of lateness and absenteeism. His 
excuse for lateness was that he slept in and missed the bus, and when 
DMB applied to dismiss him the Ministry of Labour requested that the 
employee be given an advance on his pay to buy an alarm-clock. And DMB 
did! He continued to receive many verbal and written warnings over a two-
year period, and was transferred to three different departments. He was 
subsequently late by two hours on two days just after he received a final 
warning, and even his fellow workers were complaining about him. DMB 
again filed for his dismissal and finally, seeing the weight of evidence 
against him, the employee resigned. 
In contrast with the situation at General Industries, DMB workers' committee 
representatives strongly defended accused workers. In a case very similar 
to one that occurred at General Industries a clerk with six years of 
unblemished service was apprehended trying to steal milk valued at 48 
cents. The code of conduct stated that theft entailed dismissal but, unlike 
their counterparts at General Industries, workers' committee members 
staunchly defended the employee for over an hour, and the head of 
department was sympathetic to their case. The hearing committee was 
unable to reach a decision, and the workers' committee successfully 
appealed to the Regional Manager for the employee's retention. Workers at 
DMB felt that discipline was generally carried out fairly. Senior employees, 
and not just workers, were subject to dismissal; in one case a white 
transport controller was dismissed for misusing Board property. 
Training was extensive at DMB and black advancement had taken place 
rapidly; much faster than at Anglo American. By 1984 most managerial and 
senior positions were held by blacks. Ten of the 13 senior head office 
positions were held by blacks, including that of the General Manager, and 3 
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of the 6 regional managers were black. At Harare Dairy 6 of the 14 senior 
positions were held by blacks in late 1984, increasing to 8 by mid-1985, 
including the post of Regional Manager. A major reason for the departure 
of whites was their racial views, and another was the much higher pay 
levels in the private sector. The rate of promotions for black managers was 
exceptional. One example is that of the Harare Factory Manager who was 
appointed to this position just before the present research began in 1984. 
After about one year in each position he received the following promotions: 
Harare Production Manager, Kadoma Regional Manager and by 1987 Harare 
Regional Manager. This rapid advancement also applied to middle-level 
blacks; for example, at Harare Dairy the Secretary to the Sales Manager 
was successively promoted to Public Relations Officer, Administration Officer 
(with a budget of $1 million), and Urban Depot Controller, during the period 
1983 to 1985. 
This high rate of promotion was beneficial for employee morale, and was a 
major compensation for low managerial salaries at Dairibord. There were a 
number of problems associated with high turnover. Most serious was the 
promotion of inexperienced personnel into important managerial positions. 
Moreover, just as appointees were becoming accustomed to their jobs they 
were promoted again; as one manager put it: "Well, it's great to get it 
'another promotion] but my feet have only just touched the ground here, and 
I haven't had a chance to understudy ... [his superior]" (Interview 1985). 
DMB was fortunate in that most of its staff coped well under these hectic 
conditions. There were some cases where staff were considered not to 
have coped, and this resulted in some demoralising demotions. This issue 
was complicated since no formal performance appraisal was in operation at 
least until mid-1985. 
Another problem with rapid promotions was that high expectations were 
raised and senior staff tended to become frustrated as promotions slowed in 
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the later 1980s. The slowing down of promotions resulted in a decline in 
morale from the quite high level of motivation in earlier years. Nonetheless, 
morale among senior employees appeared to be in general positive. This 
rapid promotion, however, did not apply to low-level workers. Turnover there 
was very low and many low-skilled workers viewed the rise of the bright 
young blacks with a certain degree of wistfulness. This was similarly the 
case with some of the white senior employees who stayed at DMB during 
the mid-1980s. There were cases where older or more experienced whites 
felt passed over for promotion in favour of blacks, though whites continued 
to be promoted after independence; and some experienced rapid promotion. 
The general view remained, though, that blacks were favoured for 
advancement. This form of affirmative action was to be expected given the 
historical changes in Zimbabwe, government policy and the fact that DMB is 
a parastatal. While rapid promotion had its costs, it was unavoidable due to 
the high turnover, especially of white managers. It was also desirable in 
terms of placing blacks into managerial positions in this key national 
enterprise. 
Apart from Cheater's (1986) study no case studies have been published on 
workers' committees in Zimbabwe. The views that have been expressed in 
the literature, as seen in Chapter 2, are critical of these bodies in terms of 
undermining trade unions and failing to provide worker participation in 
management decision-making (Cheater 1988, 1986; Nangati 1984a). 
Evidence presented here shows how workers' committees operate at DMB. 
It is argued that they played a constructive role in representing workers and 
in trying to organise workers into a viable trade union. 
At Harare Dairy there were thirty members of the central workers' 
committee, one from each department and nearby depots. They elected six 
members to negotiate with management on the works council, including the 
chairman and secretary. Since there was no certified trade union each of 
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the workers' committees at the six dairies elected a member to a national 
committee to represent workers at the employment board for the dairy 
industry. Prior to the meetings of the employment board the same 
management and worker representatives held "Domestic Employment Board 
Meetings" to negotiate as many issues as they could before the formal 
employment board convened. In addition, about three times per year DMB 
provided the national employee representatives with facilities to meet and 
prepare for negotiations with national management (see Figure 7.2). 
Training for labour negotiations had been provided to workers' committee 
representatives at Silveira House, a respected Catholic-funded organisation 
that had long promoted the development of black Zimbabweans. 
Figure 7.2 Structure of Worker Representation at DMB 
Employment Board 
Domestic Employment Board Meeting 
National Employee Representatives Meeting 
Workers' Committee Chairmen + Harare Secretary 
Kadoma Mutare Gweru Harare Bulawayo Chipinge 
Harare Works Council 
Workers & Management 
4 management 
4 workers 
Centra! Workers' Committee 
Workers Only 
30 members 
Dairy Work Force 
Source: Interviews with DMB staff. 
At the dairy level workers' committees and works councils primarily dealt 
with day-to-day labour relations issues such as work scheduling, job grading 
and canteen issues. There was also some interest in the functioning of the 
enterprise such as promoting products that have greater return for DMB, and 
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questioning of appointment procedures following the embezzlement of funds 
by a recently appointed accountant. Executive members exhorted workers' 
committee representatives to encourage honest work and deprecate 
absenteeism and laziness. The achievements through these bodies tended 
to be piece-meal, like having pay-day a few days earlier in the month or 
having specific jobs regraded. At the national level workers' committee 
representatives obtained broader benefits such as requiring the consultation 
of workers' committee representatives before the dismissal of workers (this 
was in May 1981, before the promulgation in November 1981 of the 
dismissal regulations), the formulation and review of the job evaluation 
scheme and code of conduct, the introduction of shift allowances, increases 
in vacation leave, bonuses and long-sen/ice leave, and the provision of a 
basic wage for ice-cream vendors who sell on commission. Workers' 
committee representatives also negotiated general pay increases at 
employment board level (see below). 
Many demands of workers were not met by management; these included 
calls for massive wage increases (e.g., 30 to 60 percent) and the unification 
of the conditions of service between established and non-established staff. 
This division was a legacy of colonialism under which the conditions of 
service for salaried staff (mostly whites) were regulated by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and wage-earners came under the Ministry of Labour. 
Established staff enjoyed superior conditions of service (e.g., shorter working 
week, longer vacation leave). This division continued at least until 1988 
despite persistent strong calls from workers for unification. Management 
correctly argued that this was a government decision and workers' had to 
put their case to the AMA. This they did and the AMA in turn maintained it 
was a ministerial, indeed cabinet, decision. This "buck passing" was largely 
an accurate reflection of the extensive decision-making layers controlling 
DMB; however, it was also a convenient means for higher authorities to 
avoid a difficult issue. DMB management was committed to maintaining 
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differential rewards, and resisted moves from workers' committees to 
challenge this. Furthermore, the large deficits sustained by DMB led 
management and government authorities to minimise wages, allowances and 
other costs so workers' requests that involved increased expenditure 
generally met with strong opposition. At times the atmosphere in meetings 
was very charged as workers became frustrated with management's 
unwillingness to agree to their proposals. In general, though, workers and 
their representatives recognised these constraints, and management 
generally endeavoured to meet workers' demands where this was possible. 
Workers were cheered by their periodic successes and management 
attempted to maintain a constructive relationship with workers' committee 
representatives. 
Contrary to the view that workers' committees undermine trade unions, at 
DMB the workers' committees worked hard to strengthen union organisation. 
Two rival unions existed in the dairy industry, both of which were 
unregistered. A few hundred Bulawayo workers belonged to a union 
federated to the well-established United Food and Allied Workers' Union 
(UFAWU) based in Bulawayo, and several hundred Harare workers were 
members of the Dairy Industry Workers' Union (DIWU) which was allied to 
the Harare-based Food Oil and Edibles Industry Workers' Union (FOEIWU). 
The Harare dairy union was virtually operated by one man, the 
Secretary-General, R. Marufu. He was aligned with Alfred Makwarimba, the 
leader of the corrupt pro-ZANU(PF) ZCTU clique, and DMB workers 
supported Marufu on the basis of his association with ZANLA ex-combatants 
and ZANU(PF). 
Marufu's DIWU consisted only of Harare Dairy workers and had 461 
members as at 28 February 1983. By February 1984 this number had 
doubled, but his FOEIWU federation had virtually disintegrated. In an 
inflated claim, Marufu stated that in 1983-84 his federation had 15,000 
265 
members and 9 full-time organisers in various industries apart from the dairy 
industry. However his one-time ally, Abisha Kupfuma (a ZCTU clique 
member), betrayed him and began drawing Marufu's staff and membership 
into his own fold so that Kupfuma could head both his own Catering and 
Hotel Workers' Union and the FOEIWU federation. By 1984, Marufu was 
reduced to the 900 DMB members and 444 members at the Grain Marketing 
Board. The union was poor. It worked out of a single room in offices 
shared by other poor ZANU(PF)-aligned unions such as Ndwana's 
agricultural union. The office furniture was even more scant than most other 
unions, and consisted of a desk, a chair, a bench and a filing cabinet. 
There was no telephone; the union shared one belonging to the other 
unions. There was no vehicle, and only one organiser made up the staff. 
The audited accounts for the DIWU for the year to 29 February 1984 are 
provided in Table 7.2. This union was the main income earner for Marufu's 
federation for 1983-84; at most the Grain Marketing Board dues added 
$2,700. 
Table 7.2 Audited Accounts of Dairy Industry Workers' Union 
for the Year Ended 29 February 1984 (in $) 
Income 
Subscriptions 5,199 
Expenditure 
Auditor's fees 75 
Motor vehicle expenses 157 
Post and telephone 156 
Rent 50 
Stationery 178 
Sundry expenses 3 
Transport 1,479 
Wages and allowances 2,936 
5,034 
Surplus 165 
Source: Auditor's report. 
The Ministry of Labour rejected an application for DIWU's registration since 
the policy was to have one union in each industry and the union was in 
competition with Nedziwe's unregistered Bulawayo-based dairy union. Hence 
neither union could represent dairy workers at employment council meetings. 
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Management did agree to Marufu attending the employment board meeting 
in 1983, and workers' committee representatives stated that he was helpful 
there. He also lobbied the Ministry of Labour to assist in obtaining the 
reinstatement of the suspended workers' committee chairman following the 
Msasa assault case. Apart from these two activities, the union did very little 
for DMB workers. This was understandable, given the union's lack of 
finances and other resources. The workers' committee continued to support 
the union, and gave its blessing to check-off payments, even though there 
was very little return for the workers' $5,000 dues per year. They argued 
that it was necessary to support the union in the hope it would eventually 
merge with the Bulawayo union and become registered. 
The DMB workers' committees were not a threat to union organisation; 
indeed, for years they pushed the two rival unions to merge and then be 
registered, without success. The two unions gave lip-sen/ice and very little 
else to amalgamation. In November 1984, the workers' committee members 
endeavoured to pressure the unions into unifying by threatening to withhold 
union dues. Marufu had recently been released from hospital suffering from 
burnt legs as a result of an accident, and under considerable pain walked 
from his office to Harare Dairy, about 3 kilometres, because he had no 
money for transport. He persuaded the workers' committee leaders to give 
him more time to amalgamate and they agreed. But long after recovering 
from his injuries, still no progress was made, and the Harare union remained 
in a parlous state. In early 1985 the workers' committees decided to hold 
the workers' union dues in trust until a merger was achieved. When this did 
not eventuate the workers' committees formed a new union which was 
registered in October 1985, and was affiliated to the UFAWU. During this 
long process, workers' committees carried out the functions of trade unions. 
One of these functions was wage negotiation. Nominal and real monthly 
minimum wages at DMB were above the statutory industrial minima during 
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the period 1980 to 1985 (see Table 7.3). In real terms the statutory 
minimum rose slightly ($1.55) during this period and the DMB minimum fell 
slightly ($4.06). (Although the 1985 DMB real wages ($87.15) remained 
above the 1979 real wages ($76.93 in 1980 prices)). Wages at DMB were 
lower than at General Industries throughout this period, though the 
differential declined considerably, from $17.04 down to $4.84 in real terms. 
Workers' committee representatives fought hard to obtain wage increases, 
but government wage policy had greater impact on wage rates, as will be 
seen. At the April 1985 Domestic Employment Board meeting, for example, 
a lengthy and at times heated debate resulted in an agreed 10 percent 
increase (which was slightly above the maximum management had agreed 
in caucus before the meeting), and this was merely subsumed within the 15 
percent statutory increase of July 1985. 
Table 7.3 Nominal and Reaf Minimum Wage (in $) for DMB, General Industries 
and Industrial Minimum July 1980-1985 
Date DMB General Industries Industrial Minimum 
Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real 
1980 91.21 91.21 108.25 108.25 70.00 70.00 
1981 104.90 92.75 121.90 107.78 85.00 75.15 
1982 125.00 99.84 134.09 107.10 105.00 83.87 
1983' 135.00 87.61 144.09 93.50 115.00 74.63 
1984 152.25 82.21 160.00 86.39 125.00 67.49 
1985 175.09 87.15 184.80 91.99 143.75 71.55 
Sources: DMB and General Industries records, various statutory instruments (see Table 
4.1) and CSO, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, December 1987. 
Mn 1980 prices. 
^For September. 
The salary levels for skilled and senior staff at DMB and other parastatals 
were considerably below those paid in private sector companies. In 1984-
85, for example, the Harare Regional Manager received $1,823.75 per 
month while the average salary for that job grade in a national survey was 
$2,258, or 24 percent higher. Consequently, there was high turnover among 
artisans, engineers, accountants and managerial staff, and DMB had 
difficulty attracting and retaining talented personnel in these areas. 
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Relations between workers and management were strained on several 
issues. One management decision that riled workers related to a housing 
scheme in which DMB assisted many of its low-income employees to 
purchase a house by acting as guarantor. Many of the houses were not 
satisfactorily completed by the private contractors, and workers wanted to 
withhold final payment until corrections were made. In order to comply with 
their contractual obligations and maintain DMB's respectability, the decision 
from Head Office was to make the payment and recoup this from workers. 
Management attempted to mollify workers by granting a four-month interest-
free repayment period, after which interest would be 12.5%. But the 
memorandum from Head Office announcing this aggravated the ill-feeling 
when workers realised the 12.5% interest was for a period of six months, 
yielding a rate of 25% per annum. Conflict also ensued when the Bulawayo 
workers' committee chairman was suspended and then transferred to a rural 
depot. This case was handled by the Ministry of Labour and was 
unresolved at the end of the research period, and it was not clear who was 
at fault. But national workers' committee members strongly objected to his 
suspension without their being informed of the circumstances. 
Workers' committee members have also at times prejudiced the working 
relationship with management. A prominent case in this regard was the 
assault of the Msasa depot manager. The Harare workers' committee 
chairman gave conflicting evidence to the police and the court, and 
management believed him to be involved in the assault. His conduct 
strained worker and management relations, and only gradually were trust 
and cooperation developed. In general this was achieved. Both parties 
pursued their own interests vigorously, but in so doing they endeavoured to 
the retain the good will of the other. 
It would be incorrect to argue that DMB workers' representatives have been 
co-opted into compliance. The co-optation argument might be summarised 
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as follows. Institutionalised procedures like the code of discipline locked 
workers into the management system and removed their militancy. National 
employee representatives were accommodated in hotels three times per year 
to buy them off; and two of the most articulate workers' committees 
chairmen were promoted to be industrial relations officers within DMB in 
order to quieten them. This line of argument is not convincing. The formal 
procedures were a substantial improvement on the previous arbitrary and 
discriminatory practices. The intensity with which workers representatives 
debated when bargaining with management also belies the co-optation 
thesis. The promotion of the two workers' committee chairmen did not 
quieten the next vociferous chairmen, and the workers' committee members 
strongly supported these appointments because they then had sympathetic 
officers with whom to deal. Furthermore, the election results in which a high 
proportion of the workers' committee incumbents were returned indicated that 
the workforce in general did not regard the workers' committee as vatengesi. 
7.3 Organisational Culture: A Luta Continua 
The physical setting of DMB premises needs to be differentiated in terms of 
head office and the 6 dairies. The head office is located in the Harare 
business centre in an unassuming, but pleasant building, while the dairies 
are located in the industrial sites. The plant, buildings and machinery at the 
dairies were quite old and were deteriorating (though this is not the case 
with the new Chipinge Dairy and the bulk milk facilities and tankers). Quite 
strong and conscious efforts were made to keep the facilities looking neat 
and clean, and the Board's bright colour scheme of light and royal blue on a 
white background helped, to present a clean and hygienic image to the 
public. The organisation's motto was "Dairibord Nourishes the Nation", and 
its logo had encircled figures of a man, a woman and two children 
symbolising the family, togetherness and goodness. 
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Relationships were friendly, but business-like. First names were used widely 
or, more in keeping with black Zimbabwean culture, surnames were often 
used without the prefix "Mr". The General Manager, Kumbirai Katsande, 
was widely referred to as "KK" (as is the Zambian President Kenneth 
Kaunda). Reporting relationships were consciously clarified in the mid-1980s 
and there was a pervasive sentiment and constant explicit reference to 
managing "scientifically" and "professionally", and moving away from "ad 
hocery" and colonialism. The former General Manager, Eddie Cross, and 
Katsande did much to achieve this. Katsande was an energetic manager 
with a degree in food technology and he was continuing his postgraduate 
education in business management. His management style emphasised 
technical and professional competence and this had a considerable impact 
on organisation members. This was cultivated through extensive training 
courses and was perpetuated by frequent reference to "new", "better" or 
"professional" management style in meetings. 
Company anecdotes and stories were not frequently told, though reference 
was occasionally made to "tough old managers who knew how to get things 
done", and glorious failures. One famous story was the commissioning of 
the bottle-washing machine in the early 1950s, described later by the former 
General Manager, S. H. Webster, in these words: 
Guests were invited to the opening of the new factory and the 
highlight was the switching on of the bottle-washing machine. When 
the time came and the switch was pressed, the machine started off 
and the vibration and weight caused it to sink into the floor as the 
foundations were faulty .... That was a terrible time (Quoted in 
Arnold 1983: 3-4). 
Other machinery such as the butter-wrapper and the stick-line iced-
confectionery maker were also notorious: the butter-wrapper kept placing 
the labels half-way around the block of butter; and the stick-line machine 
managed to produce about 3 or 4 saleable products out of 7 on each cycle. 
Various epithets were used to describe many of these old machines and 
equipment at Harare and elsewhere as "worn-out", "antiquated", and 
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"museum-pieces". But a core value at Dairibord was to carry on in the face 
of adversity. This value was clearly demonstrated in the case of the butter-
wrapper. After spending yet another day or two trying to overhaul the aged 
contraption, the engineers stood by hopelessly watching the girl on the label 
still being wrapped half-way around the side of the block of butter. New 
parts were needed; indeed a new machine was needed, but unavailable. 
After lamenting for some time, one of them remembered an abandoned 
butter-wrapping machine from the old dairy at another site, so off they went 
to "cannibalise" the old machine to keep their present b^te noir working. 
In the early years Dairibord was an organisation that "could be laughed at 
because it made so many mistakes", but "[t]here was tremendous esprit de 
corps and camaraderie among the staff in those days" (Arnold 1983: 10 
quoting former General Manager Webster). This same duality characterised 
DMB after independence and with a black management team. In the early 
1980s, dairy supplies were well below demand, by the mid-1980s a 
combination of external factors led to an over-supply of milk, so DMB had to 
strive to find markets for its produce and to keep the antiquated machinery 
producing. So the spirit of "battling-on" or a luta continua (i.e. "the struggle 
continues") remained a key value in DMB's culture. A luta continua is a 
revolutionary slogan derived from the Mozambican liberation movement, and 
was widely used in the Zimbabwean nationalist movement. More recently in 
Zimbabwean usage it connoted the continuing, almost unwinnable struggle 
against intractable forces beyond one's control. Many employees, from 
managers to shopfloor workers, appeared to operate in accordance with this 
value at DMB, and it seemed sufficiently widespread to consider it a feature 
of an organisational culture and not merely part of a more narrow 
management culture. 
There was a marked degree of loyalty among Dairibord staff and this is not 
simply due to the organisation's being the only dairy manufacturer in the 
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country. Many staff members could fairly readily adapt to other food or 
drink producing companies. As numerous employees stated, DMB provided 
many black employees with training and promotions that they only dreamt of 
before independence; their prospects for career development were still good, 
they were "treated well" by their employer, and there was generally a 
friendly working atmosphere in the company. There was also something of 
a commitment to serving the nation by working for Dairibord. Employees did 
not see themselves as cadres sacrificing themselves for national 
development, but there was a sense of pride in contributing to the 
production of nutritious products for Zimbabwean consumers. 
Conclusion 
Labour relations at Dairy Marketing Board were conducted in a basically 
cooperative manner. The organisation was faced with severe constraints in 
terms of a lack of finance, and extensive decision-making layers through 
which government authorities placed controls over parastatals. For workers 
this meant that many of their claims involving funds were opposed, as were 
their requests for conditions of service that were not in conformity with those 
in other parastatals. Despite these constraints workers and management 
overcame the hostilities of the early 1980s and developed a constructive 
working relationship. To an extent this decline in hostilities was imposed by 
the government to prohibit strikes and other industrial action. However, 
conflicts were not simply repressed, there were many ways in which 
management and workers developed an understanding of the other's 
position. Personnel and labour relations systems such as those for job 
evaluation and discipline were introduced and managed fairly, and rapid 
black advancement took place. Employee development and promotions 
were an important compensating factor to the low pay levels at DMB 
compared to private sector companies. Workers' committees played a major 
role in improving relations between workers and management, and at the 
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same time they vigorously pursued workers' interests. Contrary to some 
accounts (e.g., Nangati 1984a) workers' committees at DMB, like those at 
Zimbabwe Alloys, endeavoured to strengthen trade union organisation, and 
eventually formed their own union affiliated to an existing union federation. 
Wages at DMB were lower than at General Industries (and indeed many 
other private companies), but whereas labour relations at General Industries 
were parlous, at DMB there was much greater cooperation. In large part 
this was due to management's willingness to accommodate workers on 
issues where this was possible. Management showed trust and reasoned 
with workers' committee members rather than relying on autocratic rule. A 
culture developed at DMB that enveloped many employees from the 
shopfloor to top management, and in this culture making do in the face of 
adversity was highly valued. This value was shared by many employees 
throughout Dairy Marketing Board, and not simply a part of management's 
culture. However, a unitary culture did not develop, since workers' values 
did not become inseparable from those of management. Fundamental 
differences remained fundamental between the two parties, and workers 
were certainly not prepared to forego the pursuit of their interests in favour 
of organisational goals. Workers and management were able to establish a 
modus vivendi to balance the interests of the organisation and the workers. 
Government policy to reform labour relations was facilitated at Dairy 
Marketing Board by its status as a public enterprise. The government 
appointed senior managers, and they were answerable to government for 
the manner in which they managed the enterprise. Managers were 
conscious of their position in a parastatal and felt obliged to conform to 
government labour policy by genuinely dealing with workers' grievances. But 
DMB was not sui generis. Prominent enterprises such as Anglo American 
and Standard Chartered Bank (see Chapter 3), also undertook programmes 
to reform labour relations. The advent of independence and the Mugabe 
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Government's labour policies to improve the position of workers provided the 
major impetus for this reform. 
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Conclusion 
The central thesis of this study is that the government's corporatist labour 
strategy has had a major impact on national labour relations in Zimbabwe. 
This view differs from interpretations of labour relations in Zimbabwe 
provided in the literature. Most accounts suggest that the Mugabe 
Government acted on behalf of capital to repress strikes, control trade 
unions and regulate labour relations to the benefit of employers. My view is 
that government attempted to benefit workers but its policies also took into 
account goals for national economic growth. Government labour policy also 
had an impact on labour relations within organisations. In some enterprises 
(e.g., Dairy Marketing Board) management policies and practices were 
radically transformed in a remarkably short period of time. The reform 
process in other organisations (e.g., Anglo American Corporation) was less 
rapid; nonetheless, the advent of independence led to major changes in the 
conduct of labour relations. Many private sector companies (e.g.. General 
Industries Limited) have resisted pressures from government and workers to 
abandon colonial management practices. But the demands for change 
persist and there are indications that recalcitrant employers are being 
influenced to moderate racist and authoritarian management practices. 
In presenting this thesis the major developments in national labour relations 
in Zimbabwe since independence, together with three detailed case studies 
of labour relations, have been examined. The major developments at 
national level can be stated briefly. The Mugabe Government was elected 
on a platform to end discrimination and improve living standards of black 
workers. Widespread strikes occurred at independence, and the government 
effectively curtailed strikes using a combination of carrot and stick methods: 
promising to promote workers' interests and repressing strikes. The 
government ordered the incorporation of trade unions into a single officially-
sanctioned congress, the ZCTU, and the ZCTU leadership was captured by 
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ZANU(PF) and government supporters so that unions would assist in 
defending and enforcing government labour policy. The government also 
insisted that EMCOZ have a monopoly to represent employers on national 
labour relations matters. The election of the EMCOZ executive was not 
supervised by government; however, EMCOZ did appoint personnel who 
were considered able to facilitate a working relationship with government. In 
an effort to benefit workers, minimum wage laws were introduced. When 
dismissals and retrenchments took place as a result of minimum wages, 
poor economic conditions and unfair employer action, the government 
required employers to obtain ministerial approval to terminate employment. 
But minimum wages and the dismissal regulations worked in opposition to 
key government objectives to generate overall economic and employment 
growth. Consequently, real minimum wages generally remained static from 
1980 to 1987 and, despite the restrictions on dismissals, employment 
declined in some sectors. 
The Labour Relations Act was promulgated in 1985 to provide the legislative 
framework for labour relations. The government argued that this Act was 
designed to democratise labour relations and protect and advance workers' 
interests. The Act did include provisions that benefited workers: for 
example, the fundamental right to form unions and workers' committees; the 
requirement that employers bargain in good faith, collect union dues for 
registered unions and provide paid maternity leave; and the prohibition of 
discrimination and unfair labour practices. On the other hand, the Act 
weakened the position of workers vis-a-vis employers by virtually prohibiting 
strikes. Moreover, the essential purpose of the LRA was to provide 
extensive ministerial powers to regulate virtually all labour relations matters 
and to control the internal affairs (e.g., staffing and financial arrangements) 
of trade unions and employers' organisations. In practice, the government 
intervened more directly in the internal operations of trade unions than was 
the case for employers' associations. For example, government supervised 
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the internal operation of the ZCTU after corrupt leadership reduced the 
congress to a shambles. Employers' activities were also regulated by 
government since the administration of the LRA by labour relations officers 
restricted the manner in which employers managed labour relations. While 
labour relations officers were sometimes biased toward employers, in general 
they sought to protect workers from discrimination and unfair labour 
practices such as unfair dismissal and an employers' failure to comply with a 
negotiated agreement. 
The case studies deal with the conduct of labour relations within large 
enterprises in Zimbabwe. Some features were common to all enterprises in 
the study; in particular, there was a marked antagonism between workers 
and management at the time of independence, when strikes or other 
industrial action took place. Personnel and labour relations systems, 
especially for black workers, were not well developed at independence, and 
during the 1980s considerable attention was given to implementing and 
reforming personnel policies and procedures (e.g., job evaluation and 
grievance procedures) in these enterprises. In addition, workers' committees 
played a major role in representing workers in negotiations with 
management. The most striking feature about the enterprises in this study, 
however, is the differences among them, and in large part the differences 
resulted from their differing management cultures. 
At General Industries relations between workers and management were 
characterised by hostility. Management paid lip-service to reforming labour 
relations policies and procedures, and resisted black advancement. The 
management culture at General Industries was marked by white Rhodesian 
values of racial superiority and an authoritarian attitude toward black 
workers. 
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At Anglo American Corporation gradual black advancement and reform of 
labour relations was taking place. Much emphasis was placed on 
establishing bureaucratic systems to regulate labour relations so as to 
replace racist or arbitrary management practices. Anglo's management 
culture facilitated the shift from arbitrary to bureaucratic procedures in two 
ways. The founding family opposed racism and stressed values of equal 
opportunity, and Anglo's experience of nationalisation in Zambia taught Anglo 
managers that it was important to avoid a negative public image, and that 
bureaucratic procedures might assist in defending the company against 
allegations of racial discrimination. Nevertheless, some white managers 
within Anglo companies retained their racist or authoritarian attitudes. 
Consequently, there was a division within the management culture and this, 
along with the need to maintain efficient production, contributed to the 
gradual rather than rapid pace of black advancement and reform of labour 
relations. 
At the Dairy Marketing Board, by contrast, black advancement proceeded 
rapidly and management reformed labour relations with the active 
participation of workers' representatives. Major structural factors, such as 
the trading deficit and government controls over management decision-
making, constrained management's ability to meet workers' demands, but 
wherever possible management sought to accommodate workers' requests. 
Management and workers shared values of making the best of difficult 
circumstances, and they developed a good working relationship. 
In presenting this examination of labour relations in Zimbabwe, I have 
provided an integrated and more detailed account of developments than is 
available in the literature. While specific issues have attracted attention, 
such as the early strikes (Sachikonye 1986) and developments within the 
union movement (Wood 1987, 1988), I have provided a more comprehensive 
account of national labour relations, and included three detailed case studies 
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of labour relations in organisations. In addition, nnost commentaries have 
been made from a radical perspective and assume that employers are 
exploitative, and argue polemically that government actively assists in this 
exploitation (Callinicos 1981; Astrow 1983; Nangati 1984a and 1984b; 
Mitchell 1987). My interpretation of labour relations in Zimbabwe is based 
on a wider survey of the relevant evidence. The three case studies show 
that there is a great deal of diversity in the conduct of labour relations by 
employers. While some employers persist with colonial management 
practices (e.g., General Industries), other employers have gradually reformed 
labour practices (e.g., Anglo American), and in some instances rapid change 
has taken place (e.g., DMB). Government labour policy is more accurately 
seen as charting a course between promoting workers' interests and 
government's national development and political goals. Thus, for example, 
strikes were prohibited so that economic activity would not be disrupted, and 
unions were corporatised into a monopoly representative body and controlled 
so that they would support and assist in enforcing government labour 
policies. On the other hand, the government attempted to benefit workers 
by prohibiting discrimination, increasing workers' incomes through minimum 
wages, and protecting workers from unfair dismissal and other unfair labour 
practices. I now review the differences between my interpretations and 
other accounts in relation to the curtailment of the 1980-81 strikes, 
government and party control of the union movement, and the role of labour 
relations officers, workers' committees and tripartite institutional 
arrangements. 
Most commentators criticise government action to repress the early strikes 
(e.g., Callinicos 1981; Astrow 1983; Mitchell 1987). I argue instead that the 
prohibition of strikes is understandable in terms of the government's 
commitment to economic growth in order to finance its social development 
programmes, and its fears that strikes could lead to chaos and jeopardise 
the security of the fragile majority rule government. In relation to trade 
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unions, Herbst (1987) argues that the formation of the ZCTU from the 
competing union congresses was advantageous to workers; yet this 
assessment completely overlooks the process involved and the results of 
this corporatisation. The formation of the ZCTU involved the capturing of 
the union movement by ZANU(PF) and government supporters. Radical 
writers such as Sachikonye (1986) and Wood (1987) seem to accept the 
capture of the ZCTU as understandable, since the non-ZANU(PF) unions 
were compromised by their association with the internal settlement parties 
(led by Muzorewa and Sithole) and white trade unions. But the 
neutralisation of non-ZANU(PF) unions, by creating rival unions and ousting 
experienced unionists, weakened the labour movement and led to the 
establishment of a weak central congress. This congress avoided criticising 
government labour policy, and thus failed to represent workers. The ZCTU 
instead functioned to support and enforce government policies, as was 
demonstrated in the drafting of the Labour Relations Act, when union 
criticisms of the bill were suppressed by the ZCTU executive. In controlling 
trade unions, government policy was not simply a matter of finding a 
balance between workers' interests and development goals. The 
government also sought to deny any opportunity for political opposition to be 
expressed through trade unions. 
Where reference has been made in the literature to the role of labour 
relations officers, it has been to argue that they are biased toward 
employers (Nangati 1984b; Ladley and Lan 1985; Cheater 1986; Mitchell 
1987). Ladley and Lan (1985) and Cheater (1986) each base their criticism 
predominantly on a single incident in which a labour relations officer dealt 
with grievances from farm workers and textile workers respectively. Nangati 
(1984b) and Mitchell (1987) prefer to rely on guilt by association, and assert 
that since many LROs resign from the Ministry of Labour for jobs in the 
private sector, then they must be corrupt and biased toward employers. I 
have argued that this is only a partial view of the situation. There are cases 
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of corrupt labour officers, and many cases are decided in favour of 
employers. In addition, government policy is for LROs to discourage 
indiscipline among workers. Yet, from observations of the handling of 
numerous cases within the Ministry of Labour, the three organisations I 
studied, and from interviews with many employers and labour 
representatives, my view is that LROs frequently lean more often toward 
workers than toward employers. The case studies show that there are 
many instances in which labour relations officers have rejected employers' 
applications to dismiss workers. This reluctance to approve dismissal 
applications reached extraordinary levels at Dairy Marketing Board so that 
workers at times received very lenient treatment from LROs. At General 
Industries, too, dismissal applications were frequently rejected by the Ministry 
of Labour. On the other hand, the Ministry of Labour did not resolve the 
grievances of the General Industries' workers' committee relating to wage 
levels, job grading, and unfair discipline, and workers in the studies reported 
by Cheater (1986) and Ladley and Lan (1985) were similarly dissatisfied with 
the results after putting their grievances to the Ministry of Labour. 
It can be argued that the Ministry of Labour was more successful in its 
defensive role to protect workers from unfair dismissal, than it was in 
actively taking up workers' grievances and obliging employers' to reform their 
labour relations practices. In some cases, however, particularly in relation to 
racial discrimination, the Ministry of Labour did stimulate labour relations 
reform. At Standard Chartered Bank and other companies in the finance 
sector employment practices, such as job evaluation and promotion 
procedures, were reformed as a result of pressure from the Ministry of 
Labour (Chapter 3). The Ministry of Labour, then, charted a course between 
advancing workers' interests, and maintaining labour discipline under existing 
management practices so that production of goods and services would not 
be disrupted. 
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My findings from the three case studies differ from views in the literature on 
the role of workers' committees. Nangati (1984a) and Cheater (1986) 
assess workers' committees in terms of their performance as institutions to 
enable workers to participate in management decision-making. According to 
Nangati, since workers' committees do not challenge capitalist relations of 
production, they merely "serve as instruments for the exploitation of the 
worker" (1984a: v). Workers' committees are also criticised for usurping the 
role of trade unions as representatives of workers at plant level, thus 
fragmenting the labour movement. My view is that it is inappropriate to 
assess workers' committees as institutions for workers' participation in 
management decision-making since they were not designed for this purpose. 
Workers' committees were formed as industrial relations bodies. The 
experience from the three case studies is that workers' committees have 
been in conflict with trade unions when the union is well established at the 
plant. When a union is well organised at plant level then it can be argued 
that workers' committees are unnecessary or even divisive. But unions are 
generally poorly developed and only about 20% of Zimbabwe's formal sector 
workforce is unionised. 
Only two (Bindura Nickel and Wankie Colliery) of the six enterprises I 
studied had well organised, registered trade unions, and thus little need for 
workers' committees. In the other four enterprises the workers' committees 
played a positive role as representatives of labour on a wide range of 
issues, from shopfloor complaints to bargaining at industry level for wages 
and conditions of employment. In these four enterprises the workers' 
committees acted as spurs to the development of trade unions. Hippo 
Valley provided a minor exception in that the workers and the workers' 
committee strongly resisted joining the agriculture union. This resistance 
resulted from workers' reluctance to be classified under the low-paying 
agriculture award, and was not due to opposition to unionism per se. 
Indeed the Hippo Valley workers' committee endeavoured to form a union for 
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the sugar industry. The Dairy Marketing Board workers' committees strove 
hard to have the two rival union federations in the food industry merge so 
that they could be represented by a registered trade union. When this failed 
they formed and registered their own union affiliated to one of the existing 
federations. So while there may be grounds for disbanding workers' 
committees in plants which have a well developed registered union in 
operation, there is a continuing need for workers' committees in the majority 
of plants where this is not the case. 
Tripartite arrangements have also been the subject of criticism in the 
literature. Nangati (1984b) argues that the Retrenchment Committee 
operated in favour of employers. Nangati provides insufficient evidence to 
support this view, and I report evidence that suggests that the majority of 
retrenchment applications were not decided in favour of employers. Figures 
for 1987 and 1988 show that approval was given to employers to retrench 
less than 40% of those workers they applied to retrench. My obsen/ations 
of two Retrenchment Committee meetings in 1984, and interviews with 
employer and union members of the Retrenchment Committee, lead me to 
conclude that the committee only reluctantly allows retrenchments when 
alternatives such as reduced working hours have been tried or when no 
alternative is feasible. 
With respect to wage setting, Herbst (1987) argues that labour was at its 
strongest position during the wildcat strikes of 1980 and 1981, and that the 
institutionalisation of wage setting under the tripartite Wages and Salaries 
Advisory Board weakened the position of labour. According to Herbst, 
labour's position was weakened since formal negotiations require attributes 
which employers are more likely to possess such as bargaining skills and 
organisational unity (1987: 375). In fact, before the institutionalisation of 
wage setting, in 1986, real minimum wages declined from 1982 to 1985. 
Herbst correctly points out that EMCOZ evinced negotiating skills superior to 
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those of the ZCTU; however, more important than relative bargaining skills 
and tactics was government labour policy and the state of the economy. 
Government labour policy was to increase minimum wages, taking into 
consideration the capacity of employers' (including the state as an employer) 
to pay and the effects on unemployment. Wildcat strikes are a fragile 
means for labour to influence government labour policy, since government 
strongly opposes strike action and it would curtail strikes should they recur. 
It is by no means certain that labour can Increase its influence over wage 
policy, but its chances are better within the institutional framework. If 
bipartite negotiations at industry level were to re-emerge, then trade unions 
would have a more significant function to fulfil, and they might be able to 
attract greater membership and build stronger organisations. 
There are signs that government is accepting the need for greater industry-
level collective bargaining, and a reduced role for government regulation of 
national wage setting {Financial Gazette 14/7/89). For some time pressures 
have been developing for a move in this direction. Unlike the first ZCTU 
leadership, the ZCTU under the presidency of Jeffrey Mutandare criticised 
government wage policy as being too restrictive, and the government had 
come to bear the blame for depressed wages in the economy. A shift 
toward collective bargaining would allow the government to avoid some of 
these criticisms, if the nascent moves toward collective bargaining at 
industry level proceed, it is likely that trade unions will increase their 
membership and strengthen their organisations and bargaining power. 
Having briefly recapitulated the major developments in labour relations and 
set out how my interpretations differ from those in the literature, I offer an 
overall assessment of the government's policy as seeking to balance the 
advancement of workers' interests with its goals for national development. 
My view is that in broad terms the government's labour policy was an 
understandable and appropriate response to the situation it faced. However, 
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particular components within this broad policy can be criticised. The 
government endeavoured to support workers by increasing minimum wages 
and protecting workers from unfair dismissal, but these two policies had a 
negative impact on the investment climate and employment creation. 
Nonetheless, given workers' pent up demands for improved living standards 
and reform of labour relations (e.g., to end discrimination and allow workers 
a meaningful role in labour negotiations), it is difficult to see how an 
alternative policy could have succeeded unless it was based on open 
repression of workers and trade unions. It would have been untenable for 
the ZANU(PF) government to ignore completely workers' demands, and not 
endeavour to increase their wage levels. The party fought the liberation war 
and campaigned on the basis of improving incomes and life chances of 
Zimbabwe's peasants and workers. To renege on these goals on obtaining 
office would have undermined the legitimacy of the government, and 
workers' opposition would have had to be contained by force. In the 
politically fragile period after independence such a policy would have been 
fraught with dangers of internal violent conflict on a much larger scale than 
occurred in Matabeleland. Open violent conflict in the country would have 
been fuelled by South Africa,^ and the possibility of a military coup or a 
recommencement of the civil war could not be dismissed. 
By the same token, massive increases in wages and far-reaching policies to 
support workers, such as rapid black advancement through affirmative action 
or the introduction of Yugoslavian-style self-management giving workers 
ultimate control over management (Miller 1980), would have bankrupted 
many businesses, especially small enterprises, and discouraged private 
sector investment. Consequently, the government's objective of economic 
growth to finance its social development programmes would have been 
blighted. Similarly, the government could not allow widespread strikes to 
^Indeed South Africa has supported armed dissidents in Matabeleland 
(Martin and Johnson 1986). 
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continue in 1980 and 1981 as this hampered economic development and 
might have led to political insecurity. 
Within this acceptance of broad government policy, however, a number of 
cnticisms can be made. The first relates to the capture of the union 
movement by ZANU(PF) supporters, resulting in a sycophantic and corrupt 
union leadership which became discredited. The government defended its 
creation of the ZCTU as the monopoly union congress in terms of 
strengthening a divided labour movement, and this argument has plausibility. 
But the government went further to ensure that the ZCTU leadership was 
controlled by ZANU(PF) supporters who would support and assist in 
enforcing government policies. This political control, I have argued, is 
typical of African governments' attempts to prevent any potential source of 
political opposition from developing a power base (Gertzel 1975). How then 
do we explain the Mugabe Government's action to facilitate the replacement 
of the corrupt leadership it earlier installed? Did the government object to 
the ZCTU leadership because it was corrupt or did the government want a 
leadership that would build a viable and more effective union movement? 
The replacement of the capricious Minister of Labour, Kangai, by Shava, 
who took a more technocratic approach, needs to be noted. More 
importantly, in my view, the government did not want the union movement to 
constitute an autonomous centre of power in opposition to the government, 
but nor did it want an ineffective union movement. The government, in 
other words, acted to end corruption and also foster a ZCTU leadership 
which would more effectively represent workers. I accept that the 
government endeavoured to promote workers' interests, and when the ZCTU 
failed to fulfil this role and became a source of embarrassment to the 
government, then the government took steps to rejuvenate the congress. 
But the government still made it clear that the union movement should work 
in conjunction with and not in opposition to government. The ousting of 
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experienced non-ZANU(PF) trade unionists just after independence was thus 
detrimental to the government's policy of promoting workers' interests, since 
it resulted in a weak union congress that government felt the need to 
replace after 3 or 4 years of dismal performance. 
My second criticism is that the extensive ministerial powers in the Labour 
Relations Act, to regulate virtually all employment matters and control trade 
unions and employers' associations, were excessive and had detrimental 
consequences. At a normative level, these powers can be viewed as being 
in conflict with democratic values of freedom of association since they would 
enable a minister to exercise authoritarian control over the conduct of labour 
relations and labour relations actors. Yet the government asserted its 
commitment to democratise labour relations. In pragmatic terms, too, the 
control provisions are open to criticism since they were an obstacle to the 
ratification of major ILO conventions relating to freedom of association. The 
government's failure to ratify ILO conventions created a dispute between 
ZCTU President Mutandare and Minister Shava which weakened the 
government's argument that it championed workers' interests. 
A third major criticism of government labour policy relates to the prohibition 
of strikes. I have argued that it was necessary to prohibit strikes in the 
period immediately following independence, since this was a politically 
volatile period in which the security of majority rule government was far from 
assured. However, by late 1987 the Mugabe Government had strengthened 
itself against threats from whites in the country and, with the unity 
agreement between ZANU(PF) and ZAPU, the ZANU(PF)'s hold on 
government was virtually unchallenged, and the dissident problem in 
Matabeleland was contained. Under these circumstances occasional strikes 
would not pose a threat to political security, and therefore the government 
could afford to relax the restrictions on strikes. It could be argued that it is 
necessary to prohibit all strikes in order to prevent occasional or isolated 
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strikes from escalating into widespread wildcat strikes such as occurred in 
1980 and 1981. But wildcat strikes could remain prohibited and strikes 
could be limited by only permitting strikes to take place under the provisions 
of the Labour Relations Act. Given the tortuous procedures that have to be 
followed for a legal strike to be held, it is unlikely in the extreme that many 
strikes would occur, and it is very likely that the LRA provisions could be 
relaxed without resulting in a major outbreak of strike activity. 
I have argued that government labour policy in Zimbabwe is the outcome of 
balancing workers' interests with the government's goals for national 
development. The government considers that private sector investment is 
necessary for employment and economic growth; consequently government 
labour policy seeks a balance between workers' and employers' interests. 
The attempt to balance interests is very similar to labour policy in other 
African countries, and this similarity is remarkable since at independence 
ZANU(PF) espoused a more forthright commitment to "socialism", "Marxism" 
and "revolution" than did ruling parties in Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya. 
Zimbabwe also follows a pattern similar to that of other African countries 
with respect to controlling trade unions. Labour legislation restricted strikes 
and enabled union activities to be controlled, militant unionists were 
detained, and the government and party took steps to establish a single 
trade union congress and have one union in each industry. On the other 
hand, trade unions benefited from the check-off system for the collection of 
union dues, and minimum wage laws were established. In Ghana under 
Nkrumah, and in Tanzania, the trade union congress was virtually a wing of 
the ruling party (Ananaba 1979). In Tanzania at one time the minister of 
labour was also leader of the union congress (Lynd 1968). There was no 
formal relationship between the union movement and government or party in 
Zimbabwe, but under the first ZCTU leadership the congress was for all 
practical purposes a wing of government and ZANU(PF). Many unionists 
objected to this status and sought a position more independent from 
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government. The ZCTU President, Jeffrey Mutandare, was willing to criticise 
government labour policy, but this was cautious criticism and unions were 
careful to avoid any suggestion that they were politically opposed to 
government and ZANU(PF). 
My characterisation of labour relations in Zimbabwe as a corporatist labour 
strategy goes beyond the superficial level provided by writers on corporatism 
in Africa such as Shaw (1982) and Higgott (1985). They fail to elucidate the 
structures and processes which characterise corporatist strategy in specific 
African countries, and their conceptions of corporatism are weak. Higgott, 
for example, sees corporatism as a framework for political analysis and an 
economic system (1985: 26). I have provided a close analysis of the 
structures and processes of corporatist labour strategy in Zimbabwe. 
Corporatist structures have been discussed in relation to the government's 
establishment of monopoly representation for union and employer bodies, the 
tripartite bodies for labour policy formulation and implementation for wages 
and retrenchment. The government has established for itself extensive 
administrative and executive powers for the implementation and enforcement 
of state corporatist labour strategy. The Labour Relations Act establishes 
sweeping ministerial powers, and the Ministry of Labour provides an 
extensive administrative structure to implement and enforce labour policy. 
Close attention has been paid to the processes through which the 
monopolisation of trade union representation was established, and the 
operation of tripartite bodies and the Ministry of Labour. 
I have not adopted the approach taken by O'Donnell (1977), linking 
corporatist political strategies with phases of industrialisation. While 
Zimbabwe has, unlike many African countries, achieved import substituting 
industrialisation, this was achieved under colonialism, not under populist 
political regimes as O'Donnell found in Latin America. In addition, the post-
independence scene in Zimbabwe cannot be periodised in terms of populist 
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and authoritarian phases as in Latin America. The Mugabe Government has 
maintained a combination of populist and authoritarian measures throughout 
its term of office. Unions have been encouraged to participate in labour 
policy formulation through tripartite bodies, and workers were encouraged to 
participate in workplace labour relations through workers' committees. These 
inclusionary strategies are characteristic of populism, and the government's 
measures to control unions and detain militant unionists are typical of state 
corporatism. Deyo (1981) refers to Singapore's combination of policies to 
benefit labour and control unions to ensure smooth capital accumulation as 
paternalistic authoritarian corporatism. Despite the differences in political 
ideology between the ruling parties in Singapore and Zimbabwe, paternalistic 
state corporatism is an apt description of Zimbabwe. The extensive 
government controls over unions and labour relations mean that Zimbabwe 
tends toward state corporatism, but the policies aimed to benefit workers 
temper this authoritarianism with benevolence. 
Analysis of corporatism in this thesis is not based on phases of 
industrialisation. The approach has instead been to follow Schmitter (1974), 
Crouch (1984, 1985) and Cawson (1986) in identifying two key features 
which characterise corporatist arrangements: the monopolisation of interest 
representation and the participation of monopolistic bodies in enforcing public 
policy. Schmitter's approach over-emphasises structures. He sees 
corporatism as a "system" of interest representation (1974: 93), and his 
attempt to operationalise corporatism resulted in a static view of the 
structures of corporatism by focusing on union density and centralisation 
(Schmitter 1981). Like Crouch (1984), I see corporatism as a "strategy", 
and this emphasises the dynamic processes involved in corporatist 
arrangements. My approach has been to carry out a detailed examination of 
the development and operation of corporatist structures such as the role of 
government and party in establishing monopoly union representation, and the 
administration of labour policy by the Ministry of Labour. In doing so 1 have 
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avoided Schmitter's preoccupation with structures and have stressed the 
processes and relations between the state and trade unions. 
With respect to my approach to labour relations in organisations, I take a 
perspective which sees organisations as sites of conflict and control. 
Radical organisation theorists maintain that there is a fundamental conflict 
between workers and management and that management style and 
techniques to improve work relations (e.g., group dynamics) are of little 
consequence (Burawoy 1985; Clegg and Dunkerley 1980). Labour relations, 
however, are not influenced only by this underlying conflict. The degree of 
conflict between workers and management in different organisations varies 
immensely, and factors such as management culture, leadership and the 
role of personnel specialists can have a major influence on labour relations. 
At General Industries the colonial culture of management and the 
management style of the Chief Executive were major factors in the animosity 
and disputation between workers and management. At Anglo American the 
corporate culture and personnel staff had a substantial impact on labour 
relations by establishing and operating bureaucratic procedures so as to 
attenuate the influence of racist and authoritarian management practices. 
My conception goes beyond superficial treatments which suggest that culture 
is unitary and malleable (Peters and Waterman 1982; Deal and Kennedy 
1982). Workers at General Industries totally rejected management's colonial 
culture, and at Anglo American there was a clash of management cultures 
with many white line managers retaining a colonial management culture and 
many top managers, personnel staff and black managers adopting a 
reformist culture. 
Far from being malleable, culture is extremely difficult to change (Schein 
1985). The case of the Dairy Marketing Board shows that cultural change 
evolved over time with considerable conflict between workers and 
management along the way. Labour relations improved as a result of the 
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bona fide commitment of workers and management to develop an amicable 
working relationship. In the process, many white managers who could not 
accept the new management culture of working in conjunction with black 
workers departed from DMB. The development of an organisational culture 
and management style that responded to black workers' demands were key 
factors in improving labour relations at DMB, but underlying conflicts 
between management and workers persisted. As in all organisations, 
culture, management style and personnel policies can improve labour 
relations, but cannot eradicate the underlying conflicts between workers and 
management. 
The Mugabe Government's corporatist strategy in relation to trade unions 
and workers was similar to a patriarchal approach to the family. The aim 
was to work for the benefit of family members but in so doing the patriarch 
sometimes used dictatorial methods. Great emphasis was placed on unity 
within the family structure and dissent was not tolerated. Efforts were made 
to meet the immediate needs of members and protect them from external 
threats. Where possible the immediate position of members was improved, 
but sacrifices were required now so that in the longer term sustained 
benefits could be obtained. The goal was to work for the benefit of children 
and grandchildren. 
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